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Abstract 
Flood defences are economically important safety critical infrastructure systems that need ongoing 
monitoring and maintenance to ensure their integrity. The aim of the research described in this 
thesis was to develop new performance-based methodologies that will contribute to improved 
management of flood defence systems in England and Wales. Performance-based asset 
management is the process of managing assets in order to optimise their behaviour when evaluated 
" against specified objectives, economic or otherwise. 
It enables prioritisation and optimisation of - 
investment decisions. It is risk-based in that the costs of interventions can be weighed against their 
benefits. An initial study identified three key areas of performance-based management in need of 
improvement: quantitative risk assessment (QRA), probabilistic condition characterisation and 
decision-support. 
QRA provides very important information for performance-based asset management because it can 
capture the effect which the components of a complex system, individually or in combination, are 
expected to make to flood risk. However, until recently implementation of QRA in the UK has 
been inconsistent and limited.. Building on previous research a tiered approach to QRA is proposed 
that provides three stages of increasingly more detailed and accurate assessment to support a range 
of investment decisions. A high-level method, that has since been applied to estimate a national 
value of flood risk, is described fully and supported with a case study. 
A condition characterisation provides information on the structural performance of a flood defence. 
Probabilistic methods, whilst being directly compatible with risk-based decision-making have 
proved to be problematic to apply in practice because of the need for detailed measurements, which 
may be uneconomical, or indeed impossible to obtain. Available information may not be in a 
format that is directly applicable to a traditional probabilistic. analysis. A new method that can use 
vague or partial information in a probabilistic analysis to generate imprecise assessments of the 
conditional probability of failure of a flood defence is described. This is extended to demonstrate 
how changes in proneness to failure can be monitored using information from defence inspections 
and model analysis. 
A new approach to representing the performance of a flood defence systems is described. The 
system is represented hierarchically providing an overview of system performance as well as more 
detailed insights into the performance of specific assets. Performance of sub-systems, including 
those from a QRA and condition characterisation, is captured by a set of Performance Indicators 
held in a database. These indicators are projected through value functions reflecting organisational 
objectives and regulatory standards and are merged to generate a Figure of Merit for the system and 
each sub-system. Uncertainty in the available evidence is represented and propagated through the 
hierarchy, providing a commentary on sources and implications of uncertainty. A case study of a 
flood defence system surrounding a town demonstrates how the methodology provides insights into 
system performance and can be used to explore different asset management decisions. 
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Chaos 
umpire sits, 
And by decision more, 
embroils the fray, 
by which he reigns: next, 
him high arbiter, 
Chance governs all. 
(John Milton, Paradise Lost) 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Approximately 10% of the UK population and assets with a capital value of over £200 billion live 
in the 12,200km2 that is at risk from flooding by rivers and the sea (Purnell, 2002). These people 
and their property are protected by over 34,000km of flood defences. Flood defences are therefore 
economically important safety critical infrastructure systems and need ongoing monitoring and 
maintenance to ensure their integrity. This is no simple task as: 
0 the scale of the flood defence infrastructure system means there are a large number of system 
components in need of management, 
" interactions between system components is frequently poorly understood, 
" failure mechanisms of flood defences are complex and site specific due to the natural 
variability in loading and geotechnical conditions, 
" monitoring information is scarce and can be expensive to obtain, 
" information on system behaviour does not lend itself to being compressed into a single format 
as it is measured at different resolutions and appears in many formats from vague, imprecise 
qualitative observations to quantitative and statistical data, 
9 uncertainties, which may be significant, are expressed in a format appropriate to the type of 
evidence and these are not always directly comparable, and, 
" there may be a large amount of information relating to an investment decision, however it is 
often only partially relevant, incomplete or conflicting. 
Consequently, monitoring and remediation resources can be mis-directed. 
An increasing emphasis on strategic planning (DEFRA, 2001b, 2001c, Evans et al., 2002) means 
decision-makers need to be able to manage and consider large amounts of information describing 
the behaviour of their system and are therefore facing intense information processing demands 
(Hall and Davis, 2001). Serious flooding in 1998 and 2000 demonstrated the need for improved 
management of flood defences (Bye and Homer, 1998, Environment Agency, 2001 and ICE, 
2001). Recently the UK government has allocated more resources for improving flood and coastal 
defence standards (HM Treasury, 2002), however, as in all publicly funded sectors, flood defence 
managers are coming under increasing pressure to use resources more efficiently and make 
decisions in a more transparent manner. These factors provide a cogent motive for the novel 
research aimed at improving decision-support techniques that are described in this thesis. 
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1.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
A review of flood defence management practices has identified the need for improvement in the 
three key areas of flood risk assessment, condition characterisation and decision-support 
techniques. The objectives of this thesis are therefore to: 
" justify the need for improvement in these three areas, 
" identify suitable techniques that could be developed to improve current methods, 
" provide a new flood risk assessment methodology that can be used to assess risk at different 
levels of resolution so that it can support a multitude of decisions, 
" provide a new flood defence condition characterisation methodology that provides an imprecise 
probabilistic measure of defence performance that takes account of the uncertainty associated 
with flood defence failure, and, 
" provide a new methodology to support decision-making by measuring the performance of 
defences and the overall performance of the flood defence system. 
1.2. FLOOD RISK 
Risk is defined as a combination of likelihood and consequences (Adams, 1995). Flood risk is 
therefore a combination of the likelihood of a flood event and the impacts that would result from 
this event should it occur (Eiker, 1997). Flooding is considered by some authorities to be the 
hazard that affects more people than any other (Ward, 1978). Whilst there can be positive 
environmental impacts resulting from flooding (Thomas, 2002) flood defence engineers are usually 
concerned with protecting people and property from harm. 
Flood risk is recognised as one of the most important indicators of the performance of a flood 
defence system (DEFRA, 1999 and ICE, 2002). It can be used to identify what may happen in the 
future, the possible impacts and consequences of these events and their likelihoods. A flood risk 
assessment provides a rational basis for the development of flood defence management policy, 
allocation of resources and monitoring the performance of flood mitigation activities. This is 
because the risk assessment considers the entire flood defence system, its interconnectivity and the 
costs of intervention or failure whilst incorporating uncertainties associated with the assessment of 
system behaviour (DEFRA, 2000b, Hall, 2000). Risk assessment is an integral part of risk 
management which is the process of gathering evidence of system performance, risk assessment, 
options appraisal and decision-making. Until recently an explicit consideration of risk has been 
limited to appraisal of major decisions in flood defence infrastructure investment (Hall et al., 1997, 
Meadowcroft et al., 1997) although there is now a rapid move towards an integrated approach to 
flood risk management (Hall et al., 2002c).. 
Flood defence infrastructure management decisions are made at many, levels, from a flood defence 
engineer who is designing a new scheme to the national policy makers in the government who have 
to allocate annual budgets to the organisations responsible for managing the defences. These 
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decisions can all be informed by a flood risk assessment and it is useful to measure this risk at a 
multitude of resolutions appropriate to the decision being informed, the scale of the project being 
undertaken and the available resources. 
A tiered flood risk assessment methodology building on the work of Meadowcroft et al. (1996) is 
therefore proposed. A high level risk assessment methodology which is based on only the 
minimum information available nationally is used to generate national assessments of flood risk, 
further developing the previously implemented method (Halcrow et al., 2001). More detailed 
methods require accurate topographical information, crest level surveys in order to take advantage 
of more sophisticated hydraulic models. More detailed defence information, such as geotechnical 
properties, enables defence failure probability to be assessed more accurately using-more 
sophisticated reliability methods. 
Research described in this thesis focuses on the risk of flooding from flood defence failure. This 
comprises two components; an estimation of the likelihood of failure of the defence and an 
evaluation of the consequences associated with this failure. There has been considerable research 
into improving quantitative flood impact assessments (Parker et al., 1987, Middlesex University, 
1990, Penning-Rowsell et a!., 1992, Penning-Rowsell et al., 2003) and estimating and modelling 
flood loads quantitatively (Pugh, 1987, CEHW, 1999, Beven, 2000, HR Wallingford and Lancaster 
University, 2002). A quantitative flood risk assessment requires estimating failure probabilities of 
existing flood defences which is the topic of condition characterisation (Section 1.3). 
1.3. CONDITION CHARACTERISATION 
A condition characterisation provides information on the structural' performance of a flood defence. 
This can be used to identify and prioritise operations and maintenance interventions (Environment 
Agency, 1996). The present method used in England and Wales ranks the condition of a defence 
on a scale of 1 ("very good" condition) to 5 ("very poor" condition). This is useful to an extent, but 
a condition characterisation should provide a description of the structure's proneness to failure, 
enabling flood defence asset managers to make informed decisions about maintenance, monitoring 
and replacement strategies. To ensure an efficient allocation of resources, the condition 
characterisation must be consistent, transparent and auditable. A condition characterisation that 
supports a risk-based framework is probabilistic, allowing decision-makers to base investment 
decisions on the proneness to failure of a coastal defence and the consequences, economic or 
otherwise, of this failure. 
Flood defence failure mechanisms are complex and site specific, demonstrating both spatial and 
temporal variability, for example due to the natural variability in loading regime and geotechnical 
behaviour. Monitoring information is scarce, can be very expensive to obtain and comes in many 
rt-.. - -. /r., .i.., ýý i .. n 
4 Performance-based management offlood defence systems 
different formats. This ranges from a fully probabilistic description of loading to a linguistic 
description of structural condition. 
A move towards a quantitative risk based management framework requires the application of 
probabilistic techniques to assess the condition of structures. These have only been applied in a 
limited manner in England and Wales. Appraisal of large projects currently relies on expert 
judgement to assign defence failure probabilities and deterioration rates (DEFRA, 2000a). 
Engineers have developed increasingly elaborate methods for the probabilistic assessment of flood 
defences (CUR and TAW, 1990, Cooke et a1., 1993, Oumeraci et al., 2001, Voortman, 2002). 
Application of these methods to complex infrastructure has often been questioned because they 
require data that are often not to hand and both difficult and costly to obtain (Parr and Cullen, 1988, 
Meadowcroft eta!., 1996). Probabilistic approaches do not readily include expert judgement which 
has traditionally formed an important part of condition characterisation. Therefore a probabilistic 
assessment of defence condition needs to be able to combine vague, imprecise qualitative data, 
such as evidence from visual inspections, with quantitative and statistical data. The uncertainty 
associated with this vagueness and imprecision needs to be appropriately represented in the final 
probabilistic assessment. 
This thesis reviews present approaches to condition characterisation and has identified generic 
needs for a condition characterisation methodology. Methods of handling uncertainty and 
techniques available to estimate failure probabilities of flood defences are evaluated. The proposed 
new methodology adapts existing reliability techniques that readily handle uncertainty expressed 
probabilistically to consider the uncertainty associated with expert judgements. This is illustrated 
with several examples that show how uncertain evidence can be used and how the deterioration of 
flood defences can be modelled probabilistically. Probabilistic assessments of structural condition 
can be used in the flood risk assessment methodology. As more information is made available, a 
more certain estimate of failure probability is made therefore increasing the accuracy of the flood 
risk assessment. The ability to model deterioration means that long term changes to flood risk can 
be predicted. 
1.4. DECISION-SUPPORT' 
Decisions relating to flood defence infrastructure are clearly amenable to a risk based decision- 
making framework. The flood defence system consists of many components that include flood 
defence infrastructure, flood warning, drainage, the natural and built environment, physical 
attributes involved with the water cycle and numerous stakeholders (Kundzewicz and Takeuchi, 
1999). The success of components other than flood defence infrastructure, such as flood warning 
and responding in an emergency is important in providing a flood defence system that performs 
well. However, the connectivity between the components within the system and the large and 
varying sources of evidence of their performance makes it difficult for a decision-maker to 
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assemble and use them to support decisions in an auditable manner. A decision-maker may also be 
constricted by codes of practice, organisational or societal values and other standards. A risk 
assessment provides useful information on the performance of a flood defence system, and lends 
itself directly to supporting resource allocation decisions. However, any quantitative risk 
assessment is inevitably incomplete and will have to exclude information that appears in an 
inappropriate format or at an unsuitable scale even though it may be relevant to the performance of 
the defence system. As in other engineering disciplines (SEAOC, 1995 and Coehlo, 1997) a more 
inclusive measure of performance, which can be thought of as all those aspects of system behaviour 
relevant to meeting objectives, is a more useful basis for making decisions. 
A new approach to representing the performance of flood defence systems has therefore been 
developed. The systems are represented hierarchically incorporating both high level business 
processes and operational processes. Performance of sub-systems such as flood defence 
embankments or flood warning systems is captured by a set of performance indicators, such as 
flood risk, which are held in a database. Evidence of performance is assembled from all available 
sources, ranging from monitoring measurements and model studies to expert judgements, 
analogous cases and accounts of past failures. These performance indicators are projected through 
value functions reflecting organisational objectives and are merged to generate a figure of merit for 
each sub-system. Uncertainty in the available evidence is represented and propagated through the 
evidence hierarchy using Interval Probability Theory, providing a commentary on sources and 
implications of uncertainty in the decision. A case study demonstrates how the approach can 
incorporate evidence from the new flood risk assessment method, providing a useful overview of 
system performance which can be used to explore different asset management decisions. 
1.5. ASSOCIATED RESEARCH PROJECTS 
The research described in this thesis has been conducted as part of two research and development 
projects. The first research project entitled `Condition Monitoring and Asset Management for 
Complex Infrastructure Systems' (CMAM) has been funded by the Engineering and Physical 
Research Council (EPSRC) reference GR/M53073/01, the Environment Agency (EA) reference 
W5A(99)03 and Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) with contributions in kind from six other 
industrial partners from engineering consultancies. Whilst many of the principles of the CMAM 
research could be applied to other fields of engineering, research within this project focused on the 
flood defence and dams industry. Research contributions described in this thesis which were 
undertaken as part of the CMAM project are: 
(1) an assessment of current asset management practices in the flood defence industry, 
(2) an improved method for assessing structural condition of flood defences, and, 
(3) a methodology and complimentary software tool to support decision-making. 
Research into performance-based management that has resulted from the CMAM project will 
contribute to development of the EA's new Performance-based Asset Management System (PAMS) 
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and to DEFRA's forthcoming Flood and Coastal Defence Project Appraisal Guidance series 
(FCDPAG6) on performance evaluation. 
Improved methods of condition assessment and taking a systems approach to flood defence 
management naturally compliment the `Risk Assessment of Flood and Coastal Defence Systems 
for Strategic Planning' (RASP) project funded by the Department of the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and Environment Agency joint research and development programme 
project W5B(01)02. The research described in this thesis has contributed to the tiered framework 
and high level methodology for national-scale flood risk assessment, described in Chapter 4, which 
form part of the RASP project. This level of the methodology is demonstrated with a case study 
and has been applied nationally under the National Flood Risk Assessment 2002 project, the results 
of which are given in Appendix G. The methodologies of the intermediate and detailed levels of 
risk assessment are also described in Chapter 4. 
This thesis describes the research undertaken by the author in the context of these two projects. 
However, it is recognised that these projects are not independent, but are complimentary in their 
research objectives. Work in this thesis shows how the probabilistic condition characterisation, 
risk assessment and decision-making methodologies can be integrated thereby enabling flood risk 
to be considered within the context of system performance. This provides a significant 
advancement in the field of flood defence management. 
1.6. THESIS OUTLINE 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis starts by providing a background and analysis of the 
problem domain. Flood defence management in England and Wales is reviewed through the study 
of relevant documents, interviews and site visits to Environment Agency offices. Chapter 3 
provides a theoretical background to making a probabilistic risk assessment. The chapter focuses 
on estimating the failure probabilities of flood defences, but also reviews techniques used to obtain 
river and coastal loads and estimate damages resulting from inundation. Chapter 4 introduces a 
new tiered risk assessment methodology that enables risk assessments to be made at a number of 
different resolutions. The level of the methodology appropriate to making a national scale 
assessment of flood risk is described in detail. Chapter 5 presents a novel approach to assessing the 
condition of flood and coastal defences. Reliability methods are used to generate failure 
probabilities and adapted to enable uncertainties that are described using imprecise information to 
be incorporated into the assessment. The means to integrate the condition characterisation 
approach and the risk assessment methodology is also described. - Chapter 6 describes new - 
techniques to support performance-based decision-making. The chapter also provides a case study 
using these techniques that shows how models of a system can be constructed and used to support 
asset management decisions. - The case study also demonstrates how the flood risk assessment 
`described in Chapter 4 and the condition characterisation methodology described in Chapter 5 can 
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be integrated. This provides an overview of system performance that can incorporate measures of 
flood risk in the context of structural and non-structural performance. 
Chapter 2 
Background and analysis of problem domain 
2.1. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of flood defence management and aims to set in context the 
needs and requirements for decision-support tools in England and Wales. The starting point for the 
development of decision-support tools was a descriptive study of current asset management 
practices for UK flood defence infrastructure together with a review of practices worldwide. A 
workshop with representatives from collaborating organisations from within public and private 
sectors provided an initial impression of the issues and challenges. Subsequent analysis involved a 
literature review, interviews with experts, site visits and case studies. The outcomes of this process 
are summarised in this chapter. 
This chapter first provides a brief history of flooding in the UK and other countries in Section 2.2. 
A brief review of flood defence management in several countries is provided in Section 2.3. The 
structure of flood defence management in England and Wales and key organisations are described 
in Section 2.4. Guidance documents important to the decision-making process in England and 
Wales are summarised in Section 2.5 (and described in more detail in Appendix Q. A key aspect 
of prioritising investment in flood defence is the condition characterisation of flood defence assets. 
Approaches to the condition characterisation of flood defences as applied in England and Wales, 
Netherlands and the USA are described in Section 2.6. Risk assessment is an important tool for 
flood risk managers, its benefits and current approaches are described Section 2.7. Section 2.8 
identifies the differences and inconsistencies between guidance documents and actual practice. 
Finally, Section 2.9 identifies areas of flood defence management that would benefit from the novel 
research in this thesis. 
2.2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Ward (1978) defined a flood defined as being: 
"A body of water which rises to overflow land which is not normally submerged" 
This definition encompasses coastal and fluvial flooding, both of which have been experienced in 
England and Wales. 
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2.2.1. Flooding in England and Wales 
Historically there have been many benefits derived from building on floodplains. Towns often 
sprung up near river crossing points or natural harbours. Areas of the UK, including the Fens and 
significant areas of many estuaries, have been reclaimed from the sea and would be underwater for 
much of the year were it not for drainage and sea defences. Drainage has also helped ensure the 
productivity of low-lying agricultural land that might otherwise spend a significant period of time 
waterlogged. Coastal towns derive benefits from trade, industry and tourism. Towns on rivers also 
benefit from trade and industry, something that was consolidated during the industrial revolution 
(ICE, 2001). Floodplains have also provided the most productive agricultural land (Purnell, 2002). 
More recently, housing, industry and infrastructure have encroached onto the floodplain reflecting 
the fact that it is a valuable resource (Penning-Rowsell and Tunstall, 1996). Agriculture and 
forestry have intensified, further increasing the demand on rivers to provide water resources and 
drainage (ICE, 2001). 
Historically, floods in England and Wales have been dominated by coastal flooding (Parker, 1985) 
and early studies by a Royal Commission (1911) focused on this threat. Prior to 1953, coastal 
defences were constructed to meet local needs, for example protection of seaside resorts (CIRIA, 
1986). The North Sea has been described as a splendid sea for storm surges (Heaps, 1983) 
resulting from both pressure gradients travelling from deep Atlantic waters and wind. One of the 
most devastating flood events of the last century was the 1953 flood of East Anglia (which also 
inundated much of the Netherlands) . This flood was caused by a North Sea storm surge dominated 
by strong wind and took nearly 300 lives and devastated much of East Anglia. After the 1953 
flood, the Waverley Committee (1954) recommended that flood defence protection reflect the land 
use of the protected area. A steady programme of investment meant that the storm surges of 1978 
and 1983 resulted in negligible damage and no loss of life in the same area (CIRIA, 1986). 
However, it is not only the North Sea that poses the threat of coastal flooding in the UK, extreme 
conditions in the Irish Sea caused flooding in the North West of England in 1977 and 1983 and 
Towyn in North Wales in 1990 (Welsh Consumer Council, 1992). Teignmouth and Torcross along 
the South Coast of England have also experienced the wrath of stormy seas in 1975 and 1979 
respectively, 
Despite these and many other flood events, there has been a common belief that flooding is a rare 
and infrequent experience in the UK (Fordham and Ketteridge, 1995). However, recent flooding in 
1998 and 2000 saw the highest river levels seen in the UK since records began over 270 years ago 
and provided a reminder of the devastating effects of fluvial flooding. These floods resulted in 
thousands of properties being flooded and damages running into billions of pounds and prompted 
several critical reviews (Bye and Homer, 1998, Environment Agency, 2001, NAO, 2001, 
ICE, 200 1) into the effectiveness of flood defences and their management in England and Wales 
and the amount of funding it receives (HM Treasury, 2002). - 
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2.2.2. Flooding as an international problem 
Flooding is also a serious problem in other countries the world over. The International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2001) estimated flooding caused nearly 100,000 deaths 
between 1991 and 2000 , and has been responsible for 58% of deaths related to natural disasters 
between 1988 and 1997 (Berz, 2000). Flooding is also important economically. Munich 
Reassurance (1997) estimated that economic damages resulting from flooding were in excess of 
$130 billion from 1986-1995. The proximity of the countries in Europe means that one weather 
system can cause inundation in several countries. This was demonstrated in 1953 when the 
Netherlands was flooded by the same storm as East Anglia in the UK (Pugh, 1987). Flooding of 
many large cities in Central and Eastern Europe including Dresden and Prague during August 2002 
was caused by a slow moving weather front resulting in a week of torrential rain resulting in 
serious flooding over much of Europe. 
On a more global scale movement of warm water in the Pacific Ocean known as El Nino has been 
shown to cause drought and flooding in different parts of the world (Smith and Ward, 1998). This 
is a clear demonstration that flooding does not respect administrative boundaries and a reminder of 
the importance of initiatives such as the European Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000). The 
United States (Lovelace and Strauser, 1998) and Japan (Kitagawa, 1998) have both experienced 
serious floods. From 1975 and 1994, economic damages to property and crops in the United States 
were estimated at being between $27.7 billion and $277 billion whilst between 1600 and 2300 
people were estimated to have died because of flooding (Mileti, 1996). In comparison with lesser 
developed countries, such as Bangladesh, deaths can run into the thousands for a single event. This 
is often a result of less well developed warning and information dissemination systems. Poor 
emergency response systems and a lack of medical supplies and sanitation can lead to many more 
indirect deaths (Smith and Ward, 1998). 
2.3. " -. INTERNATIONAL ]FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
International approaches to flood management are usually shaped by the severity and the frequency 
of flooding, the type of flooding experienced and the economics and culture of the region and its 
floodplains. This section offers a brief insight into the approach in several countries. The approach 
to flood defence management in England and Wales is discussed in detail in later sections. 
2.3.1. United States of America'. 
Flood management in the USA involves several organisations. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) manages and provides funding and in particular aims to minimise 
casualties for floodsrthat have been declared a major disaster by the US president under The 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (Downtown and Pielke, 2001). ' The United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) plans, designs, builds and operates water resources infrastructure; including 
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flood defences (McKay et al., 1999). Research into improving flood defence management is also 
performed by the USACE and they have started to employ a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
risk-based management techniques (National Research Council, 1995, USACE, 1996,1999b, 2000 
and Moser, 1997). `Alternative' approaches to flood risk management are becoming more popular, 
Miletti (1999) and Burby et al. (2000) have recognised that sustainable natural hazard mitigation is 
best achieved through effective land-use management. Kunreuther (2000) and Ryland (2000) 
recognise the importance of insurance as part of a risk management strategy. Hecker et al. (2001) 
identify the benefits to be gained from improvement in emergency management. 
2.3.2. The Netherlands 
Flood management in the Netherlands is overseen nationally by the Rijkwaterstaat who provide 
guidance and form national policy. Two thirds of the country (25,000km2) and the majority of the 
population are at risk from flooding (Litjens-van loon et al., 2000). The country is divided into 
eleven provinces that contain a number of dyke rings protecting the low-lying land in polders. 53 
Water boards are responsible for the management and maintenance of flood defences in these 
polders. Prior to 1953, dykes were constructed to the highest known level of flooding. A storm 
surge in 1953 resulted in the overtopping and failure of a number of sea-dykes, killing 1835 people, 
destroying 4500 buildings and an economical loss of about 14% of the Dutch GDP (Visser, 1998). 
Van Dantzig (1956) recommended the consideration of economics in decision-making and since 
the 1953 floods, the level of protection has been risk based with the most densely populated and 
economically important areas receiving protection against the 1 in 10,000 year flood event (Jak and 
Kok, 1999). After the 1996 Flood Defence Act, these became set down in probabilistic terms 
(Voortman et al., 2001) and each defence is required to be assessed for safety every 5 years (De 
Looff, 1998). Increasingly risk-based and probabilistic techniques are being employed to aid 
design, maintenance and assessment (CUR and TAW, 1990, Cooke et al., 1997, Jonkman et al., 
2002, Voortman et al., 2002). Without flood defences, two thirds of the Netherlands would be 
flooded, this vulnerability has ensured large amounts of investment in the past on construction and 
maintenance of defences to a high standard rather than on developmental control, warning, 
emergency repair or insurance (De Ronde, 1998). A result of the high vulnerability of the 
Netherlands to flooding is that floodplain management is not a feature of flood management 
(Penning-Rowsell and Tunstall, 1996). 
233. Bangladesh: A less developed country 
A brief review of flood management in the USA and the Netherlands suggests that more developed 
countries are employing ever more sophisticated tools and techniques. In lesser developed 
countries, lack of funds means these are less easily implemented. Bangladesh, for example, takes 
an alternative approach to flood management. Because of its low elevation, over two thirds of the 
country is at risk of flooding. This risk is compounded by increased urbanisation, however, due to 
limited resources and lack of knowledge many households are unprotected against flooding 
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(Arambepola, 2002). Between 1950 and 1988,25 major flood events resulted in over 60% of the 
country being inundated (Khalil, 1990). There is no one dominant flooding mechanism, with flash 
floods, rainwater flooding, river flooding and coastal surges all being a major threat (Pugh, 1987 
and Smith and Ward, 1998). Bangladesh has a Water Development Board with responsibility for 
flood defence, however, whilst they have previously implemented structural solutions to flooding, 
the success of these has been questioned (Thompson and Sultana, 1996). Much of the funding for 
flood management comes from the international aid community due to the relative regional 
poverty. Instead, an approach to `living with floods' has been suggested that does not rely on 
enormous amounts of infrastructure that a poor nation such as Bangladesh can not hope to maintain 
(Khalequzzaman, 1994). Such an approach would attempt to minimise the danger and disruption 
of flooding, by drawing a distinction between frequent but benign floods that often bring positive 
consequences (such as soil fertility) and the infrequent but disastrous events (Rumi, 2002). 
2.4. STRUCTURE OF FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT IN THE UK 
The structure of flood defence management is complex and rapidly evolving. The responsibilities 
for flood defence in the UK are laid out in several Acts of Parliament described in Section 2.4.1 
below. These are enacted by several organisations, the most important of these is the Environment 
Agency which has a supervisory role over all matters related to flood defence in England and 
Wales'. This section describes the organisations that are involved in flood defence management in 
England and Wales and the legislation that governs them. 
2.4.1. Legislation 
Four key Acts of Parliament cover flood defence which define responsibilities, administrative 
processes and funding powers for engineering works. A summary is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Land Drainage Act 
The Land Drainage Act of 1991 is concerned with defence against water and covers internal 
drainage associated with all ordinary watercourses, as well as considering coastal flooding. The 
Act requires that private owners of watercourses maintain them to an appropriate standard. 
Operational responsibility for coastal works lies with local authorities under supervision from the 
EA. The authorities must apply for approval from DEFRA or the Welsh Office who may also 
provide grant aid. The Act also defines a number of key terms: 
" Main rivers are watercourses designated as such on main river maps and are generally the 
larger arterial watercourses. 
" Ordinary'watercoürses are all those watercourses that are not designated as main river. 
' Whilst aspects of flood defence management in Scotland and Northern Ireland are similar to that in England 
and Wales, it is governed by alternative arrangements not specifically addressed in this thesis. - 
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" Critical ordinary watercourses are ordinary watercourses which the Environment Agency and 
other operating authorities agree are critical because they have the potential to put at risk from 
flooding large numbers of people and property. 
" Sea defences are measures to help prevent flooding from the sea. 
" Coastal protection are measures to protect the land against erosion and encroachment by the 
sea. 
" Coastal defence is an overarching term that includes both sea defence and coast protection. 
Water Resources Act (1991), 
Environment Act (1995), 
Coastal Protection Act (1949), 
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Figure 2.1 Key legislation, roles and responsibilities for flood defence in England and Wales 
(adapted from NAO, 2001) 
Water Resources Act 
The Water Resources Act of 1991 deals with the drainage of land and provision of flood warning 
systems. The drainage of land covers main rivers and provision of sea and tidal defences. 
Operational responsibility lies with the Environment Agency with grants from DEFRA and the 
Welsh Office. The Environment Agency is also now required to provide the same service for 
critical ordinary watercourses. 
Environment Act 
The Environment Act of 1995 established the Environment Agency and their Scottish counterpart 
the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency. The Act defines the roles of the parties involved in 
flood defence, and section 6(4) defines the role of the EA stating that: , 
".... the (Environment). Agency, shall in relation to England and Wales 
exercise a general supervision over all matters relating to flood defence. " 
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The Act also defines strategies for other environmental issues such as mines, national parks, air 
quality and waste management. 
Coastal Protection Act 
The Coastal Protection Act of 1949 governs the funding, construction and operation of measures to 
protect the land from erosion or encroachment by the sea. Operational responsibility lies primarily 
with local authorities. Approval is required from DEFRA or the Welsh Office for construction of 
coast protection works. These organisations also provide grant aid for large projects. 
Other Acts and Regulations 
There are other Acts and statutory instruments that can have an impact on river and coastal 
engineering projects. These include Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Town and County 
Planning Regulations 1988, Conservation Regulations 1994 and the Flood and Environmental 
Protection Act 1985 which governs the deposition of anything below Mean High Water Springs 
tide level. 
2.4.2. Organisations involved in flood defence management 
The key organisations involved in flood and coastal defence management in England and Wales, 
their roles and interactions are described below. 
DEFRA (formerly MAFF) and The National Assembly for Wales 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) oversees the Environment 
Agency with respect to flood defence in England, whilst in Wales this responsibility lies with the 
National Assembly for Wales. DEFRA has responsibility for establishing policy, issuing national 
guidance and paying capital grants to fund large flood and coastal defence projects. In 1999, 
DEFRA outlined its high level targets for flood and coastal defence (DEFRA, 1999) and in 2001 a 
joint research and development programme was started in conjunction with the Environment 
Agency following recommendations by Penning-Rowsell (1998). 
The Environment Agency 
The Environment Agency came into being on the 1" Äpril 1996. It is non-departmental public 
body that was established under the provisions of the 1995 Environment Act. It is an 
amalgamation of the National Rivers Agency, HM Inspectorate of Pollution and the waste 
regulation arm of the Local Authorities. The Environment Agency have a supervisory role for all 
flood defence matters in England and Wales, but also have a duty to conserve and enhance the 
natural environment. The EA have jurisdiction over main rivers, critical ordinary watercourses and 
sea defence works. The EA is responsible for managing 34,000km of defences, that defend just 
under 10% of the population and 12,200km2 of England and Wales from flooding. 
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The EA has a tiered organisational structure in order to provide national consistency in policy 
provision, but also maintain local accountability in service provision (Parish, 1998). The head 
office based in Bristol is responsible for policies, standards and ensuring a consistent approach. 
There are eight regional offices which are arranged on the basis of river catchment areas for water 
management (although the boundaries are often different for pollution and waste control purposes). 
Each region is further split into three or four areas providing a total of 26 area offices over England 
and Wales. 
In response to the Bye Report (Bye and Homer, 1998) the EA restructured its flood management 
activities in order to deliver its core services which are (Harman et al., 2002): 
(1) Strategic Planning to assess medium and long term management options for the flood 
defence system, 
(2) Operating a flood warning system to forecast and disseminate warnings, 
(3) Managing emergency response in the case of a flood, 
(4) Managing capital programme of improving, replacing or constructing defences, 
(5) Regulating development in the floodplain and along watercourses, 
(6) Operating and maintaining flood defence infrastructure and channel capacity, 
(7) Flood risk mapping to provide an indication of the level of risk within a floodplain, and, 
(8) Researching and developing new tools and techniques needed for effective flood 
management. 
Whilst the services are delivered at a local, regional and national level, the processes enacted to 
deliver these services will vary at each level within the organisation. For example, policy and best 
practice for flood warning are disseminated to regional offices that oversee the implementation of 
these policies across the region. However they are predominantly implemented at an area level 
where the staff are responsible for disseminating the warning to the public. 
Regional and Local Flood Defence Committees 
Flood defence committees were set up to raise funds from local authorities and to agree flood 
defence programmes recommended by the Environment Agency. Local committees have delegated 
powers from the regional committee to raise funds for their area. 
Internal Drainage Boards 
There are 235 Internal Drainage Boards (although they operate as 65 consortia). These Boards 
have jurisdiction over ordinary watercourses in an Internal Drainage District. The Boards secure 
funding from local land owners and Local Authorities. They also pay levies to the EA to fund 
work on main rivers that protects internal drainage districts: 
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Inland Local Authorities 
These authorities (usually councils) have jurisdiction over ordinary watercourses except in an 
Internal Drainage District. They pay levies through flood defence committees to fund alot of the 
Environment Agency's flood defence work. Local authorities (in conjunction with other 
organisations such as the emergency services) are responsible for the implementation of emergency 
plans in the event of serious flooding. 
Maritime Local Authorities 
These authorities have jurisdiction over coast protection (protecting of the coast from erosion, 
rather than defending low lying land from flooding) and ordinary watercourses except where they 
are in an Internal Drainage District. 
2.5. FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE 
It is important to understand not only the organisation involved in flood defence management and 
their responsibilities, but also the existing management framework. This enables the needs of the 
decision-makers, which are discussed in Section 2.9, to be better identified. 
Flood defence management procedures in England and Wales are laid out in several key document 
published by DEFRA and the EA, it is also heavily influenced by several well used manuals and 
other forms of guidance. Some of the procedures in this guidance are very detailed and so a fuller 
description is provided in Appendix C. 
2.5.1. ' Flood Defence Management Manual 
The Flood Defence Management Manual (FDMM) (Environment Agency, 1996) provides a 
framework for prioritising and justifying maintenance decisions and small (<, E50,000) capital 
projects of river defences. These procedures are currently being reviewed. The FDM M acts as a 
guidance document for the procedures required by the Flood Defence Management System 
(FDMS). The FDMS is a database that also includes some pre-programmed routines of 
prioritisation and justification methods outlined in the FDMM. Data from the FDMS has now been 
migrated into the EA's new National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (NFCDD) which does 
not include any in-built decision-support functionality. The aim of the NFCDD is to provide a 
definitive source of all data on flood and coastal defences (including those not managed by the 
Environment Agency) to help make better informed decisions (Linford et aL. 2002). Asset 
management procedures within the FDMM are supported by the Condition Assessment Manual 
(Glennie et aL, 1991) which is used as a guide to help flood defence inspectors assess defence 
condition. The present methodology for condition assessment is discussed in detail in Section 2.6,1 
and a new methodology is proposed in Chapter 5. 
The principal items of information required by the FDMM are as follows: 
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(1) A description of defence condition on a five point scale from 1 (Very Good) to 5 (Very 
Poor) which summarises the inspection information on the state of the existing asset, 
guidelines for which are laid out in the Condition Assessment Manual. 
(2) Surveys that evaluate the assets in the flood risk area i. e. the potential consequences of 
flooding. 
(3) Data about previous floods and predictive models of flooding are gathered (although this 
can often be limited) so that estimations can be made of the likelihood of flooding. 
(4) Cost estimates are required to compare alternative implementation and scheme options. 
This information is used to calculate a value of the Standard of Service (SoS) for a given length of 
river. The SoS is a measure of the expected damage per kilometre of river per year. 
The decision outcomes from the FDMM are either: 
" `Do nothing' 
" Improve present SoS (capital scheme) 
" Perform structural repairs (periodic maintenance) 
" Cleaning, mowing etc (routine maintenance) 
Routine maintenance is prioritised on the basis of the service provided (using the SoS number as a 
prioritisation indicator) and periodic maintenance is provided using the condition assessment. 
Capital projects, if appraised using the FDMM, consider economic, environmental and social 
factors as well as the SoS and integrity of any defences. 
2.5.2. Management Plans 
Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) (MAFF, 1995, DEFRA, 2001 c) lay out procedures for 
developing a long term strategy for sustainable coastal defence within coastal sediment cells, taking 
account of natural coastal processes and human and other environmental influences and needs. 
SMPs are prepared by coastal groups that include representatives from the EA and Maritime Local 
Authorities. There are a number of generic policies available to the shoreline manager. 
" Hold the existing defence line by maintaining or changing the standard of protection. This 
policy should cover those situations where works or operations are undertaken in front of the 
existing defences (this includes interventions such as beach recharge, rebuilding the toe of a 
structure, the construction of offshore breakwaters) to improve or maintain the standard of 
protection provided by the existing defence line. Policies that involve operations to the rear of 
existing defences (for example, construction of secondary floodwalls) should be included under 
this policy when they form an integral part of maintaining the current coastal defence systems. 
" Advance the existing defence line by constructing new defences seaward of the original 
defences. Note that use of this policy should be limited to those management units where 
significant land reclamation is considered. ,;:. 
" Managed realignment by identifying a new line of defence and, where appropriate, 
constructing new defences landward of the original defences. 
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Inland Local Authorities 
These authorities (usually councils) have jurisdiction over *ordinary watercourses except in an 
Internal Drainage District. They pay levies through flood defence committees to fund alot of the 
Environment Agency's flood defence work. Local authorities (in conjunction with other 
organisations such as the emergency services) are responsible for the implementation of emergency 
plans in the event of serious flooding. 
Maritime Local Authorities 
These authorities have jurisdiction over coast protection (protecting of the coast from erosion, 
rather than defending low lying land from flooding) and ordinary watercourses except where they 
are in an Internal Drainage District. 
2.5. FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE 
It is important to understand not only the organisation involved in flood defence management and 
their responsibilities, but also the existing management framework. This enables the needs of the 
decision-makers, which are discussed in Section 2.9, to be better identified. 
Flood defence management procedures in England and Wales are laid out in several key documents 
published by DEFRA and the EA, it is also heavily influenced by several well used manuals and 
other forms of gtiidance. Some of the procedures in this guidance are very detailed and so' a fuller 
description is provided in Appendix C. 
2.5.1. Flood Defence Management Manual 
The Flood Defence Management Manual (FDMM) (Environment Agency, 1996) provides a 
framework for prioritising and justifying maintenance decisions and small (<£50,000) capital 
projects of river defences. These procedures are currently being reviewed. The FDMM acts as a 
guidance document for the procedures required by the Flood Defence Management System 
(FDMS). The FDMS is a database that also includes some pre-programmed routines of 
prioritisation and justification methods outlined in the FDMM. Data from the FDMS has now been 
migrated into the EA's new National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (NFCDD) which does 
not include any in-built decision-support functionality. The aim of the NFCDD is to provide a 
definitive source of all data on flood and coastal defences (including those not managed by the 
Environment Agency) to help make better informed decisions (Linford et al., 2002). Asset 
management procedures within the FDMM are supported by the Condition Assessment Manual 
(Glennie et al., 1991) which is used as a guide to help flood defence inspectors assess defence 
condition. The present methodology for condition assessment is discussed in detail in Section 2.6.1 
and a new methodology is proposed in Chapter 5. 
The principal items of information required by the FDMM are as follows: 
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(1) A description of defence condition on a five point scale from 1 (Very Good) to 5 (Very 
Poor) which summarises the inspection information on the state of the existing asset, 
guidelines for which are laid out in the Condition Assessment Manual. 
(2) Surveys that evaluate the assets in the flood risk area i. e. the potential consequences of 
flooding. 
(3) Data about previous floods and predictive models of flooding are gathered (although this 
can often be limited) so that estimations can be made of the likelihood of flooding. 
(4) Cost estimates are required to compare alternative implementation and scheme options. 
This information is used to calculate a value of the Standard of Service (SoS) for a given length of 
river. The SoS is a measure of the expected damage per kilometre of river per year. 
The decision outcomes from the FDMM are either: 
" `Do nothing' 
" Improve present SoS (capital scheme) 
" Perform structural repairs (periodic maintenance) 
" Cleaning, mowing etc (routine maintenance) 
Routine maintenance is prioritised on the basis of the service provided (using the SoS number as a 
prioritisation indicator) and periodic maintenance is provided using the condition assessment. 
Capital projects, if appraised using the FDMM, consider economic, environmental and social 
factors as well as the SoS and integrity of any defences. 
2.5.2. Management Plans 
Shoreline Management Plans (SMPs) (MAFF, 1995, DEFRA, 2001c) lay out procedurths for 
developing a long term strategy for sustainable coastal'defence within coastal sediment cells, taking 
account of natural coastal processes and human and other environmental influences and needs. 
SMPs are prepared by coastal groups that include representatives from the EA and Maritime Local 
Authorities. There are a number of generic policies available to the shoreline manager. 
" Hold the existing defence line by maintaining or changing the standard of protection. This 
policy should cover those situations where works or operations are undertaken in front of the 
existing defences (this includes interventions such as beach recharge, rebuilding the toe of a 
structure, the construction of offshore breakwaters) to improve or maintain the standard of 
protection provided by the existing defence line. Policies that involve operations to the rear of 
existing defences (for example, construction of secondary floodwalls) should be included under 
this policy when they form an integral part of maintaining the current coastal defence systems. 
" Advance the existing defence line by constructing new defences seaward of the original 
defences. Note that use of this policy should be limited to those management units where 
significant land reclamation is considered. 
" Managed realignment by identifying a new line of defence and, where appropriate, 
constructing new defences landward of the original defences. 
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" Limited intervention by working with natural processes to reduce risks while allowing natural 
coastal change. This may range from measures which attempt to slow down rather than stop 
coastal erosion and cliff recession to measures that address public safety issues such as flood 
warning systems. In other cases, measures might be undertaken to maintain the natural 
standard of defence on accreting shorelines, for example, managing blow-outs on advancing 
dune systems. 
9 No active intervention, where there is no investment in coastal defence assets or operations, i. e. 
no shoreline management activity. 
A high technical content is required for the SMP. Part of the planning process requires the 
consultation of all stakeholders including the general public. The forthcoming Catchment Flood 
Management Plans (HR Wallingford et al., 2001) will provide similar guidance for river 
catchments. CFMPs will be supported by the Modelling and Decision-Support Framework 
(MDSF) that automates part of the process, in particular river modelling and identification of 
impacts (Wicks et al., 2002, Ramsbottom et al., 2002). 
2.5.3. DEFRA Project Appraisal Guidance 
The DEFRA Project Appraisal Guidance (PAG) series (DEFRA 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001 a, 
200 lb) define the procedures for appraising capital works. The series consists of six volumes 
which provide guidance on different aspects of project appraisal. PAG1 (DEFRA, 2001a) provides 
an overview of the project appraisal process and guidance on integrating the key elements. 
Strategy Plans (Coastal Defence Strategy Plans and Sub-catchment Plans) (DEFRA, 2001b) are 
more rigorous studies on achieving the aims of the Management Plans within smaller areas. PAG3 
(DEFRA, 2000a) gives guidance on identifying methods for valuing costs and impacts in monetary 
terms and sets out a recommended decision process, based on economic values. Of particular note 
is the use of probabilistic discounting over the life of the plan. Probabilities of defence failure and 
degradation rates over the plan duration are assigned using expert judgement. PAG4 (DEFRA, 
2000b) gives guidance on managing risk and uncertainty. Risk assessment methods are reviewed 
and guidance on probabilistic assessment is provided. PAGS (DEFRA, 2001 c) provides guidance 
on appraisal of environmental consequences. Aside from general guidance on best practice and 
environmental impact assessment, methods for assigning costs to environmental losses are given. 
PAG6 is unpublished but will provide guidance on performance evaluation and covers the appraisal 
of policies and plans as well as individual schemes in order to determine their effectiveness and 
efficiency in delivering the original aims and objectives.,, The guidance will also provide a 
framework for integrating lessons learned into future project management., 
2.5.4. Additional guidance--_, _, 
Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of initiatives in regard to non-statutory plans that 
deal in particular with flooding and coastal issues. Many of these contain policies and proposals 
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that have land use planning implications, some directly involve flood defence managers, whilst 
others may impact only indirectly. 
The Planning Policy Guidance Note 25 (PPG25) (ODPM, 2001) is aimed at providing guidance to 
local planning authorities in order that they use their existing powers to guide, guide, regulate and 
control development in accordance with government guidelines. PPG25 aims to raise awareness to 
local authorities about the issues involved with development in flood risk areas and ensure that as 
well as local issues, catchment or coastal cell scale issues are also addressed. Estuary management 
plans (EMP) focus on ensuring a sustainable use of estuaries and are prepared by all major 
stakeholders. Harbour management plans (HMP) are similarly produced for harbours. Coastal 
habitat management plans aim to develop sustainable coastal defence strategies in areas of 
important wildlife. Local Environment Agency Plans (LEAP) are produced by the Environment 
Agency on a catchment basis to develop a more holistic long term approach to achieving all its 
aims with respect to flood defence and other issues such as water quality, fisheries and recreation. 
Water Level Management Plans (WLMP) identify the water level requirements for a range of 
activities such as flood defence, agriculture and conservation. River basin management plans are 
required by the EU Water Framework directive (EU, 2000) which sets out the objectives of the 
water bodies in the r* °r basin and how they will be achieved. Other plans that may have an impact 
on flood defence rraaagement are Community strategies, Heritage Coast Management Plans, 
Biodiversity Acti: "s Plans (BAP), Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plans (ICZM). 
Guidance in Enl land and Wales also comes from other organisations such as the Construction and 
Industry Resean h and Information Association (CIRIA) in the form of manuals. Some of the more 
important manua`s provide guidance on river bank protection (Hemphill and Bramley, 1989), rock 
use in coastal engineering (CIRIA and CUR, 1990), seawall design (Thomas and Hall, 1992), the 
beach management manual (CIRIA, 1996) and guidance on general risk assessment (CIRIA, 1996). 
The USACE Coastal Engineering Manual (USACE, 2002) and the Environment Agency's 
overtopping manual (HR Wallingford, 1999) are also frequently used design tools. In addition to 
this the British Standards Institution publishes codes, such as BS6349 (British Standards, 1989-. 
2000) that provides guidance on construction of marine structures. - ' .. 
2.6. CONDITION CHARACTERISATION 
A condition characterisation is an important indicator of the structural performance of a fluvial or 
coastal defence. As described in Section 2.5, they are currently used to justify investment decisions 
in England and Wales. ý Three differing approaches to condition characterisation are described in 
the following sections. 
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2.6.1. England and Wales 
The present condition characterisation methodology used in England and Wales by the 
Environment Agency ranks a flood defence between 1 ("very good") and 5 ("very poor"). This 
score is based on visual inspection of the defence by comparison to standard photos, using 
linguistic descriptions of condition set out in the Condition Assessment Manual (Glennie et al., 
1991). An example page from the manual is shown in Figure 2.2 for a bank slope of "good" 
condition. At this basic level no precise measurements are made. Every flood and coastal defence 






In reasonable condition. Minor defects minor routmn n i, imti n. nfl( f 
required, stable side slope well vegetated, stone revetment it toc in 
condition. 
General: 
Minor, non-urgent defects. Minor routine maintenance is only work 
required. In reasonable condition but with some increase in maintenance 
needed Slight dPfert not more than Sn-ý, of lennth or area , iffe t< cl 
Figure 2.2 An example page from the Condition Assessment Manual showing a bank slope of 
"good" condition (Glennie et al., 1991) 
More detailed assessments as recommended by the National Rivers Authority (1991) and DEFRA 
(1999) have only partially been implemented in England and Wales. The approach considers 
failure modes and has a tiered format, with more frequent and detailed levels of inspection being 
required on identification of a problem. 
An initial `baseline survey' gathers all available data, where possible using as-built design 
information. Frequently this will not be available and therefore additional investigations will be 
required. The information gathered for this more detailed investigation should include: 
" topographic surveys, 
" channel or beach profiles, 
" bathymetric surveys, 
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" aerial photos, 
" land ownership surveys, 
" visual condition and photographs, 
" outfall and culvert surveys, 
" structural surveys, 
" diving inspections, 
" geotechnical investigations, and, 
" mechanical and electrical inspections. 
This information is then assessed in the context of the level of protection needed from the asset. 
Particular consideration should be given to the level of the structure, its strength under normal and 
extreme loading conditions and ability to pass flood flows. The level of detail to which these 
investigations are undertaken is risk-based and considers the likely consequences of failure. 
`General' inspections are carried out by in-house staff every 6 months to two years. `Principal' 
inspections are carried out by engineers in place of a general inspection once every three or more 
years. These inspections are used to monitor any deviation in performance from the `baseline' 
inspection, and to identify the presence of any defects and the need for intervention. The frequency 
of inspection is risk-based, considering the importance of the assets in the system and past 
experience of its behaviour. The main difference between the two types of inspection is that 
principal inspections are more thorough, and involve making measurements as opposed to a solely 
visual inspection. Whilst any defects and their consideration in relation to failure modes are 
expressed qualitatively, the outcome of the inspections is summarised using the condition grade 
described previously. General or principal inspections should also be undertaken after an extreme 
event. 
The NRA (1990) report recommends that crest level surveying should be performed at least once 
every ten years, and more frequently if settlement is quite fast. Thorough structural inspections are 
required if general inspections conclude there is a cause for concern. These are based on specific 
consideration of failure modes and analysis of whether the structure is able to meet its performance 
objectives. Underwater inspections may also be necessary. The aim of these procedures is to 
monitor significant parameters at regular intervals, allowing asset managers to identify trends in 
asset behaviour. One off incidents of damage are therefore not incorrectly identified as being part 
of progressive defence failure. 
The condition grade is used in the prioritising of maintenance works, as described in section 2.5.1 
(and in more detail in Appendix C), which outlines the methods within the Flood Defence 
Management Manual. 
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2.6.2. United States of America 
In the US, the Army Corps of Engineers uses a scoring system to rank defences from 0 ("failed") to 
100 ("excellent condition"). The condition index considers the defence's structural integrity and its 
ability to fulfil its functions (Oliver et al., 1997). Actual approaches can vary between defence 
types, but the overall condition index, C1comb;,, e& for a defence combines functional and structural 
ratings for a multitude of damage patterns. A damage pattern is a measurable indicator of the 
proneness of a structure to a particular failure mode. For example, measuring crest height provides 
an indication of proneness to overtopping and overflow. A weighting is applied to emphasise the 
relative importance of damage patterns. A final value for the condition index for n damage patterns 












where Wj is a weight that represents the relative importance of the damage pattern score, C, to the 
overall structural integrity. The weighting factors in Equation 2.1 are rarely linear and so an 
adjustment factor, AF,, an example of which is shown in Equation 2.2 (McKay et al., 1999), is 
applied to account for the increasing dominance of a particular damage pattern, C,, as it approaches 
zero. The weights, Wf, are re-normalised accordingly. 
AFi =8 7 
Ci - 40 ( 
30 
40 <_CI, 569 (2.2) 
This example shows how as the damage pattern score, C, reduces from 69 to 40, the value of W, is 
multiplied by up to 8 times, representing the increasing likelihood that the structure will fail by the 
corresponding mode. If a particular damage pattern is deemed to be `critical' by an expert, the 
value of CIcomb; neJ is set to the value of the 
C, for the critical damage pattern. 
The Condition Index system provides an indicator of a structure's performance, and is used to 
justify increased funding and an aid for prioritising flood defence works. 
2.6.3. The Netherlands 
The approach to condition characterisation in the Netherlands is tiered, consisting of three levels of 
progressively more accurate assessment. The output of an assessment is a linguistic statement 
classifying a segment of defence as being `good', `satisfactory', `unsatisfactory' or of `uncertain' 
stability for the next five years (De Looff and Van der Meer, 1998). All dykes are analysed at a 
basic level and then if classified as uncertain, more accurate assessment techniques are employed. 
Condition assessments of flood defences in the Netherlands focus on the design level. The 
assessment of an asset is based on it fulfilling^the criteria to meet the design loads. The current 
safety standards require that the failure probability of a dyke is 10% for an event with an 
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exceedance probability of 0.01 in 100 years (Pilarczyk, 1999). The frequency of condition 
assessment is five years. 
A dyke system in the Netherlands can span great lengths. Due to spatial and temporal variations of 
hydraulic loading, revetment type, structural dimensions and soil properties, a dyke system will 
show a varying degree of dependency along its length (CUR and TAW, 1990). For ease of 
analysis, the dyke system is divided into sections based on the previously listed properties. To 
meet the legal requirements, flood defence structures must be of sufficient height, stability or in the 
case of dunes systems or beaches have a suitable volume or profile. 
Basic Assessment 
The first level of assessment considers limited evidence of condition and failure modes and 
applying this to various rules of thumb, derived from experience and experimental results, an 
assessment of stability is made (Stoutesdijk et al., 1998). This assessment is based on correlating 
visual observations of the slope, core, armour layer size, cover layer thickness, filter laws and 
freeboard with these rules. For example experience has shown that a slope with a shallower 
gradient than 1: 4 will not fail and the dyke can therefore be immediately classified as `safe' with 
respect to slope failure. 
Detailed Assessment 
This level of assessment considers the dyke's stability with greater accuracy than the previous 
assessment, allowing for more structures to be classified as safe or unsafe by reducing the 
uncertainty associated with the condition assessment. Measurements are taken of the design 
parameters of a dyke. These are then assessed using the current design criteria (CUR and TAW, 
1991 and TAW, 1999) to assess whether the structure satisfies these requirements. This level 
involves a more specific consideration of the values of key parameters. More parameters are 
evaluated than in the basic assessment and software is used to support the assessment. 
A structure is classified as `safe' if it meets all the current design standards (for example hydraulic 
gradient less, than critical hydraulic gradient). To classify a structure as `unstable' it must clearly 
fail to meet design criteria (for example hydraulic gradient is greater than 1.5 times the critical 
hydraulic gradient). Structures still not definitively shown to be either `satisfactory' or 
`unsatisfactory' are classified as `uncertain' and undergo an advanced assessment. 
Advanced Assessment 
The advanced level of assessment requires a much more thorough inspection of the structure 
involving numerical model simulations as well as in-situ tests. As much data is collected as 
possible at this level of analysis with sampling at intervals of between 100 and 250 metres along 
the length of the dyke. 
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To test the permeability of the cover and filter layers, parts of the revetment are removed to study 
the filter and clay layer underneath, searching for silt between the cover-layer and filter layer. The 
efficiency of the filter layer is also tested. Consideration of the filter layer's permeability is 
important (Bezuijen and. Kruse, 1998) because this will influence the likely failure mode. Block 
pull-out tests allow the calculation of inter-block clamping forces for block revetments. The blocks 
would be selected for the tests if after visual inspection they appeared to be looser than surrounding 
blocks. Analysis of the clay layer is done by digging a trench to get an exact profile of the dyke. 
This also allows the integrity of the clay to be considered so that a judgement of the residual 
strength can be made. However, this analysis is not universally favoured because of the damage 
caused to the dyke by the invasive investigation. 
Final tests involve the use of the ZETSTEEN (CUR and TAW, 1995) numerical model. 
Monitoring of the phreatic line, wave pressure and filter layer pressure over normal tidal conditions 
and storm conditions allows the revetment loads to be analysed over a multitude of conditions. A 
final assessment of `satisfactory' or `unsatisfactory' is then made. 
2.7. RISK 
This section introduces the concept of risk. The process of risk management is introduced and a 
number of methods available for assessing risks are reviewed. The benefits of risk assessment as a 
tool to support decision-making are discussed in the context of the requirements of a flood defence 
manager. 
2.7.1. Definition of Risk 
The British Standards Institution (1991) provide a technical definition of risk. 
"Risk is the combination of the probability or frequency of occurrence of a 
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence" 
A hazard is defined as a situation that could occur that has the potential for human injury, damage 
to property, damage to the environment, or economic loss. Whilst the term `risk' can refer to risks, 
at all stages of a flood defence project such as design risk, procurement risk and construction risk, 
this thesis focuses on the risk to the natural and built environment from flooding. Flood risk is 
therefore a measure of the likelihood of a flood event and its economic, social or environmental 
impacts, which is formally defined by Equation 2.3: 
Flood Risk = Probability of flooding x Consequence of flooding (2.3) 
How this definition is interpreted will often vary as different stakeholders will have alternate 
perspectives of flood risk. National policy advisors will usually be interested in annual statistics 
for the whole country, whereas individuals in a floodplain will be more concerned about their 
Background and analysis of problem domain 25 
personal risk (although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive). As seen in Section 2.2 the 
impacts of flooding vary between countries and it is only natural for people from different areas to 
weigh the economical, social and environmental impacts differently to each other and sometimes 
national policy makers. 
2.7.2. Risk management 
Risk management framework 
Risk management aims to facilitate the assessment and mitigation of undesirable outcomes (such as 
flooding) by providing a common framework for identifying uncertainty and comparing different 
intervention options. The generic risk management framework (Figure 2.3) includes the process of 





II Intervention II 
State i+1 State i 
Figure 2.3 The generic risk management cycle (adapted from HM Treasury, 2001) 
The f ooding system 
Before risk management can begin, the scope of the system must first be identified. Flooding may 
have positive or negative impacts on any part of the natural and built environment. Integrated 
flood risk management incorporates these different aspects of the flooding system and their 
influences on each other. Key elements of the flooding system include (Penning-Rowsell and 
Tunstall, 1995, Smith and Ward, 1998, Kundzewicz and Takeuchi, 1999 and Hall et al., 2003): 
" The physical (geomorphological, hydrological and hydraulic) processes involved in flooding. 
" Flood control structures, such as drainage systems, storage reservoirs and flood defences. 
" Economic, social and environmental assets that are impacted on by flooding and/or influence 
flooding processes. 
" Organisations with a statutory responsibility for managing flood risk. 
" Insurance companies providing cover for flood risk (thereby acting as a means of transferring 
or sharing flood risk). 
" Other stakeholders effected by flooding or interventions taken to manage flood risk. 
These sub-systems will contain a mixture of `hardware' (plant, computers, instrumentation etc. ), 
`software' (databases, models etc. ) and `bioware' (people, the environment etc. ) (Wymore, 1993). 
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Changes in flood risk 
Intervention strategies can alter the behaviour of different parts of these sub-systems, some 
examples of possible human interventions are given in Table 2.1. Changes may also result from 
natural processes such as climate change or long term geomorphological evolution. Figure 2.4 
shows how human and natural interventions can alter flood risk. It can be seen that enhancement 
or deterioration of the defence infrastructure act to increase or decrease the probability of 
inundation. Public education and improved flood warning will reduce the consequences of 
flooding. Uncontrolled development in the floodplain will clearly act to increase flood 
consequences, however, the probability of flooding may be increased due to the loss of drainage 
and alteration of floodplain properties. 
Table 2.1 Examples offlood risk management interventions (Hall et al., 2003) 
Intervention Effect of action Role 
Development control in Limit to construction. of buildings Planning authorities 
floodplains and infrastructure in the flood 
plain, hence controlled increase in 
vulnerability 
Improving flood resistance of Reduced flood damage Property developers and 
buildings building owners 
Increasing public awareness of More effective public action to Building occupants 
temporary measures to reduce reduce flood damage to building 
flood impact on building contents 
contents 
Flood insurance Redistribution of the cost of Insurance companies 
damage across the population and 
through time 
Increasing storage in Reduced flood severity Property and infrastructure 
catchments and reducing the developers, planning 
rate of runoff (source control) authorities and farmers. 
Urban drainage Reduced probability of flooding. Water authorities, local 
authorities and highways 
authorities. 
Flood defence Reduced probability of flooding Environment Agency and 
" Planning (up to events that overtop the local authorities. 




Soft engineering eg. beach Reduce vulnerability of defences Environment Agency and 
nourishment and vegetation fl local authorities 
management 
Real time flood forecasting . Reduced 
flood impact (if followed Environment Agency and 
and warning by appropriate action by the Meteorological Office 
._.:,, . public) Emergency repair of flood Reduced probability of flooding Environment Agency and 
defences emergency services 
Evacuation of people in flood Reduced public safety and health Emergency services 
events impacts of flooding 
Post-flood recovery and Reduced social, health and Local authorities and 
reconstruction '. :° economic impacts of flooding - insur ``' ers 
ý- 
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Defence deterioration or 
vandalism 
Increasing rainfall and 
storminess 
Flood warning and I Public awareness 
emergency response 
Probability of flooding 
Figure 2.4 How human and natural interventions can change food risk (Sayers et al., 2002) 
2.7.3. Risk assessment methods and techniques 
A risk assessment involves (Stewart and Melchers, 1997): 
(1) identification of the hazards, 
(2) identification and estimation of the consequences of these hazards, 
(3) estimation of the likelihood of a hazard occurring, 
(4) evaluation of the significance of the risks, and, 
(5) identification and evaluation of the uncertainties. 
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Risk management encompasses the risk assessment process, how it is used within the decision- 
making process and also involves the mitigation of risks and uncertainties. DEFRA (2000b) 
recommend flood defence managers in England and Wales take a tiered approach to risk 
assessment, with qualitative approaches being recommended for shoreline and catchment 
management plans and where possible, quantitative methods being applied for the more detailed 
strategy plans. 
Identification of hazards 
Hazard identification identifies the sources of risk to the system. This process is usually 
undertaken by a team of experts applying one of a number of techniques to aid them. These 
techniques range from an initial brainstorming or Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) (Stewart and 
Melchers, 1997) through more formalised techniques such as the Structured What-If Checklist 
(SWIFT) (HSE, 2001), Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Stamatis, 1995), Failure 
Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (CIRIA, 2001) to specialised techniques for highly 
complex systems, such as Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) (Kletz, 1997). 
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Changes in flood risk 
Intervention strategies can alter the behaviour of different parts of these sub-systems, some 
examples of possible human interventions are given in Table 2.1. Changes may also resultom 
natural processes such as climate change or long term geomorphological evolution. Figure .g 
shows how human and natural interventions can alter flood risk. It can be seen that enhance 
or deterioration of the defence infrastructure act to increase of decrease the probability of 
inundation. Public education and improved flood warning will reduce the consequences of 
flooding. Uncontrolled development in the floodplain will clearly act to increase flood 
consequences, however, the probability of flooding may be increased due to the loss of 
and alteration of floodplain properties. 
Table 2.1 Examples of f ood risk management tnterwntlons (Nall et at.. 2003) 
Intervention Effect of action Role 
Development control in Limit to construction of buildings Planning authorities 
floodplains and infrastructure in the flood 
plain, hence controlled increase in 
vulnerability 
Improving flood resistance of Reduced flood damage Property developers ax1od 
buildings building owners 
Increasing public awareness of More effective public action to Building occupants 
temporary measures to reduce reduce flood damage to building 
flood impact on building contents 
contents 
Flood insurance Redistribution of the cost of Insurance companies 
damage across the population and 
through time 
Increasing storage in Reduced flood severity Property and mfrsstn 
catchments and reducing the developers, planning 
rate of runoff (source control) authorities and farniers 
Urban drainage Reduced probability of flooding. Vater authorities, locaa 
authorities and highes 
authorities. 
Flood defence Reduced probability of flooding Environment Agency 





Soft engineering eg. beach Reduce vulnerability of defences Environment Agency a 
nourishment and vegetation local authorities 
management 
Real time flood forecasting Reduced flood impact (if followed Environment Agency 
and warning by appropriate action by the Meteorological Office 
public) 
Emergency repair of flood Reduced probability of flooding Environment Agencyý - 
defences emergency services 
Evacuation of people in flood Reduced public safety and health Emergency services 
events impacts of flooding 
Post-flood recovery and Reduced social, health and Local authorities and 
reconstruction economic impacts of flooding insurers 
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Figure 2.4 How human and natural interventions can change flood risk (Sayers et al., 2002) 
2.7.3. Risk assessment methods and techniques 
A risk assessment involves (Stewart and Melchers, 1997): 
(1) identification of the hazards, 
(2) identification and estimation of the consequences of these hazards, 
(3) estimation of the likelihood of a hazard occurring, 
(4) evaluation of the significance of the risks, and, 
(5) identification and evaluation of the uncertainties. 
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Risk management encompasses the risk assessment process, how it is used within the decision- 
making process and also involves the mitigation of risks and uncertainties. DEFRA (2000b) 
recommend flood defence managers in England and Wales take a tiered approach to risk 
assessment, with qualitative approaches being recommended for shoreline and catchment 
management plans and where possible, quantitative methods being applied for the more detailed 
strategy plans. 
Identification of hazards 
Hazard identification identifies the sources of risk to the system. This process is usually 
undertaken by a team of experts applying one of a number of techniques to aid them. These 
techniques range from an initial brainstorming or Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) (Stewart and 
Melchers, 1997) through more formalised techniques such as the Structured What-If Checklist 
(SWIFT) (HSE, 2001), Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Stamatis, 1995), Failure 
Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (CIRIA, 2001) to specialised techniques for highly 
complex systems, such as Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) (Kletz, 1997). 
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Indicative methods of risk assessment 
Risk registers and matrices are frequently used to tabulate and record risks and document the 
decisions, for example steps taken to mitigate the risk. These are mostly associated with project 
risk assessment. An example of a risk register is shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Example of a risk register (DEFRA, 2000b) 
Project No. Project Manager 
Project Name 
Project Description 
Risks Probability Consequence Assessment Mitigation Action By Residual Risk 
Frequently precise probabilities of occurrence of an event are not available, or the cost to obtain 
them would be inappropriate for the level of analysis of the risk assessment. Linguistic bands are 
therefore used to describe the probability, for example, ranging from `frequent' through 
`occasional' to `improbable'. These can be correlated to numerical values if these are required for 
a quantitative analysis. The mitigation measure is designed to reduce the risk that has been 
identified (this could involve reducing the consequences or the probability of occurrence or a 
combination of the two). The residual risk remaining after this action is taken should be identified, 
and if necessary take further mitigating measures (CIRIA, 1996). 
Risk matrices of likelihood and consequence can be a convenient and useful method of displaying 
this information (CIRIA, 1996), as shown in Table 2.3, where darker shades of grey are used to 
represent greater risks. This method is recommended by CIRIA (2001) for a simple strategic level 
risk assessment of infrastructure embankment condition in order to categorise the risk and identify 
actions to be taken. 
Table 2.3 An example of a risk matrix, with darker shades representing a higher risk 
Consequences 
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Comparative qualitative methods, such as the risk matrix, are useful in that they allow different 
types of hazard to be compared on the same scale, require a relatively small amount of specialist 
skill and allow easy prioritisation of the risks. However, they require many judgements and one of 
their weaknesses is the inconsistency with which these are assessed. Hazards may also have many 
possible levels of consequence, for example, ' tripping on a banana skin may result in anything from 
a bruise to a broken back (Stewart and Melchers, 1997). The connectivity between different 
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aspects of the system, for example how several small hazards occurring at the same time may have 
a consequence greater than the sum of their individual consequences, is not considered. 
Some of these problems are addressed by Failure mode element and criticality analysis (FMECA). 
This prioritises the risk of failure associated with individual structural components. FMECA 
combines event trees with a risk register to produce a location, cause, indicator diagram (Figure 
2.5) that can be used to rank each failure mode according to the combined likelihood of occurrence, 
consequence and confidence. 
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Figure 2.5 Part of a FMECA analysis of a concrete dam (Morri. et al., 2000) LIBRARY' 
ENGINEN" 
The criticality of an element is assessed by multiplying the likelihood, consequence and confidence 
score. This is multiplied by the impact to provide a measure of risk (Morris et al., 2000). This 
offers a mechanism for considering risk in a transparent and auditable framework without the need 
for excessive probabilistic analysis. This has been tested within the UK dams industry using 
quantitative comparisons of criticality, confidence and consequences (CIRIA, 2000), similar 
methods have been adapted in British Columbia in order to perform a full probabilistic analysis of 
dam safety (Nielsen et al., 1994). 
Event trees are tools that describe the sequences of events from an initial event to a final outcome 
(HSE, 2001). For example, inadequate filter layers in a revetment can lead to a loss of fill beneath 
the revetment, resulting in a loss of strength of the revetment, resulting in premature damage of the 
revetment. The causes and effects can be modelled in a fault or event tree. An event tree is a 
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logical representation of the events that may follow from an initiating event (eg. high water levels). 
An example of an event tree for a flood defence is shown in Figure 2.6. 
High water level? Heavy rainfall? Failure of pumps? Outcome 
Yes -Flooding 
P(R) P(WL)XP(R) 
Yes Yes -Flooding 
P(WL) No P(P) P(WL)X(1-P(R))XP(P) Overtopping of 
defence 1-P(R) No No flooding 
1-P(P) P(WL)x(1-P(R))X(1-P(P)) 
No No flooding 
1-P(WL) 1-P(WL) 
Figure 2.6 An example of an event tree 
Fault trees often appear similar to event trees, but they are a logical diagram showing all the failure 
or partial failure mechanisms that contribute to the failure of a structure (Thomas'and Hall, 1992) 
Figure 2.7-shows an example of a fault tree. The AND gate represents the assumption of 
independence whilst the OR gate represents mutual exclusivity. . 
Failure of 
flood defence 





mode 1 mode 2 
Pf, Pf2 
Figure 2.7 An example of a fault tree 
Probabilistic methods 
Many quantitative methods, such as fault trees, require the estimation of failure probabilities. 
Present guidance in England and Wales, described in Section 2.5 and Appendix C, requires the use 
of probabilistic discounting. Failure probabilities and degradation rates are assigned by experts. In 
-the context of 
flooding, flood events are best described in terms of probability distributions to 
reflect the likely range of loads to which they are subjected. Uncertainties in defence response 
have also been represented using probability distributions (see for example Oumeraci et al., 2001). 
The main steps to making a probabilistic assessment of flood risk involve: 
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(1) describing loads (eg. water level, marine storminess) probabilistically, 
(2) describing defence system response probabilistically, 
(3) modelling inundation, and, 
(4) estimating the consequences of defence failure over a range of flood events. 
Description of loads as joint probability distributions using methods such as those described by 
Hawkes ei al. (2002) that consider joint loadings in the coastal environment are widely applied in 
current practice (CIRIA and CUR, 1991, CUR and TAW, 1990). River loads can be described 
probabilistically and this has been well established in current practice by the Flood Estimation 
Handbook (CEHW, 1999). 
Extensive research (including CUR and TAW, 1990, Casciati, 1992, Lamberti, 1992, Reeve and 
Burgess, 1994, Wolff, 1997, Cooke et al., 1997, Madrell et al., 1998, Reeve, 1998, Martinelli et al., 
2000, Oumeraci et al., 2001, Voortman et al., 2002, Reeve, 2002) has studied the estimation of 
flood defence failure probabilities using reliability methods. However, their application to flood 
defence management in England and Wales has been limited (predominantly due to insufficient 
data). In the Netherlands where rather more data on flood defences is available, they have started 
to use the PC-RING software (Steenbergen, 2001) to perform a full probabilistic analysis for each 
of their ring dyke systems. This software estimates the failure probability of the dyke system using 
first order reliability methods (see Section 3.3.2 for a detailed explanation of these techniques) to 
estimate failure probabilities for a number of failure modes for each dyke section. The failure 
modes analysed are overtopping, piping, inner slope stability, outer slope stability and revetment 
failure. To perform the reliability analysis a complete set of information on loadings and defence 
property is required. PC-Ring assumes parameters are suitably expressed as either a point value or 
a probability distribution. Certain values, such as the variance of soil cohesion, are usually based 
on expert judgement, or a representative default value, rather than an investigative study of the soil 
(Harr, 1995). Whilst the software is specifically set up to assess the ring dyke systems that are so. 
common in the Netherlands, the theory behind the reliability analysis is transferable. However, 
implementation of these methods in the UK would be limited by the lack of necessary information 
and the cost associated with obtaining it. 
The USACE (1996) more commonly use expert judgement to construct relationships between 
water height and failure probability rather than more explicit approach proposed by Wolff (1997). 
Wolff s approach calculates the failure probability of failure modes that can be described by limit 
state functions using First Order Second Moment (FOSM) methods (these are described in detail in 
Chapter 3). However, Wolff acknowledges that limit states are not well developed for some 
functions, if at all, and introduced an additional `judgement' limit state function that elicits expert 
judgment to account for other items not explicitly modelled. This `judgement function' is analysed 
in the same manner as a traditional limit state function using FOSM methods. A total failure 
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probability for a structure is calculated by making the conservative assumption that the failure 
modes are independent. The most recent guidance on geotechnical reliability (USACE, 1999) 
recommends the use of fault trees populated with probabilities obtained either from reliability 
calculations or expertjudgement to calculate levee failure probabilities. HEC software (USACE, 
1998) is used to support the calculations in the guidance and uses several packages to perform the 
hydrological, hydrodynamic, reliability and economic analyses to calculate flood risks. This 
method clearly offers the benefit of considering the key processes in assessing flood risk, but 
simplifications have been made as the system is not fully integrated; for example, the effect of 
failure of upstream defences on downstream loads. 
Reliability, uncertainty and the theory behind probabilistic risk assessment are elaborated in 
Chapter 3. 
Additional methods 
There are other tools a decision-maker can use to help support decisions in a risk framework and 
some of these have been reviewed by HR Wallingford (2002). Ultimately the choice of method 
should reflect the decision being supported, for example a radial uncertainty chart provides a means 
to graphically assess the importance of different uncertainties and would be used when 
identification of the largest uncertainties was a key factor influencing a decision. 
Figure 2.8 A radial uncertainty chart (HR Wallingford, 2002) 
Figure 2.8 shows an example of how a radial uncertainty chart for a beach nourishment project may 
look. Along each line are uncertainties in the future environment (UE), uncertainties in values, 
costs or quantities (UV) and related decisions (often made by third parties) that may influence the 
long term outcome of the project (UR). The circles in Figure 2.8 represent the uncertainty in sea 
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level rise (1), uncertainty in global circulation models (2), uncertainty in future CO2 levels 
(3), 
uncertainty in project costs (4) and uncertainty in future legislation related to offshore dredging 
(5). 
2.7.4. Risk as a decision-making tool 
The move towards integrated flood risk assessment brings many advantages to flood defence 
management. These advantages are that it: 
" allows consideration of the entire flood defence system and the interconnectivity of its 
components, 
" 'incorporates uncertainties associated with the assessment of system behaviour, 
" offers an insight into the sensitivity of the flood risk to these uncertainties, 
" explicitly considers the costs of improving the system and impacts of system failure, 
" is transparent and auditable, and, 
" provides a logical and rational basis for development of flood management policy and 
resources and monitoring the performance of flood mitigation activities. 
Because of this, risk assessments can be used to support a broad range of decisions relating to flood 
and coastal defence systems, these include: 
" strategic planning at a national, catchment and coastal cell level, 
" planning of flood warning and emergency response, 
" regulation of development, 
" prioritisation and justification of capital schemes, 
" prioritisation and justification of maintenance, 
" prioritisation and optimisation of monitoring strategies, 
" identification and optimisation of data collection strategies, and, 
" scheme design and optimisation of both hard and soft defences. 
In general, decision-making involves selecting a preferred option of intervention for the system by 
considering the predicted performance of the system in terms of meeting a set of performance 
objectives (DEFRA, 2000b). For flood and coastal defence managers, these are usually indicators 
of economical, social and environmental performance. Maximising the value associated with an 
option, by minimising the environmental, social and economic risks, provides the decision-maker 
with a logical manner on which to base their decision (Hall, 2000). Areas of higher risk can be 
targeted for investment and the benefits of different interventions can be explored and justified in 
an auditable and transparent manner. A good risk assessment will also identify and evaluate the 
uncertainties allowing a decision-maker to account for these in the decision and mitigate them 
where possible. This is especially important in flood and coastal defence where' there is often 
considerable uncertainty in determining the probability and consequences of flood events (HR 
Wallingford, 2002). The benefits of data acquisition schemes and their subsequent effect on' 
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uncertainty can be explored within a risk-based framework. Quantitative risk assessments can be 
used to perform the economic optimisation of structural design. This has been formalised by 
Sorensen et al. (1994), Voortman et al. (1998) and Tung (2000). 
min C(Z) = Co +G'J (ý+ý 






where C(z) is the total cost as a function of the vector of design variables z Co represents costs not 
dependent on the design variable such as initial studies, C1, (z) construction costs as a function of 
design variables (including time), Cfdamage costs from failure, C,,. i maintenance costs, Pf 
probability of failure, r' is the net interest rate, g is the yearly rate of economic growth and N is the 
structure's lifetime. Economic optimisation of soft defences, such as beach nourishment schemes, 
has been demonstrated through integration of sediment transport models, simulations of 
nourishment strategies and probabilistic discounting of costs and consequences by Dawson and 
Flory (1999), van Noortwijk and Peerbolte (2000) and Johnson and Hall (2002). 
Assessment of risk brings many advantages to flood defence management as it provides a useful 
and logical basis for supporting a wide range of decisions. However, it should be noted that risk- 
based management is not without potential pitfalls that need to be avoided (Hall, 2000). These 
range from the practicalities of obtaining and using evidence in a risk assessment to more 
philosophical issues related to modelling and decision-making and are expanded upon in the 
following sections. 
Risk communication and perception 
How risk is communicated and perceived by others is a potential problem with disseminating 
probabilistic risk assessments (Royal Society, 1993). Numerical risk assessments can be accepted 
as fact rather than the partially subjective evaluations they are (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). 
Engineers in the UK also have difficulty in communicating even relatively basic risk concepts to 
members of the general public (Hall et al., 1998). 
People's reaction to risks will depend on their values (organisational, cultural etc. ) and objectives, 
for example some people will value economic risks more highly than environmental risks. Public 
opinion can also be heavily influenced by the media. Less frequent, but higher consequence 
events, for example a train crash, will often receive more attention than more frequent, lower 
consequence events, such as a car crash (Royal Society, 1983). Risks may be voluntarily accepted, 
for example dangerous activities such as parachuting. Westerners are usually prepared to accept 
risks between 100 and 1000 times greater if they are voluntary (Starr, 1969). Flooding is rarely 
perceived to be a voluntary risk. Whilst the UK government favours taking a risk neutral (as 
opposed to risk averse or risk seeking) perspective to investment decisions (HM Treasury, 1997) in 
order that over a long time the net value for the tax payer is maximised, the attitudes of the public 
towards serious flood events should be considered and it may often be necessary to adopt a risk 
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averse (accepting a lower risk than the expected risk) decision-making strategy that constrains the 
risk of extreme events. 
Beck (1992) and DETR et al. (2000) warn that risk assessment needs to be a transparent and 
inclusivp'process to ensure that maximum support is gained from the public and decision-makers. 
Therefore to ensure that efforts to create ever more sophisticated and improved techniques for risk 
assessment are accepted into the decision-making process, the risks and the assessment 
methodologies must be appropriately communicated. 
Modelling 
A quantitative risk assessment by its very nature requires modelling. The sophistication of the 
models ranges from a simple limit state description of failure to a continuous simulation of an 
entire system. A model is by definition an abstraction of reality and will only ever be an 
approximation of the processes governing system behaviour. This approximation is due to (Davis 
and Blockley, 1996): 
" that which cannot be foreseen, perhaps because the phenomena are previously unknown, or the 
interconnectivity between phenomena is not understood, and, 
" that which is foreseeable but is: 
(a) ignored by mistake, 
(b) ignored by choice, perhaps because the process is considered unimportant, or, 
(c) ignored because of a lack of resources, perhaps because the process is too complex to 
model or necessary data is too costly to obtain. 
There are often limits to the predictability of some processes in the long term. For example, De 
Vriend (1991) argues that long term trends in coastal evolution are "a weak residual of a very 
`noisy' signal of short term variability". 
Measuring modelling uncertainties involves devoting a large amount of effort and computer 
resources. The integration of probabilistic methods into these models adds a further order of 
complexity (Hall, 2000). For these reasons, it is likely that this is why the majority of modellers 
use models that are `fit-for-purpose' and it is relatively rare for modelling uncertainties to be 
accounted for (Beven, 2002). However, even if model uncertainties are not explicitly measured a 
decision-maker needs to be aware (if only in a qualitative sense) of the limitations of the models as 
ultimately, the risk assessment reflects their completeness and dependability and this should be 
considered in subsequent decision-making. 
Expert judgement 
There is much evidence that can be used to assess flood risk. Hall (1999) identified 117 data 
collection and analysis processes for a single managed set back project on the East Coast of the 
UK. The amount and type of uncertainty will vary according to the type of evidence and collection 
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processes. As identified in Sections 2.5,2.6 and 2.8, expertjudgement plays an important role 
in 
decision-making in England and Wales. Ideally probabilities used in risk assessment are 
constructed from quantitative or statistical analysis, although the choice of method used for the 
analysis and the applicability of the data used are in themselves subjective judgements. Expert 
judgements are naturally prone to bias (Kahneman et al., 1982 and Cooke, 1991) and to minimise 
this bias, the decision-maker should (Hall, 2000, DEFRA, 2000b): 
" define the event to which the judgement is being attached precisely, 
" 'structure the problem logically so initiating events can be linked to consequences, 
" check the judgement for inconsistencies by logically structuring the elicitation and obtaining 
other judgements that can then be subjected to peer review and criticism, 
" use available quantitative information to inform expert judgement, 
" document and structure the evidence and process by which the judgement is elicited, and, 
" assign `most likely' or `best' and `worst' estimates rather than point estimates. 
Expert judgements are an important source of evidence of system behaviour and should not be 
ignored. However, these judgements, be they in the form of evidence of performance, or 
judgements about the suitability of a particular model should be acknowledged and made 
transparent in the decision-making process. The uncertainty associated with these judgements 
should be acknowledged and evident in the risk assessment, this issue is discussed below. 
Capturing uncertainty 
Lindley (1971) argues that probability can be used to capture all forms of uncertainty. There are 
many situations in which probabilistic handling of uncertainty will be useful to the flood defence 
manager. For example, river flow cannot be predicted with certainty, but given historical flow 
records it is possible to construct a probability distribution of flow rates. However, in many 
decision-making situations information is incomplete or in the form of expert opinions expressed in 
vague linguistic terms. The uncertainty associated with this data needs to be appropriately 
represented in the risk assessment. Current approaches to quantitative risk assessment in England 
and Wales require judgements on defence strength to be expressed as subjective probabilities of 
failure: However, this sort of discrete representation of failure probability is inappropriate for 
capturing a judgement that is characterised by vague, incomplete or ambiguous information. This 
type of uncertainty, or fuzziness, may be represented as interval bounds or fuzzy sets. These 
provide a'description of the possible space in which the actual value is expected to lie, without 
endeavouring to attach probabilities of the likelihood of the value. Fuzzy descriptions of 
parameters have been proven useful in capturing uncertainty in structural condition (Yao, 1997) 
and geotechnical conditions (Dodagoudar and Venkatachalam, 2000). Where uncertainty is less 
amenable, to representation as a probability distribution it should be expressed in an appropriate 
7, 
syntax in the risk assessment. 
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Decision-making 
The economics of decisions are compared by DEFRA (2000a, 2002) using several techniques. The 
shortcomings of one of the simplest tools, a benefit-cost analysis are readily acknowledged (Hall et 
al., 2003). Discounting is used to evaluate the whole life cost and benefit economics of schemes, 
however its shortcomings for valuing sustainability are recognised by Adams (1995). This has 
been recognised at a national level (DETR, 1999b) where economics is considered alongside the 
environment, health and other social indicators as evidence of sustainable development. The short 
fallings of economic tools needs to be considered in decision-making. 
Traditionally the justification of intervention schemes that involve construction or maintenance of 
defences to reduce flood risk has focused on measuring the benefits in terms reducing economic 
losses (DEFRA, 1993). Critical reviews (Bye and Homer, 1998, ICE, 2001) have resulted in a 
more explicitly multi-attribute approach (HM Treasury, 1999) that also considers social and 
environmental indicators (DEFRA, 2002). However, care must be taken with such approaches. 
These approaches are usually applied it the earlier stages of project management to reduce the 
number of schemes before a detailed appraisal. Multi-attribute methods do not currently take into 
account the uncertainty associated with the scoring system used which is more likely to be 
prevalent at an earlier stage in project appraisal. There are probabilistic ways of handling this 
uncertainty (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) but Hall (2000) recommends an interval approach. Whilst 
this will not necessarily enable a single preferred option to be identified, it is usually more 
appropriate to identify a handful of options for further study. 
Decision-makers should be aware that whilst a risk assessment provides an `optimum' solution, this 
is based only on those effects considered in the analysis and is therefore vulnerable to events not 
included. These effects can be mitigated by good risk management that includes monitoring, 
managing vulnerability, reducing response time, reducing mitigation costs and remaining flexible 
(Collingridge, 1980). This compliments the observational method that was introduced to 
geotechnical engineering (Peck, 1969 and CIRIA, 1999). This method suggests that where there is 
a high degree of uncertainty it is better to prepare for the most likely conditions and be ready to 
adapt the design based on monitoring. This approach is most useful if the decision-maker is able to 
adapt their decisions and update their models as more information becomes available, and often 
forms the basis of beach nourishment techniques (Hall, 2000). It may be necessary to weigh the 
apparent loss of flexibility in adopting the `optimum' decision against the loss in flexibility. 
Robustness will usually be favoured in conditions of high uncertainty. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.9 where scheme B has the highest risk, and based only on this information scheme A 
would appear preferable. However, the uncertainty associated with scheme A is much greater. A 
decision-maker has to therefore weigh up the advantages of a greater expected reduction in risk 
against having a more robust scheme. 
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RISK 
Figure 2.9 Uncertainty in the decision-making process 
2.8. CURRENT PRACTICE IN FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT 
The previous sections have provided a review of the techniques and guidance available to flood 
defence managers in England and Wales. An insight into less formalised procedures and actual 
practice which was obtained through: 
" visits to three Environment Agency offices, 
" informal interviews with Environment Agency staff, 
" informal discussion (in the form of interactive seminars) with experts and professionals 
involved in flood defence and infrastructure management, and, 
" site visits with EA officers and separately with sub-contracted engineering consultant that 
included condition assessment inspections of flood defence works. 
The findings of this study are summarised below. 
Application of guidance 
The FDMM is only applied to a limited extent. This uptake varies considerably amongst the 
regional and area offices. Data logging in the FDMS is also inconsistent, with some offices being 
able to provide records going back further than a decade and others with only recent visual 
inspections. A number of reasons were identified for this limited uptake: 
(1) The FDMM superseded the previous procedures of the individual regions. Whilst national 
consistency was recognised as being desirable, it was felt that the FDMM was inferior to the 
procedures already in place. 
(2) The procedures laid out in the FDMM appear laborious and time consuming to decision- 
makers and the value which they provide is not obvious. " 
(3) Information in legacy databases could often not be stored within the FDMS (due to 
insufficient database fields). 
(4) The FDMS is, not a-well designed, user friendly piece of software. A front-end has since 
been created to enable compatibility with more accessible databases. 
(5) Capital projects that are applying for DEFRA grant aid (and frequently those not applying 
for grant aid) are required to follow different guidance. 
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In April 2002, the NFCDD took over from the FDMS as the EA's database. The procedures within 
the FDMM are currently being reviewed. 
Limited application of the FDMM, the ongoing review of asset management procedures and the 
recognition by flood defence managers of the benefits available from risk-based management 
has 
resulted in interim approaches being adopted by different EA regional offices. These vary 
according to the resolution at with the risk is measured, being at either the reach or individual 
defence level. Limited data has required that these methods are based on a comparison of defence 
condition and a crude measure of the consequences of flooding based on the land use along the 
reach. These qualitative risk-based approaches are used to support prioritisation of maintenance 
and inspections. Aside from recent estimates of an expected annual, damage for England and 
Wales 
(Halcrow, 2001), flood risk tends not to be quantified. 
Other guidance such as DEFRA's FCDPAG series and SMPs (and in the near future, CFMPs) are 
more rigorously applied than the FDMM. The greater flexibility in these guidelines allows the' 
latest technological advancements to be applied. Aside from meeting legal requirements (such as, 
for example, satisfying the European Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000) capital projects are 
required to follow these more stringent guidelines if they are to apply for DEFRA grant aid. The 
scale and amount of funds being invested in capital projects will mean a detailed analysis is often 
more appropriate. 
Data gathering and analysis 
In the same manner as the degree of FDMM implementation varies, so do the EA's data gathering 
activities. Some regions commission full and detailed surveys of their assets similar to those 
suggested by the NRA (1993), others record just a visual inspection of asset condition (described in 
Section 2.6.1). The limited nature of this assessment means there is a large amount of uncertainty 
associated with this information. Its use as an indicator of the performance of a flood defence is 
limited and should therefore not be the sole piece of evidence on which investment decisions are 
based. 
The value of data collection activities is not always recognised. Data is often collected based on an 
historical precedence rather than within a framework that weighs the use of the data against its cost. 
Regular monitoring of defence crest levels, one of the most important pieces of evidence needed to 
assess the performance of a flood defence (NRA, 1993, TAW, 1999b), does not take place 
nationally across England and Wales. Whilst measurement of crest levels is important, their use is 
limited without loading information. 
The resolution and level of analysis of data is not always appropriate to the decision it is being used 
to inform. Frequently information content is lost through discretisation of detailed datasets. For 
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example, land use bands categorise the floodplain behind a reach according to likely damages. 
They are often obtained from surveys that require precise evaluation of the assets in the floodplain. 
This evaluation is then discretised crudely into five bands, which could be as accurately and more 
cheaply estimated from the study of an Ordnance Survey map. This band and not the results from 
the detailed survey are used to support investment decisions. 
Information collected by one initiative within the EA is not always communicated to other 
initiatives or departments. Data collected by local authorities has often been unavailable or 
difficult to obtain. The advent of the NFCDD is improving data communication, but this issue has 
also been recognised by DEFRA and Environment Agency (2001). However, even when data is 
adequately communicated the sheer volume means that without the benefit of the types of methods 
proposed in this thesis, decision-makers will struggle to maximise its usage. 
Decision-making 
The FDMM provides a decision-making methodology that has been automated to some extent 
within the FDMS. Although some aspects of the methodology can be considered to be quasi-risk- 
based in that some measure of consequence and proneness to defence failure are measured the 
usefulness of these methods is limited as they: 
" are difficult to follow and frequently introduce unexplained coefficients, weightings and 
formulae, 
0 do not consider uncertainty, 
" do not analyse data at a level appropriate to the scale of the decision being supported, and, 
" do not allow comparison of different intervention options (eg. repairs, maintenance and capital 
projects). 
As a result of this, the application of the FDMM to support decision-making is resisted by flood 
defence managers. 
Flood Defence Officers (FDOs) are responsible for asset inspections and identifying the need for 
intervention works. They usually have a very good knowledge of their area of responsibility and 
the behaviour and condition of the assets within it. An understanding of an asset's behaviour is 
vl- crucial in its management (NRA, '1993) and the experience of many of the FDOs means they have 
'an overview of the performance of the system through time instead of the snapshot provided by an 
assessment using the Condition Assessment Manual. This knowledge and experience ensures the) 
play a key role in identifying areas of concern and recommending action to be taken. 
Boland et al. (1990) suggest that individuals are engaged in cycles' of decision-making in their ow 
domain. This corresponds to what was observed in the Environment Agency where decision- 
making by flood defence managers is much more likely to be a result of negotiation at parallel 
levels within the organisation. For example, prioritising maintenance works is dominated by the 
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results of negotiation between managers and a number of FDOs working in different parts of the 
flood defence system rather than using the FDMM. The budget would be decided by negotiation 
between area managers, regional managers and the Regional or Local Flood Defence Committees. 
This is shown in Figure 2.10 that provides an overview of some of the flood defence infrastructure 
decision-making processes. 
This suggests that there is a substantial reliance on the experience of the FDOs, a result of this is 
that a recommendation to invest money in a defence is made by just one person with little or no 
transparency or auditability in their decision-making process. It is only relatively recently that 
information on asset condition has been recorded centrally and in a nationally consistent manner 
and so there is potential for much of this `corporate memory' to be lost when an FDO leaves or 
retires. To compound this loss, in-house expertise has been reduced due to down-sizing and out- 
sourcing of many technical services. 
Large projects frequently involve many organisations (ranging from engineering consultancies and 
government organisations to charities and environmental bodies) and for larger projects a public 
consultation stage may be required. Aside from being required to make more detailed studies when 
applying for DEFRA funding, the involvement of the public or other organisations requires that 
information is externalised and decisions are made more transparent and auditable. 
Funding 
Funding of flood defences is obtained from many authorities. The majority of funding comes from 
a levy on council tax paid via local councils. The second most important source of funding is 
capital scheme grants from DEFRA (which range from 15-85% of project cost). Venables (1998) 
identifies lottery funds, EU funds and private partnerships as being other funding sources. 
Because funding allocation is reviewed annually it becomes difficult to make long term budget 
plans. Though ten year plans are produced, in truth they are likely to become very unreliable after 
the third year. This is due partly to the uncertainty in predicting the future behaviour of the flood 
defence system and also because the council levies have to be re-negotiated on an annual basis. 
This ensures it is difficult to make long term plans, which is contrary to the aims of making 
management and strategy plans. Whilst there are good reasons for DEFRA to provide grant sizes 
that vary depending on the project and region, the size of grant can greatly influence the type of 
project. It can make more economic sense within a high-grant region to initiate a capital project, 
but without the grant the overall cost of a maintenance project would be less. This discourages a 
strategic approach to management. A recent funding review (DEFRA, 2002b) concurs with this 
and has recommended that the EA be given a block grant to reduce the uncertainty of the annual 
budget. 
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The nature of flooding also serves to undermine investment in defences because the return period 
of severe storm events is greater than the lifetime of the administrations that make the investment 
decisions. Periods of little significant flooding often results in complacency. Fund managers in 
central and local government will be pressurised to re-prioritise funding allocation to a higher 
profile cause. In addition to this, apathy from the general public results in increased losses at the 
next flood event due to a lack of preparedness. After a large flood event, funding for flood defence 
managers will be increased and the cycle continues. This has also been recognised by the ICE 
(2001) in a recent review of river management. 
2.9. ISSUES IDENTIFIED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Previous sections of this chapter have described the structure of flood defence management and the 
present methods used make flood defence investment decisions in England and Wales. It is clear 
from this review there are a number of aspects of flood defence management that can be improved. 
Three key areas have been identified. 
(1) Risk assessment. 
(2) Condition characterisation. 
(3) Decision-support. 
This section identifies the major weaknesses in the present state of the art of these areas and makes 
recommendations that the remainder of this thesis seeks to address. 
2.9.1. Quantitative flood risk assessment 
Section 2.7.4 identified the benefits to be gained from using a risk assessment to support decisions 
as long as the potential weaknesses are recognised and addressed where necessary. A flood risk 
assessment provides a key indicator of the performance of a flood defence system and is required to 
support the appraisal of policy options, allocation of resources and monitoring performance of 
investment in flood management. Flood risk management decisions take place at a number of 
levels, ranging from national policy decisions through planning in catchments and coastal cells and 
localised scheme design and operational decisions. Both government (DEFRA, 1999) and industry 
(ICE, 2001) have identified the need for improved management of flood risk. 
FCDPAG4 (DEFRA, 2000b) provides guidance on risk and uncertainty issues, however, this 
guidance was written with the intention of providing support for the management of capital 
schemes. ' The guidance provides support for a broad range of aspects of risk assessment and 
management and offers only limited guidance for the assessment of the risk of flooding due to 
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The use of risk assessment to support operations and maintenance decisions is currently limited. 
The Standard of Service (SoS) measure used in the FDMM provides an indicator of performance 
and information about expected annual damages. Decisions can be made based on a comparison of 
the current SoS and a target value. The use of the SoS methodology does provide a rudimentary 
risk-based framework as it compares a measure of likelihood and consequence. However, defence 
behaviour is not considered in the SoS meaning an important part of the flood defence system is 
neglected in the estimation of expected annual damages. Even if defence performance was 
considered, the SoS will not necessarily provide the optimal economic solution because of the 
limited consideration of costs and residual risk and the coarse discretisations involved in the 
calculations. Locally introduced risk-based methods provide a qualitative approach to the 
prioritisation of maintenance and inspection frequency. However, this type of approach is limited 
because: 
" risk is only assessed in a comparative manner, 
" uncertainties are not considered, 
" the likelihood of flooding is assumed tö be a function of only the defence condition, 
" changes to the system condition, such as the increase in certainty from regular inspections or 
the increase in performance resulting from maintenance can not be measured in terms of risk, 
" costs associated with the intervention strategies can not be assessed against the reduction in 
risk or uncertainty, 
" qualitative measures of risk from a limited analysis of the consequences and likelihood of 
flooding are only suitable to minor investment decisions. 
Recent guidance (DEFRA, 200 lb and DEFRA, 2001c) has encouraged flood defence managers to 
work in a more strategic manner. This encourages flood defence decisions only to be made after 
considering their influence on other parts of the system, for example increased erosion down drift 
of a sea wall. Likewise, flood risk should be evaluated by considering the behaviour of the system. 
The interaction between defences, water levels and the floodplain all need. to be considered when 
making an assessment of flood risk. 
Quantitative risk assessment methodologies have been introduced in the USA and the Netherlands. 
Naturally, these have been tailored to suit the specific needs of the country or individual situations. 
These approaches are inappropriate for application in England and Wales because of the 
differences in organisational structure, the amounts of funding that are allocated, the availability of 
data and the criticality of flood defences as part of the national infrastructure. However, there is 
clearly a need for methods capable of a more explicit consideration and evaluation of risk to 
support flood defence investment decisions. 
Improving the quality and comprehensiveness of knowledge used is one of the most useful ways of 
improving the risk assessment (National Research Council, 1992). However, the amount of 
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resource, in terms of data acquisition and analysis committed to a risk assessment should reflect the 
nature of the decision(s) that the assessment seeks to inform (De Looff and Van Der Meer, 1998, 
Wang and Xiang, 2002, Sayers et al., 2002). A tiered approach to systems risk assessment, 
building on the work of Meadowcroft et al. (1995) is proposed. The key recommendations for a 
risk assessment are summarised below. 
A tiered assessment that employs progressively more sophisticated analysis to support a range 
of decisions that vary from national funding allocation to maintenance prioritisation and 
individual scheme design. 
9 Quantification of flood risk using probabilistic methods. 
9A broad definition of the flood defence system. 
" An explicit consideration of the dependency and interconnectivity between elements of the 
flood defence system and the failure modes of these defence elements. 
" Quantification of the uncertainties in the risk assessment. 
" Information on loadings, defence performance and consequences should be separated until the 
final stage of the assessment in order to identify the sources of uncertainty. 
A method that satisfies these requirements is described in Chapter 4. 
2.9.2. " Condition characterisation 
A condition characterisation should provide a description of the structure's proneness to failure, 
enabling flood defence asset managers to make more informed decisions about maintenance, - 
monitoring and replacement strategies. In England and Wales, the current condition 
characterisation philosophy is to consider the deterioration of the defence rather than directly 
analysing the defence's capacity to withstand various loadings as is the case in the Netherlands. 
Although grading defences on a scale of 1 to 5 is useful to an extent, it provides rather limited 
information about the defence's proneness to failure and its performance. Whilst the grading is 
based implicitly on the behaviour of the defence, it falls short of the explicit consideration of 
failure modes in the USACE methodology. Both the potential performance and degradation of the 
defence (and therefore the resulting loss in performance) needs to be addressed when making a 
condition characterisation. FCDPAG3 (DEFRA, 2000a) and FCDPAG4 (DEFRA, 2000b) do 
require the use and estimation of defence breach probabilities for use in the appraisal of capital 
projects. These probabilities are usually derived from expert judgement. The probabilities are 
point estimates and do not capture the uncertainty associated with the analysis or the fact that the 
failure probability is conditional on loading. FCDPAG4 also suggests how these failure 
probabilities may change over time to enable long term risks to be estimated, but this change is 
based on probability deterioration functions again, assigned by experts rather than model outputs or 
rates of deterioration of parameters that influence defence strength. 
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A condition characterisation should therefore provide a representation of defence performance over 
a complete range of loads. Uncertainty associated with this performance should be kept separate 
from uncertainties in loading. A condition characterisation methodology should: 
" provide consistency, transparency and auditability, 
" make use of all evidence about a defence's performance in whatever format it appears, be it 
precise measurements, expert judgements, statistical data or model predictions, 
" explicitly consider the uncertainty associated with measurements and expert judgements (Hall 
et al., 1998), 
" provide an indication of the dependability of the condition assessment by reviewing the quality 
of the available information and the process by which it was generated, 
" combine as much site-specific data as exists with generic knowledge about the performance of 
different types of defence, 
" optimise resource use by comparing the cost of obtaining evidence with the reduction in 
uncertainty it provides, whilst also considering the consequences of failure of the defence, 
" allow easy incorporation into a risk-based management framework to allow risk-based 
prioritisation of works and monitoring, and, 
" allow integration into an asset management database and show how a defence performs 
through time, allowing the engineer to identify damage patterns and likely failure modes. 
A new probabilistic approach to condition characterisation of flood and coastal defences that fulfils 
the above objectives is described in Chapter S. 
2.9.3. Decision-support and asset management 
A detailed study of the core guidance manuals (Section 2.5 and Appendix C) and discussion with 
experts and practitioners (Section 2.8) has shown that flood defence management in England and 
Wales involves numerous organisations interacting at a multitude of levels. The sheer scale of the 
operation, the many stakeholders and the vast quantities of monitoring data, places a heavy 
information processing burden on decision-makers which can result in less efficient decisions being 
undertaken. AA number of decision-making processes that could benefit from improved decision- 
support have been identified: 
" transparency and auditability of decision-making, 
" evidence gathering, 
" level of information analysis, 
" handling uncertainty, 
systems and strategic management, and, 
" funding methods. 
These are discussed in the following sections. 
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Transparency and auditability in decision-making 
The introduction of DEFRA's project appraisal guidance has improved the transparency in 
decision-making for large scale capital projects that are applying for a DEFRA grant. SMPs and 
CFMPs also provide improved transparency and auditability in the decision-making process on a 
catchment of coastal cell basis. The guidance provides a degree of technical freedom allowing 
decision-makers to use the most up to date techniques, whilst providing a more standardised 
decision-making process. This improved transparency results from the need to externalise the 
decision-making process to other stakeholders (in many cases this includes the general public). 
Minor capital projects or those that do not qualify for grant aid are not required to follow the 
procedures laid down by DEFRA. However, capital projects are usually appraised using this 
guidance. The FDMM, despite having an appraisal methodology, is generally not used for capital 
project appraisal. 
Guidance for the appraisal of maintenance projects is given by the FDMM. The extent to which 
these are implemented varies across England and Wales. Whilst the FDMM does standardise the 
decision-making process for maintenance, its deficiencies have made it unpopular amongst 
practitioners. Maintenance and inspection decisions are made through a process of negotiation 
between Flood Defence Officers and managers. Whilst the FDOs have a good understanding of the 
behaviour of their part of the flood defence system their decision-making processes need to be 
recorded and captured in a transparent and auditable manner. This reduces the reliance on the 
FDOs as `corporate memory' which is increasingly important as organisational downsizing and the 
outsourcing of work becomes more commonplace. Because the decision-making process has not 
been properly formalised, it is often not clear how the decision to invest is made, what evidence is 
used to support these decisions and why the decision was made to gather this evidence. Despite 
gathering. a great deal of evidence on the performance of flood defences, the connection between 
this evidence and identifying the need for an intervention is frequently not made. 
Decision-making needs to be more integrated. Whilst the decision-making process for larger 
projects has become more transparent, these decisions are still considered and appraised 
independently to maintenance decisions. A more holistic approach that identifies and allows 
comparison of the benefits to the system as a whole from a number of different types of decision 
should be considered. 
Evidence of performance 
The process of options analysis and evaluation in flood defence management involves assembling 
and manipulating vast quantities of evidence. This evidence will appear in a range of formats, 
including dense numerical model results, textual evidence in technical reports, analogous cases, 
expert judgements, and perceptions and value judgements from the wider stakeholder group. In 
other words the evidence appear :, ir ryýdm nt levels of granularity and does not lend itself to 
Uf: RMty 
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being compressed into a single format. Whilst there may be a large volume of information relating 
to a decision, it is on the whole only of partial relevance, incomplete and sometimes conflicting. 
Decision-makers are therefore facing intense information processing demands (Hall and Davis, 
2001) and this requires the structuring of evidence so it can be used efficiently. A number of key 
issues on the evidence of the performance of flood defence systems have been identified, these 
relate to issues of data collection, usage and analysis, the use of expert judgement and the 
importance of flood risk as a measure of flood defence system performance. 
Evidence on system performance needs to be presented in a clear and structured manner to enable 
all stakeholders to communicate better with each other. If these approaches are not consistent and 
to some extent formalised, there is potential for monitoring and remediation resources to be mis- 
directed. 
Information collection and analysis 
Evidence on system performance needs to be of a density, frequency and quality appropriate to the 
decision being supported. The level of analysis should also compliment the scale and importance 
of the decision being supported. Currently detailed information is collected and then discretised to 
support decisions when a more approximate data collection strategy would suffice. Conversely, 
expert judgements can be used to generate precise failure probabilities that are then used to justify 
enormous investments. This approach compliments that of a tiered risk assessment framework 
described in Section 2.9.1. 
Expert judgement 
Because of the scarcity and cost of obtaining monitoring information, there has historically been a 
major input of expertjudgement in condition assessment. Decision-making in the FDMM and 
FCDPAG series relies heavily on expert judgement. A degree of expert judgement is inevitable 
and the experience of experts, such as the FDOs, can provide a lot of useful information on the 
performance of a system. However, it is important that these judgements are explained and 
justified. This ensures that there is transparency in the decision-making process and that the 
decision-maker is aware of where these judgements came from, their limitations and the 
uncertainty associated with them. Integration of both qualitative and quantitative evidence 
provides a broader picture of system performance. 
Flood risk 
Section 2.9.1 identified the need for improved flood risk assessment because of its importance as a 
measure of the performance of a flood defence system. Measures such as flood risk should be 
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considered in the context of other parts of the flood defence system to provide a richer overview of 
system performance. 
Uncertainty 
Whenever making decisions, it is important to consider uncertainty. Uncertainties in flood defence 
management arise from a number of areas, including natural randomness, such as wave loadings 
(inherent uncertainty) or lack of knowledge, for example in geotechnical conditions (epistemic 
uncertainty). Presently, uncertainty is primarily handled through the use of engineering judgement 
and factors of safety. Although the FDMM has no methodology to incorporate uncertainty in the 
decision-making process, more explicit approaches to uncertainty are being promoted (DEFRA, 
2000b). Being able to identify and quantify uncertainty enables the decision-maker to target 
resources more efficiently and optimise data gathering and monitoring strategies. Uncertainties 
and how they influenced the decision-making process need to be recorded in an auditable and 
transparent manner. 
Systems and strategic management 
In order to put into place effective maintenance and investment strategies it is important to be able 
to understand how these strategies will alter the performance of not just a particular asset but the 
entire system. The FDMM provides no guidelines or framework for considering systems effects. 
The importance of this is recognised in SMPs (DEFRA, 2001c), FCDPAG2 (DEFRA, 2001b) and 
CFMPs which promote the implementation of strategic approaches, however, little guidance is 
provided as to how this should be done. 
The interconnectivity of the elements of a flood defence system is not considered sufficiently at 
any level of decision-making. System connectivity needs to be identified at the all levels of the 
system. This needs to start at the lowest levels, where the condition of a flood defence is based on 
an average assessment of all the individual structural elements. The interconnectivity between 
these elements and neighbouring defences needs to be considered. This connectivity is influenced 
by shared properties, such as geotechnical variables, shared loadings and support offered by 
neighbouring defences and elements. The relationship between this physical infrastructure and 
other parts of the system such as flood warning systems, emergency response and education 
programmes also needs to be considered 
Identifying the connectivity of the system provides a better understanding of system behaviour and 
the relative importance of different parts of the system and can help to improve resource allocation. 
There are only a limited number of generic investment decisions for flood defence infrastructure, 
these are: 
" do nothing, 
0 structural repairs (periodic maintenance) 
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" cleaning, mowing etc. (routine maintenance) 
" capital works, 
" increase or decrease inspection frequency, and, 
" increase or decrease data collection. 
To be able to identify the correct choice of intervention, these decisions need to be compared 
within the same methodology. For example, would an increase in maintenance be a more efficient 
long term use of resources than a capital project to replace an asset? Or, would increasing the 
density of data collection increase certainty in the performance of an asset to a level whereby a 
more informed decision can be made? At a higher level in flood defence management, this 
investment in the physical needs to be weighed against the importance of operating a reliable flood 
warning system and public education programmes. 
Understanding the connectivity between system components allows a more holistic approach to 
decision-making to be achieved because the system wide impacts of decisions can be monitored. 
For example, what change in the overall system performance is expected when more money is 
spent on flood warning? Will the reduction in cost resulting from mowing embankments twice a 
year instead of four times a year decrease the overall system performance as a result of less 
efficient conveyance? Being able to answer these questions is of great importance when justifying 
and prioritising investment decisions as investment can be targeted where it is most needed in the 
system. 
Funding 
Funding allocation is reviewed on an annual basis making long term planning difficult. The 
present system of providing block grants to individual projects can lead to a less efficient use of 
funding. Whilst impetus for change with regards to financing flood defence projects needs to come 
from policy makers in national and local government, a decision-support methodology needs to be 
able to demonstrate the benefits that could be achieved from a change in funding strategies. 
Economics need to be incorporated into any decision-support tool so that the flow of funds and any 
change in performance resulting from investment decisions can be demonstrated. 
,s 
Key needs in decision-support 
In the light of the issues discussed above, the following key needs for decision support have been 
identified: 
"" to provide a model that considers the processes enacted by the sub-systems and their 
interconnectivity, 
" 'to assemble evidence about asset condition and performance from diverse sources and 
represent it in a common and coherent model, 
0 to provide a model that integrates risk assessments with other measures of system performance, 
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" to externalize (to outside organisations and other decision stakeholders) expert judgements and 
decisions in a transparent and auditable manner, 
" to provide a commentary on sources and implications of uncertainty in the evidence, 
" to provide a platform for testing the implications of alternative asset management options 
(including data collection options), and, 
9 to facilitate dialogue between experts who specialise in different aspects of the flood defence 
systems and other decision stakeholders. 
Whilst a quantitative flood risk assessment provides a useful and logical decision-making tool, it is 
inevitably incomplete and will exclude evidence of interest to the decision-maker because it 
appears in an inappropriate format or at an unsuitable scale. A performance-based approach to 
asset management that satisfies these criteria is described in Chapter 6. 
2.10. SUMMARY 
Since the Easter floods of 1998, flood defence management in England and Wales has been in a 
state of rapid evolution. This chapter has shown through analysis of the current guidance and 
structure of flood defence management that, coupled with the fact flood defence managers are 
under increasing pressure to use resources more efficiently, ' there is a cogent motive to improve. 
decision-support techniques. Three key areas have been identified for improvement and these are: 
"a quantitative risk assessment methodology that can be tailored to suit the decision being 
supported, 
"a probabilistic condition characterisation methodology that explicitly considers failure modes 
and lends itself to integration within the aforementioned quantitative risk assessment . 
methodology, and, 
"a performance-based decision-support methodology that enables the risk assessment and 
condition characterisation to be integrated within the broader context of system performance. 
These methodologies are described in Chapters 4,5 and 6 respectively. 
Chapter 3 
Theoretical background to flood risk 
assessment 
3.1. OVERVIEW 
This Chapter explores the theoretical background to flood risk analysis. Two of the three areas 
identified for further research in Chapter 2 are improved methods for systems-based risk 
assessment and condition characterisation. A probabilistic method of assessing defence condition 
is a necessary. step on the route to quantitative risk-based management of flood defence systems. 
The theory behind these two areas is explained in this Chapter, whilst much of the theory relating 
to the proposed decision-support methodology is introduced in Chapter 6. 
The structure of this chapter is based on the source-pathway-receptor model (DETR et al., 2000) 
which can be used to establish relationships between the sources of hazards (such as rain or waves), 
the pathway by which it is transmitted (such as over the floodplain) and their consequences (such 
as flooding of property). Originally developed to manage environmental hazards such as pollution, 
this framework is useful as it reflects the physical processes by which flooding occurs and deals 
explicitly with the impacts which concern the decision-maker (Pollard and Guy, 2001). With 
respect to flooding, it is clear that the risk is predominantly governed by the receptor. The source 
(precipitation, waves and tidal surges) cannot be controlled, the pathway (flood defences, and 
floodplain), if managed appropriately can be used to mitigate risk, but it is the receptor (people and 
property) that have the potential to be controlled the most (ICE, 2001). Figure 3.1 shows an 
example of a source-pathway-receptor relationship for a flood defence system. Rain, melting snow 
or coastal storminess leads to increased loading, this in turn results in direct overtopping of the 
defences, or possibly their failure. Failure of the defences results in flooding of residential and 
non-residential property damaging property and the economy. People are also affected with effects 
ranging from distress and inconvenience to illness or loss of life. The impacts on the natural 
environment from flooding can be positive or negative. This may involve the creation of important 
new wetlands, or the destruction of sensitive habits. These impacts may be long or short term. 
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Figure 3.1 An example of a source-pathway-receptor relationship , 
This chapter describes the probabilistic risk assessment process from a theoretical point of view. 
Risk assessment and decision-making in flood defence management are characterised by 
uncertainty. Different types of uncertainty and how the techniques available to handle them are 
therefore reviewed in Section 3.2 prior to consideration of specific steps of a risk assessment. 
Methods used to model the source and estimate loads are described in Section 3.3. A large part of 
the research described in this thesis is on flood defence systems reliability. The pathway aspect of 
the risk assessment is described in Section 3.4. This section describes techniques to estimate 
defence failure probabilities. Section 3.5 discusses the impacts of flooding and how these can be 
measured and incorporated into a quantitative flood risk assessment. 
3.2. UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty is defined by the National Research Council (2002) as: 
"... a general concept that reflects our lack of knowledge or sureness 
about something or someone, ranging from just short of complete 
sureness to an almost complete lack of conviction about an outcome. " 
Early attempts to deal with uncertainty in flood risk management have been based on tradition. For 
example, the USACE (1996) would traditionally add approximately 3ft of freeboard as a factor of 
safety onto their embankments. In the UK (ICE, 2001) and the Netherlands (Pilarczyk, 1998) the 
previously highest recorded water level was used as the design event. 
How a decision-maker manages uncertainty will often vary upon the situation. If the uncertainty is 
small, and the consequences of any variability are small the decision-maker may choose to ignore it 
in the analysis (Benjamin and Cornell, 1970). Where uncertainty is significant the decision-maker 
may account for it conservatively by applying a safety factor. Flood risk management requires 
consideration of uncertain processes and therefore requires appropriate techniques for handling 
uncertainty to ensure efficient resource use and transparent decision-making. 
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As identified in Chapter 2, decision-makers need tools that can use information in whatever format 
it appears and also identify and manage the uncertainty involved in their decision. It is useful to 
distinguish between different types of uncertainty. Hacking (1975) identifies two categories of 
uncertainty; inherent and epistemic uncertainty. Inherent uncertainties represent natural variability 
and randomness in samples and cannot be reduced (Pate-Cornell, 1996). Episteinic uncertainties 
are caused by lack of knowledge of the system and our ability to measure and model it and can 
therefore be changed as knowledge increases (Parry, 1996). Van Gelder (2000) proposes a 
classification of uncertainty appropriate for flood risk managers which will form the basis for the 
review in this Chapter (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Classification of uncertainty in. flood defence modelling (adapted from Van Gelder, 
2000) 
3.2.1. Inherent uncertainties 
Inherent uncertainty, often known as random or natural variability, can be further categorised into 
temporal and spatial variability. Temporal inherent uncertainty represents the uncertainty 
associated with a process that varies with time, for example due to the uncertainty in predicting 
future wave heights. Spatial inherent uncertainty represents variations in the space of a process, for 
example due to variations in material strength along the length of a defence. It is useful to discern 
between these two types of inherent uncertainties (Vrijling and Van Gelder, 1998). 
A realisation of a stochastic load that varies with time (for example individual wave heights) 
remains unpredictable as inherent uncertainty in time can not be reduced despite gathering 
unlimited data (Hora, 1996). However, acquisition of more data, for example on wave height, does 
mean that the certainty with which the predicted probability of realising a given wave height can be 
decreased (see Section 3.2.3 for more detail on statistical uncertainties). 
Spatial variability can be described as stochastic processes in space.. Conditions between the 
sampling points can be described by a probability distribution and autocorrelation function 
(Vrijling and Van Gelder, 2000). Spatial uncertainties can often be reduced by denser sampling 
strategies (Van Gelder, 2000). For example, there is only one realisation of material strength at any 
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point along the length of a flood defence. Sampling this strength every 50m as opposed to 500m 
will act to decrease the uncertainty associated with the distribution and autocorrelation function 
used to describe the spatial variability (see Section 3.2.3 for more detail on statistical uncertainties). 
3.2.2. Model uncertainty 
Uncertainty in modelling can be considered as epistemic uncertainty (Zio and Apostolakis, 1996). 
Representing the real system as X, and the system model as X', the model uncertainty, N, is defined 
by Ang (1973) as: 
X=NX* (3.1) 
If the state of the real system is random, then the model, X, and uncertainty, N, will be random 
variables. Model uncertainty reflects the uncertainty associated with using a process model based 
on incomplete process knowledge, or data, to represent a system. Numerical models of physical 
processes are incomplete and physical models are subject to scaling effects (HR Wallingford, 
2002). 
3.2.3. Statistical uncertainty 
Statistical uncertainty is a type of epistemic uncertainty. Statistical uncertainty can be further 
divided into parameter uncertainty and distribution uncertainty (Van Gelder, 2002). Parameter 
uncertainty (also known as statistical inference uncertainty) occurs when the parameters of a 
distribution are determined from a limited number of data. The amount of uncertainty is related to 
the size and variability of the dataset (Van Gelder, 2002). 
Distribution uncertainty (also known as statistical model uncertainty) refers to the uncertainty that 
results from the selection of a particular statistical model to extrapolate a particular set of data (HR 
Wallingford, 2002). Judgement is used to select appropriate models and fitting techniques. 
In terms of uncertainties in flood defence, it is clear that inherent uncertainties dominate the 
loading on flood defences, whilst epistemic uncertainties dominate structural response and how it is 
modelled. 
3.2.4. Expressing and handling uncertainty 
Uncertainty can be expressed in a number of ways (HR Wallingford, 1997,2002, Klir and Folger, 
1988 and Hall, 2003). 
" Precise value: "crest height is 11.2m AOD (above ordnance datum)". 
" Upper and lower bound: "the crest height is 11.2m ±0.3m AOD". 
" Linguistic statement of deliberate vagueness such as "the defence is unlikely to fail". 
" Unquantified ranking: "defence A is less likely to fail than defence B". 
" Probabilistic value: "there is a 1% chance of overtopping". 
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These types of uncertainty can be captured using either probability or possibility distributions. 
These are discussed in the following sections. 
Probabilistic handling of uncertainty 
Many phenomena of concern to the flood risk manager are random. A probability distribution 
describes the variability of these phenomena. A probability distribution can be either discrete or 
continuous (Ditlevsen, 1981, Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982, Winkler, 1996 and Melchers, 
1999). Historically, probability theory has been the primary tool for representing uncertainty in 
mathematical models (Dodagoudar and Venkatachalam, 2000). Knowledge of the probability of 
given flood loads allows a flood risk manager to balance the cost of investment in flood prevention 
against the expected impacts of flooding. This provides a more efficient solution than designing - 
for the worst case loading which may be prohibitively expensive. 
Probability theory 
Probability theory is based on certain fundamental axioms, the most widely accepted being those of 
Kolmogorov: 
" every event A in a sample space has probability 0 :! 9P(A) <_l, 
" the probability of the inevitable event, S, is P(S)=1, consequently the probability of the 
impossible event, R, is P(R)=O, and 
0 for two events that are mutually exclusive (i. e. realisation of Al precludes the realisation of A2): 
P(A, U A2) = P(A) + P(A2 ) 
For n events A1i... An that are not mutually exclusive: 
(3.2) 
ý1-1 n rt 
P=UAi = EP(A; )-EP(A; nAj)+ FP(A; nAjnAk)-... +(-1)"+'P(Al... nA")) (3.3) 
i=I i<f i<j<k 
If there is a degree of dependence between two events, A and B, then conditional probabilities are 
used. The conditional probability ofA occurring assuming B has occurred is given by: 





It therefore follows that if A and B are independent events, then: 
P(A I B) = P(A) and P(A n B) = P(A). P(B) (3.5) 
For mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events, 
P(B) _ P(B I A1)"P(A1) (3.6) 
tai 
which is known as the theorem of total probability. For a more detailed overview of probability the 
reader is referred to Ang and Tang (1975) and Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001). 
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There are a number of methods that can be used to estimate the parameters of probability 
distribution functions. Whilst a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis an 
introduction to classical statistical methods and Bayesian inference are provided below. Detailed 
descriptions of these methods and a number of others are available from many sources, including 
(but not exclusively) Ang and Tang, 1975, Van Gelder, 2000, Bedford and Cooke, 2001. 
A distribution of probability can be described by its moments, the first two being the mean or 
expectation, E(X), and the variance, var(X) (Ditlevsen, 198 1), given by: 
00 
E(X) = px = 
Jxfx (x)dx (3.7) 
-00 
var(X) = E(X - 1x)2 = 6s = 
j(z-f[s)2 fz(x) (3.8) 
The third order moment, or skewness represents the degree and direction of symmetry of the 
probability distribution and is defined as: 
E(X -, ux)3 =- 
j(x-px)3fx(x)dx (3.9) 
The use of probabilistic distributions to describe loading conditions is well established (CUR and 
TAW, 1990, CIRIA and CUR, 1991, HR Wallingford and Lancaster University, 2000). The 
approach generally applied in the UK to estimate coastal loads is that of Hawkes et al. (2002) 
which fits existing records to generate joint exceedance probabilities of wave height and water 
level. 
Method of moments 
The method of moments sets the moments of a distribution function equal to those of the observed 
sample. The sample moments are calculated using: 
E(X) ° px =1 Xi (3.10) 
n 1=1 
MA(X)=E(X - ftx)j =o =1 Y(X, j -/1)i (3.11) n I=1 
where Mi represents the ith moment and n the number of samples. 
Method of maximum likelihood 
An improvement on the method of moments is the method of maximum likelihood as it provides 
unbiased (i. e. its expected value is equal to the true value) parameter estimates. The likelihood can 
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be regarded as representing the information about 9 coming from the observed data. The 
maximum likelihood is therefore the value that makes the observed data most likely. For the 
random variable with densityf(xi 9) where 0 denotes the parameters describing the distribution of a 
random variable X with x observations. 0 is chosen to maximise the likelihood function, L, of 
observing the data set xl,... x,,: 
R 
L(O I xl,..., x) = J] f(x1 10) (3.12) 
i=1 
The method of maximum likelihood is most suitable to large sample sizes as the shape of the 
function is less biased by rarely observed events (Van Gelder, 2000). 
Bayes' theorem 
Bayes' theorem (Bayes, 1763 and see also Box and Tiao, 1973 and O'Hagan, 1994) provides a 
technique for updating a distribution (known as a prior distribution) in the light of new information 
to generate a so called posterior distribution. For an event, B, and a collection of events A 
contained in the set 1 such that A; nA, Q whenever i#j (mutually exclusive events), and 
A1 v ... u A c0 (collectively exhaustive events): 
P(At I B) 
nP(B 
I Ai). P(Ai ) 
P(B I Aj). P(Aj) 
j=1 
(3.13) 
where P(A; ) is called the prior probability, P(A1 B) is the posterior probability and P(Bot) is the 
likelihood. This is also valid for continuous variables: 
f(xI8)"f(9) f(eix)= .0 ff(x 0). f(0) dO 
-CO 
(3.14) 
where Xand 6 are defined as for the method of maximum likelihood with joint probability density 
function f(x, O) and corresponding conditional densities f(xl 0) and f(9k) and f (6) = 
$f(x, o)dx the 
marginal density of 0. 
The prior distribution is supposed to represent knowledge about parameters before the outcome of, 
for example, an experiment is known. Ideally the prior probability distribution is elicited on the 
basis of available information, judgement or past experience. The empirical Bayesian method is to 
use the available data (perhaps pooled from many experiments) to select an appropriate prior 
distribution and then a classical estimation procedure (such as the method of moments or maximum 
likelihood) to estimate the distribution parameters (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). Where the form of 
this distribution is unknown, a non-informative distribution can be used. A number of methods of 
obtaining non-informative priors are now introduced. 
.ý... ý. _ <. t.. 
ýý 
ý_ 
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A non-informative prior distribution that can be thought of as completely neutral is uniform over 
all the parameter space (a completely flat prior is likely to be improper as its integral will be 
infinite, therefore a diffuse prior such as p N(O, v) where a -, o can be used). Note that the term 
non-informative is misleading as even in this case, the prior is stating that all the values are equally 
likely. Flat priors do not always give a proper posterior density after updating and there are 
consistency problems with their use (Efron, 1978). 
Jeffreys (1961) proposed that a non-informative prior, p(9), be invariant under a one-to-one 
parameter transformation. The non-informative prior of p(9) can be shown to be p(O) I(9)'ß (Box 
and Tiao, 1973) where I(-) is Fisher's (1925) measure of information about 0 in a random variable, 
x. 




where E (. ) is the expectation of (") with-respect to the distribution of the likelihood function ftxj9). 
This measure of information quantifies how much is learned about 6 from the observation x by 
calculating the expected curvature of the likelihood function (i. e. a measure of the sensitivity of the 
likelihood to 0. However, a prior distribution should only represent prior information and a 
weakness of Jeffreys' prior is that it is dependent on the form of the data (O'Hagan, 1994). 
An alternative approach to constructing minimally informative priors is to maximise entropy. The 
entropy, H(j) of the densityJ(O) is defined as (Jaynes, 1957,1963): 
Co 
H(f) ff(0) log f(0)d0 (3.16) 
and can be thought of as a measure of how uninformativej(O) is about 0. To minimise införmation, 
a distribution off(0) can be found that maximises the entropy. Unlike Jeffreys' method, the 
maximum entropy method is not invariant to parameter transformations (O'Hagan, 1994). Without 
applying constraints the entropy method renders a uniform prior distribution. Kapur and Kesavan 
(1992) and Singh (1997) amongst others provide a detailed overview of the maximum entropy 
approach and provide a general solution for identifying a non-uniform prior. 
Bayes' theorem can also be used to account for statistical model uncertainty by calculating the 
posterior probabilities for all competing models and providing a Bayesian discrimination procedure 
between competing models (Pericchi and Rodriguez-Iturbe, 1983). 
Generalised Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation for measuring model uncertainty 
The generalised likelihood uncertainty estimation (GLUE) technique was developed by Beven and 
Binley (1992) and Beven (2000) to estimate model and parameter uncertainty of models. It is 
essentially a Bayesian model weighting method (Howson and Urbach, 1993). 
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The GLUE technique recognises the fact that there is no single correct model/parameter set 
combination that describes a system. Often many different combinations of input parameters result 
in equivalent or near-equivalent system behaviour when performing. This is the concept of 
equifinality. The rational behind the GLUE technique is to assume all combinations of model 
structures and parameter sets could be a possible simulator of the system. The likelihood of each 
parameter set is assigned a value based on comparing the observed and predicted system response. 
Models that do not represent the observed behaviour of the system are rejected and given a 
likelihood of zero. Therefore only behavioural simulations (simulations that exhibit behaviour 
similar to the system being modelled) are used to estimate the model uncertainty. The likelihood 
measures are used to weight the predictions of the remaining models and estimate uncertainty for 
the simulation. Likelihood values from different data can be combined as more data is collected. 
Dependency between parameters is accounted for as it is reflected in the likelihood value. The 
main processes of the GLUE procedure (Beven, 2000) are: 
(1) choosing model(s) to be assessed in the analysis, 
(2) selecting feasible input distributions for the input parameters, 
(3) sampling the parameter space using Monte Carlo simulations to obtain random parameter 
sets, 
(4) choosing an appropriate likelihood measure and setting a threshold for unacceptable (non- 
behavioural) parameter sets, and, 
(5) identifying acceptable and non-acceptable simulations and weight each simulation by the 
likelihood value of the parameter set used and derive uncertainty bounds. 
An initial sample space needs to be defined for the parameter values. The parameter space needs to 
be large enough to include simulations with a high likelihood, but not so large that meaningless 
model runs are simulated. This is frequently a subjective reflection of prior knowledge of the 
parameter values, however it is safest to start with ,a wide range as the 
Bayesian likelihood 
procedure refines the parameter range as more data is added (Beven and Binley, 1992). The 
sampling strategy should be chosen such that the parameter sets most likely to give a good 
representation of the system are chosen. In most GLUE applications, a uniform independent 
sampling of parameters in the parameter space is used because of its ease of use, however this is 
inefficient if large areas of the parameter space result in non representative simulations (Beven, 
2001). 
_ 
The efficiency can be improved if a limited number of exploratory simulations are used to 
identify local optima (simulations with high likelihoods). Further simulations are selected so that 
sampling is denser in these regions (Werner and Khu, 2002). 
The likelihood measure, Le, should equate to zero for all outputs that do no reflect the behaviour of 
the system, and its value should increase as the similarity to the system being modelled increases. 
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A number of approaches are suggested by Beven and Binley (1992), one such approach calculates 
the model efficiency using Equation 3.17. 
(7,2< Qä 6, J 
(3.17) 
where Q2 measures the variance of the observations and o, 2 measures the variance of the residuals 
defined as: 
n_ 
Qe=1ýýQ, -Qr{' })2 
n r_ý 
(3.18) 
where n is the number of time steps, Qf is the observed value at time t and Qt {O, Y} is the 
simulated value given parameters O and input data Y. If the simulated values form a perfect fit 
with the observed data, the likelihood is unity. For a fit no better than assuming the mean of the 
data is known (i. e. a=Q; ) it takes a value of zero (Nash and Sutcliffe, 1970). It is important to 
note that good calibration data is needed in order to assess how well the model performs in 
comparison to observed system behaviour. 
The uncertainty is calculated by describing the likelihood values as a probabilistic weighting 
function. A distribution of the model predictions may then be generated, thereby allowing 
variance, percentiles and other measures of uncertainty to be calculated. 
As more data becomes available, the likelihood weights may be updated, Beven and Binley (1992) 
suggest the use of Bayes' theorem. 
LpLI Y)=LyLI Y). LoL) (3.19) 
where Lo(Q) is the prior likelihood distribution, Ly(eLv) is the calculated likelihood given the new 
observations y, and Lp(9) is the posterior likelihood distribution of the parameter set. The GLUE 
therefore depends on model test data which may not be available (Hall and Anderson, 2002). 
Possibilistic handling of uncertainty 
Whilst exceedance probabilities are naturally suited to describe hydraulic loads, flood defence 
management is not concerned only with numerical information. As described in Chapter 2, expert 
opinion plays an important role in decision-making in flood defence. In information-scarce 
situations, such as predicting the effects of climate change, the possibility of an event occurring is 
considered rather than attempting to assign a probability, requiring some form of expert judgement 
to elicit a description of a variable. This description can be captured in the form of a fuzzy set. 
A fuzzy set is defined by a membership function ILA: X--' [0,1 ] where µA is the degree of 
membership of any element of X in A with a value of I representing full membership. Fuzzy sets 
were introduced by Zadeh (1978 and 1983) and are used to describe the possibility of membership. 
A possibility distribution represents the inherent vagueness in linguistic terms and was introduced 
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to describe sets whose membership criteria are imprecise (Klir and Folger, 1988) thereby 
generalising crisp set theory in which the membership of µA would be limited to a value of either 0 
or 1. 
An example of a group pf membership functions is shown in Figure 3.3. This membership function 
has been constructed to represent the possibility of a man being described as `short', `average', 
`tall' or `very tall'. People are often referred to as `tall', but this linguistic term is inherently 
imprecise. This imprecision can be captured in a fuzzy set that shows the possibility, µ, of 
someone being of a certain height. For example, to be called `tall', the lowest possible height is 
1.8m (approximately 5ft 10") and the highest is 2.04m (6ft 8") with the most possible height for a 
man to be described as `tall' ranges from 6ft 2" to 6ft 5". It is impossible for a man to be described 
as `tall' outside the upper and lower ranges, however, it should be noted that at a height of 2m (6ft 
7") it is still possible to describe a man as `tall', however there is a greater possibility of him being 
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Height (m) 
Figure 3.3 Example of a trapezoidal membership function describing a man's height (from left to 
right) as either 'short, 'average, `tall' or `very tall' 
Possibility (or fuzzy set) theory 
Whereas probability theory deals with the randomness of future events, possibility theory deals 
with the possibility of events (Casciati and Faravelli, 199 1). Fuzzy sets can be operated in the 
same manner as crisp sets such that: 
'Ä (x) =1- ua (x) . ..,, (3.20) 
/t AUa (x) = max[PA (x), PB (x)] (3.21) 
Pans (x) = min[PA (X), uB W1, (3.22) 
In order for any function of this form to qualify as either a fuzzy union or intersection, it must 
satisfy the following conditions (Klir, and Folger, 1988): 
-- ". - J(0,0)=0 ;, f(0,1) f(1,0) x(1,1)=1; i. e. f behaves as it would for a crisp set,,. 
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" J(a, b) f(b, a); i. e. f is commutative, 
"a Sa' and b Sb', then f(a, b) a', b'); i. ej is monotonic, and, 
"fa, b), c) =J(a, f(b, c)); i. ej is associative. 
where f represents the function of intersection or union of two sets. It is often desirable in certain 
applications to consider the following additional requirements: 
"f is a continuous function (a small increase in the membership grade in either set A or B doe not 
therefore produce a large change in the membership of Au B), and, 
" J(a, a) = a; i. e. f is idempotent (the union of any set with itself produces the same set). 
Evidence theory 
Shafer's (1976) mathematical theory of evidence, which is an extension of Dempster's original 
theory (1968), is a tool that is used to represent ignorance, or imprecision in evidence, through 
belief and plausibility measures. A belief measure is a function: 
Bel: p (X)- [0,1 ] (3.23) 
where p (X) is the power set consisting of all the subsets of X. The belief function assigns to each 
crisp subset ofXa number in the interval [0,1] and satisfies the axioms (Klir and Yuan, 1995): . 
" Bel (f) =0 and Bel (X) =1; 
" for every A, Bep (X) if AcB then Bel (A) 5 Bel (B); 
" if the sequence (A1 eP (X) Ife N) of the subset of X is monotonic (i. e. Ai CAZ 5=-.. A or 
Ai QA2 Q--An) then lim Bel (Ai) = Bel(lim A; ), and, 
" for every neN and every collection of subsets of X. 
Bel(A,. A2 v... A)z Bel(Ai)-Bel(A1 nAj)+... +(-1)"+'Bel(A, r) A2 n... A, ) (3.24) 
I 1<j 
Associated with each belief measure is a plausibility measure, P1, defined as: 
P1(A) =1- Bel (A) (3.25) 
However, plausibility measures can be defined independently as: 
PI: P (X)-º [0,1 ] (3.26) 
and satisfying the first three axioms that satisfy the belief measure and for every neN and every 
collection of subsets ofX: 
PI(A, r) A2 n... A, )Pl(A1)-1: P1(A4 uAj)+... +(-1)"+'P1(Al tA2 v... A") (3.27) 
i t<j 
Every belief measure and its plausibility measure can be expressed in terms of the basic probability 
assignment which is a function: 
m: ý (X)-º [0,11 
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where m(A) is the degree of evidence, or probability mass, supporting the claim that a specific 
element of X belongs to the set A, but not to any subset of A. A belief and plausibility function can 
therefore be defined by: 
Bel(A) _ Y_ m(B) for all Ae p(X) (3.30) 
BQA 
PI(A) =E m(B) for all AE p(X) (3.31) 
BnA*O 
Bel(A) is a lower bound on a family of probability measures and P1(A) is an upper bound. 
Dempster's rule of combination can be used to combine two sources of evidence, B and C, where 
the probability mass of the combined evidence, m(A), is given by: '. 
I ml (B)m2 (C) 
m(A) = Bic-A (3.32) E ml (B)m2 (C) 
BnC*A 
This rule of combination assumes that the two sources of evidence are `distinct', in that the 
knowledge of one piece of evidence does not induce non-vacuous belief in the truth of the other 
(Smets, 1990). 
Dubois and Prade (1991) extended evidence theory to provide a mechanism for projecting 
uncertain information through a function of the form yf (x). The uncertain dependency between 
(xI, x2... x) can be expressed in terms of a random relation which is a random set (91, p) on the 
Cartesian product X1xX2... X such that: 
, p(R, 
) 
, 3={y(R; )IR, E9R}, y(Ri)={y(x)I xERi} 
for all Ae3 (3.33) m(A) =I 
A-y(Pi) 
where (Z, m) defines the range of y. 
Hall (2003) demonstrates an application of this extension to evidence theory using Owen's 
equation to estimate bounds on wave overtopping rates (HR Wallingford, 1980). The water level, 
wave height and wave period are described using joint measurements, the crest level is represented 
as an interval value. Two model coefficients are described using fuzzy sets (rather than taking pre- 
assigned deterministic values), chosen to represent the uncertainty associated with using a model 
based on experimental data as a site specific tool. Because of the complexity of visualising the 
random set that is generated, cumulative belief and plausibility functions are plotted. These 
estimate bounds of probability, providing a representation of the uncertainty in the estimate of 
overtopping volumes. 
Second order random variables to describe uncertainty 
Burmaster and Wilson (1996) proposed the use of second-order random variables to separate 
variability from uncertainty. Instead of describing uncertainty using a single random variable, 
individual parameters that describe random variability are mapped through a probability 
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distribution representing the uncertainty in the description of this parameter. This may be related to 
the equipment used to measure the evidence, or the expert judgement involved in estimating the 
variability. A parameter is now described by moments that are themselves expressed in terms of a 
distribution, for example N(5,0.5) and o=-N(1,0.5). This allows variability and other 
uncertainties, which have different management implications, to be separated. 
3.3. SOURCE: FLOOD LOAD ESTIMATION 
The source is "synonymous with hazard and refers to a situation with potential for harm (for 
example, heavy rainfall, strong winds, storm surge etc. " (ICE, 2001). This section provides an 
introduction to techniques used to estimate the magnitude and frequency of storm events. The 
accuracy and type of output of the load estimation has an impact ou the uncertainty associated with 
a flood risk assessment. Knowledge of loadings is required to enable a flood risk manager to 
estimate the loadings on the system and therefore the defence failure probabilities. 
3.3.1. Fluvial flooding 
The majority of river floods in the UK are due to intense precipitation. Catchments in colder or 
mountainous regions will experience flooding caused by snowmelt. On rare occasions, landslides 
or dam failure can also lead to flooding. Catchment properties, such as its size, shape and degree 
of urbanisation and forestation and the part of the catchment subjected to the intense rainfall 
influence the size of the flood flow in the river. 
Flood estimation using data 
The Flood Estimation Handbook (CEHW, 1999) is the standard for hydrological modelling in 
England and Wales. Other approaches to rainfall-runoff modelling have been developed and some 
of these are discussed briefly here. The Flood Estimation Handbook identifies two methods used to 
estimate peak flood flows and their associated probabilities: 
(1) Statistical analysis of existing flow records, and, 
(2) Rainfall-runoff methods. 
The statistical method requires a long dataset. Annual maximum flows are ranked and the 
probability of occurrence of the flow, X, is given by: 
P(X ? Q)_ r-a 
N+1- 2a) 
(3.34) 
where Q is the flow rate for a given event, r is the ranking of the flood event (a rank of 1 represents 
the highest flow in the record), Nis the number of annual maxima and a is a constant for particular 
probability density functions. The Weibull distribution that is used in the United States to calculate 
flood frequencies assigns a=0 (Helsel and Hirsch, 2002). However, a more unbiased value of a 
(Chadwick and Morfett, 1993) commonly used to plot an extreme value distribution is given by 
Gringorten (1963) as 0.44. The return period, TR, of the flood is: 
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TR =YP(X>Q) (3.35) 
It is recommended that the method is not used for extrapolating flows exceeding the 1: 200 year 
event (CEHW, 1999). 
There are many rainfall-runoff methods (Beven, 2000), the most common of these in England and 
Wales is based around the unit hydrograph (Sherman, 1932) and is used when little or no flow data 
is available. Catchment characteristics are extracted from the Flood Estimation Handbook 
(CEHW, 1999) to calculate the time to peak of the unit hydrograph which relates the effective 
rainfall and the storm runoff. Using more standard characteristics obtained using methods in the 
Flood Estimation Handbook, the flow rate can be calculated for a given return period. 
Flood estimation using process-based models 
Process based models aim to simulate the processes involved in hydrology by using suitable 
equations. An overview of the processes involved in hillslope hydrology is shown in Figure 3.4 
and Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.4 Processes in a perceptual model of hillslope hydrology between storms (Seven, 2000) 
Freeze and Harlan (1969) laid down a blueprint for process-based models by linking the equations 
for surface and sub-surface flow. This is still followed by the majority of models despite the 
necessary simplification of the processes shown in Figure 3.5 (Beven, 2000). Processes such as 
preferential flow cannot be adequately described despite attempts to do so (Bronstert and Plate, 
1997). 
The Systeme Hydrologique European (SHE) (Abbott et al., 1986) is a grid based model. These 
elements are linked by surface runoff and groundwater flow components. Each grid element has a 
specified parameter set describing subsurface flow, vegetation, overland roughness, channel flow 
and snowmelt. 
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Figure 3.5 Processes in a perceptual model of hillslope hydrology during storms (Beven, 2000) 
The Institute of Hydrology Distributed Model (IHDM) (Calver and Wood, 1995) discretises the 
catchment based on hillslope planes based on flow lines such that any lateral exchange of water 
between elements can be neglected. If the flow follows the form of the surface then this 
discretisation may be performed by a topographical analysis, however a 2-D model such as SHE is 
required if the geology is such that this assumption no longer holds (Beven, 2000). 
Flood estimation using similarity and distribution function models 
TOPMODEL (Beven et al., 1995) takes a different approach to process-based models and assumes 
that all points in the catchment with the same topography index respond in the same manner. This 
index represents the propensity of any point in the catchment to become saturated (Beven and 
Kirkby, 1979). The reliance of this model on fewer parameters gives it an advantage over more 
parameterised models (Fleming, 2002), however it should be noted that as with the IHDM it is not 
always appropriate to parameterise the flow regime using topography. 
Hydrodynamic modelling 
There are two aspects to hydrodynamic modelling, in-bank river channel modelling and floodplain 
modelling. It is noted that hydraulic modelling of flow through the floodplain should technically 
be included in the pathway domain, however, it is briefly introduced in this section because it is a 
natural continuation of hydrological modelling and is not a feature of the novel research in this 
thesis. 
Hydraulic models have a varying degree of complexity. Clückie and Owens (1987) note that 
advances in hydrometeorology, computing and remote sensing have allowed major advances to 
take place in the design and implementation of extreme flood prediction. Integrated rainfall-runoff 
and flood routing has been implemented to a limited extent in England and Wales (Cluckie and 
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Han, 2000), however this does not yet incorporate real-time inundation analysis. Some commercial 
software does contain integrated hydrological modelling routines, but it is usual for upstream 
hydrographs to be used as initial inputs to hydraulic models. 
Flow is usually modelled using a volume storage concept. This is based on conserving the volume 
of water flowing between two sections of river. Khatibi and Haywood (2002) proposed a 
categorisation of approaches to fluvial modelling based on the level of information revealed by a 
particular approach. The defining characteristics of each model category are given in Table 3.1. A 
detailed review of modelling techniques is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a number of 
the more frequently used modelling methods are briefly described below. 
Table 3.1 Categorisation offluvial modelling approaches based on the concept of volume storage 
(Khatibi and Haywood, 2002) 
Distributed prism/wedge storage 
Hydrodynamic routing models 
Conservation of mass/momentum 
Physically meaningful parameters 
Extensive data required 
Distributed prism/wedge storage 
Kinematic routing models 
Approximating mass/momentun 
Physically meaningful parameters 
Ample data required 
Distributed prism storage 
Hydrological routing models 
Distributed layout 
Conservation of mass 
Some parameters 
A conceptual control volume 
Conceptual models 
Anputloutput boundaries 
Conservation of mass 
Extensive parameters 




Not conserving mass/momentum 
Empirical model 
A selection of points 
Regression equations 
Heuristic rules 
A selection of points 
What if conditions 
Rules Iof thumb A single point 
--' - 
No mathematics 
The essential problem in analysing flow is shown in Figure 3.6. The Navier-Stokes equations 
apply at a single point, P, in a fluid. At this point the governing equation for the streamwise 
motion of a small element is (Knight and Shiono, 1996): 









Secondary flows=Weightforce+ Reynoldsstresses (3.36) 
(vorticity) (lateral) + (vertical) 
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where {U, V, W} are velocity components in the {xy, z) directions, p is the fluid 
density, gis the 
slope, g is the gravitational acceleration and r,,, and r. are the Reynolds stresses on planes 




Depth-averaged velocity, Ud 
Local boundary shear stress, zb 
Figure 3.6 Flow in a natural channel 
One dimensional models, so called because the one dimensional hydrodynamic St. Venant 
equations (Equation 3.37 and 3.38) for mass and momentum are solved along a series of cross- 









where Q is the volumetric flow rate in the channel, A the cross sectional area of the flow, q the flow 
into the channel from other sources (i. e. from the floodplain or possibly tributary channels), So the 
down-slope of the bed, n the Manning's coefficient of friction, P the wetted perimeter of the flow, 
and h the flow depth. 
Flow over embankments and through the floodplain is modelled using spill equations and 
structures can be accounted for using energy loss equations. Despite the simplifications of the 
physical process, they can provide reasonable estimates of water level (Fleming, 2002). 
Commercial packages include ISIS, MIKE 11, ONDA HYDRO 1-D and HEC-RAS. 
Preistnall et al. (2000) suggested a simplified inundation modelling technique that involves 
intersecting a plane representing the flood water level with a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) to 
provide an estimate of flood extent. 
LISFLOOD-FP (Bates and De Roo, 2000) provides an extension to one dimensional modelling of 
the river by modelling the floodplain as a 2D rastermodel. Flow in the channel is modelled using 
Equations 3.37 and 3.38, similarly floodplain flow is described in terms of momentum and 
continuity, discretised over a grid of square cells. This allows the model to represent 2D dynamic 
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flow fields on the floodplain. Flow between cells is simply a function of the free surface height 
between the cells. 




h513 h'1 112 
Qx'J = now AY (3.40) 
n Ax 
where h'i is the water free surface height at the node (ij), Ax and Ay are the cell dimensions, n is 
the effective grid scale Manning's friction coefficient for the floodplain, and Q, and Qy describe the 
volumetric flow rates between floodplain cells. Qy is defined analogously to Equation 3.38. The 
flow depth, hfiaw, represents the depth through which water can flow between two cells, and is 
defined as the difference between the highest water free surface in the two cells and the highest bed 
elevation. This method provides performance comparable to that of more complex, two 
dimensional finite element models (Bates et al., 2002). 
Two dimensional models not only divide the channel cross-section into more areas, but also include 
processes that are excluded from one-dimensional flow equations. These include the lateral shear 
and secondary flows in addition to the usually dominant bed friction. The depth-averaged form of 
the Navier-Stokes equations is used to describe the direction and magnitude of flood water in the 






pgHSo - Ud(I + 
s2 
+ p. ZH2l 
8 Ud [H(pUV)d] (3.41) 
where s is the channel side slope and Ud is the depth mean velocity defined by: 
Ud=HUdz 
A popular commercial package in the UK is TELEMAC2D. 
(3.42) 
Three dimensional models take the analysis a stage further and involve solving a three dimensional 
Navier-Stokes equation (for example Younis, 1996, Falconer and Chen, 1996). Several 
commercial packages exist such as TELEMAC3D, DELFT3D and HYDRO 3-D which can model 
three dimensional flows caused by stratification, wind and waves. 
3.3.2. Coastal flooding 
The majority of coastal flooding is usually a result of low-lying land (for example, large areas of 
East Anglia in the UK) being inundated by storm surges (Smith and Ward, 1998). The likelihood 
of inundation can be increased at estuaries when a high river level encounters a storm surge in the 
sea, as occurred in the river Thames in 1928 (Brooks and Glasspoole, 1928). Inundation and 
''damage may be caused directly by extreme wave conditions and in some parts of the world; 
tsunami are a real threat (Bascom, 1959). 
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Morphology 
The intensity of coastal floods is. influenced by the shape of the coastline and near shore 
bathymetry (Pugh, 1987). Areas such as the North Sea cause storm surges to be funnelled, 
resulting in a significant increase in water level (Ward, 1978). The characteristics of the seabed 
and co4stline influence the degree of shoaling, refraction, diffraction and breaking of any wave 
attacking the shore and any coastal defence (McConnell, 1998). Bathymetry, through the alteration 
of wave loadings, therefore impacts on flood risk. 
Modelling of coastal morphology plays an important role in coastal flood risk management (Reeve 
and McCue, 1997, Hall et al., 2000). Coastal erosion results in reduced beach protection thereby 
increasing the flood risk. However, this erosion may also provide natural protection in the form of 
beach nourishment downdrift of the erosion site. 
A detailed review of morphological modelling is outside the scope of this thesis. This section aims 
to provide an overview of a number of tools and methods available to flood risk managers. More 
detailed descriptions are available from many sources, including (but not exclusively) Komar 
(1998), Kamphuis (1999), Dean and Dalrymple (2001) and USACE (2002). 
Methods of predicting shoreline movement are often made using a "one-line" model that predicts 
the position of a single contour line along a stretch of coast using a continuity equation for the 
sediment transport, S: 
dSs+dSy+hdy=0 
dx dy dt (3.43) 
where Sx and S, are the sediment transport components in the x and y direction in time t over a 
vertical range of sediment transport h (Figure 3.7). 
Profile at time t+&t --ýý, ý 
ho 
Prfile attimet 
Loreline y(x, t) 
x 
Figure 3.7 Definition of variables for the continuity equation for sediment transport (Reeve and 
McCue, 1997) 
One line models have been extended to n-line models that describe horizontal evolution of the 
beach at a number of points across the profile (Bakker, 1968). 
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Stochastic methods (eg. Reeve, 1995, Johnson and Hall, 2002) perform a set of simulations to 
gauge the likely variation in the future shoreline rather than a purely deterministic prediction. 
Statistical-dynamical methods, proposed by Reeve and Fleming (1997), introduce an additional 
factor F(x, t) that represents net long term contribution of processes other than mean long shore 
transport (eg. sediment sources, sinks). This is used to `fit' the traditional one-line model to 
historical data. The one-line model combined with the forcing factor is subsequently used to 
predict bounds on the evolution of the coastline. Payo et al. (2002) have eltended the one-line 
model to include tinie-varying boundary conditions. 
De Vriend (1991) argues that long term prediction of evolution requires an alternative approach 
because long term trends in coastal evolution are "a weak residual of a very `noisy' signal of short 
term variability". This has been addressed through behaviour-oriented (or phenomenological) 
modelling (De Vriend et al., 1993). This maps the observed behaviour (both from historical 
records and other models) onto a simple mathematical model that exhibits the same behaviour 
within a given range of spatial and temporal scales. 
The erosion of dunes and cliffs is important as. these can be a large source of sediment. Dune 
erosion is usually modelled using Vellinga's (CUR and TAW, 1991) equations. An erosion profile 
is established based on storm conditions. The volume of dune eroded is assumed to correspond to 
the difference in volume between the initial beach profile and assumed storm profile (Figure 3.8). 
Eroded dune JEqual 
volumes Sand drawn down 
Figure 3.8 Dune system storm erosion/accretion balance (CIRIA, 1996) 
1: 12.5 
The most common approach to assessing cliff erosion is based on extrapolating future recession 
scenarios using historical cliff position records (Dolan et al., 1991, Cowell et al., 1997). The 
closed profile approach applied to dune erosion can also be applied to predicting cliff erosion. The 
Bruun profile can be used to assess the change in cross-shore profile resulting from sea level rise 
and shoreline evolution (Dean, 1991). Recent advances have seen a move towards process-based 
modelling of cliff erosion (Meadowcroft et a!., 1999, Walkden and Hall, 2002). These models 
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consider the interactions between the underlying processes of cliff erosion, such as the cross-shore 
distribution of erosion, longshore sediment transport, shore platform erosion and cliff-face stability. 
This approach is more appropriate to longer term modelling than the reductionist (and 
computationally expensive) approach to cross-shore modelling proposed by Nairn and Southgate 
(1993). A more detailed review of cliff erosion modelling is provided in Lee and Clark (2002). 
Estimation of magnitude and frequency 
Coastal loadings are usually described in terms of the, joint probability of wave height and water 
level (from a tide or storm surge) as the two are statistically dependent. This is partly due to the 
fact that meteorological conditions tend to produce both extreme water levels and waves at the 
same time. Primarily, it is because extreme waves are usually depth-limited as they come close to 
the shore. The highest near shore waves occur when extreme offshore wave conditions coincide 
with extreme water levels. 
The method proposed by Hawkes et al. (2002) involves first measuring data on wave height, wave 
period and water level or hindcasting this information from wind data. Statistical distributions are 
then fitted to these. The dependence between wave height, water level and wave steepness is also 
fitted. Monte Carlo simulations are used to simulate a large number of wave heights, wave periods 
and water levels using the fitted distributions. These simulations can be used to calculate extreme 
wave heights, periods and water levels. A more thorough description of joint-probability methods 
is given by HR Wallingford and Lancaster University (2000). Methods of constructing probability 
distributions are discussed in Section 3.2.4. 
Inundation modelling 
Coastal inundation can be caused by a number of mechanisms; overtopping, overflow and defence 
breaching. HR Wallingford (1999) has produced a manual that is used to calculate overtopping 
volumes based on wave heights and water levels for different structure types. Breaching 
mechanisms are discussed more in Section 3.4 and in Appendix D. 
The consideration of tidal and wave effects can add a further complication to modelling coastal 
floods, however, there are packages that specifically account for these effects such as MIKE 21, 
and many of the aforementioned 2D and 3D packages, such as DELFT3D and the TELEMAC 
series can also model coastal floods. 
3.4. PATHWAY - FLOOD DEFENCE RESPONSE 
The pathway is defined as the "connection between a particular hazard being realised and the 
receptor that maybe harmed" (ICE, 2001). One of the most widely used intervention strategies 
available to the flood risk manager is the construction and maintenance of flood defence structures. 
To enable an assessment of flood risk a manager must have an understanding of how these 
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defences behave under a range of loads and the likelihood of their failure. This section discusses 
methods used to analyse flood defence failure in order to obtain flood defence system failure 
probabilities. Appropriate techniques are adapted and used in Chapter 4 and 5 as part of a new 
approach to systems-based risk assessment and condition characterisation. 
3.4.1. Flood defences and their failure mechanisms 
Flood and coastal defences can fail by many different mechanisms. Each of these mechanisms may 
have several initiating events. In theory these mechanisms can all be described using limit state 
functions. However many are poorly understood and there may be limited information for their 
application to a given site. Failure of a defence is defined as an event that results in water finding a 
way over, under or through it. This may be a result of breaching, overtopping, overflow, seepage 
or piping. The failure of a flood defence is one of the key events of the pathway stage of the 
source-pathway-receptor model. 
A review of failure mechanisms for both flood and coastal defences is provided in Appendix D. 
This review describes the processes that can lead to failure of a defence, and gives details of limit 
state functions used to describe failure mathematically and the key parameters that influence 
failure. These functions can be used to estimate failure probabilities using reliability theory 
(Section 3.4.2). 
3.4.2. Reliability analysis 
It has long been recognised that absolute safety cannot be achieved and so a degree of poor or 
uncertain performance must be accepted (Freudentahl, 1947, Pugsley, 1951, Torroja, 1958). 
Reliability originally came about to enable the rational treatment of uncertainties in structural 
design and provides a decision-making tool for selecting an appropriate compromise between the 
requirements of safety and economy (Freudentahl, 1956, Cornell, 1967, Benjamin and Lind, 1969, 
Cornell, 1969). Reliability theory can be used to estimate flood defence failure probabilities. 
Whilst this section provides a background into reliability theory, research presented later in this 
thesis demonstrates how reliability theory can be used to assess the condition of structures with 
uncertain evidence and be adapted to make predictions of their future performance in a manner that 
compliments a risk-based framework. The term structural reliability is defined by Thoft- 
Christensen'and Baker (1982): 
"a structure's ability to fulfil its design purpose for some specified time, or in 
a mathematical sense, it is the probability the structure will not attain each 
specified limit state (ultimate or serviceability) over a period of loading. " 
There are five main steps to a reliability analysis (Oumeraci et al., 2001). 
(1)' Identification of the system, its components and failure modes. 
(2) Definition of limit state equations for these failure modes. 
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(3) Identification of limit state variables. 
(4) Calculation of reliability for each failure mode. 
(5) Calculation of bounds for system failure. 
These concepts and some of the methods used to estimate reliability will be introduced over the 
next few sections. A simple reliability problem is outlined and the methods available 
for solving it 
are described in more detail in the following sections. 
The general reliability equation takes the form shown by Equation 3.44: 
gU=R-S 
(3.44) 
Where x is a vector of random variables describing the system; R is the strength of the structure and 
S is the load on the structure. Failure occurs when g(x) <_O, the probability of failure is therefore: 




Where f, denotes the probability density function of the boundary conditions. This is demonstrated 
graphically in Figure 3.9. 
S- Load effect R- Resistance 
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Figure 3.9 Basic reliability problem demonstrating load (S), resistance (R) and failure density 
So-called level II and III reliability methods, summarised in the following sections, can be used to 
solve the integral in Equation 3.45 using numerical or analytical methods. A more detailed 
description of these methods is available from many sources, including (but not exclusively) 
Throft-Christensen and Baker (1982), Casciati and Faravelli (1991), Melchers (1995) and Ditlevsen 
and Madsen (1996). 
Level II: First-Order Second Moment methods (FOSM) 
A first-order method is so-called because it approximates the failure surface to a first order or linear 
function. First, considering the simplest case when both R and S are defined by two independent 
normal variables, the failure probability is described by: 
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where It and or define the mean and variance of R and S; (") is the standard normal distribution 
function and ß is the reliability index (Cornell, 1969). As shown in Figure 3.10, ß is a measure of 
the distance that pg is away from the boundary of the failure space in terms of standard deviation ag. 
If the failure function is non-linear then approximate values for p1 and of can be obtained by 
performing a Taylor series expansion: 
" dg 
gL)=g(x1, x2... x")=S(p>>k2... p,, )+Z- (Xr -fir) 
r"r ýt 
(3.47) 
where dgldzi is evaluated at (µ1, µ2... ps). However, this index is dependent on the linearisation 
expansion point (Ditlevsen, 1979). In order to minimise errors due to the linearisation, the 
expansion point should be a point on the failure surface rather than a mean point (Thoft- 




Figure 3.10 Definition of reliability index 
This is readily extended to consist of more variables as long as the function g(x) is linear and is 
defined as a normal distribution. Hasofer and Lind (1974) proposed a reliability index, ßHL which 
is invariant to the choice of failure function. This is achieved by normalising the failure function 
variables onto a new co-ordinate system which has rotational symmetry with respect to the standard 
deviations. The reliability index, (3HL, is independent of the failure function because equivalent 
functions result in the same failure surface, g(y)=0. (3HL is defined as the shortest distance from the 
origin of the normalised co-ordinate system to the boundary of the failure surface. This is known 
as the design point (Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11 Mapping the failure variables onto a normalised co-ordinate system and defining OHL, 
the Hasofer-Lind reliability index 
Melchers (1999) formalises an algorithm to calculate ßnL. 
(1) standardise the random variables x to the independent standardised normal variables y 
(Figure 3.11) using Equation 3.48, 
yl = 
Xr - Pxr (3.48) 
Est 
(2) transform g(x)=0 to g(4=0, 
(3) select initial trial point yý", 
(4) compute 0(1), 
(5) let m=1, 
(6) compute directional cosines a 
dgi 
2 o. s 




(7) compute g(flt)), 
(8) compute yý"`+'): 




(9) compute OHL(m), 
(10) check whether y('n+1) and/or OHL (ni+1) have stabilised; if not return to step 5 and increase m by 
unity, 
(11) If optimising a design, calculate z, the design points for the variables, or calculate Pf. 







First order second moment methods can be extended to allow the use of random variables 
described by non-normal distributions (this is more commonly known as a First Order Reliability 
Method (FORM)). 
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To calculate the Hasofer-Lind reliability index, an additional transformation to convert these non- 
normal variables into normal variables is required. The Rosenblatt transformation (Rosenblatt, 
1952 and Hochenbichler and Rackwitz, 1981) can transform a vector of variables into a set of 
uncorrelated, standardised and normally distributed variables. The transformation assumes that the 
original density and distribution functions correspond to the values of a normal distribution at the 
design point (see Figure 3.11). This is shown by Equation 3.52: 
G(xd) _ 
xid - fUtXr 
'1 
Ya g( xd) 
xa - fý'xr (3.52) j 
Q'xl Xi Qual 
where 1(-) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, x°, represents the value of the 
basic variable x; at the design point and L', d and v' are the mean and standard deviations of the 









where A") is the standard normal probability density function. 
Level IT Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) 
First order methods that approximate the failure surface (g-0) to a linear function become less 
accurate as the limit state function becomes more curved. Second order methods try to account for 
this by fitting a quadratic surface to the limit state function (Breitung, 1984 and Hohenbichler et 
al., 1987). Second-order methods can be implemented using either sampling techniques or 
asymptotic approximation (Melchers, 1999). 
The sampling method involves first estimating the probability using standard FORM analysis, the 
`error' is then calculated by sampling the space between the first order and second order 
approximations of the limit state surface (Hohenbichler and Rackwitz, 1988). 
The asymptotic approximation, for limit state functions that are not too non-linear and have only 
one design point, involves approximating the failure surface to an asymptotic function shown in 
Equation 3.54 (Breitung, 1984). 
11 (1-ßK )]-% Pf z c( -ß)t 
[ 
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where ai is the ith principal curvature of the limit state at the design point. 
Second order methods are clearly more complex than their first order counterparts and frequently 
require the use of sampling techniques to obtain a solution. Therefore, there is sometimes little 
advantage to be gained over using Level III methods. 
IL 
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Level III: Integration and simulation methods 
Simulation techniques, often referred to as Monte Carlo simulations, involve sampling at random to 
artificially simulate a large number of experiments. This automatically deals with non-linearity in 
functions and non-normal random variables (Hammersley and Handcomb, 1966). 
Direct sampling 
This involves direct sampling from the basic variables and counting the number of failures. The 
failure probability, Pf, is therefore estimated using: 
Pf NN YIlg(x, ): 50] (3.55) 
where N is the total number of simulations, xj is the vector of the observation of the ith simulation 
and 1[g(x', ) <_0] is an indicator function that outputs 1 if g(x', ) <0 an d0 if not. This method is 
robust as it can handle reliability calculations in which there is more than one design point. The 
number of simulations, N, required to obtain a given confidence level, C, in the failure probability, 
Pf, is (Broding et al., 1964): 
Ný-In(1-C) 
Pf (3.56) 
Therefore for a 99% confidence level when Pf-10-3 over 4600 simulations are required. This 
calculation time for a Monte Carlo simulation is independent of the number of variables and can be 
improved by using importance sampling. 
Importance sampling 
The direct sampling approach described previously samples points uniformly, wasting considerable 
effort in sampling areas that are not in the region of interest, in a reliability analysis this will be the 
failure region. Techniques for overcoming this problem increase the density of sampling in the 
region of interest by ensuring a more efficient selection of random variables and hence increase the 
overall efficiency of the simulation. This requires selection of an `importance-sampling' density 
function, h, (x) that approximates the failure function over the region of interest. The failure 
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(3.57) 
where Vis a vector with a probability density function hv(y, and v't is a vector of sample values 
from the importance function hV("). Choosing appropriate importance functions can be challenging 
as it is important not to bias the estimate. Melchers (1989) suggests defining the importance 
function as by i%(_v, C) where C is a diagonal matrix of Uri 2 with the mean of Vplaced at 1' (the 
maximum likelihood of J. This can reduce the number of sample points required significantly 
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(Engelund and Rackwitz, 1993) and such an importance sampling function generates sample points 
that are unbiased with respect to each variable. 
This and other methods of making Monte Carlo simulations more efficient, such as directional 
sampling, are described in more detail in Melchers (1999). 
Random variables to estimate model uncertainty in a reliability analysis 
There will always be a measure of epistemic uncertainty associated with any model of a system, 
however sophisticated it is. The two sources of uncertainty in limit state models are parameters that 
are unknown or have been ignored due to their relative unimportance and idealisation resulting 
from mathematical expressions. The effects of these uncertainties could be so negligible that the 
resulting reliability calculation will be unaffected. Additional investment to improve the model 
would therefore not be justifiable in a risk-based framework. The process of evaluating model 
uncertainty is accepted as being one of the more difficult parts of structural reliability analysis as 
the model uncertainty is dependent on many factors and information about the uncertainty is scarce 
and fragmentary (Ditlevsen and Madsen, 1996).. The process of estimating model uncertainty has 
also been addressed with GLUE (described in Section 3.2.4) which addresses the same problem in 
a different context. 
Ditlevsen (1982) proposed a method of evaluating uncertainty in structural reliability that does not 
use model outputs or processed data that can be used by experts in making a judgement of model 
uncertainty. The uncertainty is represented by randomly deforming the idealised limit state 
function into a `possibly true' limit state surface. The failure surface g(x)=0 becomes g(V(x))=0 








"real" limit state / 
surface: g(V())=0 
Figure 3.12 A randomly distorted limit state surface resulting from defining a random vector 
(Ditlevsen, '1982) '- ,° '--' 
The reliability is therefore the probability that the random vector Vo has not failed. The simplest 
example of the field V(x) is: 
V(x) =x+J (3.58) 
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where Jisa random vector independent of x. A more flexible and less idealised representation is 
obtained using: 
V(x) = Hx+ (3.59) 
where 1Y is a random matrix independent of x. The distribution of the input random vector X is 
therefore replaced with the probability distribution of V(x) in the reliability analysis. The model 
uncertainty is therefore accounted for by modifying the distributional properties of the input vector 
(Ditlevsen and Madsen, 1996). 
3.4.3. System failure probability 
A complex system may contain a combination of parallel and series sub-systems. The failure 
probability for a series system is governed by the component with the highest failure probability. 
The failure, F, of a component of a series system of n members will have a failure probability, Pf, 
defined as: 
Pf= P (F, V F2 V ... V F) (3.60) 
This is shown by the failure space in Figure 3.13, and equates to convolution of the joint 
probability distributions in this space. Parallel systems fail when a combination of system 
components fails. The failure probability of a parallel system is given by Equation 3.61. 
Pf=P(F, nF2n... rFR) (3.61) 
This is represented in Figure 3.13 by the intersecting failure space. As with series systems, this can 
be calculated by integrating the limit state functions over the failure space. Equations 3.60 and 
3.61 clearly provide two limiting conditions on the probability of failure of any system. However, 
the assumptions of completely serial or parallel systems is often difficult to justify and can provide 
unhelpfully wide bounds on the probability of failure. Real systems are likely to contain a network 
of elements that demonstrate varying degrees of parallel and serial behaviour. 
Failure in both 
limit states 
Failure in limit state 2 
e.,. ßß, 
Figure 3.13 The failure space of a two-component system 
Correlation 
Failure in limit state 1 
Failure modes and defences demonstrate a degree of correlation if some or all of their resistance 
and load variables are shared. The correlation can result from dependency of loadings, for 
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example, a storm surge along a stretch of coastline, or dependency between system elements such 
as the geotechnical properties of a river bank. 
The coefficient of correlation is a dimensionless value between zero and one, which correspond to 
uncorrelated and fully correlated coefficients respectively. The coefficient of correlation, p, 
between the reliability, G, of two defences, i and j, with resistance, R, being subject to a load S, is 
(CUR and TAW, 1990): 
P(R,, Rj)"a(R1)"c(Rj) + p(S,, Sý ). o (S, )"Q(S1) 
P(Gr Gý) = 
a(GJ)o(G f) 
(3.62) 
For correlation coefficients greater than 0.7, Ditlevsen second-order bounds (introduced later in this 
section) can be rather wide (Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982). 
In the context of flood defences, the coefficient of correlation may be a function of the distance 
between two defences and over long distances the autocorrelation will tend to zero as the actual 
parameters at two locations that are far apart will have no relationship. This is usually the case for 
breaching where resistance parameters are variable, but for overtopping the storm level can 
correlate the defences over a long distance. CUR and TAW (1990) recommend that the correlation 
length (length over which the correlation tends to zero) is taken as 500m. When implementing a 
first order reliability analysis, the Rosenblatt transformation (described in Section 3.4.2) is used to 
transform arbitrarily distributed parameters into uncorrelated normally distributed parameters. 
It is useful to calculate the overall failure probability of a structural system rather than just one of 
its failure modes. Calculating correlation coefficients of defence resistance is rarely possible in 
England and Wales due to insufficient data (although it may be possible to correlate loadings along 
a length of defences). The example in Figure 3.13 shows the failure space for a system with two 
limit states, the review of flood defence failure in Appendix D shows that defence can have many 
more failure modes than this. A single flood defence is also part of a larger system of defences, 
increasing the dimensionality of the system significantly. Exact determination of the failure 
probability of complex systems is not always possible and a numerical solution is often time- 
consuming (Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982) and so it is usually more useful to estimate bounds 
on the failure probability. 
First-order bounds 
First order failure bounds, so called because they consider only single element failure, assume 
perfect dependence and perfect independence between the system's failure modes. For 
independent failure modes, the failure probability is the product of one minus the failure 
probabilities (Equation 3.63). For dependent failure modes the weakest failure mode will always 
be less likely to fail. Hence bounds on the failure probability, Pf, of series systems of n 
components can be calculated from: 
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max(Pfý) 5 Pf <_ rj(1-Pfý) (3.63) 
n 
i=1 1=1 
For parallel systems, these bounds are given by: 
nn 
rj (P1) 5 Pf 5 min(Pfl) (3.64) 
i=1 
Second-order bounds 
For many systems, first order bounds are too wide to be useful (Throft-Christensen and Baker, 
1982) however, Ditlevsen (1979b) proposed higher order, narrower bounds. Second order bounds 
consider the joint failure probabilities of two system elements as well as individual element failure 
as shown in Equation 3.65. 
Pf, +E ! r] -E Pfl n Pf j ,05 
Pf S Pfj - max[Pf; n Pf i (3.65) 
i=2 j=1 i=2 i=2 j<i 
3.4.4. Reliability assessment of flood and coastal defence structures 
It is the need to make a quantitative assessment of flood risk that is driving the need to estimate 
failure probabilities. These values can be incorporated into a systems analysis to incorporate 
multiple failure modes and structures. However, it is important to recognise that the accuracy of 
probabilities for singular events (events that have never been observed and may never be observed) 
is often questioned (Bedford and Cooke, 2001) and cannot be falsified. Under these circumstances 
the failure probability should be thought of as a propensity interpretation of probability, meaning it 
is a measure of the tendency for the event to occur (Popper, 1959, Bunge, 1981). 
First order second moment methods have a sound grounding in the field of coastal defence having 
been successfully applied on numerous occasions (Burcharth, 1992, Burcharth and Sorensen, 1998, 
Hussaarts et al., 2000, Kortenhaus et al., 2002, Voortman et al., 2002 to list a few), and these 
applications are clearly transferable to fluvial defences. However, application of the reliability 
methods themselves can add an extra degree of uncertainty. Level II methods can result in errors 
from evaluating the failure probability caused by linearization of the failure function. Point 
estimate methods (Rosenblueth, 1975,1981) have been successfully applied in coastal flood risk 
assessment by Reeve (1998,2002). Harr (1995) has formalised their inclusion within a reliability 
analysis to estimate failure probabilities. However, as with first order second moment methods, 
functions with a high degree of nonlinearity produce significantly erroneous results if the higher 
moments are unknown (Li, 1992). Whilst more accurate (but processing intensive) level III 
methods can be applied, ultimately a reliability analysis is as accurate as the failure model and data 
used. 
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Guidance on applying reliability methods in flood and coastal defence has focused on the design of 
structures rather than their assessment (CUR and TAW, 1990 and Oumeraci et al., 2001). The 
large amount of data required to perform a reliability analysis limits its use as an assessment tool in 
situations of sparse or incomplete data. Despite the fact that probability distributions are well 
established to represent uncertainty in wave and water levels (CIRIA and CUR, 1991 and CEHW, 
1999) and there is much well documented research and guidance, there has traditionally been a 
resistance from engineers to apply reliability methods in the design of flood and coastal defences 
where reliability methods are still relatively new'and design and investment decisions have to be 
made under extreme uncertainty. Despite this, probabilistic methods offer many advantages: 
" they offer a consistent and transparent approach to design and assessment, 
" design costs can be optimised and investment decisions made more efficiently, 
" they can account for the uncertainty in the design parameters, and, 
" they allow a quantitative assessment of flood risk to be made to monitor system performance. 
Model uncertainty parameters, based on the method of Ditlevsen (1982), have been used in the - 
reliability analysis of coastal structures with several limit state functions. Burcharth (1992) gives 
an example application using Hudson's rock armour stability equation and defining the model 
uncertainty, A, as A-N(1.0,0.18). These values are usually based on the scatter in experimental 
data that was used to generate the. original failure function. The use of such parameters to capture 
model uncertainty is often controversial as the empirical evidence supporting these approaches is 
questionable (Blockley, 1999) and more significant are the uncertainties stemming from 
transferring a parametric model developed from experimental data to a specific site (Hall, 2003). 
The second order approach of Burmaster and Wilson (1996) requires uncertainty to be mapped 
onto a probability distribution for each parameter. However, as described previously in Section 
3.2.4, this uncertainty is not best represented by probability distributions. Moreover, the 
dependency relationship between marginal distributions of model output and model dependability 
is seldom clear (Hall, 1999). For the purposes of structural design, model uncertainty is usually 
accounted for in a more deterministic manner using partial safety factors (Oumeraci et al., 2001). 
Caution is also required when using certain limit state formulae in a reliability analysis as they are 
usually based on scale model tests that often show considerable scatter in the results. To address 
the uncertainty in scale model results, researchers have recommended "safe" values of model 
coefficients. , Whilst these provide a sound basis for design, their inherent conservatism means that 
they will result in biased risk assessments. To avoid this bias, the original experimental data may 
need to be revisited to estimate "most likely" rather than "safe" values of model coefficients 
together with an estimate of the surrounding uncertainty. For some well know formulae this has 
already been done using probability distributions (Stoutesdijk et al., 1998, Bezuijen and Kruse, 
1998). Hall (2003) demonstrated that eliciting expert judgement to generate fuzzy membership 
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functions can be a useful method of representing the uncertainty associated with these parameters 
and the transferring of a model derived from experimental data to a specific site. - 
Lindley (1987) argues that probability "is the only sensible description of uncertainty and is 
therefore adequate for all problems involving uncertainty" and HR Wallingford (2002) note that 
many natural phenomena conform well to probability distributions. However, much of the 
scepticism related to the application of reliability methods stems from their inability to incorporate 
evidence on the dependability of input parameters and evidence from the diverse range of sources 
with different degrees of fuzziness that is the case in decision-making in flood and coastal defence. 
It is rare in the UK that there is enough information to be able to generate accurate values for the 
moments of parameters that control failure mechanisms. Other parameters can not accurately be 
defined by a point value. Membership functions which were introduced in Section 3.2.4 offer a 
useful alternative of capturing expert judgement which is based upon possibilistic rather than 
probabilistic reasoning. In situations where expert judgement cannot provide a meaningful 
probability distribution, a possibility distribution of values can be estimated. In its simplest form, 
this places bounds on the possible value of a system parameter, for example rock diameter. A more 
informative description would be a fuzzy set. The use of possibility descriptions means that 
probabilities do not have to be estimated for each possible value. Uncertainty associated with the 
use of possibility distributions can be propagated through the reliability analysis and reflected in 
the final estimate of failure probability. Whilst this appears to increase the uncertainty associated 
with the reliability assessment, in reality, the decision-maker is better informed about where the 
uncertainties in the data lie. Estimation of a parameter distribution is itself a form of uncertainty. 
Whilst a Bayesian may argue that probability distributions should be estimated initially and 
improved with time, a lack of data, infrequent failure information and irregular monitoring mean 
this approach is often inappropriate in flood defence. Because of a lack of training data, the use of 
GLUE which is undoubtedly a powerful methodology for estimating model uncertainty, is limited 
for estimating uncertainty in rare (such as an extreme flood) or unrepeatable (such as a 
hydrologically activated landslide) events (Hall and Anderson, 2002). This is the case for 
reliability analyses. Flood defence failures are not frequent events and those that have occurred 
have often not been recorded adequately. This, coupled with the fact that failure mechanisms are 
often affected by site specific factors means that methods such as GLUE that rely on training data 
will not be appropriate. GLUE is also not without the need for subjective judgements, such as the 
likelihood measures, that are used in other model uncertainty methods, however, it is argued that by 
making these judgements explicit they can at least be subjected to peer review and scrutiny. 
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3.5. RECEPTOR - IMPACT ESTIMATION 
The receptor "refers to the asset that may be harmed' (ICE, 2001). To be able to estimate flood 
risk an assessment of the impacts of flooding is required. This section describes the methods used 
to estimate potential flood consequences. 
If there were no development in floodplains there would be no flood risk. However, the benefits 
offered from living near rivers or coastlines and from farming the fertile floodplain land have 
resulted in towns and cities growing in these areas. In the Netherlands and'parts of East Anglia, 
land has been reclaitned from the sea creating areas of vulnerable low-lying land. Compounded by 
sea level rise and an increasing population the impacts of flooding are likely to increase in the 
future. Flood risk can therefore be reduced by receptor management. In the United States, this has 
been taken to one extreme where entire communities have been relocated to reduce flood risk 
(Miletti, 1999). In England and Wales controlling future development in floodplains is now 
recognised as being an important part of flood risk management (ICE, 2001). Receptor 
management is not always considered to be a suitable option. For example, in the Netherlands 
where the majority of the country is at risk from flooding the pathway is the dominant method used 
to control flood risk. 
Flood impacts are categorised based on whether they are direct or indirect and tangible or 
intangible. These can be further classified based on whether they are primary or secondary losses 
as shown in Table 3.2 (Smith and Ward, 1998). 
Table 3.2 Categories of flood loss potential (Smith and Ward, 1998) 
FLO OD LOSSES 
DIRECT INDIRECT 
TAN GIBLE INTANGIBLE TANGIBLE INTANGIBLE 
Prima Seconds Primary Seconds Primary Secondary Prima Secondary 
Physical Costs of Loss of Ill health Disruption 
Reduced Increased Out- 
migration damage 
complete human of flood of traffic spending 
hazard 
and reduced to 
restoration life -' victims and trade 
vulnerability confidence property community of survivors in area 
Direct tangible losses 
Traditionally flood risk has been expressed in economic terms and current assessments of flood risk 
clearly emphasise this, although there is increasing recognition of the need to assess other risks 
(DEFRA, 2000). The Flood Hazard Research Centre (FHRC) at Middlesex University has'studied 
in detail the effects of direct tangible damage (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton (1977), Middlesex 
University (1990) and Penning-Rowsell et al. (2002)) which resulted in the publishing of depth-, 
damage curves such as those in Figure 3.14 (where a negative depth indicates basement flooding). 
Primary losses in urban areas results from direct physical damage to property. Primary losses in 
rural areas are a result of crop damage or loss of livestock and agricultural infrastructure (eg. 
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irrigation and drainage systems). Agricultural damages vary according to the type of crop and 
season. A previous national assessment of flood risk in England and Wales has shown that direct 
tangible losses are usually dominated by urban damage. Halcrow et al. (2001) calculated the 
average annual economic damage to be £814million and of this 12% was due to loss of agriculture 
and 0.5% due to traffic disruption. 
Secondary direct tangible losses relate to restoration of buildings. After restoration a loss in 
property value resulting from the flood may also be expected, but Montz (1992) has shown that 
house prices should be expected to recover and that flood risk was not an important long-term 
consideration in buying property. However, there is evidence to suggest that as insurance 
companies increase their premiums after major floods, or refuse to insure homeowners in 
floodplains, the property value is significantly reduced (ICE, 2001). 
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Figure 3.14 An example of a depth-damage curve for "Retail shops ", showing lower, upper and 
indicative damage bounds (Middlesex University, 2002). 
Direct intangible losses 
Primary direct intangible losses are the mortality rates associated with a flood event. These can be 
deaths attributed to drowning or as a result of water-borne disease or starvation. Guidelines for 
levels of acceptable individual risk are given by the HSE (1989). Methods for estimating the 
number of deaths from flooding (and other disasters) have been proposed by Vrijling et at. (1995). 
This approach calculates both individual risk, IR, which reflects the risk to the individual at a given 
location. 
IR = Pf X Pdv (3.66) 
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where Pf is the probability of a flood and PQyis the probability of death given the flood. This is 
used to limit the risks of nearby hazards and transport routes (Jonkman et al., 2002). A national 
level of risk, or societal risk, SR, is also measured: 
SR = E(N) + k. a(N) (3.67) 
where E(N) represents the expected number of deaths which is increased by the risk aversion index 
k (which represents the public attitude towards large disasters and different types of risks) of the 
standard deviation. 
Secondary losses are related to physical or mental ill-health resulting from the flooding. Physical 
illness can come as a result of water-borne disease or polluted water. Long term distress and in 
some circumstances mental illness can result from loss of family or possessions and general 
disruption. Hoque et aL (1993) showed the devastating effect of the 1991 floods on public health 
in Bangladesh. Prediction of the severity of these impacts is difficult. Even after a flood, this 
assessment is challenging. Typically, such assessments involve a comparison of pre- and post- 
flood event visits to doctors or hospitals, other effects such as depression or stress are based on 
interview and questionnaire studies (Bennet, 1970). However, these require a good knowledge of 
the pre- event situation and are naturally subjective. 
Recently measures of social vulnerability (described in more detail in Chapter 2) have been 
suggested for England and Wales to provide an indication of the likely seriousness of the direct 
intangible effects of flooding (DTLR, 2000 and Tapsell et al., 2001). Intangible losses also result 
from a drop in lifestyle quality. Penning-Rowsell et al. (1992) have suggested methods for 
evaluating the losses associated with recreation and environment in the coastal environment. 
Guidance for evaluating the cost of the environment are described in more detail in Chapter 2 and 
DEFRA (2000c). 
Indirect tangible losses 
Whilst often quantifiable, less research has been done on measuring indirect tangible damages 
compared to direct tangible damages, although Parker et al. (1987), the Environment Agency 
(1996) and the Department of Transport (2001) have proposed methodologies for measuring losses 
caused by disruption to the transportation infrastructure. Penning-Rowsell and Parker (1987) 
identified that these losses can extend beyond the flooded area. For example, disruption of the 
transport infrastructure'results'in diversions thereby wasting people's time and fuel, and possibly 
disrupting local trade. Other indirect tangible costs include costs of the emergency response 
services and loss of public utilities such as gas, electricity or water. Secondary losses are caused by 
long term losses in trade, interconnection of industries within the same flooding region or a change 
in the spending priorities of consu mers'as a result of the flooding and for large floods these 
damages can be substantial (Olsen et al., 1998). Recent flooding in England and Wales has made 
üý 
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some areas of the floodplain likely to be left uninsured resulting in a dramatic drop 
in house price 
in these areas (ICE, 2001). 
Indirect intangible losses 
Indirect intangible losses are the hardest to measure and it is difficult to differentiate between 
primary and secondary losses (Smith and Ward, 1998). Types of intangible losses include 
long 
term environmental changes, changes in social behaviour and population migration of those who 
are able to leave thereby resulting in greater vulnerability of the remaining population. 
3.6. SUMMARY 
Using the source-pathway-receptor framework the key stages of risk assessment have been 
reviewed. This has been complimented by a review of uncertainty which is present at each stage of 
the risk assessment. The key needs for flood defence managers identified in Chapter 2 required the 
research to place a greater emphasis upon assessing failure probabilities of defences and flood 
defence systems. The analysis in this chapter therefore focussed on methods available to assess the 
reliability of flood defence systems and techniques available to handle the uncertainty associated 
with the data needed for these analyses. 
Two of the key needs for flood defence managers identified in Chapter 2 were: 
(i) a quantitative systems-based flood risk assessment methodology, and, 
(ii) a method to describe defence condition probabilistically. 
A flood risk assessment requires an assessment of loads, likelihood of inundation and consequences 
of inundation. Each part of this assessment has associated uncertainties. These should be kept 
separate and only combined when calculating the final risk to allow the decision-maker to identify 
the main sources of uncertainty. The level of acceptable uncertainty will be dependent on the 
decision and available resources. A more detailed analysis, whilst reducing uncertainty, will also 
require more resources and is therefore inappropriate for a minor investment decision. A tiered risk 
assessment methodology that uses a level of analysis appropriate to the decision being informed is 
therefore proposed. The three tiers for this methodology are outlined in Chapter 4. A method 
suitable for application on a national scale is described in detail. 
A review of techniques available to flood defence managers has identified reliability methods as 
being a useful and well established tool for assessing failure probabilities of flood defences. 
However, their application so far has involved the use of evidence expressed as either deterministic 
or probabilistic values. Much information pertaining to flood defence failure is suited to being 
expressed in these formats (eg. distributions of water levels). However, expert judgement which 
has a pivotal role in flood defence management is much better expressed as a membership function. 
Membership functions can also be used to capture uncertainty associated with incomplete or scarce 
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data. Again, this is frequently the case for the flood risk manager. Reliability analyses need to be 
able to incorporate this information, placing bounds on the failure probability which represent the 
uncertainty in the evidence. This enables quantitative bounds on the probability of defence failure 
to be estimated using the best available information without pre-supposing any parameter 
distributions. Upper and lower failure bounds for a defence can be calculated using ordinary 
system bounds or Ditlevsen bounds. A novel approach to condition characterisation of flood and 
coastal defences that incorporates membership functions within a reliability analysis of flood and 
coastal defences is described in Chapter 5. This methodology corresponds to the detailed level of 
the tiered risk assessment described in Chapter 4. 
Whilst a probabilistic risk assessment and reliability analyses of defences provide useful indicators 
of system and defence performance, other evidence of performance should be included in order to 
broaden the perspective of the decision-maker. A decision-support tool that enables this is 
described in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4 
A tiered approach to flood risk assessment 
4.1. OVERVIEW 
The review of the current state of flood defence management in Chapter 2 identified the need for a 
flood risk assessment that provides a rational basis for development of flood management policy, 
allocation of resources and monitoring the performance of flood mitigation activities. In order to 
support a wide range of management decisions a tiered framework has been developed that builds 
on the work of Meadowcroftet al. (1996). This chapter provides an overview of three increasingly 
detailed levels of risk assessment and describes in detail a method appropriate for making a 
national-scale flood risk assessment. The intermediate level of assessment is described completely 
and the detailed level, which is at an earlier stage of development, is briefly outlined. 
A national-scale risk assessment presents particular challenges in terms of data acquisition and 
manipulation, numerical computation and presentation of results. A methodology that addresses 
these difficulties through appropriate approximations has been developed and applied in England 
and Wales. The methodology represents the flood defence system in sufficient detail to test 
alternative policy options for macro-scale investment decisions in flood management. Defence 
condition is assessed against proneness to overtopping' and breaching using curves constructed by 
experts that describe the conditional failure probability of a defence. Appropriate assumptions 
about defence system behaviour are made. Flood outlines and depths are generated using a rapid 
parametric inundation routine. Potential economic and social impacts of flooding are assessed 
using national databases of floodplain properties and demography. A case study of the river Parrett 
catchment and adjoining sea defences in Bridgwater Bay demonstrates the application of the 
method and presentation of the results in a Geographical Information System. 
4.2. A TIERED RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
As described in Chapter 2, considerable numbers of people and property are at threat from flooding 
and recent flooding has demonstrated the need for improved management of flood defences. 
Flood risk assessment is required to support the. appraisal of policy options, resource allocation and 
In this case, overtopping refers to overtopping dominated by overflow for fluvial defences and overtopping dominated by wave action for coastal defences. -This is explained in more detail later in the Chapter. 
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as a measure of performance of the substantial annual investment in flood management (HM 
Treasury, 2002). 
The amount of resources invested in data acquisition and analysis for risk assessment should reflect 
the importance of the decision(s) that are being informed. Flood management takes place at a 
number of levels, ranging from national policy decisions to planning decisions in a river catchment 
or coastal cell down to individual scheme design and day to day operational decisions. A flood 
risk assessment with three tiers is proposed. Each tier provides a progressively more thorough and 
accurate assessment of flood risk appropriate to the decision being taken (Table 4.1). In order for 
the High Level analysis to be performed on a national scale, only data that is available for the 
entirety of England and Wales can be used. The Intermediate Level incorporates additional 
information on loading, floodplain topography and defence structure. The Detailed Level uses 
information about the autocorrelation of loads and composition of the defences and a much more 
detailed study of their proneness to failure to provide the most accurate flood risk assessment. 
Table 4.1 Hierarchy of risk assessment levels, the decisions they inform, the data needed and 
methodologies used to implement them 
Level Decisions to inform Data sources Methodologies 
High " National assessment of " Defence type " Generic probabilities of defence 
economic risk, risk to " Condition grade failure based on condition 
life or environmental " Standard of Protection assessment and crest freeboard 
risk " Indicative flood plain " Assumed dependency between 
" Prioritisation of maps defence sections 
expenditure " Socio-economic data " Empirical methods to determine 
" Regional planning 
" Flood warning planning 
" Land use mapping likely flood extent 
Intermediate Above plus: Above plus: " Probabilities of defence failure 
" Flood defence strategy " Defence crest level and from reliability analysis 
planning other dimensions where " Systems reliability analysis using 
" Regulation of available joint loading conditions 
development " Joint probability load " Modelling of limited number of 
" Maintenance distributions inundation scenarios 
management " Flood plain topography 
" Planning of flood " Detailed socio-economic 
warning data 
Detailed Above plus: Above plus: " Simulation-based reliability 
" Scheme appraisal and " All parameters required analysis of system 
optimisation describing defence " Simulation modelling of 
strength inundation 
" Synthetic time series of 
loading conditions 
The three tiers of flood risk assessment share common elements. Each level requires: 
"'a description of loadings (water levels and wave heights), 
" an estimation of defence failure probabilities, 
" an inundation model, and, 
" an estimation of consequences (people and property in the flooded area). 
The methods used to achieve these aims vary according to the required detail of analysis. 
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4.3. HIGH LEVEL METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. Overview 
To calculate a national assessment of flood risk, it is necessary to aggregate the average annual 
damage (AAD) over all the floodplains in England and Wales. An overview of the method used is 
described in this section and shown by the flowchart in Figure 4.1, a more detailed description is 
provided in Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.5 and results from a case study are shown in Section 4.4. 
The only nationally available information on the potential extent of flood inundation are the 
Indicative Floodplain Maps (IFMs) which are outlines of the area that could potentially be flooded 
in the absence of defences in a 1: 100 year return period flood for fluvial floodplains and a 1: 200 
year return period flood for coastal floodplains. The IFM was derived from a variety of sources: 
topographic maps, flood models and/or historical flood records. For the purposes of the risk 
assessment the Indicative Floodplain is divided into flood damage zones not greater than tkm x 
Ilan. Each flood damage zone is associated with a system of flood defences which, if one or more 
of them were to fail, would result in some inundation of that zone. Defences can be associated with 
more than one flood damage zone. 
The probability of failure of a flood defence system can be estimated using the methods of 
structural reliability analysis (CUR and TAW, 1990 and Melchers, 1999). However, these methods 
require probability. distributions for the hydraulic loads and parameters describing defence response 
as well as analytical or numerical expressions for each failure mode. Unfortunately in England and 
Wales there is no nationally available probabilistic loading information. Moreover, information on 
defence crest level and structural strength parameters is not consistently available. Clearly it is 
crucial tobe able to establish a relationship between loading and crest level. In England and Wales 
the only information nationally available is a measure of the Standard of Protection (SOP), which is 
an assessment of the return period at which the defence will significantly be overtopped or 
overflowed. In the high level methodology the SOP is used as a benchmark for a generic load 
distribution. A generic probability distribution of defence failure, conditional on load, defence type 
and condition, is used to estimate the probability of failure by two mechanisms, overtopping and 
breaching. An estimate is made of the probability of every combination of defence failure within a 
flood defence system, taking into account the dependency between defence sections. 
For each combination of defence failure an approximate flood outline is generated using parametric 
routines that estimate discharge through or over the defence and inundation characteristics of the 
floodplain. Whilst high resolution topographic data is becoming available on a national basis in the 
UK, without information on flood water levels it cannot be used to estimate depths of inundation. 
Estimation of flood depth therefore has to be based on statistical data from real and simulated 
floods in a range of floodplain types and floods of differing severity. Economic risk is calculated 
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based on damage to properties and agricultural land use within the flooded area. The population at 
risk is derived from census data and a measure of the social harm of flooding is obtained from 
Social Flood Vulnerability Indices (Tapsell et al., 2002). 
Identify system to be assessed - for rivers this will usually be a catchment. I 
This encompasses the floodplain and the defence protecting it. 
Collect defence information (SOP, condition grade, length, co-ordinates), classify 
defences and assign each defence fragility curves for overtopping and breaching 
I Identify impact zones based on land use database and collect impact I 
information (depth-damage curves, population, SFVI) 
For every impact zone I 
For each flood event in a range 
of events of varying severity 
Identify potential flood extent and system of I 
defences that influences each impact zone. 
For every combination 
of defence failures 
Calculate the probability of the given I 
combination of defence failures 
I Calculate the depth of flooding in each I 
impact zone. 
II Extract flood damage based ön depth of 
`ý flooding 
Calculate the total flood risk (economic and social) and extract other indices 
(contribution to risk from each impact zone, defence or flood severity, etc. ) 
Present results in GIS or tabular format 
Figure 4.1 Overview of the high level flood risk assessment methodology 
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4.3.2. High level systems reliability analysis 
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Figure 4.2 shows a simple example of a flood defence system. The floodplain (defined by the 
limits of the IFM) is divided into m flood damage zones, labelled z1, z2,..., zm each Ikm x Ilan in 
size. Breaching or overtopping of one of n flood defences, labelled d1, d2,..., dd, results in 
inundation of one or more of these flood damage zones. For each damage zone it is necessary to 
calculate the probability of every combination of defence failure that may cause flooding in that 
zone. Defining the failure of defence d; as Di and non-failure as D. ,a damage zone protected 
by 
two, defence, d1, d2, has three possible defence failure scenarios Dl n D2 , Dl o D2, 
D, ( D2 , 
and one non-failure scenario, Dl n D2 . 
Extent of floodplain 
. 00 ' 




Z' d2 z5 
d1 d3 z8 zl l 








Figure 4.2 A floodplain that has been divided into impact zones (zl-z14) and protected by flood 
defences (d, -d7) 
The probability of failure of a defence is a function of the probability of an extreme load (river 
water level or combined wave height and sea level) and the defence's resistance to that load. In the 
absence of information on the frequency of extreme loads a factor x multiplied by the SOP has 
been adopted as a proxy for load. Thus if the SOP is 1: 100 years, then a load with x=0.5 
corresponds to a 1: 50 year return period event. The annual probability P(X z x) of an event X with 
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Each defence section d, is assigned, on the basis of its defence classification and condition, a 
conditional probability of failure given a loadx, P(D, 1x), for a range of values ofx. In reliability 
analysis a conditional probability distribution of this type is referred to as a 'fragility curve' 
(Casciati and Faravelli, 1991 and Chapter 5). Typical fragility curves are illustrated in Figure 4.4 
and Figure 4.5. The fragility curve can be combined with the loading distribution to generate an 
unconditional probability of defence failure, P(Dr): 
Go 
P(D) = JP(x)P(DI I x)dx 
0 
(4.3) 
where p(x) is the probability density function of the load x. The product x. SOP is a measure of the 
severity of the hydraulic load, so it is replaced by the symbol 1, in which case: 
Go 
PAD) = 
JP(I)P(Dj I 1)dl 
0 
(4.4) 
and P(Dill) can be obtained from the fragility curve by reading off at x =1/SOP. For the purpose of. 
the current analysis the fragility curve is defined in discrete terms at q levels of 1: Ii,..., I,, enabling 
Equation. 4.4 to be re-written as: 
P(D+) = 
t[ýL> if+lj+" 





where L is a random variable representing the hydraulic load. Unlike the commonly used First 
Order Reliability Method (Melchers, 1999) this discrete approach allows arbitrarily shaped 
distributions of load and structural response. From a computational point of view, the discrete 
approach is attractive because it generates exact bounds on the probability of failure, illustrating 
numerical errors in the same format as the other uncertainties in the analysis. 
To estimate the probability. of occurrence of a scenario in which a given number of defences in a 
system fail requires information about the dependency between the variables describing system 
behaviour. In this national-scale analysis three simple assumptions are made: 
(1), Loading of all defences in a defence system is considered to be fully dependent i. e. all 
defences are subject to the same load at the same time. The relief of load on downstream 
defences due to failure of an upstream defence, for example, is not considered. 
(2) The resistance of different defences to extreme loading is independent i. e. the strength of 
each defence is assessed independently and does not depend upon the strength of its 
neighbours. For a system of two defences, d1 and dz, that are both subjected to load 1 the 
probability of both defences failing is then: 
P(Dir Del) = P(Dill)"P(D2I1)" (4.6) 
(3) The resistance within a given defence section is fully dependent i. e, the whole section 
responds to loads in the same way. 
For very long defences the third assumption becomes difficult to sustain., Whilst the parameters 
describing defence resistance, for example crest height or geotechnical properties, will show strong 
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dependency nearby, CUR and TAW (1990) suggest that over a distance greater than about 500m 
these parameters are more or less independent. Therefore for the purposes of the defence systems 
analysis, defences over 600m in length are split into sections 300-500m long. 
Having accepted the assumptions outlined above, the probability of a typical failure scenario 
D, n .. nD,. nD r+1 n ... n 
D., is calculated as follows: 
P(D, n... nD, nD, +, n... nD, 
)= 
q-i IL+l j+l I; _i L >_ 
2-L2 
]]P(DI 
11; )... P(D. (I; ). P(D. +, I l; )... P(D 
I If) (4.7) 
j-2 
To understand the impact of defence failure it is also important to establish the mode of failure, be 
it breach or overtopping. The impacts of a defence being overtopped or breached can be quite 
different and so need to be considered separately in the flood risk calculation. Failure of defence d, 
by overtopping is denoted as D; 0T and failure by breaching as D. Non-failures of defence d, are 
labelled D, o,. and D, s respectively. Breaching and overtopping are not fully independent failure 
mechanisms; overtopping can often be the initiating mechanism for a defence breaching (Thomas 
and Hall, 1992). A defence can therefore be in one of four combinations of failure mechanisms: 
(1) Dis nD; 07. represents the state of non-failure of the defence. 
(2) D; B nD0T represents failure by overtopping (as the defence has not breached as well). 
(3) D; 8 nD; or represents failure by breaching without overtopping occurring. 
(4) Dis nD, 07. represents failure by breaching with overtopping. 
The probability of failure by overtopping given a particular load 1 is labelled P(Di07{1) and the 
probabilities of breaching, with or without overtopping, again given load 1 are labelled 
P(D. I D; o,., 1) and P(D; $ 
I D; 01., 1) respectively. The probability of non-failure is therefore 
P(Djor I1)P(D, 3 I D, or, 1) (4.8) 
Since P Djor 11) -1-P(DIor. 1) and P(D, - DOT, 1) =1- P(Da I D, 01., 1) the probability of non- 
failure can be rewritten as 
P(DIor 3, DB (1) _ 
[1- P(D, or 11)}[l - P(D; B I D. 0 ; 1)] (4.9) 
The probability of just overtopping, P(D, or, D1e 11) occurring given load 1 is 
P(Dlor I Djs 11) = P(D; or 
11) - P(Dre I Dror, 1). P(D, 0711) (4.10) 
The probability of breaching given load 1, P(D; B 11), is the sum of the probabilities of breaching 
occurring with overtopping and without overtopping 
P(DIB 11)= P(Dia I D; or, 1) . P(D; or 11)+ P(Dra I DjoT, I)P Dior 11) (4.11) 
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which can be rewritten as: 
P(D; a 11) = P(Dja I Dror, 1 
ýP(Dror 11) + P(DIa I 51 jor, 1) 
[l 
- P(Dror 11)]. (4.12) 
To evaluate Equations 4.9,4.10 and 4.12 requires three fragility curves: (i) overtopping, 
P(D; OT I x), (ii) breaching given over topping, P(DiBI Djor, x) and (iii) breaching given no 
overtopping, P(D, B I Dror, x)" Considering one typical defence failure scenario 
DIOT n ... n 
D, B n D,,, n ... n D. , Equation 4.7 becomes: 
P(D1or. B n... nDB nD,., n... nDýý= 
+I j+i _X>I, 
+ Ij_, )]P(Di0r. 
'B ýi).. P(D, I IJ)ý(D,. 1 I IJ)... P(D, ' l) (4.13) ý-ý 22 
where P(D, or. B 
11. ) is obtained from Equation 4.10 and P(DrB I lý) is obtained from Equation 
4.12. 
For each defence there are three states that are of interest: overtopped, breached and not failed. For 
a flood damage zone protected by n defences there are therefore 3" system states whose 
probabilities are to be estimated, this becomes computationally infeasible for defence systems of a 
realistic size. A significant reduction in the number of defences can be considered if only those 
defences that result in some flooding in a given flood damage zone are considered. If the average 
number of defences protecting each zone, zi,..., z, , is a, where a is much less than n, the number of 
failure scenarios to be considered reduces from 3" to the order of m. 3°. Further saving is achievable 
if it is recognised that many of these failure scenarios will be common to neighbouring zones. 
It may still be necessary to reduce the numbers of calculations further and this can be achieved by 
neglecting combinations of defence failure involving large numbers of defences as these make a 
small contribution to the total probability of failure. The error due to this approximation can be 
calculated exactly provided the probability of non failure for the whole system 
P(D, n5, n... t Dýý is also calculated. Suppose that in a system with n defence sections, the 




(n - i) 
such scenarios, the probability of each of which is labelled P;, j=1,..., r. The error E from' 
neglecting higher order scenarios is given by 
E=1-Pý 
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An upper bound on flood risk can therefore be calculated by multiplying this risk with the 
maximum possible damage within the flood damage area. 
4.3.3. Constructing fragility curves 
In a detailed risk analysis, fragility curves for overtopping and breaching mechanisms would 
be 
constructed on a defence-specific basis considering dimensions, material properties and failure 
mechanisms. However, the information required to construct defence-specific fragility curves 
in 
not available on a national basis. Generic fragility curves have therefore been constructed 
based on 
defence classification and a condition assessment. A new defence classification hierarchy is 
introduced which is used to establish generic defence type fragility curves for overtopping and 
breaching. There is a large element of expert judgement involved in the construction of these 
curves. This has been supplemented by additional analysis wherever possible. 
Defence classification 
In England and Wales the Environment Agency (1996) classifies every flood defence based on the 
individual defence components (for example inward slope, crest and outward slope) and their 
composition (for example turf or concrete). This leads to a classification in which sub-divisions 
have little relevance to the proneness to failure, whilst important characteristics such as crest width 
and level can go unrecorded. 
For the purpose of national-scale risk analysis a simple new classification has been developed, 
focussing on those salient characteristics of a defence cross-section that influence its resistance to 
extreme loads. An algorithm has been established that gives a direct mapping from the 
classification used by the Environment Agency to the new reliability-based classification used here. 
The highest level in the classification shows seven defence types that exhibit significantly different 
behaviour (Figure 4.3). The next level within the hierarchy considers the degree of protection 
offered by the defence; a wider defence will provide more protection, as will a defence that is 
protected on its front slope, crest and rear slope (Environment Agency, 1996b). The final level of 
classification considers the properties of individual components. A complete summary of the 
defence classification is given in Appendix E. 
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Figure 4.3 The seven main classes of flood defence. The classification for seawalls has been 
expanded as an example. 
Overtopping mechanism 
If the SOP were a perfect measure of the return period at which the defence would overflow or be 
overtopped then for all x >_ 1 the defence would have failed by overtopping and for all x<I it 
would be safe. However, flood defence designers typically include some allowance for freeboard, " 
and there is also uncertainty in crest levels and extreme loads. This means that defences do not on 
the whole overtop as soon as x=1. Freeboard allowance cannot be assumed to be nationally 
uniform, because of different local conventions and assumed rates of settlement. The fragility 
curve shown in Figure 4.4 has therefore been adopted. Uncertainty is reflected through the use of 
upper and lower bounds on the conditional failure probability for a given load, x. 
The definition of SOP relates to the condition in which there is `significant' overtopping. 
Interpretation of this definition of overtopping is subjective. In the case of fluvial defences, 
overtopping is dominated by overflow, as opposed to wave action (CIRIA, 1987), which is defined 
as the condition when the river stage exceeds the defence crest level. Evidence from floods of 
known severity overtopping defences of known SOP, primarily from records of the autumn/winter 
floods of 2000 (Environment Agency, 2001), has been used to verify points on the fragility curve 
shown in Figure 4.4. Additional statistical analysis of the level of freeboard showed that defences 
frequently have a substantial amount of freeboard (HR Wallingford et aL, 2002), significantly 
raising the level of protection they offer against overtopping compared to their design event, 
explaining the low conditional probability of inundation shown in Figure 4.4. 
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For sea and tidal defences, overtopping is dominated by wave action. Overflow is 
likely to lead to 
the breaching of the defences (see Appendix D for a review of failure mechanisms). In random 
seas in any storm there is a sometimes small but certainly finite probability of overtopping. 
The 
fragility curve for overtopping of sea defence shown in Figure 4.4 reflects this variability through 








Figure 4.4 Fragility curve used in the high level analysis showing the conditional probability of 
overtoppingforfluvial and coastal defences 
Breaching mechanism 
The probability of breaching in a storm of given severity is influenced by the type of defence and 
its condition. As suggested in Section 4.3.2, it is also strongly influenced by presence or absence 
of defence overtopping. Therefore a family of fragility curves have been developed for each 
defence classification, condition grade and overtopping/non-overtopping cases. An example of a 
family of these curves is shown in Figure 4.5. The fragility curves were are developed using a 
similar technique to that proposed by the USACE (1996) in which critical points on a curve are 
fixed by a combination of expert judgement and analysis, with a straight line between them. 
The difficulty arises in the As described in Chapter 2, the only nationally available information on 
defence condition is a visual assessment that grades each defence from Grade I ("very good") to 
Grade 5 ("very poor"). The Environment Agency's Condition Assessment Manual (Glennie et al., 
1991) provides benchmark photographs of the main types of defence in all five conditions. Grade 
5 nominally represents a defence in an effectively failed condition. However, the photographs 
(Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7) in the Condition Assessment Manual indicate that some of these 
defences would afford some resistance against breaching, at least in loads where x<1, so a; 
fragility curve has been established based on assessment of this residual resistance. Unfortunately 
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field evidence of defence failure is very scarce indeed. Verification of the fragility curves has 
therefore been based primarily on published values of the resistance of defence materials (CIRIA, 
1987, CUR and TAW, 1990, CIRIA and CUR, 1991, Environment Agency, 1996b). 
1.00 
P(Anot OT, CG= 1) 
0.80 
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Figure 4.5 Fragility curve used in the high level analysis showing the conditional probability of 
breaching with and without overtopping for a seawall of condition grade 1 and 5 
fi 
The bounds on the fragility curves have predominantly been elicited from expert judgement as the 
credible limits between which they expect the actual values to lie. As described earlier, limited 
Figure 4.6 Sheet pile wall with a condition grade of "very good " (Glennie et at., 1991) 
Figure 4.7 Sheet pile wall with a condition grade of "very poor ". Note that the piles appear to 
offer plenty of residual strength despite being in the worst possible condition grade category 
(Glennie et al., 1991) 
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evidence has been used to verify these bounds. No calibration of expert judgement using methods 
such as those proposed by Cooke (1991) has been applied, however, in order to address bias and 
over-confidence the judgement of several experts has been pooled. Fragility curves for each 
defence classification type are shown in Appendix E. 
4.3.4. Inundation modelling 
For each failure scenario an approximate flood outline is generated using parametric routines 
established by external collaborators. These routines estimate discharge through or over the 
defence. In the absence of topographic data and water levels, this is based on the valley type and 
statistical data of real and simulated flood events. An inundation outline and the corresponding 
depths in each damage zone are estimated for each defence failure scenario. These are used to 
construct probability-depth curves for each damage zone in the floodplain. The inundation 
methodology is described fully in Appendix F. 
4.3.5. Evaluating risks 
Damage zones within the floodplain were established based on al km square grid. The probability 
distribution of flood depth was calculated at the centroid of each damage zone and assumed to 
apply to the whole of the damage zone. 
Economic damage 
The numbers of domestic and commercial properties in each damage zone were extracted from 





where yis the greatest flood depth from all failure scenarios, p(y) is the probability density 
function for flood depth and D(y) is the damage at depth y. The total expected annual damage for a 
catchment or nationally is obtained by summing the average annual damages for all damage zones. 
Social impacts 
The population at risk was estimated from the number of inhabitants within a damage zone using 
2001 census data. The Social Flood Vulnerability Indices (SFVI) (Tapsell et al., 2002) were used 
to identify communities vulnerable to the impacts of flooding. Social vulnerability is ranked from 
"very low" to "very high" and is based on a weighting of the number of lone parents, the 
population over 75 years old, the long term sick, non-homeowners, unemployed, non-car owners 
and overcrowding, obtained from census returns. The risk of social impact is obtained as a product 
of probability of flooding times the SFVI, providing a comparative measure for use in policy 
analysis. 
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Uncertainty in the risk assessment 
Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.4 involve applying methods that are prone to large amounts of uncertainty; 
both because of the approximations that have been made and the great variability in the quality of 
data available on a national scale. 
A simple, yet explicit method of representing uncertainty at all the stages of the risk assessment has 
been applied. The uncertainty is represented by identifying an upper and lower bound of each of 
the most uncertain quantities. For example, the uncertainty in the fragility curves (Figure 4.4) is 
addressed by use of an upper and lower bound on the fragility curves, representing both the 
uncertainties in defence response and extreme loadings. The final outputs for flood risk are 
represented as upper and lower bounds. The uncertainties accounted for by these bounds are the 
uncertainty in loadings, defence response, inundation volumes and property damage. No 
assumption about the distribution of risk between these bounds can be made, though in the absence 
of more information, the best estimate will be the average of the two values. The wide bounds on 
risk estimates, in particular at a local resolution provide a cogent motive for a more thorough risk 
assessment to support decisions made at this level. 
4.4. EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATION: THE RIVER PARRETT AND BRIDGWATER BAI' 
Prior to national application (HR Wallingford et al., 2003), the flood risk assessment methodology 
was first tested by the author on the Parrett catchment in the South West of England, a system of 
sufficient complexity to evaluate the robustness of the methodology, before proceeding to the full 
national assessment. The lower reaches of the Parrett include a network of drainage channels, 
whereas the upper reaches are quite steep. The fluvial defences adjoin short sections of sea defence 
in Bridgwater Bay. Establishing the defence system involved merging geographically indexed data 
on flood defences from the NFCDD (the Environment Agency database) with data on the centreline 
of all watercourses, held by CEH Wallingford. A continuous defence line on both banks of every 
watercourse and along all coastlines fronting the floodplain was generated. Significant lengths of 
river were not reported in the database as having a defence, in which case it was assumed that there 
was no raised defence. A non-raised defence can not fail by breaching and will provide resistance 
against overtopping equal at least to its neighbouring defences. 
The two main outputs for the analysis, which were geographically indexed in a Geographical 
Information System (GIS), were the risk in each damage zone and the average contribution to this 
risk from each defence in the flood defence system. Figure 4.8 shows the output from the 
economic risk assessment. The damage zones have been shaded, with a darker shade representing a 
higher economic risk. The total expected annual damage for the Parrett catchment was calculated 
as £1.4-£2. Imillion. This compares with the only previous analysis (Halcrow et a!., 2001) which 
estimated a total risk of £2.7 million. In the close-up of the Parrett estuary shown in Figure 4.9 the 
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defence line has been coloured to represent the contributions to risk from each defence. The darker 
shades represent a higher risk contribution (ranging from <£10 expected annual damage for some 
impact zones dominated by poor quality agricultural land to >£ 1,000,000 expected annual damage 
for high density urban areas). Defence failure probabilities (established using the fragility curves) 
can also be viewed in a similar manner. 
flood risk (OS Map © Crown Copyright) 
Parrett catchment and 
Bridgwater Bay 
`, 
Other queries that can be made on the output data include: 
" risk contribution from defences sorted by condition grade; 
" risk contribution from defences sorted by SOP; 
" risk contribution from floods of varying severity; 
" number of people at risk from flooding and a measure of their social vulnerability; 
" number of houses at risk of flooding to a given depth with a given probability. For example, in 
the Parrett catchment, between 2335 and 2704 residential properties (out of a possible 15668) 
and from 492 to 601 non residential properties (out of a possible 1605) are expected to be 
flooded to a depth of 0.2m or greater in a 1: 100 year flood. 
" number of properties with a high social vulnerability at risk of flooding to a given depth with a 
given probability. For example, in the Parrett catchment, between 229 and 458 people of 
Figure 4.8 GIS view of flood risk for the Parrett catchment where darker shades represent greater 
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maximum vulnerability (out of a possible 1374 with the maximum vulnerability and 17273 
total properties) are expected to be flooded to a depth of 0.2m or greater in a 1: 100 year flood. 
contribution towards the flood risk from flood defences(OS Map (D Crown Copyright) 
4.4.1. Limitations 
National assessment of flood risk is severely limited by availability of data and also to some extent 
by computational constraints. The proposed high level risk assessment method has been designed 
to give an unbiased aggregate measure of risk on a national basis and cannot be expected to be 
consistently accurate for every locality. The key limitations are as follows: 
The frequency of extreme fluvial flows or marine storms has not been assessed directly. The 
factor x times SOP has been used as a proxy for load. 
" Only linear defences are considered in the systems analysis. 
" Probabilistic analysis of defence resistance using fragility curves is based on a simple defence 
classification and generic fragility curves that do not take explicit account of defence geometry 
_: ýý 
and other key parameters that determine defence resistance. 
Figure 4.9 GIS close-up of Bridgwater Bay showing economic risk for damage zones and relative 
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9 The current quality of information relating to defence location, condition and SOP within the 
Environment Agency database is highly variable. 
" The flood spreading routine is based on volumetric concepts but does not include any 
hydrodynamic modelling and is based on a simple characterisation of floodplain morphology 
and approximate flood outlines in the IFM. 
" Flood depths are based on statistical analysis of real and simulated data and do not take account 
of local topography. 
These approximations are appropriate for a high level risk assessment, especially when considering 
the sparse data. Site specific decision-making should be supported by more detailed risk 
assessments which will require more detailed data collection and analysis, these are described in 
section 4.5. When more detailed information is available in an appropriate format, this can 
contribute to verification of the high level method. 
4.4.2. Applications 
The high level methodology can be used to obtain a national measure of flood risk. Results of the 
national application of the method described in this chapter are given in Appendix G. This is in 
line with meeting high level target 5b (DEFRA, 1999) set by the overseeing organisation of the UK 
government. The results obtained from the high level methodology can be used to: 
" monitor the performance of the national flood defence system, 
" justify investment from the government, 
" prioritise investment between river catchments and coastal cells, 
" identify areas in need of a more detailed risk assessment, and, 
" identify areas of social deprivation and support decisions using indicators that are not purely 
economic (for use in justifying investment in defences and flood warning). 
As well as providing an assessment of current risk, the methodology can be used to test future 
flooding scenarios and policy options, provided these can be resolved using the parameters of the 
methodology. For example, to illustrate the potential impact of climate change, the SOP of all 
defences was reduced by 20% (this reflects to an increase in water levels as a result of climate 
change). Therefore a defence that provided protection to a 1: 200 year SOP effectively reduced to a 
1: 160 year SOP. In this climate change scenario the total economic risk increased to an expected 
annual damage of £1.8-£2.7mil1ion (Figure 4.10). 
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simulation had increased loads by 20% (OS Map © Crown Copyright) 
The influence of repairing defences in poor condition can be assessed by altering the condition 
grade of defences. All defences with condition grade below 2 ("good") were raised to grade 2, 
reducing the total economic risk decreased to an expected annual damage of £ 1.3-£2.0million 
(Figure 4.11). This decrease is not particularly dramatic because most of the defences on the Parrett 
are already condition grade 2 or 3. The decrease in annual average risk can be weighed against the 
estimated cost of repairing the defences. 
This clearly allows users to explore the influence of general implications of investment decisions. 
The approximate nature of the analysis means that it is not an appropriate methodology for use in 
detailed economic justification of schemes or strategy plans. However, a preliminary investigation 
may be performed using an approximate method to discard certain options at an early stage of the 
analysis. 
Figure 4.10 GIS representation of flood risk in the Parrett catchment after a climate change 
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condition grade of all defences to "good " (OS Map © Crown Copyright) 
4.5. MORE RIGOROUS RISK ASSESSMENT 
Section 4.4.1 identified a number of limitations with the high level methodology. These are 
addressed in more detailed analysis through: 
" Statistical analysis of hydrology, and joint probability loading conditions for sea defences, 
including spatial dependency in both cases. 
0 Inclusion of additional components of the defence system, such as upstream storage reservoirs, 
pumps and relief channels to support more strategic decisions. 
" Quantified probabilistic analysis of defence failure making use of site-specific measurements. 
0 Analysis of the dependency between defence strength parameters within defence sections and 
between neighbouring sections. 
0 Hydrodynamic modelling for flood depth and extent using high resolution topographic 
information. 
" More detailed analysis of tangible and intangible impacts of flooding, including disruption to 
transportation systems. Analysis of the influence of non-structural flood mitigation measures 
such as flood warning. 
The extent to which these are implemented in the intermediate and detailed level risk assessment is 
described in the following sections. 
Figure 4.11 GIS representation of the Parrett catchment after maintenance had increased the 
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4.6. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL METHODOLOGY 
The intermediate level risk assessment aims to support SMPs and CFMPs by performing risk 
assessments at the sub-catchment or coastal sub-cell level. Previous risk assessment on this scale 
has not been explicitly risk-based and consisted of varying levels of technical analysis (Newcastle 
University et al., 2000). The development of a robust and accessible regional scale risk assessment 
methodology means future regional management plans can be supported by quantified estimates of 
flood risk in a consistent manner. The intermediate level has been developed fully, but at the time 
of writing not implemented. It is summarised briefly and then described in more detail in the 
following sections. 
The intermediate level methodology continues to use data such as the defence condition grade and 
defence type. However, this is supplemented by additional information, including, defence width 
and crest level (which are also stored in the Environment Agency database, although their 
availability is more limited) where available. The intermediate level is not intended to be applied 
nationally, although computing resources and adequate data permitting this may eventually be 
possible.. 
Fluvial loads are estimated from river gauges and rainfall-runoff data to obtain probability 
distributions of inflow. Joint-probabilities of wave height and water levels are used to describe 
coastal loadings. 
A hydrodynamic model incorporating a DEM is used to estimate inundation extents and depths in 
the floodplain. Damages are calculated using spatially indexed property and flood depth 
information. 
Defence strength is described using fragility curves. These are constructed by identifying dominant 
failure modes and correlating the proneness of failure to known parameters such as geometry. 
The possible number of combinations of defence failure in a system consisting of n defences 
equates to 2". To calculate a precise value of flood risk (or precise bounds on risk after accounting 
for uncertainties) it is necessary to perform a hydrodynamic simulation of all these scenarios. This 
is not possible so an algorithm has been established that identifies upper and lower bounds on flood 
risk. These bounds are then converged in the most efficient manner possible. 
An overview of the Intermediate Level risk assessment methodology is shown in Figure 4.12. The 
methodology is described in more detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 4.12 Overview of the intermediate f ood risk assessment methodology 
4.6.1. Load estimation 
To estimate fluvial loads for the intermediate level, statistical analysis of recorded flow rates is 
used to compliment the FEH rainfall-runoff method (CEHW, 1999). These are used to obtain the 
probability, P, of a given inflow, Q. 
P( 
Figure 4.13 Example of a probability density function for inflow 
a--i V- 
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For coastal flooding, joint probabilities of wave heights and water levels are needed. These are 
derived using methods described by HR Wallingford and Lancaster University (2000). Wave data 
is obtained from wave gauges and wind hindcasting. Extreme water levels are taken from POL 112 
(Dixon and Tawn, 1997) and complimented by local measurements where available. Overtopping 
discharge rates for coastal defences are estimated using methods described in the overtopping 
manual (HR Wallingford, 1999). 
4.6.2. Hydrodynamic modelling 
Hydraulic modelling can be significantly improved from the high level methodology by using 
hydrological loading information, defence crest levels and a Digital Elevation Map (DEM) of the 
floodplain. Loads on defences are no longer considered to be identical for the entire system. 
However, the conservative assumption that defences fail simultaneously in multiple failure 
scenarios is made to enable the risk assessment to be performed at a large scale. The analysis is 
therefore event based rather than time-dependent. For each failure scenario the inundation model 
provides spatially indexed data on flood depths and extent which can be used to estimate damages. 
Whilst the risk assessment methodology is not restricted to a particular inundation model, a 
desirable characteristic is that the model can be set up to perform a large number of simulations 
rapidly and with little external interference. 
4.6.3. Describing defence performance 
Fluvial defence overtopping 
For fluvial systems, overtopping is modelled within the hydrodynamic model. Depending on the 
hydrodynamic model being used, flow over a defence may be modelled using a weir equation 
(Chadwick and Morfett, 1993). For free flow (modular) when h, / hd> m: 
Q=Cd bh's (4.17) 
and for drowned flow when h / hd =4n: 




where Q= flow (m3/s), Cd = discharge coefficient, b= breadth of the weir, h = upstream depth of 
water above the embankment crest, hd = downstream depth of water above the embankment crest, 
and, m= modular limit. This approach may be more suited to the 1-D or quasi-2-D models 
described in Section 3.3. If a depth-averaged 2-D model or full 3-D model is being used, then flow 
over the defence can be modelled by solving the Navier-Stokes equations (Section 3.3). 
Coastal defence overtopping 
For coastal defences, information on defence roughness is required to model overtopping using 
Owen's equation (HR Wallingford, 1980) (Equation 4.19) and later adaptations (HR Wallingford, 
1999). For sloping, impermeable seawalls the overtopping rate, Q, is given by: 
It 
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wher H, is the significant wave height, Tm is the mean wave period, h, is the crest level, h, v is the 
still water level and a and b are coefficients based on the slope and berm. For rough and armoured 
slopes, a roughness coefficient is required. This is based on the type of material and where this is 
unknown a value can be assigned based on the limited defence revetment material classification 
information used for high level risk assessment (eg. turf front face corresponds to a roughness 
coefficient of 0.9-1.0). 
Fluvial defence breaching 
As at the high level method, defence condition is described using fragility curves (Casciati and 
Faravelli, 1991 and Chapter 5). In order to maximise the use of additional information, fragility 
curves are generated by identifying the dominant initiating failure mechanism of a particular 
structure. This is achieved through an onsite inspection of each individual defence. For example, 
for a fluvial defence this will usually be overflow leading to breaching or piping. Simple algebraic 
expressions using a limited number of parameters are used to construct fragility curves. In the 
case of overflow of fluvial defences, fragility curves can be constructed by relating conditional 
failure probabilities with overflow rates. Bettes and Reeve (1995) established relationship between 
the overflow head and the expected damage for embankments. This relationship can be used to 
help define points on the fragility curve. For mechanisms that are less well studied, relationships 
may have to be established based solely on expert judgement. An example of a fragility curve 
constructed through for an embankment most likely to fail from damage cause by overflow is 
shown in Figure 4.14. As at the high level, uncertainty in the defence response is represented by an 
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Figure 4.14 Fragility curve for an embankment with a dominant failure mode of damage caused by 
overflowing 
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Coastal defence breaching 
Coastal defences are subjected to joint loadings of waves and water levels. For the intermediate 
level, as with fluvial defences, a dominant failure mode is identified. However, for mechanisms 
dependent on waves and water levels, a fragility surface is generated by plotting P(BI WVLJ4) 
against the loading WL (water level) along one axis and H. (wave height) along another. 
Coastal morphology plays an important part in the proneness of a defence to breaching; a large and 
stable beach will offer additional protection. Intervention in coastal processes alters those 
downdrift. Assessment of changes in flood risk over the duration of a SMP requires the modelling 
of morphology to be incorporated into the risk assessment methodology. This enables intervention' 
strategies, and their subsequent impact on morphology and flood risk to be tested. Methods 
available to model coastal morphology have been introduced in Chapter 3. 
4.6.4. Defence systems failure analysis 
The defence systems failure analysis is more rigorous than the high level methodology. Upstream 
storage (and other defences besides embanlanents such as sluice gates) are included alongside 
linear defences in the modelling of the system allowing a more complete range of strategic 
decisions to be supported. The methodology will be described in the context of fluvial systems. A 
few changes that are required for coastal systems are described later. 
Defences can be in one of three states; overtopping, breaching or not failed. At the intermediate 
level overtopping volumes are given by the hydrodynamic model meaning that the number of 
possible combinations of defence failure (henceforth referred to as scenarios) that need to be 
analysed is now 2", for a system with n defences. The large number of failure scenarios means for 
any realistic system these scenarios can not all be modelled. Bounds on flood risk are therefore 
established. As more failure scenarios are modelled these bounds converge. 
1. Establish 'worst case' water level loadings 
The first step is to model the `worst case' scenario of no defences failing - effectively establishing 
a baseline for system behaviour (Scenario 0). This establishes the worst case water level, WLj, 
loading at each defence along the watercourse for the inflow, Qj. Failure of any defence will serve 
only to potentially lower the water level at a particular defence for any given flood event. The 
flood extent, depths and damages accrued from any overtopping are also calculated. 
2. Calculate failure probabilities for each scenario 
Because of the potentially enormous number of scenarios it is not be possible to model the 
inundation of each failure scenario. It may not necessarily be possible to calculate the failure 
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defences failing simultaneously) is calculated. For an n defence system the probability of a defence 






The probability of a typical scenario (in this case involving the failure of defence d) is given by: 
P(SS) = P(DI) x P(D2) ... x P(Dd )... x P(Dn-1) x P(Df) 
(4.21) 
where D. represents non-failure of defence n. 
As described in Section 4.6.2 no account is made of the sequence of failure in multiple defence 
failure scenarios. This results in a conservative estimate of flood risk as any relief in water levels 
following failure of upstream defences is not considered in the estimation of the breach probability 
(though it is included in the hydrodynamic modelling of inundation extent). The length of time of 
loading is not considered either. Although a longer loading will increase the failure probability of a 
defence, this can be reflected in the fragility curve as a more serious flood event will usually result 
in a longer loading time on the defences. Both of these factors will be considered at the detailed 
level of the risk assessment methodology. 
3. Estimate maximum possible damage 
A maximum damage value is estimated by super-imposing the flood outlines and worst case flood 
depth in each floodplain cell-from all single defence failure scenarios and the non-failure scenario. 
For each inflow estimate, j, the consequences, Cmaxj, from this extreme flood envelope are 
calculated. Note that this does not necessarily equate to the sum of all damage values for each 
scenario. 
4. Calculate risk from single defence failure scenarios 
The next stage involves simulating failure of each defence along the watercourse and using the 
flood outline and flood depths from the hydrodynamic model to establish the damages associated 
with this failure. The economic risk, R, for any given defence failure scenario is the multiple of its 
probability, P(S), and consequences, C: 
R= P(S) xC (4.22) 
5. Calculate initial bounds on flood risk 
A lower bound on the flood risk, RL of a system with n defences can therefore be calculated by 
summing the risk for all first order scenarios: 




Because the probability of all the scenarios sums to unity an upper bound on the risk, Ru, can be 
calculated: 
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r 
Ru=RL+ C. 
.,, j x 
1-T P(Si) (4.24) 
r=o 
This represents the sum of the risk associated with all first order failure scenarios and the 
conservative assumption that damage from all the remaining scenarios is the damage calculated 
from the super-imposed flood extent of the first order failure scenarios. 
6. Rank remaining scenarios 
The remaining failure scenarios (2°d order to mt' order) are ranked according to their probability of 
occurrence. Starting with the highest scenario probability the inundation model is run and the 
damage for each scenario is calculated.. As each of these remaining scenarios is analysed, the 
bounds on flood risk will converge. If z represents the number of multiple defence failure 
scenarios analysed, the new bounds, RL+z and Ru+z are now: 
A+z 
RL+z =Z Ci xP Sj (4.25) 
i=o 
n+z 
Ru+z=RL+z+C. j x 1-EP(Si) (4.26) i=0 
The bounds will therefore converge by C. _, x P(Ss) 
for each time an additional scenario is run. 
Enough scenarios should be calculated to ensure this convergence is satisfactory given the 
available resources and acceptable level of uncertainty. 
M+z 
The scenarios are ranked on probability as the term Cmaxj x 
1, 
- P(S1) is minimised by 
i=0 
n+z 
maximising the total probability analysed, I: P(SI). This will act to reduce the upper bound in 
i=o 
the most efficient manner possible thereby optimising the use of computational resources. 
7. Calculate bounds of system risk 
Performing this analysis for many values of Q will enable the upper and lower bounds on flood risk 






Figure 4.15 Plot of flood risk vs. river discharge Q 
The plot of flood risk against the discharge, Q (Figure 4.15) is then integrated over the discharge 
distribution shown in Figure 4.13 to calculate an upper and lower bound for the flood risk of the 
system. 
8. Coastal systems 
The nature of coastal systems is different to that of fluvial systems. Both the directionality and the 
dual nature of the loading need to be considered. The risk assessment methodology for coastal 
systems takes the same general form, but with a small number of changes to reflect the differences 
between the two types of system. 
Because coastal systems are subjected to both wave and water level loadings, the conditions most 
likely to result in defence failure are not necessarily the same as those likely to result in the 
maximum inundation. Therefore both extreme wave and water level events (as well as those in 
between) need to be considered. 
The shape of the coastline often means that nearby defences protecting the same land are not 
necessarily subjected to the same loading conditions due to the directionality of the loading. An 
extreme example of this is shown in Figure 4.16. The methodology for accounting for the direction 
and type of loading is summarised as follows. 
(1) Identify the system of n sea defences that protect a self-contained floodplain. Describe the 
resistance of each defence i (i =1,..., n) in the system in terms of a fragility function, 
conditional upon overtopping rate Q;: F(D; IQ; ) where Di denotes failure of defence i 
(Dawson and Hall, 2003a, 2003b). 
(2) Construct a joint probability density function (j. p. d. f. ) J(H WL) using simultaneous 
measurements of wave height H, 5 and water level WL at the site. 
(3) Make a random sample of a large number (-10,000) points from the j. p. d. f. AH,, WL). For 
each point in this sample calculate the overtopping rate, Q1(Hs, WL) at each defence i= 
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1,..., n in the system using the Overtopping Manual (HR Wallingford, 1999). Since 
parametric overtopping calculations are computationally inexpensive, no importance 
sampling is required at this stage. 
(4) For each sample of (Hs, WL) estimate the conditional probability of system failure, 
P(DSIHS, WL) assuming independence between defence sections: 
N 
P(D, I H,, WL) fl[1-P(D, I Qr(H,, WL))] (4.27) 
r"ý 
(5) Identify the point t on HsxWL that maximises P(DSIH WL)j(H3xWL). Make a fairly small 
sample of ni points (m=100) over a regular grid centred on t. 
(6) For each point j=1,..., m calculate the conditional probability P(DkIH$, WL), k=1,..., 2" 
of all of the defence failure combinations (again, these calculations are computationally 
inexpensive). Select the r failure combinations that make a non-negligible contribution to 
the total conditional probability of system failure P(D, IHs, WL) (generally r «< 2). 
(7) For each failure combination k =1,..., r run the inundation model using the loading 
conditions (H5, WL), the overtopping rates the overtopping rates Q, {Hs, WL) and an 
empirical estimate of the breach size and dischage, for breaching failure modes (HR 
Wallingford, 2003). 
(8) For each run k=1,..., r of the inundation model estimate the economic damage Ek using a 
database of house locations and standard depth-damage criteria. 
(9) The conditional risk R(H WL) is given by 
R(H:, 91) = 1: P(Dk I H, WI'). Ek 
k. l 
(4.28) 
(10)Plot at each point k =1,..., r on H3xWL the quantity f(HJ, WL). R(H3, WL). These points are 
then used to estimate the risk-based importance sampling distribution. Fit a joint p. d. f. 
f, p(Hs, WL) (normalising as necessary) to the values at k =1,..., r. 
(11)Sample as may points as are computationally feasible (typically 1000s) from, fmp(Hs, WL). 
At each point repeat steps 6-8. 
(12)The total flood risk Rro1 is given by 
R,,, = 
JJR(H,, WL)f(H,, WL)dH, dWL (4.29) 
which may be obtained by numerically integrating the results obtained in Step 11 with the 
j. p. d. f. J(HH, WL). 
These steps can be repeated twice using upper and lower-values of crest heights, damage values etc. 
to obtain bounds on flood risk. 
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Figure 4.16 How defences of the same system, protecting the same area of coastal land can be 
subjected to different loadings. 
4.6.5. . 
Impact estimation 
Hydrodynamic modelling offers the opportunity to improve on the high level methodology as flood 
depths are spatially indexed. The depth of water in the flooded area is not approximated to the 
same value for every building within an impact zone for a given failure scenario as it is in the high 
level methodology. The inundation model provides a flood outline and flood depths that account 
for the topography of the floodplain. 
As with the high level methodology, depth-damage curves taken from the Multi-Coloured Manual 
(Penning-Rowsell et al., 2003) are used to estimate flood damage. Social risk is measured using 
population numbers, the Social Vulnerability Flood Index (SVFI) (Tapsell et al., 2001). 
At the intermediate level it is appropriate to consider additional damages to those evaluated at the 
high level. Inclusion of secondary direct damages, such as transport disruption, provides an 
estimation of these sometimes significant economic impacts and allows transportation engineers 
and emergency services to incorporate flooding into their planning process. 
4.6.6. Uncertainty 
The uncertainty is, as at the high level, accounted for by identifying upper and lower bounds for the 
most uncertain quantities. For example, the uncertainty in defence fragility is represented by upper 
and lower bounds on the curves. Uncertainty in defence crest levels and DEM heights can also be 
accounted for with bounds (eg. LIDAR data often used to generate DEMs can have an accuracy of 
±0. lm). 
Uncertainty in loadings is considered by analysing a number of loadings that share the same 
probability of occurrence. For example, the 100 year fluvial flood event will have different flow 
rates depending on the storm duration. The highest and lowest river levels at each defence are 
established by analysing a number of the storm durations. Uncertainty in coastal loadings is 
considered through the modelling of a large number of combinations of wave and water level. 
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4.7. DETAILED LEVEL METHODOLOGY 
The detailed level is, at the time of writing, at a less developed stage than the intermediate level. 
This level of the methodology aims to support scheme design and optimisation. The methodology 
involves continuous sin}ulation of loading and system response using real or synthetic time series 
data. Continuous simulation offers a number of benefits that are not achievable at the intermediate 
level. 
(1) Flood defence failure is no longer considered to be independent by considering the 
autocorrelation of the resistance variables. 
(2) Correlation of coastal loads is considered by simulating a long time series of loading at 
each defence that is obtained from an offshore to nearshore transformation. 
(3) The sequence of defence failure can be modelled. 
(4) The duration of the loading can be modelled. 
(5) Flood duration can be measured. 
(6) Variation in antecedent conditions (eg. volume of storage reservoirs, beach levels) can be 
captured. 
(7) Sequential flood events (and their resulting impact on the system) are modelled. 
This enables the detailed appraisal of alternative interventions, including responsive strategies that 
react to observed system behaviour. Despite a large number of benefits, continuous simulation 
does have its disadvantages. These are mainly attributable to the significant increase in computing 
resources required. Aside from the length of time required to run each simulation, extreme events 
which may be of interest to the flood risk manager may not be modelled, even over a long 
simulation. 
Defence performance can still be described by fragility curves. These curves are generated from an 
uncertain reliability analysis of multiple limit state functions. This is described in Chapter 5. 
Another approach is to adapt the reliability methods developed in the Netherlands (CUR and TAW, 
1990). The applicability of these methods in the UK has been demonstrated at the Caldicot levels 
on the Severn Estuary (Buijs et al.; 2003). 
A more rigorous evaluation of uncertainty is appropriate at the detailed level. In addition to 
considering uncertainties from loading, defence response and economic damages, model 
uncertainty may be measured. Aronica et al. (2002) have already demonstrated how inundation 
models can use the GLUE methodology of Binley and Beven (1995). However, this requires a 
large. number of additional model realisations as well as good training data and may not be feasible. 
SUMMARY 4.8. 
Chapter 2 identified risk assessment as playing a key role in the future of decision-making in flood 
defence management: `Building on the work of Meadowcroft et al. (1996) a tiered risk assessment 
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methodology has been proposed. The proposed methodology explicitly considers the defence 
system and uncertainty in each step of the assessment. 
This Chapter has introduced this tiered approach to risk assessment of flood defence systems and 
identified how different resolutions of analysis can be used to support decisions at all levels within 
flood defence management. The high level methodology which is suitable to make an assessment 
of flood risk for the entirety of England and Wales has been described in detail. A case study of 
the river Parrett and Bridgwater Bay has demonstrated the applicability of the method and its 
potential as a tool for decision-makers. The more rigorous intermediate and detailed levels of the 
methodology are part of ongoing research but their methods have been outlined. Methods of 
improving the probabilistic description of defence failure, more suitable for a detailed level of risk 
assessment are introduced in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 
Improved condition characterisation 
5.1. OVERVIEW 
A review of flood defence management in Chapter 2 identified the need and requirements for a 
condition characterisation methodology. This is being driven by the need for a quantitative risk- 
based approach to flood management introduced in Chapter 4. Systems based risk assessment 
requires an assessment of the condition of the flood defences within the system. The level of 
analysis required for the risk assessment and consequently the condition characterisation should be 
appropriate for the decision being supported. 
Chapter 4 introduced fragility curves that were constructed using expert judgement for broad 
assessment of flood. The condition characterisation methodology proposed in this chapter uses 
reliability methods to establish fragility curves. This approach allows explicit consideration of 
multiple failure modes and bounds of failure for a structure can be established. Traditional 
reliability methods have been adapted to allow expert judgement which is so often a part of 
condition characterisation to be represented by describing failure parameters using membership 
functions. This method can be adapted to monitor the loss in structural performance by modifying 
appropriate parameters. The use of models to predict the behaviour of these parameters also allows 
the engineer to predict future losses in performance which is critical for long term strategic 
planning. Whilst the methodology can be used to identify the data most likely to reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the condition characterisation and therefore target resources more 
efficiently, the emphasis of the methodology is not on improving data acquisition methods, but 
rather on maximising the use of available information. The different aspects of the condition 
characterisation methodology are described and supported using examples. 
5.2. RISK BASED CONDITION CHARACTERISATION 
5.2.1. Key requirements 
A high level target for the Environment Agency of England and Wales requires that flood risk 
assessments are to be made on a national scale (DEFRA, 1999). Decision-makers have for many 
years been making investment choices based on a qualitative comparison of risk (eg. Burgess and 
Reeve, 1994) which only provide comparative measures of risk. To provide a quantitative 
ti ,. ýýý,,:. , .. ý,. ýý ý. 
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assessment of risk, a quantitative measure of the probability of the hazard, in this case the 
probability of defence failure is required. A probabilistic condition characterisation provides this. 
Chapter 4 introduced a tiered risk assessment methodology that recognised the need for a level of 
analysis appropriate to the decision being supported. Naturally this should reflect the level of 
analysis used to perform the condition characterisation. Table 5.1 shows how some of the 
decisions supported by a risk assessment require more accurate assessments of flood risk and 
consequently condition characterisation. 
Risk-based asset management of coastal defences requires an assessment of the probability of 
failure of each element in the coastal defence system. However, engineers engaged in condition 
characterisation do not usually have sufficient information to generate precise failure probabilities. 
This is because the information available to them (Section 5.2.3) may be vague or incomplete and 
perhaps of questionable dependability (for example if it is based on the judgement of a single 
inspecting engineer). A condition characterisation is therefore required that can consider all 
evidence on defence performance regardless of its format and explicitly consider the uncertainty 
associated with this evidence. 
Moreover, to generate a probability of failure not only requires an assessment of the defence 
strength (which is the topic of condition characterisation) but also an assessment of the loading 
conditions. Loading conditions are generated by hydraulic and statistical analysis that is conducted 
by other experts and may not be available to the inspecting engineer when they are conducting their 
inspection. The frequency with which the analysis of these loads is updated does not necessarily 
coincide with the frequency of defence inspection. Therefore, it is preferable that the assessment of 
defence condition should be separated from the assessment of loading. This is achieved by 
characterising the defence strength with a fragility function (Section 5.2.2). 
A thorough condition characterisation should specifically identify the failure modes of the defence 
under consideration and make use of existing generic knowledge of the variables that influence 
those failure modes. This generic knowledge is customarily expressed in terms of algebraic 
relationships between the load and strength of the defences which are usually presented as design 
formulae. Parameter values should be used that are appropriate to the defence condition. Design 
formulae address the defence when it is in its as-built condition, so without adjustment are 
inappropriate for the assessment of degraded defences. The effect that degradation will have on the 
state variables describing the defence strength needs to be identified. The variables and hence 
defence performance are adjusted appropriately. 
ýý 
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Table 5.1 Showing increasing degree of analysis and accuracy to support different decisions 
Decisions to be supported Uncertainty of condition characterisation 
National assessment of flood risk 
Prioritisation of expenditure 
Prioritisation of maintenance 
Flood defence strategy planning 
Regulation of development 
Scheme appraisal and optimisation j)7 
load 
5.2.2. Expressing defence performance with fragility functions 
The fragility (Casciati and Faravelli, 1990) of a structure is the probability of failure, conditional on 
a specific loading, L. If the failure of a structure is described by a limit state function Z such that Z 
S0 represents system failure and Z> 0 represents the not failed condition, then the fragility 
function FR(L) = P(Z S 01 L). A fragility curve is a plot of the conditional probability of failure of 
the structure given a complete range of loadings. Fragility curves generated by expert judgement 
were introduced in Chapter 4 to describe the probability of defences breaching and overtopping. 
In Figure 5.1 the load under consideration is the significant wave height H,. The fragility curve 
therefore provides a complete probabilistic description of the strength of the structure under the full 
range of loading conditions. Coastal defences are usually subject to more than one type of loading, 
most typically both wave height, Hs, and water level, W. Thus in general the fragility will be a 
function of several loading variables L, L,,. 
The fragility function can subsequently be combined with the loading distribution to generate a 
probability of defence failure, P(Z SO). 
P(Z: 5 0)= f FR(1)dl 
For the case illustrated in Figure 5.1, suppose that the significant wave height is represented by a 
Gumbel distribution with parameters a=2.5 and =1.7, then integrating (numerically) the loading 
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Previously in Chapter 4, fragility curves to describe a defence's proneness to overtopping and 
breaching were constructed using expert judgement to estimate conditional failure probabilities for 
a few given loads. Whilst this acts as an important first step onto the risk management ladder in 
information poor situations, a reliability analysis based on a number of failure modes provides a 













Significant wave height, H, (m) 
Figure 5.1 A typical fragility curve 
5.2.3. Condition characterisation evidence 
Information on defence condition appears in a range of formats, from precise measurements to 
vague expert judgements. Table 5.2 includes some examples of the types of evidence that may be 
available to an engineer engaged in a condition assessment. 
Table 5.2 Examples of condition characterisation support evidence 
Source of evidence Evidence Example of evidence Use of evidence 
format 
Expert judgement Linguistic Structure is `safe' General assessment of 
degradation 
Expert judgement Integer Overall rating from 1-5 
General assessment of 
adation 
_ 
Visual observation Linguistic Crest `uneven' Observations of 
Measured Precise Settlement of crest by 0 5 
Precise failure mode 
observation numerical value . , analysis 
Population of Probability Mean armour size =1.5m and 
measurements distribution variance = O. lm 
probabilistic analysis 
Generic knowledge Range of values 
_ Soil is loose and sandy therefore V _ague*failure mode 
we can estimate: 25°<r '<35° analysis 
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The Bayesian school of probability suggests that all of these types of uncertain information should 
be mapped onto a precise probability distributions (Lindley, 1971). The approach adopted here is 
based on the principle that inherent uncertainties in nature (for example due to the unpredictability 
of future wave conditions) should be separated from epistemic uncertainties (for example of soil 
strength at a given defence cross-section) as recommended by Hofer (1996). Uncertainty in 
condition characterisation is dominated by these epistemic uncertainties, which can be represented 
by making imprecise mathematical statements, either in the form of interval bounds on an unknown 
value, or, more generally, by constructing a fuzzy set over an unknown value. A fuzzy set can be 
thought of as a `fuzzification' of an interval measurement in which the interval bounds are softened 
by assigning a membership function, pt, (on a [0,1 ] scale) to values near the bounds of the interval. 
The membership function can be thought of as a measure of the possibility of encountering a given 
value (see Section 3.2.4 for a more thorough description of possibility and membership functions). 
For example, the rock diameter, D, of a revetment may be expressed in a range of formats. A newly 
built structure may have precise information available from design specification and construction 
records, in which case rock diameter may be presented as a probability distribution such as a 
normal distribution with p=1.5m, a=0.1m. For existing structures precise distributions of rock 
diameter will seldom be available, in which case a small sample of measurements could be used to 
estimate bounds on the rock size, for example D=1.5-2.0m. This could be generalised to a fuzzy 
set, indicating the possibility of a particular value for D. Figure 5.2 shows an example of a 
trapezoidal fuzzy set showing that the most possible values for D are between 1.6m and 1.9m, but 
with a decreasing possibility it could be as little as 1.5m or as great as 2.0m. Newberry et al. 
(2002) demonstrated the capability of engineers to rapidly estimate with a high degree of accuracy 
characteristics of rock armour and it is this sort of expertise that can be used to assign fuzzy sets 
through observation. This technique should be supported by a number of measurements, 
identification of the largest and smallest rocks can be used to place upper and lower bounds on the 
distribution. Visual identification of the most common rock size allows bounds to be placed on the 








1 1.5 2 2.5 
..... 
'. Rock Diameter (D,, so) 
Figure 5.2 An example of a fuzzy set defining the possibility of values for the rock diameter, D 
/»j 
Improved condition characterisation 127 
Imprecise parameters can be used in the assessment of the fragility function, in which case, rather 
than generating a single fragility curve, (fuzzy) bounds on a family of fragility curves are 
generated. Entering multiple parameters as fuzzy or interval values or increasing the bounds on 
these values results in an increase in uncertainty associated with the structure's performance. This 
has the effect of widening the bounds on the fragility curves. This imprecise fragility function can 
then be integrated, using Equation 5.1, with the loading distribution to generate interval bounds on 
the probability of failure. This is illustrated with supporting examples in the following sections. 
5.3. - APPLICATION 
5.3.1. Single failure mode 
The condition characterisation methodology is described using an example. First a fragility curve 
representing the proneness to failure of the rock armour revetment shown in Figure 5.3 is 
calculated. The analysis is then repeated using different types of vague information about the dyke 
in order to generate an imprecise fragility function. 
crest height 
Ili % 
The probability of revetment failure can be estimated using Van der Meer's formula (Van der 
Meer, 1988) for armour stability and a First Order Reliability Method (Melchers, 1995). The limit 
state functions from Van der Meer's formula are given by Equations 5.2 and 5.3. 
Z=6.2SO. 2P0.18An50(cota)0.5SO25N-0.1 _HS 
for plunging waves, and 
Z=S0.2P-0.13An50(cot a)(0.5-P)S- . 5PN-0.1 _HS 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
for surging waves, where P is the permeability factor; A=p, aklpwe; 1; Dso is the nominal rock 
diameter; a is the revetment slope; sm is the mean wave steepness; N is the number of waves 
attacking the structure and Sd is the damage number. This damage corresponds to a non- 
dimensional eroded areawhich is defined by Broderick and Ahrens (1982) as: 
Figure 5.3 Definition of variables for typical rock armour revetted dyke 
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Sd -2 
%n5O 
where A, is the area of erosion around the still water level (Figure 5.4). 
Still Water Level 0 
0 
Filter layer 
--- Initial slope 
1 -Profile after 3000 waves 
Figure 5.4 Definition of erosion area of a revetment 
(5.4) 
In Equations 5.2 and 5.3 the loadin g (L) is H3. By conducting the reliability analysis over a range 
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Significant wave height, H, (m) 
Figure 5.5 Fragility curve of a revetment's proneness to failure using Van Der Meer's formula to 
determine revetment stability 
5.3.2. Incorporating imprecise information 
As described in Section 5.2.3 a fuzzy set can be used to capture the uncertainty in the diameter of 
rock armour. Uncertainty in other parameters can also be captured by this means. This section 
considers the permeability of a structure, P, which is assessed based on the similarity of the 
structure with some prototypical pictures and the diameter of core, filter and revetment material 
(Figure 5.6). Estimation of P is therefore always, to some degree, subjective. 
ý 
ýý 
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" Armour layer thickness = 2D5oA 
" Filter layer thickness = 0.5DnsoA 
" D,, soA / D,, 5oF=4.5 
(a) P0.5 
9 Armour layer thickness = 2DsoA 
" Filter layer thickness =1.5DSOA 
" D,, 5oA / Dn50F=2, D,, 5oF / D. 50C=4 
" Armour layer thickness = 2DASOA " No filter 
" Dn50A / DnsoC=3.2 " No core 
Figure 5.6 Permeability factor of revetments for (a) P=0.1, (b) 0.4, (c) 0.5 and (d) 0.6 
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A newly built structure may have precise information available from design specification and 
construction records, in which the permeability factor, P, is defined as being 0.1. Consider now the 
situation for existing structures, in which the filter layer may have clogged up, or the exact nature 
of the underlayers is unknown. An exact figure for P will be difficult to obtain and it may be 
economically unviable to perform a detailed investigative survey. In this case bounds based on 
brief visual observations or previous experience may be assigned to define the permeability, for 
example, P= 0.1-0.4. This information can be used to calculate bounds on the fragility curve 
(Figure 5.7) and can also be thought of as a sensitivity test. Integration, using Equation 5.1, with 
the loading distribution generates interval bounds on the probability of failure. 
r"- (a) P=0.6 














Significant wave height, H, (m) 
Figure 5.7 Imprecise fragility curve of Van der Meer's equation (P e X0.1,0.41). Other values as 
in Figure 5.5) 
Using the fuzzy set defined in Figure 5.8 instead of an interval to define P, a more informative 
description of the defence fragility can be obtained. This trapezoidal fuzzy set shows the most 
possible values for P are between 0.2 and 0.5, but with a decreasing possibility P could be as little 
as 0.1 or as great as 0.6. This produces a family of fragility curves, shown in Figure 5.9. The area 
between the middle two curves represents the most possible failure space, with decreasing 
possibility of occurrence to the outer curves. This can be integrated with the loading to provide 
fuzzy probability bounds. In Figure 5.10 four of the variables that determine revetment failure 
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Figure 5.9 Family offragility curves with P defined by the fuzzy set in Figure 5.8 (all other values 

















a= 23°; s, ° = 0.06; sM = 0.045; D,, so = 1.6; D,, so = 1.4; Sd =6 
Sd=3 
a= 28°; 
sm = 0.065; 
D. so = 1.8; 
Sd=7 
Fuzzy parameters: 
(all trapezoidal sets) 
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Figure 5.10 A family of fragility curves generated as a result of defining multiple parameters as 
fuzzy sets 
53.3. Multiple failure modes 
Two further failure modes, run-up and toe stability were then included to the example introduced 
above. The limit state for run-up is defined by Vrijling (1993): 
Z= He - HW - Rue%o - Hs (5.5) 
where He is the height of the dike crest, HW is the water level, and Ru2% is a measure of the run-up 
for the highest waves and is defined as: 
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R. zýj. tang (5.6) 
ýI M 
Toe stability is defined by Van der Meer et al. (1995). 
z=0.24 
h` 
+1.6 ý1öd SAn50 - Hs (5.7) Dn50 
where ht is the toe depth, Nod is the damage factor (which ranges from 0.5 at the start of damage, 
4.0 at failure). The original parameters used to generate Figure 5.5 were used with a crest height of 
10.5m and the toe at 3m below a fixed water level. 
Ditlevsen's (1979b) second order bounds (defined in Chapter 3) were calculated for these three 
failure modes to generate two fragility curves that define the upper and lower bounds of conditional 
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Figure 5.11 Second order series system failure bounds for three failure modes 
5.4. PERFORMANCE LOSS FROM STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION 
Degradation in defence condition influences the probability of failure by changing variables that 
determine the defence fragility. For example settlement influences the crest level, which is critical 
in overtopping calculations. Erosion of the dyke crest and back slope influences the overtopping 
threshold value for failure. Analysis of deteriorated defences therefore involves identification of the 
defence variables that have been influenced by deterioration, and, assessment of the effect that 
deterioration has had on the value of those variables. Being able to monitor and predict 
degradation is important for decision-making. In some cases it will be possible to measure the 
change in a variable due to degradation (for example change in the crest level due to settlement), in 
other cases this measurement may only be approximate (for example the degree of clogging of a 
\ 
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filter layer). This results in the movement of the fragility curve, which represents a loss in 
structural performance. Table 5.3 lists some examples of variables that can be monitored to assess 
the degree of degradation. 
Design formulae usually address the defence when it is in its as=built condition, so without 
adjustment are inappropriate for the assessment of degraded defences. The effect that degradation 
will have on the state variables describing the defence strength needs to be identified and the 
variables adjusted appropriately. 
Table 5.3 Variables that can be monitored to assess degradation 
Failure mode Variables to monitor 
Revetment stability Damage number (eg. Sd) 
Armour layer thickness 
Armour stone mass 
Filter layer permeability 
Overtopping Crest level 
Roughness 
Geotechnical stability Pore pressures 
Permeability 
Geometry 
Corrosion Reduction in section modulus 
Beach/dune erosion Geometry 
Some limit state functions (for example Van der Meer's formula) have a damage parameter within 
their formulae and so a loss in performance can be represented by altering this variable. For 
example, Equation 5.2 can be rearranged to calculate the damage number: 





where Z. is equal to tanclsm° 5. This can be used to predict damage from continuous wave loading 
(Van der Meer, 1986 and Melby and Kobayashi, 1998,2000) by using: 
4Hs(t+t) ßm(1+t) 
Sd(i+l) = Sd(i) + max[N(141) - Nsd'0k 6.2Po. i8Aso 
(5.. 9) 
where N(t+q represents the number of waves of size Hs(, +1) in the current storm and Nj is the 
number of waves of this storm required to reach the current damage level of Sd(0. Clearly the rate 
of damage progression will slow as the revetment is subjected to more loads. This is because as Sd 
increases, so does the required number of waves to cause that damage, Nom. Therefore to progress 
the damage, Hs needs to be relatively large compared to previously experienced events or that there 
are a greater number of waves, N(, +1), for a given storm. In physical terms, this may be a result of 
the re-profiling of the breakwater cross-section. 
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Figure 5.12 illustrates two graphs, the upper plots the hourly time series of wave heights to which 
the revetment is subjected, the lower shows the increase in damage parameter over this time for 
three armour stone sizes, D50 =1.0m, 1.2m and 1.5m (other variables as in Figure 5.5) where an Sd 
value of 12 represents failure. Pozueta et al. (2002) have recently used a similar method as a 
design tool to optimise the life of a breakwater, in which the random nature of the loading was 
accounted for by repeating the simulation a number of times with randomly generated time series 
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Figure 5.12 Increasing damage as a result of wave action on a revetment (Sd=12 at total failure) 
M0 
Many limit state functions do not contain a damage parameter. Consider, for example, the analysis 
of an existing, deteriorating sheet pile wall seawall. The thickness of the wall is reducing due to 
corrosion, whilst the beach level fluctuates (Figure 5.13). Suppose that the section modulus S= 








Figure 5.13 Definition of variable for sheet pile retaining wall 
d. 
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The limit state function for failure by rotation is defined as the point at which the passive force, Pp, 
exceeds the active force, PQ, about the point of rotation, 0: 
Z=PpxM, -P. xM. 
where Mp and Ma are the moment arms of the passive and active force about point 0. The moment 
capacity, MM, of the pile is given by design guides (such as Corus Group, 2001) and the limit state 
function is given by: 
Z=Mc-P. XMa (5.10) 
More details on sheet pile design and geotechnical failure are given in Appendix D. Application of 
a first order reliability analysis (described in Section 3.4.2) generates failure probabilities of 0.019 
for failure by rotation at the toe and 2.3 x 1Ofor failure due to insufficient moment capacity. 
Frequently in England and Wales, the toe depths of structures are uncertain (Reeve and Burgess, 
1994), therefore to use a precise failure probability is inappropriate. However, an engineer can use 
their judgement to make an assessment of the likely depth of toe based on evidence from design 
drawings of similar structures. A fuzzy set can be used to represent this judgement. Figure 5.14 
defines a fuzzy set suggesting the pile has a maximum depth that lies between 8 and 12 metres, but 
the most possible depth lies between 9 and 11 metres. Failure probabilities associated with these 
depths can be calculated; the failure probability will therefore lie between 0.006 and 0.082, but the 
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Figure 5.14 Fuzzy set defining sheet pile height and the corresponding failure probabilities 
Whilst the above examples provide an indication of present performance, the decision-maker is 
often interested in how this performance is expected to change. If the beach is assumed to lower at 
a constant rate of 0.04m/year, the increase in annual failure probability can be predicted as shown 
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Figure 5.15 Change in annual rotational failure probability for a receding beach 
The change in annual failure probability due to corrosion can be predicted by consideration of the 
change in moment capacity assuming a steady rate of corrosion of 0.035mm/side/year (Corns 
Group, 2001). Figure 5.16 shows the time dependent probability of failure due to moment capacity 
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Figure 5.16 Change in annual corrosion failure probability over time for a sheet pile that is 
corroding on a receding beach 
The first order series system failure bounds have been calculated using the equations defined in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.3). The bounds represent the upper and lower limits of the failure 
probability assuming the failure modes are somewhere between completely dependent or 
independent. 
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Figure 5.17 Upper and lower failure bounds for sheet pile retaining wall, considering both failure 
due to corrosion and toe erosion 
The decision-maker can now monitor the bounds of system failure for multiple modes of structural 
failure over time as is shown in Figure 5.17. It is apparent that rotational failure due to insufficient 
toe depth dominates the failure bounds until year 70. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter responded to the need identified in Chapter 2 for developing a probabilistic approach 
to condition characterisation of flood defences. Reliability analysis has been shown to provide a 
useful approach to assessing the condition of flood and coastal defences. The approach to 
condition characterisation compliments the detailed level of the risk assessment methodology 
proposed in Chapter 4. As with the high level risk assessment, the condition of the structure is 
described using fragility curves which are a useful condition characterisation tool as they provide a 
representation of defence performance over a range of loading conditions. Integration of the 
fragility curve over the loading provides a failure probability of the defence. The natural 
uncertainties due to loading and epistemic uncertainties associated with the condition 
characterisation are kept separate. 
Traditional reliability analysis only allows uncertainty to be expressed as probability distributions 
of random variables. This is often an inappropriate means of capturing the expert judgement so 
often associated with estimating some failure parameters. The reliability analysis has been adapted 
to allow membership functions to describe these parameters and it has been demonstrated using the 
example of a revetment how this uncertainty can be quantified and is still apparent in the final 
estimation of failure probability which is reflected as probability bounds or fuzzy probabilities. As 
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a result of being able to quantify the uncertainty, the most useful monitoring information can be 
targeted to obtain the largest decrease possible at an appropriate price. This has been demonstrated 
by using uncertain information to characterise the condition of a revetment and a sheet pile. 
Frequently, the decision-maker is interested in how a structure will perform over time. Models can 
be used to predict how a beach will recede or how a structure will corrode, and this information can 
be used to monitor how a structure's performance will very with time. This has been demonstrated 
by monitoring the change in the damage number in Van Der Meer's rock armour stability equation 
as a result of a time series of wave heights and also showing the loss in structural performance of a 
sheet pile due to corrosion and reduction of toe depth caused by beach lowering. 
System bounds on failure probability can be estimated to provide an estimation of the defence's 
proneness to failure and consequently the proneness to failure of a defence system. System 
behaviour can be predicted and monitored over time providing a useful risk-based tool for the flood 
defence manager. 
Chapter 6 
Decision support for flood defence systems 
6.1. OVERVIEW 
In Chapter 2, it was shown that decision-making in flood defence is a multi-disciplinary endeavour 
involving a complex set of technical, economic, social and environmental issues. The processes of 
options analysis and evaluation in flood defence management involve assembling and manipulating 
vast quantities of evidence that can appear in a wide range of formats. Coupled with the sheer 
scale and complexity of the system there is potential for monitoring and remediation resources to 
be mis-directed. 
In this chapter it is demonstrated how needs for improved decision-making may be addressed by 
the development of generic principles and a software tool that assists a non-expert user to 
implement those principles. An overview of the methodology summarises the key concepts and 
processes, which are then described in more detail. These concepts have been implemented in a 
case study of a flood defence system that demonstrates the applicability and use of the techniques 
for flood defence managers. The integration of the risk assessment and condition characterisation 
methodologies is also described, providing a. useful approach to supporting flood defence 
managers. 
6.2. KEY PRINCIPLES 
The needs identified for decision-support in Chapter 2 have been satisfied by the development of. 
generic principles and a software tool that assists a non-expert user to implement those principles. 
The main elements of the proposed modelling approach are illustrated in Figure 6.1. The 
photograph on the bottom left hand side of the diagram represents the flood defence system of 
interest. Abstracted from this are measurements of performance and a hierarchical model of the 
flood defence system. Performance indicators are associated with one or more relevant sub- 
systems in the hierarchical model. 
A probabilistic condition characterisation provides evidence of the structural performance of a 
flood defence. This condition characterisation is also used as part of a risk assessment. Risk 
assessment provides an overall measure of the performance of the defence system (in terms of 
average annual risk) and also more detailed information on the contribution which individual 
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defences make to flood risk. Whilst risk is an important indicator of the performance of flood 
defence systems, it is inevitably incomplete and will have to exclude information that is relevant to 
system performance because it appears in an inappropriate format or at an unsuitable scale. The 
decision-support methodology maximises the results of a risk assessment by incorporating them at 
the appropriate level of the system description, yet places risk in the broader context of all of the 
sources of evidence and values that the asset manager will wish to take into account. 
Performance indicators are projected through value functions to provide a non-dimensional 
measure of how performance is valued in the context of a particular sub-system. Each indicator is 
then weighted to generate a figure of merit for that sub-system. A revised set of weightings are 
used to generate figures of merit for specific aspects of system behaviour. These concepts are 
discussed in more details in the following sections. 
6.2.1. Process 
A general terminology is required that can integrate both `hard' (eg. flood defences) and `soft' (eg. 
flood warning) aspects of the flood management system, focusing upon how they deliver 
performance (Hall and Davis, 2001). It is proposed that the concepts and terminology of process 
modelling can provide the required generic framework. A process is a purposeful activity, in that it 
enacts a transformation in a controlled manner. A typical process enacted by a flood dyke would 
be "Protecting town X from flooding". Note how the participle of the verb is often used in the 
description of a process. The process may be thought of as taking some resources, be they physical 
or information resources, and transforming them into an output. Figure 6.2 illustrates the generic 
process, with the process' primary function being the transformation it enacts within a control loop 
that ensures the process continues to deliver the required performance in a dynamic environment. 
In the context of flood defence this usually involves investment of capital or operational budget 
which results in some transformation in terms of risk reduction. The transformation is enacted by a 
sub-system (for example a flood dyke) within the overall system under consideration, providing a 
link between the process that delivers a desired response and the sub-system that enacts that 
process. Using processes rather than physical entities in the framework allows a much richer 
description of the performance of the sub-system which may include a range of project 
management issues as attributes of the processes. 
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Subsystem t_)( Response 
Intervening II Monitoring 
Decision- 
making 
Figure 6.2 A generic process 
6.2.2. Hierarchical modelling 
Flood management decisions take place at a range of levels from planning decisions (such as 
Catchment Flood Management Plans (HR Wallingford et al., 2001) and Shoreline Management 
Plans (DEFRA, 2001c)), to strategic allocation of resources, and local operation and maintenance 
decisions. All of these decisions contribute to the overall objectives of flood management. A 
performance based asset management system should 
seek to support all of these levels of decision- 
making in a consistent manner. This can be achieved by adopting a hierarchical description of the 
defence system. Different levels within the hierarchy describe the system to a differing degree of 
detail and are intended to support different decisions. The approach provides a linkage between 
different levels of decision-making so that the influence that detailed decisions have on high level 
performance is illustrated. At the top is the whole system under consideration, which may be a 
whole catchment, whilst the lowest level of the system could be the flood defences or their 
components. Model construction should be performed `top-down', first identifying a high level 
process such as reducing flood risk a given catchment. The next step is to identify the sub- 
processes that are required to enact the super process. Decomposition is based on criteria of 
process rather than necessarily by representing the physical connectivity between sub-systems. 
Process modelling is by its very nature subjective, however, experience (Davis and Hall, 1998, 
Davis, 2002) has shown that with guidance from experienced modellers, decision-makers can agree 
on a model structure after a few iterations. 
6.23. Performance and Performance Indicators 
Performance can be thought of as those aspects of system behaviour that are relevant to achieving 
objectives. A flood defence system will be expected to perform in economic, environmental, 
technical, safety and perhaps other respects. It is therefore necessary to be able to map all evidence 
of performance onto a common scale, value the success of the evidence compared to performance 
objectives and weigh the relative performance of different pieces of evidence against each other. 
Evidence about performance of a system or sub-system is provided by performance indicators. 
These performance indicators are the system state variables that are relevant to achieving 
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objectives. System objectives are derived from organisational and stakeholder values. In flood 
management, high level performance indicators are derived from government policy and include, 
for example, total national flood risk (reported on by the National Flood Risk Assessment 2002 
(HR Wallingford et al., 2003) study) or annual investment in flood defence. Low level 
performance indicators may, for example, be an assessment of structural condition or maintenance 
cost. 
As described previously, evidence of the performance of flood defence systems can be obtained 
from many sources, however, frequently raw measurements will require further interpretation in 
order to be used as meaningful performance indicators. A record of flood defence overtopping 
does not necessarily represent unsatisfactory performance because a meaningful statement of 
performance can only be made after loading conditions are considered. Performance indicators 
may be derived from monitoring activities or from model predictions of future behaviour, 
expressed for example as inundation contours or failure probabilities. Many performance 
indicators are time varying, in which case the rate of change of the performance indicator may be 
of more interest to a decision-maker. CIA 
Evidence. of performance is not only measured locally within a system, but may also be propagated 
up from lower levels of the system. At higher levels within a hierarchy, systems can exhibit 
emergent properties, for example, flood defence components (for example a defence crest) will 
have specific performance indicators (eg. surface condition), whilst at the system level of the dyke 
cross-section, groups of components (for example crest, front slope and rear slope) will interact as 
a flood defence structure and have performance indicators which are measured at this level of the 
hierarchy (eg. stability against mass rotational failure). However, both the individual performance 
of the sub-systems and the locally measured performance will affect the performance of the system 
at this level of the hierarchy. Performance at higher levels of the system can also be an aggregation 
of lower level performance indicators for example maintenance costs for a river reach can be 
aggregated to obtain a catchment-scale measure of total maintenance expenditure. 
6.2.4. Value functions 
A sub-system will frequently have many performance indicators associated with it, which will 
usually be measured against different dimensions. In order to generate an overview of the sub- 
system's performance, it is necessary to map all the performance indicators onto a common non- 
dimensional scale. This is achieved by mapping each performance indicator with a function that 
represents how the user values different levels of performance. Once the performance indicators 
have been mapped onto a non-dimensional scale, they are weighted to reflect their relative 
importance to achieving the sub-system's objective. 
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Figure 6.3 shows the general shape of these value functions. The value of v,, the measure of how 
the sub-system, i, is performing is generated by projecting the performance indicator, P!, through 
the value function f: 
VI =. f (P1; ) (6.1) 
For example, using a linear value function (Figure 6.3(a)) to value a performance indicator 
measured as being 63, on a scale of 0 (worst performance) to 100 (maximum performance) results 
in a value of 0.63. The value function is chosen by the user based on organisational values and 
objectives, codes of practice and company and legal standards. A stepped function (shown in 
Figure 6.3(b)), for example, could be used to represent a regulatory threshold, where performance 
one side of the step would be `acceptable' and given a score of 1, conversely performance the other 
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Figure 6.3 Value functions used to map performance onto a non-dimensional scale 
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Under some circumstance a performance indicator may be projected through more than one value 
function in order to reflect how a particular aspect of performance is evaluated against multiple 
objectives. For example the indicator "frequency of defence inspection" may be evaluated with 
respect to system reliability (in which case higher frequency represents improved performance) and 
also with respect to cost (in which case higher frequency represents lower performance). 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates how a performance indicator, in this case crest height, is mapped through a 
value function on to a figure of merit (Section 6.2.5) represented by an `Italian flag' motif, which is 
a graphical representation of an interval probability where green (the lighter shade on the left hand 
side of the tricolore) represents evidence of satisfactory performance, S,,, conversely the red (the 
darker shade on the right hand side of the tricolore) represents unsatisfactory performance defined 
by 1-S, and white represents the uncertainty or Sp S,,. Figure 6.4 shows a measurement of crest 
height of 45m AOD measured to an accuracy of f2cm that is mapped through an s-shaped value 
function which also has a degree of uncertainty associated with it. This represents the uncertainty 
with the river routing models that predicted the flood event that would overtop the defence and any 
lack of confidence with the choice of value function (perhaps if a group of experts were unable to 
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Figure 6.4 Mapping a measurement through a value function to generate a non-dimensional value 
score 
A special case of uncertainty is when performance indictors are recorded as linguistic values, for 
example on a five-word scale from `very poor' to `very good' such as that currently in use by the 
Environment Agency to assess the condition of flood defences. This measure defines the level of 
performance and whilst the uncertainty associated with this is captured in terms of the vagueness of 
the measurement, the degree of vagueness will depend on the performance indicator being 
measured and the experience and knowledge of the engineer making the measurement. Assigning 
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an assessment of confidence that is also on a five point scale allows these factors to be captured and 
also makes it is possible to generate an interval measure as shown in Figure 6.5. For example a 
judgement of `good' performance made with `medium' confidence yields an interval probability of 
[0.62,0.87]. Linguistic performance indicators are elicited directly from the expert as a judgement 
of performance relative to objectives so there is no need to project the performance indicator 
through a value function. 
























Figure 6.5 Mapping linguistic evidence onto a non-dimensional scale using value functions 
6.2.5. Figure of Merit 
Decision-makers are interested in how a system is performing against a range of objectives 
(Ozelkan and Duckstein, 1996). This overview of system performance, taking into account all 
objectives (eg. cost, environment, safety) is called a figure of merit. For sub-system i with m 
performance indicators, the figure of merit, FM is calculated by applying a weight, w, which 
represents the importance of the performance indicator to the overall performance of the system 
(Wymore, 1993): 
FM, _- ý_ý 
wi, IV, 1 :.... wj 1'1, ` (6.2) 
ýý 
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where the weights wI, J represent the relative importance of the value, v11, of the performance 
indicators to the sub-system's overall performance. 
Decision-makers are also interested in performance of the system against specific attributes such as 
cost or safety. These can be thought of as different aspects of performance, the new figure of 
merit, FM;,,,, representing performance against aspect, A, is calculated by altering the weightings 
according to the aspect of system performance under consideration as shown in Equation 6.3. 
mm 
FM;, 4 =I Wi, i, AV;, i , 
2: Wi, 1, A =1 
(6.3) 
jsi 1=t 
Different aspect views are represented by the multiple sheets in the top right corner of Figure 6.1. 
6.3. PROPAGATING EVIDENCE USING INTERVAL PROBABILITY 
Performance indicators and figures of merit will inevitably have uncertainty associated with them. 
This is due to both errors in measurements and predictions, and uncertainties in how performance is 
valued and compared. A simple approach to uncertainty handling has been adopted using interval 
bounds for all uncertain quantities, including measurements and value functions (see Figure 6.4). 
The following sections describe how, using interval probability theory, evidence of performance is 
propagated through the hierarchical model of the system. 
6.3.1. Propagating evidence through a hierarchy 
Figure 6.6 provides an overview of how evidence from performance is propagated through the 
system. 
Evidence of performance can be measured at a specific level in the hierarchy and also be 
propagated up the hierarchy from lower sub-systems. A figure of merit for the propagated 
evidence and figure of merit for the direct evidence (calculated using Equation 6.2) are weighted 
to provide a merged figure of merit, FMm,,. ged, for a given sub-system such that: 
P(FMi)mergei = w1. P(FM; )me + W2. P(FMi)propogatee , wl + W2 =1 (6.4) 
Calculation of the performance of the super-system requires consideration of how the sub-systems 
and performance evidence interact, and this is represented by necessity, sufficiency and 
dependency. The following sections describe these measures and how, through use of Interval 
Probability Theory, evidence is propagated through the hierarchy. 
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Process 2.1 
Merged FMS., 
Local FM2, I 
Propagated 
PI 
Necessity, Sufficiency, Dependency 
(Sections 633 and 63.4) 
Process 1.1 Process 1.2 
. FMI. i FMI. 2 
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Figure 6.6 Overview of evidence propagation 
6.3.2. Interval probability theory 
Process 13 
FM, 3 
Evidence is propagated through the hierarchy using interval probability theory (Cui and Blockley, 
1990, Hall eta!., 1998) to represent the degree of belief that a process is performing well when 
compared with objectives. If E represents the proposition about the satisfactory performance of a 
system, the probability P(E) is defined by a lower bound, So(E), and an upper bound, SP(E). 
P(E) E [S,, (E), Sp (E)I (6.5) 
The interval probability is interpreted as a measure of belief, where So(E) represents the extent to 
which it is certainly believed that E is true or dependable, 1- SP (E) = S. (E) represents the extent to 
which it is certainly believed that 
E is false or not dependable, and the value S. (E) - S (E) 
represents the extent of uncertainty of belief, in the truth or dependability of E. Three extreme cases 
illustrate the meaning of this interval measure of belief: 
" P(E) E [0,0] represents a belief that E is certainly false or not dependable, meaning there is no 
satisfactory performance, 
" P(E) E [1,1] represents a belief that E is certainly true or dependable , meaning there is no 
unsatisfactory performance, and, 
" P(E) e [0,1] represents a belief that the degree of performance is unknown. 
Ü.. 
rAý 
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The interval S(E)=SP(E) implies that there is no uncertainty in the proposition and corresponds to 
conventional probability. This approach is founded in evidence theory (Shafer, 1976) which can be 
used where handling uncertainty with probability theory is badly suited due to vagueness or 
incompleteness in information (Klir and Folger, 1988). Interval probability theory (IPT) is useful 
as it retains the desirable properties that make evidence theory more attractive than Bayesian 
probability methods (Hall et al., 2002b) as it: 
represents in a fairly straightforward manner aspects of ambiguity, vagueness and 
incompleteness in evidence, 
" provides a balance between, on the one hand, not being so weak as to provide inferences that 
are of limited practical use, yet on the other hand not artificially constraining the problem 
implying less uncertainty than is in fact the case, 
9 conveniently represents dependency relationships between evidence which is an important 
issue in complex evidential situations, 
" captures a range of inferential relationships between levels in the evidence hierarchy, and, 
" is closely related to probability theory, however, it is not necessary to exclusively allocate 
probability to a judgement in line with belief and plausibility. measures (Shafer 1976) and 
possibility measures (Zadeh, 1978) that have been introduced in Chapter 3. 
6.3.3. Dependency 
The dependency between sub-systems represents the amount of evidence originating from a 
common source or being influenced by common processes. For example there would be a high 
dependency between the age of an asset and its condition recorded upon inspection. Both pieces of 
evidence could be used in an assessment of performance, but if they were combined without 
recognising the dependency then the overall evidence for satisfactory performance may be 
overestimated. 
Cui and Blockley (1990) developed previous work on interval representations by introducing the 
parameter, p, which represents the degree of dependence between propositions El and E2: 
P=- 
P(El n E2 ) 
min(P(E1), P(E2)) 
(6.6) 
Thus p=1 indicates that El c E2 or E2 c El (i. e. they are nested propositions), whilst if Et and E2 
are independent 
p= max(P(E1), P(E2)) (6.7) 
so that 
P(E, n E2) = P(EI). P(E2). (6.8) 
The minimum value of p is given by 
p= max 
P(E1) +ß'(E2) -1 0 
min(P(E1), P(E2 ))' (6.9) 
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where p=0 indicates that E1 and E2 are disjoint or mutually exclusive such that E1. E2=0. 
If p is defined as an interval [pt, A] then: 
S (El n E2) = A. min(S(E1), S(E2)) (6.10) 
Sp (El n E2) = p.. min(Sp(Ei), Sp(E2)) (6.11) 
S (El v E2) = S(E1) + S(E2) - p1. min(S(E1), S,, (E2)) (6.12) 
SP (El v E2) = SP(EI) + SP(E2) - p,,. min(SP(Ei), Sp(E2)). (6.13) 
To implement the methodology, a dependency parameter is assigned on a scale [-1,1] with 0 
representing independence. A linear transformation converts this to the actual dependency, p, on a 
scale [0,1]. The approach has been adopted because, from the definition of p in Equation 6.9, it 
can be seen that the value of p representing independence varies with the level of evidence 
assigned to or calculated for the relevant sub-processes. The use of the linear transformation means 
that the user can make a simple judgement of dependency on a three point scale from mutual 
exclusion (-1) to independence (0) to full dependence (1) without having to calculate p. This 
relationship is given in Table 6.1, points between the three defined values are extrapolated linearly. 
Table 6.1 The relationship between the dependency parameter and pfor two propositions 
Mutually exclusive Independent Dependent 
p0 max(P(E1), P(E2)) 1 
Dependency parameter -1 01 
The dependency parameter is an additional item of information, which is elicited in order to 
address explicitly the dependency between propositions. It is a convenient means of exploring 
different dependence relationships when the exact nature of dependence is uncertain. A measure of 
dependency is defined between each sub-process. An example calculation showing the use of 
dependency in interval probability theory is given in Appendix H. 
63.4. Logical Inference, Necessity and Sufficiency 
Having established a method for combining probabilities, the relationship between the 
propositions, El, E2... E about the performance of sub-systems . 1,2... n and some hypothesis, H, 
about the performance of their super-system needs to be addressed. To establish the support, P(H), 
on the basis of the propositions, it is necessary to know P(E) and the relationship between E and H. 
This relationship is defined by the conditional measures P(AE) and'P(H IT) which can be 
obtained using the theorem of total probability (Chapter 3). For a single proposition this is: 
P(H) = P(H I E). P(E) + P(H I E)-P(E) (6.14) 
which can be rewritten as: 
P(H) = P(H I E). P(E) + P(H I E). (1- P(E)) (6.15) 
'ýý 
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This has been addressed for one proposition by Dubois and Prade (1990), when all the terms are 
expressed as interval number the bounds S and S. are: 
Sn(H)=S,, (HI E)S,, (E)+ S. (HI iý)(1-Sn(E)) ; S,, (HI E) ZS,, (HI E)" 
Sn (H) = Sn (H I E)S p (E) + 
S, (H I E)(1- Sp (E)) ; otherwise (6.16) 
and 
Sp(H)=Sp(HI E)SP(E)+Sp(HI E)(1-Sp(E)) ; Sp(HI E)>_Sp(HýE), 
Sp (H) = Sp (H I E)Sn (E) +Sj, (H I E)(1- Sn (E)) ; otherwise (6.17) 
If E is a necessary condition for H (Figure 6.7(a)): 
P(HI E): 5 1, P(HI E)=0 (6.18) 
If E is a sufficient condition for H (Figure 6.7(b)): 
P(HIE)=1, P(HIE)<_1 (6.19) 
In the special case that E is both a necessary and sufficient condition for H. 
P(HI E)=1, P(HI E)=0 (6.20) 
A weaker and more general condition is when E is relevant or partially sufficient to H (Figure 
6.7(c)), in which case: 
0< P(H I E): 5 1,0: 5 P(H I E) S1 (6.21) 
(a) (b) (c) 
,... ---. ýH ýEH 
Figure 6.7 Venn diagrams of (a) E necessaryfor H; (b) E. sufficient for H; (c) E relevant to H 
In the context of performance modelling of systems, the sufficiency, S, is a measure of the influence 
that a given sub-system has on the performance of its parent or super-system, and, the necessity, N, 
is a measure of the extent to which failure (non-performance) of a sub-system will cause failure 
(non-performance) of its parent super-system. Increasing sufficiency has the effect of increasing 
the weight applied to the given sub-system. Increasing necessity has the effect of decreasing the 
weight applied to any sub-systems that do not intersect (are not dependent upon) the given sub- 
system. If a sub-system is necessary to avoid failure, it provides importance evidence about the 
super-system so the weight applied to those sub-systems that do not intersect with it (i. e. intersect 
with its negation) should be small. For example, a flood warning system that performs well will 
greatly improve the overall performance of the flood defence system meaning it will have a high 
sufficiency. However failure of the flood warning system does not result in complete failure of the 
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flood system as other system processes are still functioning, therefore the necessity will be quite 
low. 
This methodology has been developed further by Hall et al. (1998b) to generate bounds on the 
inference for systems with n proposition. Due to the lengthy nature of this calculation, a worked 
through example is provided in Appendix H. 
6.4. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
The methodology outlined above is rather laborious to implement in practice without the help of a 
software tool for constructing process models, storing performance indicators and propagating 
evidence. A Windows based software tool (known as PERIMETA) has therefore been developed 
by co-researchers to support the methodology and demonstrate its applicability with a case study. 
The tool is described briefly here before describing in more detail the case study that formed part of 
the current research. The tool comprises of a hierarchical systems model linked to a database of 
performance indicators, with the following key elements: 
"a graphical tool for drawing hierarchical models, 
"a model manager, to navigate large models and switch between alternative special views, 
"a database of performance indicators, which is intended to be compatible with an 
organisation's database and intranet systems, 
"a graphing tool for illustrating how performance indicators have varied with time, 
"a library of parameterised value functions, which can be chosen and adapted by the user, and, 
" an inference engine for implementing IPT. 
The software's help documents have been placed in Appendix Ito provide a more detailed 
overview of how the software is used. 
6.4.1. Graphical model construction 
Each process model is constructed using a conventional drag and drop interface. Only acyclic 
(hierarchical) structures are permitted by the graphing tool. The model can be automatically sorted 
into layers. 
The Figure of Merit provides an immediate overview of system performance, enabling the user to 
identify areas of poor performance and their implications. By clicking on the icon for a sub- 
system, the user is able to view: 
"- the interval estimates for measured and propagated evidence, 
" the weights used to merge the measured and propagated evidence, and, 
' The software developed for implementing the decision-support methodology was programmed by co- 
researchers, with design input from the author, however a brief overview is included here and more detailed 
information is provided in Appendix I. ;,.,; ,... 
k, 
'"i 
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" the necessity and sufficiency and dependency measures used in the propagation process. 
Further interrogation takes the user to the relevant entries in the database of performance indicators 
(Section 6.4.3) and the value functions through which they have been projected. 
6.4.2. Model manager 
The hierarchical model can rapidly grow to be too large to show on a single sheet. Therefore, a 
`model manager' is illustrated in the top left hand corner of Figure 6.1, which allows the user to 
navigate the model and show the area of interest. The user can collapse or expand sub-systems at 
the bottom of the model. The default view of the model displays the general values of the figures 
of merit. However, the user can switch between views by choosing a specific view from a tool bar 
(Section 6.2.5). 
6.4.3. Database of performance indicators 
Every performance indicator is held in a database which records: 
" the name of the performance indicator, 
" its current value, 
" its dimensions, 
" the sub-system(s) it provides information about, and, 
"a default value function. 
6.4.4. Library of value functions 
When associating a performance indicator with a sub-system, the user has to specify the value 
function. This is achieved by choosing either the appropriate linguistic measure (Figure 6.5) or one 
of the six generic shapes shown in Figure 6.3 and specifying its limits and, if appropriate, its 
curvature. Uncertainty in the value function is handled by specifying an interval range within 
which the function can vary. Since, in general, both the performance indicator and the value 
function will be an interval-value, interval bounds on Equation 6.2 are calculated. 
6.4.5. IPT inference engine 
Having established the model structure and captured the performance indicators, the final step is to 
enable propagation of evidence through the hierarchy. At each level in the hierarchy other than the 
lowest level, the user enters 
" `necessity' and `sufficiency' values, which represent the criticality of the performance of the 
sub-systems to the performance of their super-system, and, 
"a 'dependency' value representing the strength- of dependency between each of the sub- 
systems. 
These are then automatically combined with the figures of merit of the sub-systems to generate the 
propagated estimate P(H)p, g. r of the figure of merit. Weights are entered to enable the merger 
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of P(H)mea,,, ea and P(H)p, opagatei to calculate the value of P(H),,, e, g,. d 
for display in the graphical 
model and propagation up the hierarchy. 
6.5. CASE STUDY: BURTON-UPON-TRENT 
The case study focuses on a flood defence system in the Midlands, England that was modelled to 
demonstrate how the methodology can be used for a complex system and provide a useful 
overview of performance. The system comprised of the town, Burton-upon-Trent, which is 
situated on the river Trent and has approximately 10km of flood defence protecting more than 
13000 people and 6000 properties (Figure 6.9). The higher level processes of the finished model 
are shown in Figure 6.14. Figure 6.15(a) and (b) show the lower level process which correspond to 
the physical defence assets. 
The model has been populated with all the available evidence of the physical defence system and 
has therefore been decomposed to the lowest level at which this evidence is recorded. Where 
possible the other process in the system, such as for the flood warning branch of the hierarchy, 
have been populated with EA data. Where performance indicator values could not be obtained, for 
example, in the case of the planning control processes, values have been fabricated to demonstrate 
how these soft aspects of the flood defence system can be incorporated into the overall system 
model. 
6.5.1. Model construction 
The nature of flood defence decision-making means it is highly amenable to hierarchical 
modelling. The management of flood defence in England and Wales is hierarchical, with policies 
and high level targets defined at a national level. The next level of management is to identify long 
term plans at catchment and coastal cell level. Finally, at a more local level, strategies and then 
solutions are identified to realise these plans and implement them. Decisions on key tasks such as 
flood warning, planning control and operations and maintenance are made at all levels of this 
hierarchy (Harman et al., 2002). 
The focus of the case study was on the lower level systems that are dominated by the flood defence 
assets. Both the `hard' system processes such as `managing flood defences' and `soft' systems 
such as `operating a flood warning system' were integrated into the model. However, case studies 
in the dam sector have demonstrated that the methodology is robust enough to handle processes at 
more abstract levels of the infrastructure system (Hall et al., 2002b). The nature of flood defence 
management means that there are a number of generic model levels that are common to a typical 
flood defence system, these are shown in Figure 6.8. This is clearly reflected in the structure of the 
full case study process model in Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15. 
I 
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Construction of the model was an iterative process involving a number of experts in the fields of 
flood and coastal defence. The top level of interest is the performance of the entire flood defence 
system. This is achieved by `managing and providing defence infrastructure', `operating a flood 
warning system', `co-ordinating an emergency response', `increasing public awareness' and 
`controlling planning and advising planning bodies'. These processes can be further decomposed, 
for example, `operating a flood warning system' is achieved by `gathering data on rainfall and river 
flows', `predicting flooding' and `disseminating warning'. `Managing defence assets' is 
decomposed into what appears to be a hierarchy of assets. Whilst the structure of the defence 
system is naturally hierarchical, it should not be forgotten that each `box' still represents a dynamic 
process, not just an inanimate object. For example `Embankment' represents not only the structure, 
but the control systems and those responsible for operating it. The model has been decomposed to 
the lowest level at which performance information is ordinarily acquired, which is the level of 
nasmg CatrWhp 
DuDlk plarwp and 
arenas aavýsnp 
panting soeias 
Figure 6.8 Generic process model structure for af ood defence system 
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6.5.2. Populating with performance indicators and assessing their value 
The size and complexity of flood defence systems means there is a large amount of evidence 
relating to their performance (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Examples of some of the many performance indicators that can be used to monitor the 
flood defence system 
Performance Indicator Description 
Condition of structure (or element) Visual assessment of an asset's condition. 
Rotational failure towards river FoS Factor of Safety: Rotational failure towards river 
Rotational failure away from river FoS Factor of Safety: Rotational failure away from river 
Slip circle (drawdown) Bishops Factor of Safety at draw down conditions 
Slip circle (erosion and drawdown) 
Bishops Factor of Safety at drawdown conditions and 
some river face erosion 
Overturning FOS Factor of Safety against overturning 
Sliding FOS Factor of Safety against sliding 
Thickness of sheet pile Measure of degree of corrosion. 
Flood Warning Lead Time Time from warning to flood 
Accuracy of prediction Previous success of accurate flood prediction 
Loss of life No. of fatalities resulting from flooding 
Risk assessment Economic flood risk assessment 
Days since inspection_ Time since last condition assessment of defence 
Environmental Impacts Linguistic description of impacts 
People at risk No. of people in floodplain 
Properties at risk 
_ 
No. of properties in floodplain 
Social-Impacts 
-- ----- -- 
Linguistic-description of impacts 
Costs: Floodbank maintenance Grass cutting etc. (x4per year). 
Costs: Condition grading 
Costs of condition assessment of flood defences by 
independent consultants (x2 per year). 
Costs: Asset inspection and debris removal Inspection and cleaning of assets (x6 per year) 
Costs: Hard defence maintenance 
_ 
Costs of maintaining structural defences 
Costs: Flood warning 
_ 
Costs of operating and maintaining flood warning 
Costs: Emergency response 
In average year (assuming 3/4 minor events, 1 /2 
major) 
Costs: Raising profile Raising profile of EA and flooding issues 
Costs: Capital expenditure Capital project costs 
Opt-in to AVM 
Percentage of people in floodplain who opted for 
Automatic Voice Messages flood warnings 
Reliability of gauges Reliability of rain, flow gauges etc. 
Accuracy of gauges Accuracy of rain, flow gauges etc. 
Calls to FloodLine 
Percentage of population in the floodplain who called 
floodline for advice during flood event 
Public awareness 
Percentage of people in floodplain who understand 
flood warnings and know how to act. 
Post flood week awareness Survey of awareness after National Flood Week 
Time spent raising public profile No. hours spent on raising public awareness 
No. of contractors who alter plans 
No. contractors who raise floors etc. based on EA 
advice to reduce flood risk 
Local Authorities who refuse planning 
LA planning applications that have been refused/ 
required modification after EA advice 
This evidence needs to be considered in a holistic and structured manner that allows a decision- 
maker to make informed choices based on the performance of all aspects of the system. 
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Performance indicators are entered into the model at the level within the system they are measured. 
Examples of evidence and appropriate value functions are given below. 
Table 6.3 Examples of performance indicator values and value functions 
Performance indicator Value function Measured Value Performance 
Crest condition Linguistic Good (Medium) [0.77,1.00] 
100 year flood S-Shaped 45.03m (±0.02m) [0.75,1.00] 
200 year flood S-Shaped 45.03m (±0.05m) [0.10,1.00] 
1000 year flood S-Shaped 45.03m (±0.10m) [0.00,0.99] 
Rotational failure FoS S-Shaped 1.03 [0.15,0.91 ] 
Maintenance costs Linear £4000 (±2000) [0.99,1.00] 
Capital costs Linear £1.2m (±0.1m) [0.89,1.00] 
Flood warning lead time S-Shaped 120min (±15min) [0.88,0.96] 
Loss of life Stepped 0 people [1.00,1.00] 
Accuracy of gauges Linear 90% (f10%) [0.75,1.00] 
Each structural element has associated with it a qualitative measure ranking a defence's visual 
condition between "very poor" and "very good". Each element may also have other specific 
indicators; for example, crest has a measure of height. Appropriate value functions are applied to 
the performance indicators. The condition grade is treated as a linguistic descriptor with the five 
point scale which maps conveniently on to the linguistic value function five point scale as 
demonstrated in Figure 6.5. 
Crest height is more complex as its performance can only meaningfully be assessed when 
compared with hydraulic loading. Flood defence performance is best described by considering a 
whole range of loading conditions (Chapter 5). To capture this, the crest height was valued against 
the 100,200 and 1000 year flood levels. This is shown in Figure 6.10. The performance of the 
crest is seen to decrease and become more uncertain against more extreme floods. A higher 
weighting is applied to the performance against the 100 year flood to represent both the fact that it 
is more likely to occur, but also that this is the flood the defence was built to withstand. Where a 
complete distribution of loadings is available, it may be preferable to calculate the probability of 
overtopping directly. However, valuing the crest height against individual flood levels allows both 
the performance of the defence over a range of loadings and the increase in uncertainty associated 
with estimating the more extreme flood levels to be captured in a satisfactory manner. 
There are many performance indicators relating to cost. These include costs of defence 
maintenance, cost of flood warning and other costs such as cost of raising awareness to flooding. 
At a high level, these costs will be an aggregation of costs at lower levels within the organisation. 
Costs can be evaluated in terms of performance by comparison with budget. For example, if 
defence maintenance costs for a river reach are £10,000 (±£2000) per year out of a total 
, 
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maintenance budget of £2,000,000 then that reach will have a relatively high level of economic 
performance. The size of this maintenance budget can be measured against the total budget to 
allow the effects of increasing maintenance at a loss of investment elsewhere in the system. 
....................... .............. " 
0.5 (a)1: 100 year 
0.0 
40.0 50.0 
1.0 ---------- ........... . 
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Figure 6.10 Mapping the performance of a defence crest through a value function for the (a) 1: 100 
year, (b)1: 260 year and (c) 1: 1000 year flood events 
Softer indicators such as public awareness to flooding are of great relevance to the overall objective 
of reducing flood risk. Several performance indicators were adapted from the results of surveys of 
members of the public in the flood area. One such indicator, percentage response to flood warning 
(i. e. percentage of public who took action to reduce damages after receiving a flood warning), was 
mapped through a concave value function (Figure 6.3(c)). This reflects an increase in performance 
associated with a greater public response, but also that the performance gain increases as more 
people respond to flood warnings. 
6.5.3. Risk and fragility as performance indicators 
Chapters 4'and 5 introduced a risk assessment methodology and a condition characterisation 
methodology. Both of these act as important performance indicators for a flood defence system. 
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A risk assessment provides an overall estimate of economic risk for the flood area, being Burton- 
upon-Trent for the case study model. A risk assessment also provides indicators of social risk. This 
can be expressed in terms of the number of people at risk or a measure of social vulnerability 
(Tapsell et aL, 2002) that identifies people who will find it harder to cope with a flood event. 
These both act as a measure of performance at the highest process in the model as it provides a 
measure of the performance for the whole of the Burton-upon-Trent flood defence system. Were 
the model to be extended to include regional or national processes, aggregated measures of flood 
risk for river catchments and on a national basis could be included. Economic flood risk is mapped 
through a linear value function and the risk for a flood system such as Burton is valued against the 
overall potential consequences of flooding. Consequently a decrease in flood risk to the town will 
increase the performance of the flood risk indicator. However, it should be noted that a reduction 
in risk is most likely associated with a corresponding decrease in performance resulting from the 
increased cost. The benefit of a performance-based methodology over a purely risk-based decision 
is that additional benefits (or losses) to the population or the environment such as amenity can also 
be considered. 
A risk assessment also produces a performance indicator for specific defences in terms of their 
contribution to the overall risk. This is mapped through a linear value function and is valued in 
terms of its contribution towards the risk for the whole system. The appropriate level of including 
risk assessments in a hierarchical process model of the flood defence performance is shown in 
Figure 6.11. 
Chapter 5 introduced a new condition characterisation approach that used fragility curves to act as 
a measure of structural performance. These can be incorporated into the model using one of two 
methods. The first employs a similar method as that used to evaluate defence crest performance 
can be employed. The upper and lower bound of conditional failure probability are taken from the 
fragility curve for the 100,200 and 1000 year flood and mapped through a linear value function. 
The lower and upper bounds on failure probability [Pf, Pf] therefore correspond exactly to [S(E), 
So(E)]. These items of evidence are then weighted against each other in the ratio 1: 0.5: 0.1 to 
represent the relative frequency of the events and therefore their relative importance to defence 
performance.: A figure of merit based purely on defence condition is therefore: 
FM= { [Pf (100), Pf,, (100)] xl . 0+[Pf (200), Pfý(200)] xO. 5+[Pf (1000), Pf (1000)] x0.1)13 (6.22) 
The second method requires a loading distribution, 1, which is combined with the defence fragility 
function, FR, using Equation 6.23, to produce lower and upper bounds on defence failure [Pf, Pf]. 
Pf =f FR (I)dl (6.23) 
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Again, these bounds are mapped through a linear value function onto a figure of merit to produce a 
representation of the total structural performance of the defence. 
Structural degradation and climate change scenarios are modelled by altering the performance 
indicators to represent the change in fragility or loading. 
Both risk and fragility provide useful information on the performance of the flood defence system 
However, care should be taken when entering them into the model as some of the evidence from 
which they are constructed is already included in the model. For example, the high level risk 
assessment methodology in Chapter 4 relies on the defence condition assessment. This means 
there is a high degree of dependency between the two pieces of evidence being used to assess 
system performance and it is important to adjust the dependency values appropriately to ensure that 
the performance is not overestimated. 
6.5.4. Assigning necessity, sufficiency and dependency values 
It is very rare that exact dependencies have been established for sub-systems within the flood 
defence system. Neighbouring defences often exhibit a strong dependency, but this dependency 
will tend to zero over a long distance. CUR and TAW (1990) identify methods of calculating the 
correlation of strength between sections of defences, however these methods have not been applied 
in England and Wales due to the difficulty and cost of obtaining information on dependencies 
which involves dense and often destructive testing of flood defences. Dependency between the 
elements of defences is dominated by the likely failure mode of the structure. Assessment of 
defence strength normally results in bounds of failure being calculated based on the assumption of 
total dependence or independence rather than the establishment of the dependency between failure 
modes. 
In the light of no better information, a default value was set for the dependency, necessity and 
sufficiency between flood defence elements and neighbouring defences. A dependency of 0.5 was 
chosen to reflect the fact that there is clearly dependency between neighbouring defences and 
individual defence elements. The necessity is also 0.5, this represents the fact that whilst failure or 
a defence element results in a considerable loss of performance of the defence it will not 
necessarily fail completely. The sufficiency of defence elements is 0.2. This represents the fact 
that the structural elements do not completely represent. the defence's sub-systems as much of the 
defence is unseen, there is also no evidence to suggest that any particular element is consistently 
more important than another in determining the defence's performance. This also rings true for 
individual defences within a defence system which have been assigned the same values of 
dependency, necessity and sufficiency. 
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The relationship between higher level processes is even more subjective. After the model was 
constructed and populated with performance indicators, default values were assigned to 
dependency, necessity and sufficiency and altered to reflect what experts thought they should be 
and how they perceived the high level processes to be influenced by changes in performance at 
lower levels within the hierarchy. 
Whilst assigning dependency values can sometimes be formalised with mathematical analysis, 
these three measures rely heavily on expert judgement. This should be recorded in an appropriate 
manner so that it is open to scrutiny and review. The sensitivity of these three measures can be 
explored by the modeller, however, a suitable semantic interpretation of these numerical measures 
needs to be established so values can be more readily assigned. 
6.5.5. Scenario testing 
Once a model has been constructed, it can be used to test management intervention scenarios. Five 
categories of scenario of interest to a flood defence manager were identified; maintenance, capital 
works, climate change, policy change and evidence collection scenarios. 
To evaluate how a maintenance scenario may change system performance, defences in the system 
were subjected to increased maintenance activity, resulting in all defences in "medium", "poor" 
and "very poor" condition being increased to "good" condition. Improved condition would be 
expected to raise system performance, whilst the corresponding increase in cost would decrease 
performance. The effect of maintaining the defences also gives more confidence in the condition 
assessment, therefore the confidence is increased from "medium" to "high". Altering the relevant 
performance indicators allows the effects of the scenario to be explored. The original performance 
of the flood defence system is shown in Figure 6.12 as being [0.33,0.60] whilst Figure 6.13 shows 
the performance of the flood defence system after increased maintenance of the defences as being 
[0.37,0.60]. The consequence is, therefore an increase in the overall performance of the flood 
defence system and a decrease in the associated uncertainty. This increase in performance 
demonstrates that the increased maintenance expenditure will improve the performance of the flood 
defence system. This can be used by a decision-maker to justify cost of maintenance. The increase 
in performance can also be compared to other scenarios, for example, whether it would be better to 
spend less and increase the condition of defences only to "medium" rather than "good". It might be 
expected that a significant increase in maintenance would have a much greater impact on the 
performance of the system. This will not be the case as the whole system is being modelled and its 
performance is dependent on the performance of other subsystems such as flood warning and 
emergency response. The model that has been constructed considers only part of a larger system 
(the entire river catchment) and therefore this increase in performance would have to be considered 
in the context of the rest of the system, for example, whether the resources invested on maintenance 
could be better used up or downstream. 
-163 
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The relationship between higher level processes is even more subjective. After the model was 
constructed and populated with performance indicators, default values were assigned to 
dependency, necessity and sufficiency and altered to reflect what experts thought they should be 
and how they perceived the high level processes to be influenced by changes in performance at 
lower levels within the hierarchy. 
Whilst assigning dependency values can sometimes be formalised with mathematical analysis, 
these three measures rely heavily on expert judgement. This should be recorded in an appropriate 
manner so that it is open to scrutiny and review. The sensitivity of these three measures can be 
explored by the modeller, however, a suitable semantic interpretation of these numerical measures 
needs to be established so values can be more readily assigned. 
6.5.5. Scenario testing 
Once a model has been constructed, it can be used to test management intervention scenarios. Five 
categories of scenario of interest to a flood defence manager were identified; maintenance, capital 
works, climate change, policy change and evidence collection scenarios. 
To evaluate how a maintenance scenario may change system performance, defences in the system 
were subjected to increased maintenance activity, resulting in all defences in "medium", "poor" 
and "very poor" condition being increased to "good" condition. Improved condition would be 
expected to raise system performance, whilst the corresponding increase in cost would decrease 
performance. The effect of maintaining the defences also gives more confidence in the condition 
assessment, therefore the confidence is increased from "medium" to "high". Altering the relevant 
performance indicators allows the effects of the scenario to be explored. The original performance 
of the flood defence system is shown in Figure 6.12 as being [0.33,0.60] whilst Figure 6.13 shows 
the performance of the flood defence system after increased maintenance of the defences as being 
[0.37,0.60]. The consequence is. therefore an increase in the overall performance of the flood 
defence system and a decrease in the associated uncertainty. This increase in performance 
demonstrates that the increased maintenance expenditure will improve the performance of the flood 
defence system. This can be used by a decision-maker to justify cost of maintenance. The increase 
in performance can also be compared to other scenarios, for example, whether it would be better to 
spend less and increase the condition of defences only to "medium" rather than "good". It might be 
expected that a significant increase in maintenance would have a much greater impact on the 
performance of the system. This will not be the case as the whole system is being modelled and its 
performance is dependent on the performance of other subsystems such as flood warning and 
emergency response. The model that has been constructed considers only part of a larger system 
(the entire river catchment) and therefore this increase in performance would have to be considered 
in the context of the rest of the system, for example, whether the resources invested on maintenance 
could be better used up or downstream. 
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Capital works scenarios can be tested by altering the model itself. Capital works involve the 
construction, replacement or significant upgrading of existing defences. This is modelled by 
adding or replacing processes in the model. 
Climate change scenarios can be modelled by adjusting the loads on the system. Predominantly 
this will alter the performance of the defence crest resulting in a (likely) decrease in performance, 
coupled with an increase in uncertainty. As described in Section 6.5.2, the loads, represented by 
the river depth are used to value the performance of the crest height, an increase in river depth for 
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Figure 6.12 An overview of the high level processes of the Burton flood defence system 
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Figure 6.13 An overview of the high level processes of the Burton flood defence system after 
maintenance improved the condition of the defences 
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Capital works scenarios can be tested by altering the model itself. Capital works involve the 
construction, replacement or significant upgrading of existing defences. This is modelled by 
adding or replacing processes in the model. 
Climate change scenarios can be modelled by adjusting the loads on the system. Predominantly 
this will alter the performance of the defence crest resulting in a (likely) decrease in performance, 
coupled with an increase in uncertainty. As described in Section 6.5.2, the loads, represented by 
the river depth are used to value the performance of the crest height, an increase in river depth for 
the 100 year flood will result in a loss in performance. 
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Figure 6.13 An overview of the high level processes of the Burton flood defence system after 
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Figure 6.14 Hierarchical process model of the Burton-upon-Trentflood defence system (Upper section) 
In Figure 6.15(a) and (b) the structural elements of the flood defence are annotated as follows; FI represents the Inward Face of the defence; FO the Outward Face; FC the Crest; BE the berm; and CS the Channel Side. 
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Figure 6.14 Hierarchical process model of the Burton-upon-Trent flood defence system (Upper section) 
In Figure 6.15(a) and (b) the structural elements of the flood defence are annotated as follows; FI represents the Inward Face of the defence; FO the Outward Face; FC the Crest; BE the berm; and CS the Channel Side. 
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Figure 6.15 Hierarchical process model of the Burton-upon-Trent flood defence system (Lower section, Part II) 
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Policy change scenarios require the alteration of the model or its performance indicators to reflect 
the new organisational priorities. For example, a simple change in fund allocation, perhaps 
increasing the maintenance budget and reducing the capital works budget, requires the appropriate 
cost related performance indicators to be altered. 
Evidence collection scenarios can be used to test the advantages of collecting (or ceasing to collect) 
different sources of evidence. This allows the decision-maker to weigh the reduction in uncertainty 
the evidence provides against its cost. 
6.5.6. Benefits of the methodology and model 
The methodology and model of the flood defence system provide many clear benefits to a flood 
defence manager. The case study has resulted in a model of a flood defence system that provides 
an overview of performance at a range of levels within the system by ordering a large number of 
assets, processes and evidence in a manner never previously achieved. In particular, the model 
maximises use of the results of a risk analysis by incorporating them as performance indicators at 
multiple levels in the system description. However, this analysis is incorporated into the broader 
context of all of the sources of evidence and values that the asset manager will wish to take into 
account providing a useful and relevant flood defence management tool. 
The figure of merit provides a clear representation of the amount of uncertainty associated with the 
sub-system. This uncertainty is a reflection of the lack of knowledge of the behaviour of the 
system. Further investigation can establish the sources of this uncertainty, allowing the decision- 
maker to target resources more efficiently. 
The model acts as a platform for exploring potential investment decisions and their impacts on all 
levels of the system. This has been demonstrated by testing a maintenance scenario, but other 
types of scenario are suggested in Section 6.5.5. 
The methodology provides a transparent and auditable mechanism for exploring, justifying and 
prioritising different types of investment decisions at all levels within the system. Clearly some 
subjective judgements are required, but these are open to scrutiny and discussion. This provides a 
more auditable and transparent mechanism than that presently in place. 
The approach proposed to capture performance uses process modelling to capture the behaviour of 
the system. The graphical representation of performance in terms of an interval has proven 
attractive to decision-makers. It is straightforward to explain, yet enables the complexity of the 
system and the richness of the evidence to be captured. A key benefit of process modelling was to 
facilitate communication between decision stakeholders focused on different areas of the flood 
defence system. Many decision-makers had previously considered only the effects of their 
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decisions on a limited part of the system and were in some cases initially surprised that decisions 
they make can influence the performance in different parts of the system. Using the model, 
engineers are able to communicate the importance of maintenance to the overall performance of the 
system, however, they can also be shown how a public liaison officer can also increase system 
performance by educating the public thereby providing a platform for comparing non-engineering 
based flood risk management techniques with more traditional approaches. Managers are therefore 
provided with a holistic view of the system and are able to view the relative importance of sub- 
systems to its overall performance. The model can also be used to help externalise information and 
decisions to organisations and the general public. 
Sceptical decision-makers, whilst recognising the benefits of the approach, have pointed out that 
model construction and maintenance represents yet another time-consuming activity. The 
implementation of the methodology in the form of the user-friendly PERIMETA software has 
helped to reduce this. However, the balance between the cost (measured in time) and benefit of 
model construction will shift in favour of this approach as it becomes more integrated with data 
initiatives such as the National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (Linford et al., 2002). Despite 
this, the very act of modelling the system provides immediate benefits in its- own right as decision- 
makers are forced to think in a way they had not previously about the processes they and others 
enact and the information that is available and its importance. 
6.6.: .° SUMMARY 
A new approach to assessing the performance of flood defence systems has been proposed to 
support decision-making. The system processes are modelled hierarchically. Evidence of 
performance of the flood defence system is mapped through a value function to produce a non- 
dimensional measure of performance. Evidence is propagated through the system using interval 
probability theory. The performance of each sub-system is represented by a figure of merit that 
provides a useful overview of the evidence of successful and unsuccessful performance of each 
sub-system. 
The methodology has been successfully tested on a case study for Burton-upon-Trent. A possible 
maintenance scenario was suggested to demonstrate how the methodology could be used to support 
investment decisions. 
The risk assessment and condition characterisation methodologies proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 
provide useful evidence of performance of the flood defence system. It has been shown that these 
can be integrated into the model hierarchy thus providing a useful means of making decisions 
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The needs for an improved decision-support methodology that were outlined in Chapter 2 have 
been satisfied. A transparent and auditable decision-making methodology has been supplied that 
can be used to support decisions by considering the performance of system processes and the 
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7.1.1. Flood risk assessment 
A review of flood risk management in England and Wales identified flood risk assessment as 
providing a powerful basis for decision-making. A quantitative flood risk assessment can be used 
to support the appraisal of scheme design, policy options, resource allocation and as a measure of 
performance of the substantial annual investment in flood management. 
To reflect the many different types of decisions made at various organisational levels within the 
flood defence management structure, a tiered probabilistic risk assessment methodology that builds 
on previous research by Meadowcroft et al. (1996) was proposed. Each level of risk assessment 
provides an increasingly more accurate estimate of flood risk. This allows the flood defence 
manager to commit resources applied to the risk assessment appropriate to the scale and importance 
of the decision. A measure of national assessment of flood risk need only be relatively coarse, 
whereas the designer of a flood defence scheme will require an accurate estimation in order to 
optimise the scheme design. Three levels of risk assessment have been proposed, a High Level 
analysis that can be performed on a national scale, making use only of data available nationwide. 
The Intermediate Level incorporates additional information on loading, floodplain topography and 
defence structure to provide a risk assessment on the scale of a sub-catchment or coastal sub-cell, 
The Detailed Level uses information about the composition of the defences and a much more 
detailed study of their proneness to failure to provide the most accurate flood risk assessment at a 
scheme level. Whilst increasingly more accurate results are provided, at all levels of assessment: 
" uncertainties in the QRA are represented as intervals, 
" defence condition is described over a full range of loads using fragility curves, and, 
"a GIS based impacts assessment is employed. 
The High Level risk assessment methodology has been described in detail. An example 
implementation for the river Parrett and Bridgwater Bay has demonstrated the applicability and 
potential of the methodology as a tool for decision-support. Climate change and maintenance 
scenarios demonstrate how the methodology can be used to support decisions on national flood 
defence investment policy. This method has now been applied for the whole of England and Wales 
(HR Wallingford et al., 2003) the results of which have been summarised and discussed in 
Appendix G. The high level method provides a number of benefits over the previous national scale 
flood risk assessment by Halcrow et al. "(2001) because: 
" defence failure probability is calculated as a function of load using fragility curves rather than 
as a point value, thereby providing a more complete overview of defence performance, 
" the upstream and downstream extent of flooding is estimated instead of assuming that a 
defence inundates to some degree all the floodplain on the same reach, thereby allowing 
defences to be associated with the parts of the floodplain they protect, 
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" multiple defence failures are considered, allowing the compound effects to be analysed, 
thereby considering all possible failure scenarios that can result in flooding of a given impact 
zone, and, 
" the depth of flooding in each impact zone for each flood event is estimated instead of using 
event weighted damages for each property, thereby providing more accurate damage 
estimation. 
Despite these improvements, there are still a number of limitations with this national scale risk 
assessment. Some of these are addressed at the intermediate level risk assessment. The 
intermediate level is more process-based. Loadings are expressed probabilistically, defence 
performance is measured in terms of more parameters and inundation models are used to establish 
more accurate damage estimates. This has not, as yet, been implemented but the methodology has 
been fully described. The most detailed level will use continuous simulation but is, at the time of 
writing, less well developed and has therefore only been outlined. 
7.1.2. Condition characterisation 
Present approaches to condition characterisation in England and Wales rely on expert judgement to 
describe the defence as being in a condition that ranges from "very poor" to "very good". 
Probabilistic methods that are described in national guidance for economic appraisal (DEFRA, 
2000a and 2000b) rely on expert judgement to estimate the total failure probability of the defence. 
A method using fragility curves to separate the loading assessment from the strength assessment 
has been proposed. Integration of the fragility curve over a probabilistic description of loading 
enables the failure probability of the defence to be calculated. 
The conditional probability of failure over a complete range of loadings (such as wave height or 
water level) can be estimated using first order reliability methods. Probabilistic methods such as 
these are not new to flood defence engineers, however their uptake in England and Wales has been 
limited partly due to a lack of necessary data. The other major reservation upheld by many 
engineers is that the uncertainty associated with estimating many parameters is not amenable to 
probabilistic treatment. Much of the evidence associated with condition characterisation is often 
vague and this type of uncertainty is better expressed as an interval measure or a fuzzy set. The 
reliability methods have therefore been adapted to capture this type of uncertainty and propagate it 
through the assessment of failure probability so the flood defence manager can consider it in the 
decision-making process. 
Examples using rock armour revetments and sheet piles have been provided to support the 
methodology. These demonstrate how uncertain information can be incorporated into the condition 
characterisation. System failure bounds are used to generate upper and lower bounds of failure of a 
structure when considering multiple failure modes. Structural degradation, which is of great 
importance to a strategic planner, can also be modelled probabilistically. This is achieved by 
176 Performance-based management offlood defence systems 
unsuitable for application within an organisation such as the Environment Agency. A DSS should 
include: 
"A DSS navigation front-end (representing the structure of the system), 
"A GIS interface to show the spatial distribution of flood and erosion risks (this thesis 
contributed towards this by developing a quantitative flood risk assessment methodology), 
"A dynamic link with key models and databases (this will include models and datasets that 
are likely to be used by the majority of users, or needed for decisions that need to be made 
in real-time such as flood forecasting), 
" Decision and uncertainty analysis tools (Chapter 6 presented a performance-based 
decision-support methodology), 
9 An inventory of other available data and models (models and datasets that do not need to 
be accessed immediately or by all users), 
" Guidance on model selection and use, and, 
" Guidance on decision-making and procedures. 
Such a framework would be capable of supporting flood defence specific decisions, which include 
maintenance and monitoring, as well as other flood risk management decisions, such as urban 
drainage, flood warning and development control. The DSS would also be able to consider the 
broader issues of river catchment and coastal zone management to ensure a more complete 
consideration of system performance. This is to become increasingly important as the UK 
implements the EU Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000) and the European integrated coastal 
zone management strategy (Commission of the European Communities, 1999). 
Clearly a major hurdle in the implementation of a DSS will be related to the design of a suitable 
distributed computing system. However, there are other more complex issues relating to the design 
and integration of individual models. The broad range of decisions that need to be supported will 
require a suitably broad selection of modelling tools. For example, long term morphological 
evolution will not be considered on the same scale as short term flooding processes. However, the 
proneness to flooding of a coastal system is influenced by the shoreline morphology. Catchment 
scale modelling of fluvial processes can be achieved at a relatively coarse resolution, but may need 
to incorporate information from much higher resolution urban drainage models. Model integration 
and modularisation issues are the subject of ongoing research (eg. Gijsbers et al., 2002, Harvey et 
al., 2002 and Khatibi et al., 2003). 
7.2.2. Refining proposed methodologies 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
An obvious improvement to the high level methodology is the incorporation of a national DEM (Li 
and Baker, 2002) and CEH FlowGrid (stage-discharge curves at regular intervals along 




quality of the high level assessment, as flood depths will no longer be based on a statistical analysis 
of a number of simulations for a given valley type. 
The fragility curves used in the high level of the risk assessment methodology described in Chapter 
4 are constructed with only limited evidence and derived from quantified analysis of documented 
failure mechanisms for a small number of defence types, back analysis of recorded failures and 
considerable expert judgement. Whilst defence specific verification of fragility curves can be 
provided by more detailed risk assessments, cost prohibits this for large numbers of defences. 
However, a more detailed analysis from these assessments may be used to validate the high level 
fragility curves. This may be achieved through direct comparison of a number of reliability-based 
fragility curves for representative defence structures and their high level counterparts. Quantified 
analysis of this type for a wide range of defences is laborious but would add substantially to the 
credibility of the high level risk assessment methodology. 
As discussed above, only limited information was available to support the construction of the 
fragility curves used to describe the proneness of defences to breaching. Data on flood events and 
defence performance is essential if this type of approach is to be improved upon at the high level 
(and indeed to support further understanding of failure modes at more detailed levels). It is 
therefore strongly recommended that a database of flood events is set up'. This database needs to 
record information relating to the loadings placed on the defence (water level, wave height, 
duration etc. ), the response of the defence (deterioration, overtopping volumes, breach width and 
invert etc. ) and any impacts (flood extents, depths and duration, evacuations, damages etc. ). 
Previous databases recording flood event information (eg. the World Health Organisation 
supported EM-DAT http: //www. cred. be/emdat/) have tended to focus on the headline figures such 
as total economic damage or number of casualties rather than information of use to engineers 
aiming to learn from the failure of the flood defence system. The importance of recording adequate 
information has been recognised by those involved in handling major flood events (Roe, 1993), and 
there is often limited information available on flood events in the relatively distant past (Mosby, 
1938) that should be incorporated into a database. However, this information needs to be 
centralised and future flood events need to be recorded'in a consistent manner. Perhaps more 
important is the recording of `near-misses'. These are events where flooding does not quite occur, 
or perhaps the defence is only overtopped in limited places. Recording these events as well as the 
failures will assist future understanding of defence reliability. 
The more detailed level methodologies of the QRA have yet to be implemented. The intermediate 
level methodology has been described fully. - The most detailed QRA has only been outlined and 
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therefore needs to be refined before it can be demonstrated. It is likely at this level of the 
methodology the level of detail required to implement this tier of the methodology may require site 
specific treatment. Therefore a suite of tools and techniques with appropriate guidance may be 
recommended rather than a specific methodology. 
Defence fragility 
This thesis has contributed towards improved characterisation of defence structural performance. 
However, our understanding of defence breaching and deterioration mechanism is not complete 
and the methodology presented in Chapter 5 can only consider failure mechanisms for which a 
limit state function exists. Further research also is required in the areas of compound failure (when 
an initiating mechanism may suddenly trigger another failure mode). A large amount of research 
has studied the propagation of breaches in dykes and embankments (eg. Visser, 1998, Hassan, 2002 
and Hanson et al., 2002). This work is being extended further through projects such as IMPACT 
(http: //www. impact-project. net/). The emphasis on studying embankment and revetment failure 
reflects the importance of such structures in protecting floodplains, however, research into other 
defences such as vertical walls needs to be considered. More specifically, mechanisms such as 
sheet pile `peeling' when one section of sheet pile failing can result in the peeling away of a long 
stretch of other sections may benefit from further study. Study of the strength of old defences (eg. 
the Victorian flood walls in Cardiff) requires analysis if we are to have faith in the safety of these 
structures. 
Wave overtopping has been the subject of a number of previous research projects that resulted in 
the publication of the Overtopping Manual (HR Wallingford, 1999). The calculation of 
overtopping rates is an essential part of a QRA as overtopping provides a direct threat to life and 
property. Research into overtopping continues under the CLASH project (Bruce et al., 2002). 
However, whilst much research has focused on predicting discharges, further research needs to be 
targeted towards quantifying the effect of overtopping rates on defence reliability. This will enable 
improved definition of limit state functions for use at the more detailed tiers of QRA, and an 
improved understanding of structural response to better support the expert judgements used to 
define fragility at the high and intermediate level of assessment. 
Performance-based decision-support methodology 
Implementation of the decision-support methodology described in Chapter 6 requires that a 
hierarchical representation of system processes is constructed. The relationship between the 
performance of a child and parent process is described by a necessity (a measure of the extent to 
which failure of the child-process contributes to failure of the parent process) and sufficiency (a 
' Note: Databases such as this will also contribute towards better definition of other parameters used in the 
high level methodology that were not defined by the author, such as the representative breach width or flood 
duration. 
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measure of the influence that a given child process has on the performance of its parent process) 
value. A further measure of dependency is used to represent the amount of evidence originating 
from a common source or being influenced by common processes. Whilst these measures are 
necessary to capture the non-linear behaviour between system processes, aspects of the method for 
propagation of uncertainty merit further attention in order to improve the uptake of the approach. 
The case study model for Burton-upon-Trent shows that there are a large number of repeated 
processes (for example, there are numerous embankments and vertical walls). As shown in 
Chapter 4, flood defences can be categorised into a limited number of generic types. The values of 
dependency, necessity and sufficiency used in uncertainty propagation are likely to be similar for a 
given classification of defence. For example, the integrity of the front face will be more important 
to the performance of a gabion wall than that of a concrete wall. It can therefore be expected to 
have a higher necessity value. This approach was adhered to in the construction of the case study, 
but lack of knowledge required these values to be assigned by expert judgement alone. This is 
justifiable as the modeller can assign values that allow the influence of the sub-systems on the 
super system to be propagated in a manner they believe corresponds to the behaviour of the real 
system. These expert judgements are recorded and so therefore auditable and open to debate. 
However, empirical evidence supporting these judgements would provide more confidence in the 
model. Being able to assign a value for necessity, sufficiency or dependency for repetitive 
processes with some degree of confidence also provides a useful model construction aid. The 
difficulty in quantifying these values more precisely stems from a lack of available data describing 
different system states. For some aspects of the system, this is already being addressed through 
DEFRA/EA funded research. For example, research into river conveyance aims to study the 
influence of factors such as embankment condition and the frequency of mowing grass on the 
embankment on the river's ability to convey water (which is one measure of the performance of the 
embankment). 
For simple systems, the sensitivity of the performance of the super-system to dependency, 
necessity and sufficiency parameters can be easily explored by the user. However, flood defence 
systems, such as the example addressed in the case study are usually large. Exploring the 
sensitivity of the performance of the parent process to these parameters is less intuitive for systems 
with a large number of child processes and hierarchical levels. The sheer volume of child 
processes makes exploratory analysis time consuming. The influence of these parameters for such 
large and complex system has to be explored more fully. This can be achieved through automated 
sensitivity testing. If large numbers of sub-systems are to be assigned generic values as described 
above then the compounded effects of this need to be quantified. It may be more appropriate to 
assign bounds to the values of sufficiency, necessity and dependency to account for the uncertainty 
associated with defining them. 
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7.2.3. Broader development 
Recalling the Source-Pathway-Receptor (S-P-R) model introduced in Chapter 3 as a convenient 
means of exploring different aspects of flood management, the contributions of this thesis are 
considered in the context of current and recommended future research. The overall contribution of 
this thesis has been a broad one. Whilst specific research targeted improvements in addressing 
flood defence condition characterisation (i. e. related to describing the pathway), a QRA provides a 
broad overview of the flood defence system performance that incorporates all three aspects of the 
S-P-R model (including a defence condition characterisation). This is- further enveloped by a 
performance-based management methodology that considers those areas of the S-P-R model that 
can not be incorporated in a QRA. 
Researchers in all aspects of the S-P-R model are constantly striving to improve the level of 
understanding of physical processes and translate this into improved models. All the 
methodologies presented in this thesis are flexible enough to not be dependent on the use of 
specific models, but can be updated as our understanding of the system is increased. For example, 
further understanding of breach propagation through physical and numerical modelling may be 
incorporated into the QRA at a number of different tiers. This may take the form of time 
dependent equations at a detailed level or empirical relationships at the high level. However, the 
consequence of using models is that they are only abstractions of our understanding of reality and 
are therefore always subject to uncertainty. Further advances in the understanding of 
meteorological phenomena, catchment processes such as the rainfall-runoff relationship, river and 
floodplain flow processes, storm surges and waves will enable improved modelling of the loadings 
on our system. Some improvements to existing models can be achieved through more complete 
representation of processes in existing models. One such example is the interaction of subterranean 
gravel layers near rivers that can result in flooding from ponding at the point where the gravel layer 
surfaces. This can be some distance from the river itself which may not be overtopping. 
In other situations, however, our understanding is limited by insufficient long term data. Projects 
such as the national wave recording network (WAVENET) will help by improving model 
validation and the estimation of future loading conditions. In all cases however, a performance 
framework allows the costs (in terms of economic and other resources required for data acquisition) 
to be balanced against the gains in terms of uncertainty reduction. 
New technologies are enabling more sophisticated means of data gathering. Satellites are 
providing land elevation maps and wind or wave data (such as the LandSat and ERS projects 
http: //www. mimas. ac. uk/spatial/). A 'useful advancement for coastal zone modellers is LADS 
(Lidar airborne depth system) which can map both above and below the waterline simultaneously 
providing a more efficient means of collecting and merging DEM and bathymetry datasets (Stumpf 
et al., 2002). Of key importance to the flood defence manager is the position and crest level of the 
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flood defences. Helicopter based surveying is currently being trialled in the UK and may provide a 
means of fast and accurate surveying of defence crest levels along long stretches of embankment 
(eg. Burgess, 2002). Improved data gathering initiatives are crucial if we are to have a reasonable 
degree of confidence in our analyses. Regular monitoring is also essential for measuring how well 
a system is performing. Remote sensing technologies, such as heli-surveying and satellites should 
be tested and fully exploited where they can be shown to provide information that improves the 
decision-makers understanding of the performance of the flood system. 
An area of research of particular importance to the assessment of coastal flood risk is the prediction 
of coastal morphology. The understanding of morphology is both important for assessing long 
term risks and defence reliability. An understanding on short (days-years), medium (years- 
centuries) and longer term scales is necessary. One storm can be enough to result in the breaching 
of a defence, perhaps from enormous and rapid toe scour - and therefore needs to be considered in 
defence design and maintenance decisions, whereas, long term understanding is necessary for 
taking strategic policy decisions. Current modelling can produce reasonable results in the short 
term (eg. Kamphuis, 1991, Nairn and Southgate, 1993) and qualitative approaches have increased 
our understanding of long term processes (eg. Burgess et al., 2002). Recent advances have been 
made in quantitative medium term morphological prediction (eg. Hall et al., 2002), but it is this 
timescale over which predictions are least certain and yet is the timescale over which most 
management plans are made. If accurate long term predictions of flood risk are to be made then 
these models need to be improved. Research continues in this area; a number of projects funded 
through DEFRA/EA funded research and European projects such as EUROSION (Serra et al., 
2003) help to further contribute to our understanding of these processes. The relative success of 
modelling in the short term may be a reflection of the timescales in which our"systems have been 
studied in detail to generate the models. In order to create more accurate medium term coastline 
evolution models, large scale and long term detailed site investigations are required. This may help 
quantify some of the long term, non-linear, morphological processes that are not observable in 
short term investigations or desk studies of historical trends. 
Increased understanding of the S-P-R aspects delivers improved performance-based management. 
Aside from producing an increasingly accurate QRA and condition characterisation through 
improved modelling and monitoring initiatives, our understanding of system behaviour and the 
ability to better predict it increases. The performance of systems and their sub-systems can be 
evaluated and continually updated. However, not all system processes are amenable to quantitative 
description, whilst others are not monitored sufficiently. Substantial advances in performance- 
based management can be made if measures for these processes are identified and monitored. 
Environmental and social indicators need to be further developed, and their likely interaction with 
fluvial and coastal management options better understood, if we are to successfully balance them 
with economic indicators when considering issues such as long term sustainability. Some of these 
;' 
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issues are being addressed by AIDEnvironment (http: //www. aidenvironment. org/) and Tyndall 
Centre (http: //www. tyndall. ac. uk/) funded research. 
The move towards the performance-based management envisaged in this thesis will not be 
achieved through technological advancement and data gathering initiatives alone. It needs to be 
accompanied by organisational change within the flood management industry, and changed 
behaviour and understanding on the part of politicians, the general public, developers and other 
decision stakeholders. Floodplain development may still continue out of necessity to provide 
housing despite recent flood events, but in this case developers and planners should consider 
mitigation measures such as flood resistant buildings. It is most likely this will have to be driven 
by the industry, but current research is already addressing some of these issues (eg. Naylor et al., 
2003). However, the implementation of a performance-based decision-support system will act as a 
catalyst for further change by enabling the advantages of these changes to be explicitly 
demonstrated. 
7.3. IMPACT OF THIS RESEARCH 
Increasing recognition of the need for more strategic and long term planning has resulted in a large 
number of different planning tools (eg. SMPs, CHaMPs etc. ). These plans may often support 
contradictory objectives and weight conflicting information differently due to the nature of the 
investigation and the varying stakeholders involved in the preparation of the plan. A vision of 
performance-based management for flood defence systems has been outlined. This performance- 
based approach is consistent with balancing these conflicts and identifying options that result in the 
greatest contribution to overall performance. Whilst, inevitably, there is additional research needed 
to improve the measurement of performance and in further understanding the dependability of 
performance evidence and connectivity of sub-systems, this thesis has successfully demonstrated 
the advantages of performance-based management. A number of key areas for further research, 
some related to specific aspects of the research presented in this thesis, others related to broader 
aspects of performance and risk management, were noted in the previous Section. However, the 
importance of much of the research described in this thesis has already been recognised by 
decision-makers in the UK. This has been demonstrated by: 
" the implementation of the National Flood Risk Assessment (HR Wallingford, 2003, Appendix 
G) using the methodology described in Chapter 4 has provided a national indicator of flood 
defence performance, 
" the implementation of the high level risk assessment methodology described in Chapter 
,4 
in the 
Foresight Flood and coastal defence project (Evans, 2003) which aims to support long term 
(over the next 30-100 years) flood and coastal defence policy, 
" the acceptance of the concept of fragility curves as a useful indicator of flood defence 
performance and as part of the probabilistic risk assessment process, 
,o 
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" the incorporation of the concepts of performance introduced in Chapter 6 into forthcoming 
DEFRA guidance on performance evaluation and the Environment Agency's new 
performance-based asset management system (which the author has been invited to contribute 
towards) that is currently being designed. 
Thus, there is a realistic prospect of the vision of the performance-based approach to management 
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Appendix A 
Definition of acronyms 
AAD Average Annual Damage 
------- - --- -- AOD - Above Ordnance Datum 
BAP Biodiversi Action Plan 
BCR Benefit-Cost Ratio 
CFMP Catchment Flood Management Plan 
CIRIA Construction Industry Research and Information Association 
CHaMP Coastal Habitat Management Plan 
CZMP Coastal Zone Management Plan 
CMAM Condition Monitoring and Asset Management 
DEFRA (formerly MAFF) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
EPSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
- EA -ý--- -- ---- -- --------- - __ _ _.. _ _- - -- -. _... -, -ý -- Environment Agency 
---- ---- EIA 
--y 
-------- ---- Environmental Impact Assessment 
EU European Union 
_FCDPAG_ --- 
Flood and Coastal Defence Project Appraisal Guidance 
FDMM Flood Defence Management Manual 
FDMS 
Flood Defence Management System (software supporting the 
FDMM procedures) 
FORM First Order Reliability Method 
FOSM First Order Second Moment 
GIS Geographical Information System 
IDB Internal Drainage Board 
ICE Institution of Civil Engineers - -ýý 
ILD Index of Local Deprivation 
MAFF (now DEFRA) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
MHWS Mean High Water Springs 
MWL Mean Water Level 
NAO National Audit Office 
NFCDD National Flood and Coastal Defence Database 
NRA 
Tý - 
National Rivers Authority (now the Environment Agency) 
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RASP Risk Assessment for Strategic Planning 
SMP Shoreline Management Plan 
SoP Standard of Protection 
SORM Second Order Reliability Method -ý - 
SoS Standard of Service 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
Appendix B 
Glossary of terms 
A frontage within which longshore and cross-shore transport of 
Coastal cell beach material takes place independently of that in adjacent 
frontages. 
Measures to protect the land against erosion and encroachment by Coast protection the sea. 
Coastal defence An overarching term that includes sea defence and coastal protection. 
Ordinary watercourses which the Environment Agency and other Critical ordinary operating authorities agree are critical because of their potential to 
watercourses put at risk from flooding large numbers of people and property. 
Fluvial defence Measures to help prevent flooding from rivers. 
Flood defence An overarching term that includes both coastal and fluvial defences. 
Flood risk 
Combination of the probability of flooding and the consequences 
(economic or otherwise) of flooding. 
Flood risk assessment Consideration of the risks inherent in flooding. 
Fragility The probability of failure conditional on a given load. 
-T !r Hazard A situation with the potential to cause harm. 
Watercourses designated as such on main river maps and are Main rivers generally the larger arterial watercourses. 
ý Ordinary watercourses Watercourses that are not designated as main river. 
-ý - _ The use of probabilities and probability distributions in order to 
Probabilistic discounting account for uncertainty when estimating present values of cost or 
benefit over a period of time. 
Reach A length of channel or coastline between defined boundaries. 
Return period 
The average length of time separating extreme flood events of a 
similar magnitude. 
Risk 
A combination of the likelihood and consequences of harm being ° 
realised from a hazard. 
Risk management The activity of mitigating and monitoring risks. p rýý 
Sea defences Measures to help prevent flooding from the sea. 
The level of protection provided by a structure. For fluvial defences 
this corresponds to the expected flood event that will lead to sop 
= overflow. For coastal defences this is the storm event that will lead 
- 
to serious overtopping. 
- ýý The degree to which the EA provides, or seeks to provide, service. 
SoS Normally achieved through capital works, routine maintenance and 
the operation of control structures. 
A reflection of our lack of knowledge or sureness about something or 
Uncertainty someone, ranging from just short of complete sureness to an almost 
complete lack of conviction about an outcome. 
Please also see Appendix F for a glossary of terms that are specific to the PERIMETA software and 
decision-support. 
Appendix C 
Official guidance on flood defence 
management 
This Appendix provides a summary of the procedures within published guidance from the 
Environment Agency and the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The main 
document used by the Environment Agency is the Flood Defence Management Manual and the 
corresponding Flood Defence Management System (the supporting database). However, the 
National Flood and Coastal Defence Database has just superseded the FDMS and the FDMM 
procedures are currently being reviewed. 
C. 1. THE FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT MANUAL 
With respect to river defence projects, small projects are appraised and prioritised according to the 
Environment Agency's Flood Defence Management Manual (FDMM). This acts as a guidance 
document for the procedures required by the Flood Defence Management System (FDMS). The 
FDMS acts as a database for the EA and has some of the FDMM's prioritisation and justification 
methods included as pre-programmed routines. Data from the FDMS has now been migrated into 
the EA's-new National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (NFCDD) which does not include any 
in-built decision-support functionality. Asset management procedures within the FDMM are 
supported by the Condition Assessment Manual (Glennie et al. 1991) which is used as a guide to 
help flood defence inspectors assess defence condition. The present methodology for condition 
assessment is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and a new methodology is proposed in Chapter 5. 
The FDMM defines and uses the Standard of Service (SoS) which is "the standards to which the 
EA seek to alleviate flooding and allow provision for adequate drainage of land". It is therefore 
the target standard of protection the EA aim to provide. It is also used as an indicator of 
performance giving an indication of the actual flood risk at a given site. The SoS was developed 
"as a management tool providing a means for the definition and monitoring of flood defence SoS 
on a consistent and objective basis". The system provides an estimate of the appropriate level of 
protection but does not endeavour to optimise the level of defence. 
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The overview of the FDMM in Figure C. 1 shows that there are two main streams of data 
input and 
three main decision outcomes. The principal items of information input into the system are as 
follows: 
(1) A condition characterisation number which summarises the inspection information on the 
state of the existing asset, guidelines for which are laid out in the Condition Assessment 
Manual. 
(2) Detailed surveys are required in order to evaluate the assets in the flood risk area i. e. the 
potential consequences of flooding. 
(3) Data about previous floods and predictive models of flooding are gathered (although this 
can often be limited) so that estimations can be made of the likelihood of flooding. 
(4) Cost estimates are required to compare alternative implementation and scheme options. 
The decision outcomes are either. 
(1) `Do nothing' 
(2) Improve present SoS (capital scheme) 
(3) Perform structural repairs (periodic maintenance) 
(4) Cleaning, mowing etc. (routine maintenance) 
Routine maintenance is prioritised on the basis of the service provided (using the SoS number as a 
prioritisation indicator) and periodic maintenance is provided using the condition characterisation 
(asset management) approach. Capital projects, if appraised using the FDMM consider economic, 
environmental and social factors as well as the SoS and integrity of any defences. 
C. 1.1. Asset monitoring 
The asset management process involves regular surveying and monitoring of flood defences. In 
line with DEFRA's high level targets (DEFRA, 1999) a fixed inspection frequency is being phased 
out in favour of a risk based approach. A condition assessment of the flood defence on a scale of 1 
to 5 and a residual life output are the main outputs of asset monitoring. The condition 
characterisation methodology is described in more detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis. Any asset 
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C. 1.2. Calculating the Standard of Service 
The SoS is a measure of expected annual damage expressed in terms of house equivalence which is 
defined as "average financial cost of damage caused to an average house when flooded". For 
example, a house will have an HE of 1.0, whereas an office has an HE of 0.033/m2. The value of 
one House Equivalent is updated annually. The three steps to calculating the SoS are: 
(1) Estimating the expected extent of flooding from historic and predictive modelling data. 
(2) Estimating the damage due to flooding and inadequate drainage (measured in House 
Equivalents per km along the reach per year) from surveys of the assets in the flood risk 
area., and, 
(3) Combining the estimates of probability and consequence of flooding to generate an expected 
annual damage. This is then compared with a target standard, derived from judgements of 
the appropriations of existing standards on a national basis. 
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Flood extent assessment 
Benefits from a flood defence scheme are calculated from the potential damages in the area being 
considered for protection. This area is defined in the FDMM as the greater of the "maximum 
known flooding extent' 'or "the area protected by an existing flood defence scheme" and is referred 
to as the flood risk area. The flood extent is estimated using all available evidence, including maps, 
flood alleviation reports (giving location of schemes, defended areas and return periods of 
protection), incident reports, modelling studies and other surveys where appropriate. 
The values of all farmland, residential and non-residential property within the floodplain are 
aggregated and averaged over the lengtll of the river reach to give a value of HE/km which is used 
to classify the flood risk area into land usage bands used to set an indicative standard of protection. 
Land use bands are defined in Table CA. 
Table C. IAssigning a land use band based on potential damages 
Land use Range of HE/km (flood and Comment 
band drainage total) for one river bank 
A >=50 Large urban areas 
B =25 - <50 
Less extensive urban areas, high grade 
agricultural land 
C =5 - <25 
Large areas of high grade land, some 
properties at risk. 
D =1.25 - <5 Mixed agricultural land 
E >0 - <1.25 Low grade agricultural land 
X 0 
No known risk of flooding, no perceived 
drainage benefit 
Note: There are two more bands Xld and Xest that represent watercourses which are perceived to act purely as a land drainage channel 
or are within an estuary and HE/km is defined as 0 for each 
Calculating the SoSflood score 
The flood score is an evaluation of the expected annual damage per kilometre from flooding, the 
drainage score is the damage resulting from inadequate drainage on farmland. Techniques using 
historical and predictive methods are used to calculate a score in terms of HE/km per year. 
The historical technique averages the potential damages that would result from the previous floods 
where they to occur at the time of analysis. The predictive technique estimates damages using 
predicted flood extents for a range of return periods to give an expected average annual damage 
(AAD) for a reach. The average of the two flood scores should be used except when poor data 
limits the reliability of one of the outputs. 
Calculating the SoS drainage score 
,. 
ý. 
As with the flood score, an AAD in terms of HE/km per year is calculated using both an historical 
and predictive technique. The historical technique relies on local knowledge and visual indicators 
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to highlight where inadequate drainage has caused a reduction in crop production. The predictive 
technique identifies land with "poor" drainage by comparing the required freeboard and with the 
freeboard at times of dominant water level which is obtained from flow readings. Both the 
historical and predictive scores are averaged except in the case of a large discrepancy when further 
investigation should be undertaken. 
SoS: Actual Standard of Service 
The actual SoS is the sum of the flood score and the drainage score. This gives the total expected 
economic damages over the course of one year along one kilometre of a reach in terms HE/km per 
year. 
SoS: Target Standard of Service 
The target standard of service is the SoS that the EA has deemed to be an acceptable annual 
damage and is derived from the land use band. Typically this standard is between 0.5-1.0 HE/km 
per year. An actual SoS that is greater than I. OHE/km per year implies the SoS is below target, 
requiring maintenance to be increased or a capital project to be undertaken. 
C. 1.3. Justification of Expenditure 
Comparison of the actual and target SoS identifies reaches that may benefit from increased 
investment. Investments need to be justified and the FDMM describes four different economic 
justification approaches, however, only one is supported by the FDMS. Within the justification 
and appraisal methodology no use is made of the SoS values or the condition characterisation. The 
main input is the benefit assessment from the earlier surveys. 
The supported method justifies investment using a benefit cost ratio (BCR). Work with a BCR>1 
can be justified, obviously a higher value represents a more economically beneficial project. The 
use of the BCR is to allow an economic comparison between options, however the FDMM 
recommends that other benefits should be considered even if they can not be quantified.. 
Two of the methods involve calculating the estimated damage for a given return period and using 
this as a benefit value. The first is based simply on land values and uses a normalised damage 
value curve - this method is recommended only for minor projects or those with little data. The 
other method calculates the benefits from increased channel capacity. 
The fourth method is similar to the old MAFF project appraisal guidance (MAFF, 1993), it is more 
rigorous and used only for larger projects. This method bases damage estimation on flood depth as 
well as flood duration. Damages to property, agriculture, economic losses resulting from 
disruption to traffic and the cost of emergency relief are all calculated. 
considerations may also be considered. 
Environmental and social 
V 
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C. 1.4. Prioritisation of Expenditure 
Limited funding requires a prioritisation method, this varies according to the type of project being 
undertaken. 
Emergency response and system operation 
Costs incurred for operating the flood defence system and responding to emergencies are given 
maximum priority and funds are made available as required. 
Periodic maintenance 
Periodic maintenance consists of structural repairs, equipment repairs, painting, embankment 
repairs and vermin control. This is prioritised using the condition grade from the Condition 
Assessment Manual. Assets with structural elements classified as condition 5 ("very poor") should 
be acted upon immediately. 
Routine maintenance 
Routine maintenance involves grass cutting, weed clearing, dredging and rubbish clearing to 
maintain the defence's level of performance. Prioritisation compares the actual SoS value and the 
land use band. Although there is no formal requirement or suggested methodology, the decision 
maker is advised to consider environmental, seasonal and agricultural impacts, as well as systems 
effects and work scheduling difficulties. 
Capital projects 
Prioritisation of capital projects is a little more demanding. The FDMM does provide a 
methodology for prioritising capital projects, but frequently the DEFRA guidance (DEFRA, 2000a, 
2000b and 2000c and 2000a, 2000b) are used, partly because this is a necessary condition to obtain 
a DEFRA grant for the scheme, but also as these methods are more thorough and tested. 
The approach involves using a number of criteria to give a combined priority rating. Four factors 
are considered: economic, social, urgency and purpose (ESUP). Other influencing factors that 
should be evaluated but not used in the original decision-making formula are environmental 
benefits, heritage benefits and potential implementation problems. Prioritisation procedures can be 
overridden if: 
" there are legal requirements(such as Health & Safety), 
" the works so minor (<£5000) analysis is not worthwhile, or, 
the works are essential because other work (eg. maintenance or another capital project) is 
prevented, resulting in increased flood risk, unless these are carried out. 
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The economic analysis ranks the discounted BCR of the scheme into six bands (eg. BCR>5 means 
very worthwhile economically so scores six out of six, BCR<0.5 means there must be a reason 
other than economics to justify the scheme as it receives no score). 
The Social rating counts the number of houses that would benefit from the flood protection. The 
more houses that benefit from flood protection the higher the social rating (for example if more 
than 1000 houses were to be protected the social rating would score the maximum six points). 
The urgency rating is calculated by using one of two methods. If the project involves asset renewal 
or replacement then the highest score from both methods outlined below should be used, if this is 
not the case then only the first method should be used. 
Method 1 is based upon the difference between the pre- and post- project Standard of Protection 
(SoP). The greater the difference between the two standards, the higher the urgency score (up to a 
maximum of 6). 
Method 2 uses the residual asset life which is based upon subjective engineering assessment and 
knowledge of its history. A lower residual life receives a higher urgency score. A residual life 
assessment is often based on a correlation with the condition characterisation. 
The purpose rating gives extra points if the area to be defended includes existing `customers' (a 
customer is a property or landholder who has assets within the flood risk area), or if the defence 
protects urban land, or if its a coastal defence. This therefore represents a policy weighting. 
These factors are combined and weighted; these weightings are set at a national level. 
Combined ESUP rating = [(W1 x d1)4 + (W2 x d2)4 + (W3 x d3)4 + (W4 x d4)4]° 25 (C. 1) 
where d= {1-(Actual Ranking/Maximum ranking)} and W is the weighting. 
This ESUP rating is then placed into the following formula to from a UTIL rating in order to 
compare project priorities in the long term: 
UTIL = 392 - (1000 x Combined ESUP rating) (C. 2) 
A higher UTIL rating implies ahigher project priority. 
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Flood warning 
Flood warning usually receives a higher priority than maintenance and capital projects because of 
importance in minimising loss of life and also mitigating economic damages. If financial 
justification of flood warning is performed using the FDMM methodology, then it is done on the 
basis that for the first 4 hours flood warning, there is a 10% reduction in damage per hour advance 
flood notice. More detailed studies of the benefits of flood warning have been undertaken by the 
Middlesex University Flood Hazard Research Centre (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 1977 and 
Middlesex University, 2002). 
C. 2. SHORELINE MANAGEMENT PLANS 
Shoreline management plans (SMPs) (DEFRA, 2001 c) provide guidance on taking a strategic 
approach to coastal defence over a 50 year period. The guidance does not specify technical 
methods, suggesting the engineer makes use of the most suitable and up to date analysis 
techniques. 
SMPs are prepared by coastal groups which include the EA and Maritime Local Authorities. SMPs 
set out a strategy for sustainable coastal defence within coastal sediment cells, taking account of 
natural coastal processes and human and other environmental influences and needs. A SMP sets 
objectives for the future management of the shoreline based on predictions of the likely future 
evolution of the coast and knowledge of coastal processes within the cell. The methodology 
involves assessment of a range of strategic coastal defence options and identification of a preferred 
approach for sections of coast within the plan area. The preferred option is selected after 
consideration of the risk to people and the developed, historic and natural environment. The 
generic decisions are: 
" do nothing, 
" hold the existing defence line by maintaining or changing the standard of protection, 
advance the existing defence , 
line, or, 
" retreat the existing defence line (managed retreat or realignment). 
The plan should consider all stakeholders of the coastal zone, and much of the planning process 
involves consultation with the general public. The plan should comment on the key shoreline 
issues showing how the shoreline is expected to evolve. The preferred planning options should be 
fully justified using economic (DEFRA, 2000a) and environmental appraisal (DEFRA, 2000c) 
guidance. An action plan of their implementation should be prepared (including a monitoring 
programme). The plan should identify the risks and uncertainties and in particular the implications 
of climate change and sea level rise on long term management. 
The choice of a preferred option is used to inform future planning decisions relating to the coastal 
flood plain. Development plan policies, flood and coastal defence strategy plans and decisions 
therefore all need to take account of SMPs. Where the preferred option is either non-intervention or 
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retreat, planning policies should strongly discourage further development in low-lying areas behind 
present shorelines. Additional development in such areas could unnecessarily commit flood 
defence authorities to expensive and unsustainable policies, which may in turn adversely affect 
biodiversity or other areas of the coast. 
C. 3. PROJECT APPRAISAL GUIDANCE SERIES 
Whilst smaller schemes and day to day operations and maintenance are regulated using procedures 
laid out in the FDMM, larger projects are frequently regulated by DEFRA. To qualify for grant aid 
from DEFRA, ranging from 15% to 85% of the total project costs (Venables, 1998), the scheme 
must be appraised according to DEFRA's Flood and Coastal Defence Project Appraisal Guidance 
(FCDPAG) which supersede the previous guidance (MAFF, 1993) which was much less detailed 
and focused predominantly on economic appraisal. There are six documents in the series, 
FCDPAGI (DEFRA, 2001a) provides guidance on combining the different aspects covered in 
volumes 2-6 and recommends how to use the document series and how technical issues, climate 
change and sustainability may be incorporated into the project appraisal process. In recognition of 
the speed of advancement of technical appraisal methods, as with SMPs, the guidance notes focus 
on the approach that should be taken rather than explicitly defining technical standards and 
methods. 
C3.1. The Strategic Approach 
FCDPAG2 (DEFRA, 2001b) sets out a framework for strategic planning for areas at risk of 
flooding or erosion. Until relatively recently flood defence works have been appraised and 
implemented on an individual basis, frequently resulting in undesirable or unforeseen effects in 
other areas of the coastal cell or river catchment. As well as reducing the risk of adverse effects, 
taking a strategic approach offers the opportunity to make savings by more efficient allocation of 
resources. Strategy plans should identify appropriate solutions to meet the aims and objectives of 
SMPs and CFMPs. 
Identifying problems and key issues 
The first step in making a strategy plan is to identify the key issues, these may have already been 
identified in larger-scale plans such as SMPs. The strategy plan needs to consider an area that 
ensures all major process and impacts of the strategy are captured within the area considered. As 
with SMPs the strategy plan should consider change over a 50 year period. 
Developing the strategy 
Strategic objectives are developed by consultation with all stakeholders. Options that meet these 
objectives are identified and investigated. The `do nothing' option is always analysed and 
considered as a baseline for comparison. -, The options are appraised on the basis of environmental 
;., (FCDPAG3), economic (FCDPAG5) and technical aspects. Issues of risk and uncertainty are 
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discussed in FCDPAG4 (DEFRA, 2000b) which also describes methods to aid decision-making 
and option selection. The final strategy plan provides an outline over a 50 year period of how to 
meet river and coastal defence objectives for the area, providing a guide for how these objectives 




FCDPAG3 (DEFRA, 2000a) identifies methods for valuing costs and impacts in monetary terms 
and also sets out a recommended decision process, based on economic values. Guidance is 
provided as to how to make a benefit-cost analysis for flood defence projects. The economic 
appraisal guidance is designed to facilitate integration into a risk framework. 
Evaluating the benefits 
The first stage in the evaluation of the economic gains from a scheme is to identify the potential 
losses within the system boundaries. These are then used to assess the potential benefits from: 
" flood alleviation, 
" coastal protection, 
" the effects of climate change, 
" pumped drainage, and, 
" flood warning systems. 
Guidance is provided for assessing actual economic values. 
There are several sources of data suggested for assessing economic damages. These include data 
from actual events, assessments from loss adjustors, adjusted council tax bands and standard data 
sets such as FLAIR (Middlesex University, 1990) and the Red Manual (Parker et aL, 1987) which 
will soon-be superseded by the Multi-Coloured Manual (Middlesex University, 2002). Special 
consideration is given to temporary or semi-permanent structures and infrastructure value 
(including road, rail, pipes and cables). Future development is not to be considered when assessing 
potential losses. Agricultural losses are considered in terms of changes in net agricultural product, 
with special considerations necessary for land subject to quota agreement. 
Indirect losses such as a decrease in trade, or disruption of road and rail networks are based on 
standard datasets in The Red Manual (Parker et a!., 1987) and COBA (DOT, 2001). Intangible 
losses, such as increased stress or damage to health should be considered if these impacts are 
thought to be unusually high: Environmental appraisal guidance is provided in FCDPAGS 
(DEFRA, 2000c). 
In the UK, flood damages are dominated by the depth of water and the volume of sediment, debris 
and sewage. Coastal flooding causes more damage than fluvial flooding due to the high salinity 
content of the water. 
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The benefits from flood alleviation schemes are calculated as the difference between the expected 
value of damage from a scheme and the expected damages from the `do nothing' option. This is 
discounted over the life of the scheme to give a present value of the benefits. It may be necessary 
to estimate breach probabilities, these are then adjusted over the life of the scheme to reflect 
maintenance intervention and deterioration. FCDPAG4 provides a little guidance on how to 
estimate and use these failure probabilities, but in England and Wales this is dominated by 
judgement. If losses (for example floodplain development) or loadings (for example as a result of 
climate change) are expected to change these may also be adjusted over the appropriate time in the 
scheme's life. 
The benefits from coastal erosion schemes are the difference in losses between the option and the 
`do nothing' scenario. A probabilistic approach to erosion is used, these probabilities are estimated 
based on judgement and where available modelling and past behaviour of the cliffs. 
Climate change is accounted for by assuming a 4.5mm/year rise in sea levels for the next 50 years, 
this should be added to a regional rate to account for land movements. 
New pumped drainage schemes are unlikely (DEFRA, 2000a), but old pumps may require 
replacement. The dominant factor is the failure probability of the pump, however, newer pumps 
may also bring benefits such as reduced maintenance or running costs. Again, these failure 
probabilities are estimated by experts. 
The benefits from flood warning are calculated by assessing the decrease in losses resulting from 
the improved warning system. A key benefit of flood warning is the reduction in loss of life. 
The decision-making process 
The main tool used to justify schemes is the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) using the Net Present Value 
over the scheme's life. The preferred choice is the highest BCR within the indicative Standard of 
Protection (SoP) needed from the defence, as specified by DEFRA guidelines. However, other 
factors will influence this decision, such as environmental considerations, uncertainty regarding the 
economic outcomes, planning constraints and the lack of funds. The BCR may be predicted over a 
long time period to assess the economic sustainability of the option. Probabilistic discounting is 
used to represent the loss in performance of an asset over time (by increasing its failure probability) 
and provide decision-makers with a value of expected economic damage over the life of the 
scheme. 
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C3.3. Approaches to Risk 
FCDPAG4 (DEFRA, 2000b) encourages the proper consideration of risk issues in the derivation of 
appropriate economic values and decision making, as set out in FCDPAG3. The depth of analysis 
used for a risk assessment should reflect the scale and impacts of the project. Guidance is given for 
a number of qualitative and quantitative approaches to risk assessment and identifying and 
handling the uncertainty associated with flood defence management. Qualitative and quantitative 
methods to estimating failure probabilities are introduced and methods of estimating system failure 
probability (for example using fault trees) are described. The concepts of risk are central to this 
thesis and so a more thorough overview of risk assessment methods, including methods discussed 
in the DEFRA guidance has been given in Chapter 2. Methods used to estimate defence failure 
probabilities are tackled in Chapter 3. 
C. 3.4. Environmental Appraisal 
Adoption of the strategic approach proposed by FCDPAG2 (DEFRA, 2001b) requires appraisal of 
non-economic indicators. FCDPAG5 (DEFRA, 2000c) provides guidance on consideration of 
environmental issues in flood and coastal defence decision-making. 
Guidance 
The Environment Act of 1995 specifies that the EA and IDBs must contribute to the conservation 
of nature and heritage when carrying out flood defence duties. MAFF (1996) published guidance 
on selecting a preferred environmental option which should be used to identify the flood defence 
scheme options most suitable for meeting environmental objectives. Suitable options are then 
taken forward for a detailed benefit-cost analysis. 
Initially, an appraisal of environmental effects is made at a strategic level to enable combined 
scheme effects to be considered. An individual environmental appraisal is then required for all 
flood defence schemes, this frequently, takes the form of an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) (DETR, 1999). Undertaking of the environmental appraisal requires collecting data and 
analysing the likely impact on environmental factors relevant to flood and coastal defence projects, 
the most important of which are flora, fauna, local population, cultural heritage, property, 
landscape and geological/geomorphological features. Consideration of other factors such as 
access, amenity and economics should also be made. Since the environmental impacts are likely to 
have a wider influence than the local area, it is important to consider effects to a broader area. 
It is government policy to encourage sustainable projects, and flood defence works should take into 
account the interrelationships between neighbouring defences and other processes within a river 
catchment or coastal cell. A long term approach, complimenting that of the SMPs and strategy 
plans should be taken. A key environmental indicator is biodiversity, and net gains or losses in 
biodiversity should be measured when implementing flood defence works. 
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Environmental evaluation 
Not all environmental impacts can be measured in monetary terms and rigorous evaluation can be 
time consuming. The degree of implementation of such methods should reflect the scale of the 
project and the significance of the impacts. There are several methods for evaluating costs, the 
recommended method is a `replacement' cost which reflects the cost of replacing or relocating a 
feature. This can be used as an economic environmental indicator, however other methods such as 
calculating an `existence' value that reflects the perceived value to present and future generations 
may be more appropriate. Non-monetary indicators of environmental value include monitoring of 
populations or species. 
A complete environmental evaluation will consider losses or gains (economic or otherwise) 
resulting from an analysis of nature conservation assets (eg. SSSIs and RAMSAR sites), changes in 
water levels (this links in directly with the WLMPs), losses in archaeological and heritage sites and 
impacts on the landscape. Clearly there is a lot of uncertainty with predicting environmental 
impacts and a lot of judgement is required in choosing appropriate assessment methods and 
evaluating impacts. 
Habitat replacement costing 
Habitat replacement costs may be required as a proxy for the value of lost habitats as part of an 
environmental evaluation, and, where habitat replacement is necessary to protect an important site 
that cannot be protected directly. The principal three costs of habitat replacement are land 
acquisition, land preparation and monitoring (pre and post project). These costs need to be 
discounted as in FCDPAG3. 
C. 3.5. Post Project Evaluation 
FCDPAG6 provides guidance on undertaking post project evaluation. The purpose of this part of 
the guidance series is to review the work undertaken, report on the level of success and feedback 
appropriate lessons for future projects. The guidance will focus on using the concept of 
performance to measure success. The guidance will recommend that indicators of performance are 
measured and placed within a risk-based framework. The complete process will involve auditing 
the success of schemes, in terms of achieving economic aims and whether process objectives have 
been satisfied. Feedback of information into ongoing management of the scheme and external 
professional practice ensures that lessons learned can be used to improve best practice in 
engineering and management. 
C. 3.6. DEFRA Grant Aid and prioritising works 
As it is unlikely that there will ever be sufficient funding for all flood defence works, a 
prioritisation score is calculated in order to target the most suitable schemes. The score is 
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calculated based on a consideration of economics, social and environmental indicators. There is a 
maximum of 20 points for economic benefits, compared to a maximum of 12 points available for 
both environmental and social benefits. The additional weighting for economics ensures that 
schemes protecting industry, commerce and major infrastructure will gain appropriate priority 
when compared to housing. 
The economics score is calculated using the BCR. This is the present value benefits divided by the 
present value costs as calculated using FCDPAG3 (DEFRA, 2000a). The score is calculated using 
Table C. 2. 
Table C. 2 Derivation of the economics score for DEFRA grant aid prioritisation 
BCR Score 
<1 0 
1 to 10.5 1 to 20 (linear scale) 
> 10.5 20 
The social score is based on the. number of people that will benefit from the scheme, a hazard score 
and a measure of social deprivation. The score for the number of people is calculated using 
Equation C. 3, with a maximum score of 8 being possible. 
75 x no. of residential properties / cost of scheme (£k) (C. 3) 
Where the purpose of the scheme is to alleviate flooding, a hazard score of I is given if water levels 
would be expected to rise so fast that practical warning times would be less than two hours. A 
score of 2 is given if there is little opportunity to give an effective warning, or flood depths 
exceeding two metres or high flows are likely to be experienced. Other schemes receive a score of 
0. 
The social deprivation measure is based on the Index of Local Deprivation (ILD) (DTLR, 2001). 
This index ranks 8414 administrative wards in England and Wales using 33 indicators of six 
`domains of deprivation'. These domains are: low income, employment deprivation, poor health 
and disability, poor education and training, poor housing, and poor geographical access to services. 
The 300 most deprived wards receive a score of 2, the next 1200 receive a score of 1. The least 
deprived 300 wards receive a score of -2, the next 1200 least deprived wards receive a score of -1. 
The remaining wards receive a score of 0. 
The environment score is based on the area and importance of the habitat within the area affected. 
The scores are calculated by summing the following three equations. 
25 x area (ha) SSSI protected / cost of scheme (£k) x 1.5 (C. 4) 
25 x area (ha) other designated sites protected / cost of scheme (£k) x 1.0 (C. 5) 
25 x net gain (ha) of habitat that achieves BAP targets / cost of scheme (£k) x 2.0 (C. 6) 
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Heritage sites also contribute towards the environment score, a Grade 1 or 2* or scheduled 
monument receives a score of 2 and a Grade 2 monument receives a score of 1 providing a total 
score of 12 is not exceeded. 
The sum of the economic, social and environmental scores is calculated and used to prioritise 
works. Those with a higher overall score are more likely to receive funding (although schemes 
with otherwise low scores can still receive funding to meet legal requirements). 
C. 4. OTHER GUIDANCE, CODES AND ORGANISATIONS 
Many codes, manuals and organisation have relevance within the field of coastal and river 
engineering. 
C. 4.1. Guidance documents impacting flood and coastal defence management 
Since about 1990, there have been a number of initiatives in regard to non-statutory plans that deal 
in particular with coastal issues. Many of these contain policies and proposals that have land-use 
planning implications, some directly involve flood defence managers, whilst others may impact 
only indirectly. 
The Planning Policy Guidance Note 25 (PPG25) (ODPM, 2001) is aimed at providing guidance to 
local planning authorities in order that they use their existing powers to guide, guide, regulate and 
control development in accordance with government guidelines. PPG25 aims to raise awareness to 
local authorities about the issues involved with development in flood risk areas and ensure that as 
well as local issues, catchment or coastal cell scale issues are also addressed. Estuary management 
plans (EMP) focus on ensuring a sustainable use of estuaries and are prepared by all major _ 
stakeholders. Harbour management plans (HMP) are similarly produced for harbours. Coastal 
habitat management plans (CHaMP) aim to develop sustainable coastal defence strategies in areas 
of important wildlife. Local Environment Agency Plans (LEAP) are produced by the Environment 
Agency on a catchment basis to develop a more holistic long term approach to achieving all its 
aims with respect to flood defence and other issues such as water quality, fisheries and recreation. 
Water Level Management Plans (WLMP) identify the water level requirements for a range of,, 
activities such as flood defence, agriculture and conservation. River basin management plans are 
required by the EU Water Framework directive (EU, 2000) which sets out the objectives of the 
water bodies in the river basin and how they will be achieved. Other plans that may have an impact 
on flood defence management are Community strategies, Heritage Coast Management Plans, 
Biodiversity Action Plans (BAP), Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plans (ICZM). 
C. 4.2. British Standards 
There are many codes of practice that are relevant to coastal and river engineers, however use of 
n, °, > these codes is not mandatory, neither does their use result in immunity against prosecution and they 
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are usually used more as guidance rather than as a legal requirement (Fowler and Allsop, 2000). 
The most useful codes for coastal engineers are: 
" BS6349 - Code of Practice for Maritime Structures 
" BS8002 - Code of practice for earth retaining structures 
" BS812, BS5328 and BS8110 - Codes of practice for use and specification of concrete 
" BS1377, BS5930, BS6031 - Codes of Practice for geotechnical testing and earthworks 
" BS6906 - Methods for testing geotextiles 
" BS8004 - Code of Practice for foundations 
" BS5493 - Code of Practice for protecting structures against corrosion 
" BS5268 - Structural use of timber 
There are also European and International standards, these are also not mandatory and provide no 
legal immunity. 
C. 4.3. Industrial and Research Organisations 
Organisations such as CIRIA (The UK Construction and Industry Research and Information 
Association) or CUR (The Dutch Centre for Civil Engineering Research and Codes) regularly 
publish manuals and texts that provide state of the art information on data collection, design, 
planning and construction. Important references for flood defence managers include Protection of 
River and Canal Banks (Hemphill and Bramley, 1989), The Manual on the use of Rock in Coastal 
and Shoreline Engineering (CIRIA/CUR 1991), Seawall Design (Thomas and Hall, 1992) and The 
Beach Management Manual (CIRIA, 1996). The Institution of Civil Engineers, who represent 
engineers and the engineering industry in the UK, recognises the important role of engineers in 
flood defence management, regularly hosts related conferences and has recently published a report 
on best practice in river management (ICE, 2001). 
C. 5. ONGOING AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (NFCDD) has recently superseded the FDMS 
as the data storage facility for the EA. The next phases of the development of the NFCDD will see 
an increase in the amount and quality of information available for use in flood defence 
management (Linford et al., 2002). 
Catchment flood management plans (CFMP) will provide a vehicle for considering holistic 
approaches to flood management at a catchment scale. The interim guidance follows an approach 
similar to that used to develop SMPs (HR Wallingford et al., 2001 and Halcrow, 2001). 




development of CFMPs by automating and supporting parts of the process.. In particular, using 
hydraulic modelling to identify economic and social risks and enable options testing. 
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The EA is currently designing a Performance-based Asset Management System (PAMS) in 
conjunction with the sixth instalment of the Flood and Coastal Defence Project Appraisal Guidance 
series (FCDPAG6). Both of these will be heavily influenced by the performance-based 
methodology introduced by the CMAM project. 
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Appendix D 
Review of flood defence failure 
D. 1. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix provides a review of flood defence failure. The flood defences and erosion control 
structures that are considered are: 
" Breakwaters 
" Seawalls 
" Dykes, levees and embankments 
" Retaining structures 
" Groynes 
" Soft defences (beach and river management) 
Control structures such as weirs, culverts and other mechanical assets are not reviewed. For each 
structure a summary of failure modes, limit state functions and design considerations is given. 
Because of the enormous number of physical processes and uncertainties there is often more than 
one limit state formula for each failure mechanism. Not all can be listed here, but the more 
commonly used limit state functions have been identified. This review is designed to compliment 
the author's study of flood defence failure mechanisms, it is in no way a design guide, nor does it 
reveal much of the detail behind important aspects such as estimating boundary conditions (eg. 
statistical estimation of joint wave and water level probabilities). For a more detailed information 
on coastal and river flood defence design the reader is referred to the references in this review and 
the main thesis. 
D. 2. BREAKWATERS 
D. 2.1. Brief summary 
Breakwaters are often used to provide calm waters for a port as well as provide protection for a 
stretch of coastline. Shoreline breakwaters are constructed to protect the coast from erosion or 
alleviate flooding by the sea (or a combination of the two). This protection is provided either 
directly by providing a physical barrier or by protecting or encouraging the generation of a beach. 
Breakwaters take on many different forms and can be either shore-connected or detached. This is 
normally dependent on the functional requirements of the breakwater; a breakwater serving to 
protect land from erosion will often be detached (except when there are strong longshore currents). 
Port and harbour breakwaters have been comprehensively studied but this work is also of great 
value in the context of shoreline breakwaters, dykes and revetments. 
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D. 2.2. Potential failure mechanisms of sloping face structures 
The main failure modes of sloping face breakwaters are shown in Figure D. 1 and 
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Figure D. 1 Failure mechanisms of a sloping face structure (from CIRIA AND CUR, 1991 except 
venting and filter migration which are derived from Pilarczyk & Zeidler, 1996 and wave breaking 
force and uplift pressure which are derived from McConnell, 1998) 
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Overflow 
The height of the breakwater is exceeded by the water level, this can result in inundation behind the 
defence and also erosion or damage of the crest. 
Wave overtopping 
The height of the breakwater is exceeded by the oncoming waves, the volume of water that 
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Slip circle (inner slope) 
This may be caused by a high phreatic level in the structure, this can occur as a result of a long 
period of high water. 
Slip circle (outer slope) 
This may be caused by a period of low water following a period of high water as the body of the 
structure may become saturated and collapse or slide. 
Piping 
An hydraulic gradient causes internal channels to form within the structure causing material to be 
transported along them and out of the structure. 
Sliding 
If the weight of the structure and its internal friction and cohesion are not enough to resist 
horizontal loadings (such as earthquakes or wave shock loadings) or changes in pore water pressure 
(caused by wave height and period) the structure or parts of it may start to slide. 
Settlement and Tilting 
The weight causes the subsoil to be compacted. As a consequence the crest level can be lowered 
(meaning there is an increased risk of overtopping). Differential settlements can result in tilting of 
the structure and uneven surfaces allowing rocks to be washed away more easily. 
Micro instability 
Micro instability of the structure's inner slope may occur because of seepage and a high phreatic 
plane. 
Liquefaction 
This occurs when pore pressures are so high that inter-granular contact is lost, meaning that the 
medium loses its shear strength. This occurs under cyclic loading from waves or earthquakes., 
Drifting ice or ship collision 
This can cause serious movement of the armour layer, or if large enough and impact is with 
sufficient force, the breakwater can be breached completely. 
Erosion (outer slope) 
This may be caused by wave attack (and also extreme ice and ship'loads).. 
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Erosion (foreshore) 
Waves and currents cause water movements on the seabed causing scour in front of the structure 
either at the toe or possibly at the berm. 
Breaking wave force 
This is most severe when the breaking waves are plunging, this can lead to armour movement or 
damage. 
Venting 
Wave induced water and pressure pushes infill material out (USACE, 2002). 
Uplift pressure 
Uplift pressures can be caused by an increase in phreatic level within the structure, this can be 
caused by either tidal or wave cycles. This difference in head may cause armour units or the filter 
layer to be moved. 
Migration of sublayers or filters 
Like piping, this is caused by hydraulic gradients created by waves or other water movements. 
This internal flow may result in the movement of fines from the inner layers to the outer layers or 
maybe even complete loss of material altogether resulting in settlement and loss of filter efficiency. 
Also if the filter gets blocked by migrating particles, it will become less efficient and more prone to 
other forms of failure. 
D. 23. General design 
Overview. 
As with most other flood defence projects, 'there is a stage of data collection and analysis to obtain 
the design conditions. These are entered into the design formulae to provide dimensions for the 
breakwater and its components. Typical components and their respective functions of a breakwater 
are given in Table D. 1. 
Table D. 1 Functions of breakwater components (CIRIA and CUR. 1991) 
Element Functions 
Toe protection Prevent erosion, increase geotechnical stability, stability of armour 
Core Attenuate wave energy, support armour, geotechnical stability 
Berm Attenuate wave energy, increase geotechnical and armour stability 
Underlayer Filtration, erosion protection of core, in-plane drainage, reduction of internal hydraulic gradients 
Armour layer Prevent erosion of armour layer by waves 
Crest and crown Attenuation of wave overtopping, access for maintenance and services 
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The design should be such that the components satisfy the required primary and secondary 
functions. Much of the general design is performed using `rules of thumb' based around general 
experience, it is recommended to test all designs in a hydraulic physical model (CIRIA and CUR, 
1991). Some of the more quantitative elements of the design are listed below. 
Armour layer 
The armour for breakwaters is designed using the Hudson formula or the Van der Meer formula 
which are also listed in Section D. 5, the Hudson formula is used to specify the weight of rock 
required: 
gp, H 3 W__ 
KD (s -1)3 cot a 
(D. 1) 
where s=p, lp and KD is chosen by the designer and influenced by many factors such as the 
whether the wave will break or not and the shape of the armour units. 
The other possible method of armour size determination is that of Van Der Meer (1998) who 
derived formulae for armour layers of thickness t=2*D50 the formulae relate incident wave 
conditions, and the level of damage that may be allowed, to the dimensionless stability number, 
H, /dD5o for plunging waves: 
H3 / ODnso = 6.2Po. ia (Sd / 
J)o. z m .s 
and surging waves: 
Hs / ADRso =1.0P-o. is (Sd l/ )o. z cot aim 
(D. 2) 
(D. 3) 
where P is a notional permeability factor (ranging from 0.1 for impermeable filter layers to 0.6 for 
non existent filter or core), Sd is the damage number which is defined as A, DS 2 where Ae is the 
erosion area, N is the number of waves and t is the Iribarren number which is defined (H/L)ý"5tan(3. 
Filter layer 
The filter design should obey filter laws: 
" D15 filter <5 D85 base Stability or piping criterion 
" D15 niter >5 Dis base Permeability criterion 
" D50 filter < 25 D50 base Uniformity criterion 
Where D represents the n% value of the material's sieve curve. 
Current attack: 
This can often be predicted using the Shields formula (Shields, 1936) for critical shear stress, but 
this is only valid for unidirectional steady flow: 
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Ter (D. 4) 
(P. - PW)8D 
where V,,. is the dimensionless shear parameter (or Shields number), r,, is the critical shear stress at 
which the rocks or particles begin to move, p, is the rock (or particle) density, pS is the density of 
water, D is the grain size. Grain displacement for particles of above 5mm has been shown to occur 
at &C, =0.03 and so this should be used as a conservative estimate in calculations. Many other 
formulae have been developed to aid in the understanding of complex flow. Due to the multitude 
of formulae involved this report will not list them (see. CIRIA and CUR (1991) for more 
information). The key factors involved in combined current and wave attack are: 
(1) Critical shear stress 
(2) Particle size 
(3) Fluid viscosity 
(4) Bed roughness 
(5) Structure slope 
D. 2.4. Specifics for structure type 
The different types of breakwater structure are shown in Figure D. 2. 
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Figure D. 2 The different types of breakwater (CIRIA and CUR, 1991) 
Rubble-mound 
Figure D. 3 shows the principal failure modes of a rubble mound breakwater. This type of 
breakwater may also have a crown wall to allow for easier access or to enable the breakwater to 
perform other actions. 
a 
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(1) Hydraulic damage (5) Overtopping and erosion 
(2j Internal erosion (6) Leeside damage 
(3) Slope failure 
(4) Toe erosion 
core 
Figure D. 3 Principle failure modes of a rubble mound breakwater (CIRIA and CUR, 1991) 
If a crown wall is desired then its stability can be predicted either by modelling or using the 
formulae derived by Bradbury et al. (1988). 
FH =(aH, A _b)*v'6 1La) 
(D. 5) 
where FH gives the horizontal loading, Lp is the peak wavelength, hfis the crown wall height, Ac is 
the armour crest level and a and b are empirical coefficients. The vertical force can be calculated 
as (assuming a triangular distribution of uplift pressure): 
F. - 
(aH/c 
- b)* `p 
BcLp (D. 6) 
where B, is the crown width. Often a more conservative assumption of rectangular distribution is 
assumed which results in an uplift force of twice that given by the above equation being calculated. 
Caisson on rock foundation 
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Figure D. 4 Failure modes of a vertical breakwater on top of a rock foundation (CIRIA and CUR, 
1991) 
Horizontally composite rock breakwater 
As shown in Figure D. 5 the main difference between caisson breakwaters and horizontally 
composite breakwaters is the extra failure mode caused by the hydraulic instability of the mound. 
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This mound in front of the breakwater must break and absorb the wave energy effectively. The 
mound is usually concrete armour units that are highly porous. The hydraulic stability of this 
mound is similar to that of the primary layer of a conventional breakwater but with different 
coefficients that need to be obtained from model testing. 
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Figure D. 5 Failure modes of a horizontally composite breakwater (CIRIA and CUR, 1991) 
Vertically composite rock breakwater 
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This type of breakwater is better deployed in deeper waters. Waves are forces to break on the 
mound which can lead to high breaking forces on the caisson. It is therefore important to keep the 
mound low. The failure mechanisms are the same as for the caisson on the rock foundation, but the 
design of the berm may be different. 
Berm breakwater 
Berm breakwaters are designed to be dynamically stable, their slope can be either artificially 
engineered or allowed to be developed by hydrodynamic forces. Prediction of the optimum berm 
design can be done using a computer model such as BREAKWAT which is based on Van Der 
Meer's modelling tests (Pilarczyk and Zeidler, 1996). , 
Reef breakwater 
These consist of a large volume of rock which can reshape to a dynamically stable profile under 
wave attack as shown in Figure D. 2. The reduced crest height of a structure can be predicted 
according to Van Der Meer (1990) using: 
ems: 
(D. 7) 
where a=-0.028+0.045 C'+0.034(h, '/h)-6.10'9B2 
where A, is the area of structure cross section, C'=Al (he')2, h is the water depth at the toe, B. is the 
bulk number (AID2, so) and Ns is a stability number.. 
Submerged breakwater 
Similar to a rubble-mound breakwater but requires lee-side armour as wave energy is transmitted 
over the breakwater. The dimensions of this armour are determined by the rate of overtopping 
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which can only be assessed by modelling. Other than the lee-side armour the design process is the 
same as for rubble-mounded breakwaters. The stability of a submerged breakwater is described by: 
h` 
= (2.1 + 0.1S)e-0-'arv; (D. 8) 'h 
where S is the damage level (A)D2i50) where A, is the erosion area. 
D3. SEA WALLS 
D3.1. Brief Summary 
A sea wall is defined as a shoreline structure whose primary purpose is either protection against 
coastal erosion, alleviation of flooding or a combination of both. Sea walls are classified based on 
their shape and permeability. Sea walls can be vertical, sloped, or a combination of the two and 
can be either porous or non-porous and be constructed from many types of material. 
D. 3.2. Summary of failure mechanisms 
Sea walls are prone to many causes of damage which can lead to one of the five main forms of 
failure of a sea wall as defined by Thomas and Hall (1992). These are: 
(1) Flow through or under the wall 
(2) Overtopping 
(3) Damage of the wall front or crest 
(4) Geotechnical instability 
(5) Slope instability 
Also stated in Thomas and Hall (1992) is the significant role of toe erosion (induced by low beach 
level) in'the stability of the wall which can be a precursor to all five main methods of failure. 
CIRIA (1986) states that 12.3% of all sea walls surveyed have suffered from significant toe erosion 
which ranks it as the most common form of damage. Particular care should be taken when 
designing the toe so as to allow for future (possibly adverse) beach evolution. 
D. 33. General design 
A prerequisite for determining design criteria is the selection of the overall design standards, i. e. 
the required life of the seawall and the acceptable risk of being overwhelmed by exceptional waves 
and/or tides (Thomas and Hall, 1992). Seawalls are designed with the consideration of cost, 
environmental impact (although often not in the past), structural and hydraulic performance, and 
their ability to fulfil their primary functions. 
The design parameters are chosen based upon the data analysed, the desired design life and the risk 
of exceedance. The wall is designed so that it is stable with respect to the hydraulic and 
geotechnical loadings and the risk of exceeding design conditions is deemed acceptable. 
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D. 3.4. Specifics for structure type 
Sloping porous walls 
These can be treated as porous revetments (such as rip-rap) which are covered in section D. 5. 
Sloping non porous walls 
These can be treated as non-porous revetments (such as concrete slabs) which are covered in 
Section D. 5. 
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Vertical walls 
These should be treated as vertical retaining structures (such as gravity walls or gabions) which are 
covered Section D. 8. The structure should also be designed against wave pressure distributions 
such as Goda's (1974). The most significant influences being wave parameters, water heights and 
structure shape. 
D. 4. GROYNES 
D. 4.1. Brief summary 
Groynes are long, narrow structures normally built perpendicular to the shoreline and sometimes 
have different shaped seaward heads (T, Y or round-head). Groynes are designed to interrupt 
longshore transport and cause a build up of sediment on the updrift side. Groynes can be 
constructed from many materials; including rock, timber, concrete, masonry and steel. 
D. 4.2. Specifics for structure type 
The different types of groyne material, their usage and respective advantages and disadvantages are 
summarised in Table D. 2. Usually, due to loss or movement of structural elements the 
performance of the groyne will deteriorate until a point it can be judged not to be able to fulfil its 
intended role. CIRIA (1996 and 1990) state that there are no fixed formulae or procedures for 
groyne design, the design process is based around experience and experimental results and differs 
for shingle and sand beaches. 
D. 4.3. Failure mechanisms 
A groyne is adjudged to have failed when it can no longer perform its desired function. This will 
predominantly be due to loss or damage of structural elements (such as wooden planks or rocks). 
Although complete loss of a groyne due to local undermining or a combination of wave forces and 
loss of foundation support due to scour is not uncommon (National Rivers Authority and Binnie 
and Partners, 1993). Other potential sources of failure are vandalism and abrasion. Wood groynes 
are also susceptible to biological attack such as fungus and rot. 
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Table D. 2 Groyne type, use, advantages and disadvantages (CIRIA, 1996) 
Type/ Advantages Disadvantages Suggested applications 
Material 
Vertical Possible post-construction Cost and availability of Low to moderate energy shingle 
timber adjustment hardwoods beaches with low net drift 
Environmental restrictions on 
hardwood sources 
Susceptible to physical abrasion 
and biological attack 
Vertical construction does not 
absorb wave or current energy 
Current induced beach scour pits 
along face and around head 
Unstable if large cross-groyne 
differentials in beach elevation 
develop or if large crest heights 
are required 
Difficult to construct below MLW 
Require maintenance 
Rock mound Hydraulic efficiency Availability and transport of Low to high energy sand or 
due to energy suitable rock shingle beaches with low net drift 
absorption Structures may be hazardous to in areas where suitable rock is 
Re-usable material swimmers and other beach users available 
Simple construction Accumulation of debris within Good for terminal structures 
methods structure 
Underwater Bed layer required if substrate is 




No size limit 
Concrete " Hydraulic efficiency Rigorous construction methods Low to high energy sand or 
units due to energy required shingle beaches with low net 
absorption May be hazardous to swimmers drift, in place of rock 
Stable, durable and scramblers Good for terminal structures 
Availability of Accumulation of debris within 
materials structure 
Bed layer required if substrate is 
mobile 
Vertical Availability of No post-construction adjustment Low to moderate energy beaches 
concrete/ materials Expensive and complex with low net drift 
masonry construction particularly below Good for terminal structures 
MLW 
Near vertical construction does 
not absorb wave or current 
energy 
Maintenance required 
Steel sheet Rapid construction Vertical construction Can be used to form foundation 
piles Can be placed below Does not absorb energy and sides of concrete structures, 
low water No post-construction adjustment particularly below MLW 
Suffer from abrasion; resulting 
jagged edges are a safety hazard 
Suffer from corrosion 
Gablons Low cost, rapid Not durable Low energy sand or shingle 
construction Particularly susceptible to beaches with low net drift 
Hydraulically efficient vandalism 
Only suitable for small structures 
Rock-filled Low cost due to Movement of rocks can damage Low to moderate energy sand or 
crib work smaller rock crib-work shingle beaches, with low net 
Hydraulically efficient drift. 
Grouted Low cost Prone to settlement problems Low to moderate energy sand or 
stone or open Susceptible to abrasion shingle beaches, with low net 
stone asphalt drift, on stable substrate 
Rock apron Increase energy Interfaces subject to abrasion due Refurbishment of old vertical 
around absorption of existing to different interactions with groynes on low to high energy 
timber vertical structures waves shingle or sand beaches with low 
net drift 
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D. 4.4. Design of groynes for shingle beaches 
Little in the way of formulae are used to design groyne fields, guidelines have been given 
following research by Coates and Lowe (1993) and Coates (1994). 
Material type 
On shingle beaches, vertical and rock mound structures were found to perform equally up until 
Hs 2m when vertical structures start to produce upper beach erosion. 
Crest level 
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The most effective structures were found to be high rock structures. The crest of groynes should 
be 
set at about lm above the design storm beach profile. This design profile needs to reflect the 
influence of varying water levels and longshore sediment transport. 
Groyne length 
The landward end is taken as the beach head, or the area beyond which erosion is not acceptable. 
Research performed by Coates (1994) suggests that groynes are only effective to the point when 
they intersect the shoreline at a depth of 0.75Hb. 
Groyne spacing 
This should be set so as to avoid the beach head not being exposed to any direct wave action within 
a groyne bay. 
Groyne head extensions 
These can be used to improve groyne efficiency. On shingle beaches scour at these heads is 
usually of little importance, meaning that they are not useful. If the lower beach is sandy, then the 
groyne extensions can mean reduced current dissipation and reduce sand scour, therefore 
increasing local stability. Large head extensions at an elevation at or above MHWS can modify the 
incident wave meaning that the groyne spacing can be increased. 
D. 4.5. Design of groynes for sand beaches -. 
Groynes are most effective on beaches in micro-tidal low wave energy environments where the 
spacial distribution of sediment transport is limited (CIRIA, 1996). 
Material type 
On low wave energy beaches, vertical groynes perform as well as rock groynes, but for higher 
wave energy beaches rock is considered more effective., 
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Crest level 
The higher the groyne crest (up to the beach berm level) the greater the effect on longshore 
transport. 
Groyne length 
The more of the surf zone covered by the groyne, the greater its efficiency. Designers are advised 
(CIRIA, 1996) to choose the breaker point of a moderate summer swell wave as the seaward extent 
of the groyne (although this could be longer if required). 
Groyne spacing 
Groyne spacing can be greater on sand beaches as they do not re-orientate themselves as quickly a 
shingle beaches. 
D. 5. DYKES AND REVETMENTS 
D. 5.1. Brief description 
A revetment is a form of protection to protect against wave or current erosion. A typical revetment 
will include an armour layer, filter layer and possibly other sub layers and details such as those at 
the crest or toe). Dykes have failure modes similar to those of breakwaters and these are 
summarised in Figure D. 1, the probable failure mode can depend on the revetment type. The main 








As dykes are sea defence structures, their principal loadings are similar to those of breakwaters. 
However revetments can be used on river embankments, but the principal loadings and therefore 
probable failure mechanisms may vary. 
There is much information on revetment design, and the main sources read by the author are of 
Dutch and British origin. These represent two different approaches to revetment design, as the 
Dutch approach is much more detailed and quantitative than the British methodology. In this' 
report the British approach is covered completely and additional information used by the Dutch is 
also described. 
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D. 5.2. Failure mechanisms 
The key failure mechanisms for revetments are: 
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(1) Removal or damage of elements (armour stones, concrete blocks etc. ) from the cover layer 
(2) Uplift pressure resulting in armour layer damage 
(3) Sliding of coverlayer 
(4) Wave impact creating a percolation force 
(5) Toe scour 
(6) Overtopping 
, (7) Piping of material 
(8) Gradual erosion 
(9) Mass geotechnical failure of river bank 
Gradual abrasion and corrosion should also be considered in design. 
Revetments are generally not used to improve mass geotechnical instability of an embankment 
unless it is part of a composite structure (Hemphill and Bran-ley, 1989) and so the underlying 
embankment should be stable before designing the revetment. 
Removal or damage of elements 
This can be caused by a number of factors, but the most likely is wave energy, although extreme 
loads such as ice or ships may cause localised damage. 
Uplfft pressure 
These can occur when the drop in groundwater level lags during a tidal cycle, this is most severe 
after a storm surge. Uplift pressures can also occur as a result of waves causing a change in water 
level at the revetment. As a wave runs up a permeable coverlayer water will seep inside, because 
the wave run-up length will be greater than the run-down, the phreatic level under the coverlayer is 
increased. This head difference may induce instability in the structure causing elements of the 
coverlayer to be forced out. 
Sliding of coverlayer 
This can occur when the frictional force between the slope and the revetment is exceeded or when 
toe support is inadequate. 
Deformation of coverlayer 
This can be caused by two processes, first the loss of fines from beneath the coverlayer (either from 
the filter or sub-layers) causes uneven settlement that leads to deformation of the eoverlayer. 
Deformation can also be caused by wave attack leading to structural fatigue. 
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Wave impacts 
Plunging breakers which break over a structure cause high, short lived but cyclic pressures. This 
can lead to brittle failure of rigid elements or deformation or-fatigue of more flexible elements. 
Waves also create an impact force when they hit the revetment as well as up and down-rush forces 
before and after breaking. 
Toe scour 
This is caused by the presence of a structure and *can result in undermining. 
Overtopping 
This can cause structural damage to embankments including lee scour. This can be reduced by 
causing a greater dissipation of energy by roughness or permeability. 
Piping 
This is caused by steep hydraulic gradients within the embankment causing soil to migrate through 
internal channels resulting in settlement. This can also lead to the blocking of the filter layer. 
Gradual erosion 
Caused by wave. action shearing particles from the slope or wave action causing local increases in 
pore pressure that liquefy the soil. 
Mass geotechnical failure 
These modes are dealt with in detail in Section D. 7. 
D. 5.3. General design 
. 
Revetment design involves similar considerations to seawall design in that previous data is used to 
provide design conditions. The revetment must be resistant to all forms of hydraulic loading (such 
as waves, turbulence and currents). Other factors such as access, environmental impact and cost 
should be considered. The type of revetment cover layer should be chosen after analysis of the 
local conditions and this will influence the design procedure and the likely failure modes. Other 
elements of the revetment are considered separately. 
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D. 5.4. Structure specific design 
Table D. 3 provides a summary of the critical failure modes, the determinant loading and strength 
parameters for the most common types of revetment. 
Table D. 3 - Summary of the critical failure modes for each type of revetment (Pilarczylc, 
1998) 
Coverlayer Critical failure mode Determinant loading Strength 
Sand/gravel Movement of material Velocity field in waves Weight friction 
Loss of material Dynamic `stability' 
Clay/grass Erosion Max. velocity Cohesion 
Deformation Wave impact Grass-roots 
Quality of clay 
Rip-rap Movement of material Max. velocity Weight 
Deformation Seepage Friction 
Permeability of 
sublayer/core 
Gabions/ Movement of material Max. velocity Weight 
mattresses and Deformation Wave impact Blocking 
geotextiles Abrasion/corrosion of wires Climate Wires 
Vandalism Large unit 
UV light Permeability of rocks 
and sublayer 
Placed blocks Lifting Overpressure Thickness, friction, 
and block- Bending Wave impact interlocking 
mats Deformation Permeability of blocks 
Sliding and sublayers 
Cabling pins 
Bituminous/as Erosion Max. velocity Mechanical strength 
phalt systems Deformation Wave impact Weight 
Lifting Overpressure 
Rock 
Rock protection can be used under both heavy wave and current attack. The principal form of 
damage to rock revetments is loss or movement of stone units. 
River revetment design 
Some of the typical characteristics of rip-rap are summarised by Escarameia (1998): 
" The rock layer is usually graded between D85JDis = 1.5 to 2.5 
" The angle of repose should be between 35° and 42°. 
" The angle of internal friction should be between 40° and 45°. 
" The thickness should be not less than 2*Dso or 1 to 1.5 maximum dimension 
" Porosity should be between 25% and 40% 
D, 5o'should be chosen as (Escarameia and May, 1992): 
Dn5O =C 2g(s - 1) 
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t/3 
where D50 = 
X50 
, and C is a coefficient that accounts 
for turbulence intensity, 0.1 should 
Pr 
be used for continuous revetments and 1.25 for end revetments. It should be noted that there are 
other methodologies suggested for this, for example see Pilarczyk (1990) and Maynord (1993). 
Coastal revetment design 
For protection against wave attack, the Hudson formula (CERC, 1984) and Van Der Meer (1998) 
formula can be used. These formulae have already been defined in Section D. 2.3. 
Gabions 
Gabions can withstand fairly heavy current attack and require less rock than a rip-rap revetment. 
However because they rely on steel to hold themselves together they can be corroded in saline 
environments. Abrasion attack is also significant in a sediment laden environment. 
River revetment design 
The most likely form of damage to gabions are abrasion, corrosion and vandalism. Corrosion can 
be relatively easily dealt with by coating or galvanising the wires. The rock size required is 
calculated by using Equation D. 9, using C=12.3 x TI-1.65 valid for TI? O. 12 where TI is the 
turbulence intensity. This equation is valid only for gabions of 300mm thickness, but it should be 
remembered that manufactures can give valuable information about their product's performance. 
Mesh sizes are normally around 40-60mm, and are normally 2/3 of the average fill size. If placed 
vertically gabions are normally tilted backwards slightly to allow for future settlement. 
Coastal revetment design 
The gabion wires should be very resistant to corrosion if placed in a marine environment, however 
wave action is likely to move rocks within the gabion wires causing abrasion. Gabions are 
therefore seldom used under significant wave exposure. 
Pre-cast Blocks 
Loose blocks for river revetments 
These are most suitable for channels where access by machines is difficult. They are also useful 
for difficult contours in the river (such as bends). The blocks can come in many sizes, materials 
and shapes and many variables are not fully researched. 
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Again using Equation D. 9, the size of block to be used can be determined, but 0=0.725 for 
continuous protection and C=0.95 for end protection. 
Blocks should also be tested against sliding, the maximum frictional force is given by: 
Ff=f x [12 xbx t0 x(Pc - Pw) xgx cos a (D. 10) 
where 12 is the length of revetment under the water line, b is the block width, t, is the block 
thickness, p,, p, are densities of concrete and water, a is the slope angle. The driving forces on the 
zone of wave attack will be: 
Fa=[1, xbx tox(P, -P, r)xgxcosa] 
(D. 11) 
where 1, is the length of revetment under wave attack (=Hjsina). Overall stability is calculated by 
comparing the appropriate ratio of F/Fa. 
Additional requirements for coastal revetments 
A complex method suggested by Klein Bretler and Bezuijen (1991) has been simplified to: 
Hs / Ata = Sb b . 
67 (D. 12) 
where tQ is the thickness, Sb is an empirical coefficient and t=(H/L)'0'5tanß (The Iribarren Number) 
and 0 is the relative density of the revetment. 
Linked block revetments 




2g (D. 13) 
where D is the characteristic size of protection, 0 is a stability correction factor, A is the relative 
density of the revetment, JGc, is stability factor, KT is the turbulence factor, Kh is the depth factor 
(D/y)^0.2 wherey is the water depth (at the toe of the bank), K, is the slope factor (which is defined 
by soil internal friction, bank slope and channel slope) and Ue is the depth-averaged flow velocity. 
Although the linking of the blocks should provide extra support against block uplift it should not be 
assumed in design (Escaremia, 1998). However the linking of blocks does provide extra resistance 
against sliding which is given by: ' 
Fp=[13xbxtoxp, xgxcosa] (D. 14) 
where 13 is the length of cable-tied revetment above the water line. 
Bitumen bound revetments 
Bitumen can be used to bind rocks and stones together to make the revetment more stability, but 
also presere some flexibility, they are sub-divided according to their permeability. The minimum 
layer thickness should be about 2 to 3 times the maximum stone size. ''' 
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Permeable revetments 
A simple formula for calculating the cover layer thickness, t, can be used: 
T. =CX Hs (D. 15) 
where C is a coefficient dependent on the sub-base. Permeable revetments should also be tested for 
wave impact pressures if they are expected to be subjected to these. 
Impermeable revetments 
The two main failure mechanisms for impermeable bitumen-bound revetments are uplift and 




where x is dependent on the revetment slope ,v is the vertical distance between the water level and 
phreatic surface, a is the vertical distance from the toe to water level. 
The maximum uplift pressure is therefore: 
0'" = Pw xgx (- + ta x COSa) (D. 17) 
to check the revetment for stability against uplift: 
to ? _C / pQ xgx Cosa (D. 18) 
to check the stability against sliding: 
to fx aw / pa xgx (f x cosa - sins) (D. 19) 
where f is the coefficient of friction which equals tang' if O'>9, or tan 0 in other conditions, where 
8 is the angle of friction between revetment and soil and 4'=angle of internal friction of sub-soil. 
Wave impact loading 
A method for design against wave impact is given by RWS (1985). The maximum wave impact 
force, Pim,., is given by: 
P,,,, = b, P = bjg1PwgH, (D. 20) 
where p,,,,,, is the maximum pressure, b; is the width over which the pressure acts (=0.4H, ) and q, is 
a factor dependent on revetment slope. To calculate cover layer thickness: 
t, 20.75 ((27/16) X (1/(l-u2)) X (Pr / Qb)4 (S/c))0.2 (D. 21) 
where ab is the asphalt failure stress, S is the asphalt stiffness modulus, u is the asphalt's Poisson 
ratio (=0.35), c is the modulus of subgrade reaction. However it should be noted that this is only 
the design thickness for one loading. In order to compensate for the repeated loading of differing 
waves a fatigue factor should be applied, although a lot of wave data is required to do this very 
accurately, a simpler method is to use: 




lx N ýn' 
' (%)5 
+ (D. 22) 
when the extreme conditions are the design conditions, if the revetment 
is not exposed to design 
conditions under an extreme event, 
4/25 
ý(/sl5 (D. 23) fj. =0 .1xN 
Yn, 
l pJ 
should be used. 
Other revetment types 
Geomats 
These are synthetic mats that are able to retain soils and also allow vegetation to grow through 
them. The mats are normally only a few millimetres or centimetres thick and usually anchored at 
their top or bottom. 
Concrete mats 
The suggested thickness of concrete mats is the same as that for block revetments. 
Flexible forms 
These are geobags or geotubes filled with sand or gravel (or cement, perhaps) that can be used as 
revetments. They are usually employed as emergency temporary measures, and as there are no 
generic guidelines the manufacturer should provide the information about their product. 
Pilin 
This should be analysed as shown in the section on vertical retaining walls in Section D. 8. 
D. 5.5. Filter design 
Filters should increase in permeability from the subsoil to the cover layer thereby ensuring that 
there is not an excessive build-up of hydraulic pressure, whilst preventing washing out of material 
from layers beneath. 
Granular filters 
The filter must obey some filter laws: 
" D15 filter <5 D85 base Stability or piping criterion 
" D15 filter >5 D15 base Permeability criterion, 
" D50 filter < 25 D50 base Uniformity criterion 
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Geotextile filters 
An additional concern with geotextile filters is deterioration by uv light or reaction with chemicals 
in the water passing through it. To meet the permeability criteria, the geotextile should satisfy: 
kg z 5k5 (D. 24) 
where kg is the permeability of the geotextile and k, is the permeability of the underlying material. 
D. 5.6. Additional details 
Overtopping 
This is related to the structures freeboard above design water level. and also the properties of the 
design wave. 
Scour 
This is related to the design wave, the structures slope and type of revetment chosen. Toe 
protection should extend a distance of at least the maximum wave height below the toe. 
D. 6. NATURAL COASTAL PROTECTION 
Natural coastal defence refers to non-structural means of reducing erosion or flood risk. This can 
take the form of an entirely beach based defence (such as shingle banks) or in addition to structural 
solutions (such as nourishment of the beach in front of a seawall resulting in decreased loading on 
the structure). The level of protection therefore offered by natural forms of protection will be a 
function of time and the antecedent loading conditions. Natural protection does not always fail in 
the absolute sense of the word, more likely it will offer a reducing (although given suitable 
conditions this can increase) level of protection (or performance) over a given time period. 
D'Angremond (1992) suggested that the definition of failure for a natural protection scheme is 
when the scheme fails to provide the require level of protection after a significantly short period of 
time than that designed for. 
D. 6.1. Dune management 
A soft form of coastal defence, dune management can be a cost-effective and environmentally 
sound means of defending sandy coastline. The dunes serve two purposes, first as an embankment 
against flooding and secondly as a reservoir of sand, replenished when beach levels are high and 
able to provide a feed of extra material during storms (CIRIA, 1996). Dunes normally form when 
sand is trapped on the windward side of a plant or piece of litter, this can then build up. More 
vegetative matter provides additional stability and more chance of additional sand being caught on 
the dune. 
Dunes are eroded by wind or waves. Wave induced erosion occurs when the sea is at the base of 
the dune and causes failure by toe scour. Wind induced erosion is rarely caused by wind alone, but 
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more likely it exaggerates other damage (usually to the vegetation) caused by humans and other 
animals. 
Good dune management should be included in a beach management programme as any attempt to 
maintain just the dunes in a fast eroding beach will not be successful. The use of sand fences and 
dune armour can help encourage dune growth and protection. One of the most complex factors in 
dune management is its effect on adjacent frontages; as it is impossible to simply terminate a dune 
system their can be quite a few complex interactions. The most threatening of which is the 
possibility of erosion at the junction, this could lead to flooding behind both types of defences. The 
following six points should be considered when designing a dune management system: 
(1) Effect of adjacent defences on sand supply to beach/dune system (eg. caused by groynes), 
(2) Consequences of sudden, temporary retreat of dune/beach system on adjacent coast, 
(3) Effects of wind-blown sand on adjacent frontage, 
(4) Danger of access and disturbance to dunes and their vegetation cover, 
(5) Wind induced onshore transport needs to be at least equal to wave induced off- and 
longshore transport, and, 
(6) Volume of material that would be removed in a storm (influenced by wave properties, 
duration of storms, water levels, slopes, sand grading). 
D. 6.2. Beach nourishment 
A healthy beach is one of the most effective forms of coastal defence as it has the ability to evolve 
naturally depending on the wave and tidal conditions. Beach nourishment is the addition of sand to 
the beach in order to replenish losses, increase the level of defence protection or provide 
recreational value to the area. Sometimes it is necessary to reduce the sediment losses from the 
beach by either using beach control structures or recycling sand from the downdrift end of the 
beach. 
The design of beach nourishment material is 'done based on the grain size at the site in question. It 
is usually the case that a coarser grain than that already there will be used (although the designer 
must be careful that smaller particles are not washed out). The other design factor is the beach 
slope and there are a range of stable slopes depending on the grain size employed. 
Choosing the design volumes to be used for nourishment is usually based on a combination of two 
approaches: 
" Empirical approaches based on past experience (particularly where nourishment has been 
ongoing for some time) 
" Modelling methods (which area combination of empirical and analytical information because 
data is required for calibration) based on predictions of longshore and cross-shore beach 
response (particularly where a new or changed beach nourishment programme is planned) 
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The design of the profile of nourishment for sand beaches has many suggested methods and it has 
been suggested that no one method should be used in isolation (Davison, Nichols and Leatherman, 
1992). Dean's method (Dean, 1991) determines the volume of nourishment required to increase 
the beach width by a certain amount. The Pilarczyk, van Overeem and Bakker (Pilarczyk et al., 
1986) method considers the reshaping of the beach profile in response to prevailing hydraulic 
conditions and the depth to which this profile develops. The `overfill ratio' method quantifies the 
amount of excess nourishment that is required to mitigate losses from not having the ideal mix of 
grain sizes for a given location (James, 1975) 
The design of shingle beaches should not use the same technique and an equilibrium technique was 
derived (Powell, 1993) for shingle beaches of a dissimilar grading. This method was developed at 
HR Wallingford and at present not enough comparison with real field data has been possible 
(CIRIA, 1996). 
The key parameters in beach nourishment design are the grain size, D, the significant wave height, 
H. Depending on the design methodology used, other wave properties (such as period) and beach 
dimensions may be required. 
D. 6.3. Managed retreat or landward realignment 
Often instead of advancing or maintaining the present beach, it is more beneficial to manage a 
landward realignment. This is often used to obtain a more favourable cost-benefit option whilst 
minimising interference with natural processes. Often this is preferential to allowing coastal 
squeeze which could result in the loss of the intertidal habitat. 
Landward realignment can take one of four forms; the setting back of the line of defences further 
inland, controlled abandonment allows the sea to form its own new water edge (Note: this is not 
equivalent to the `do nothing' option as this requires monitoring to ensure no unwanted erosion). 
The other forms of retreat are to deliberately reduced the size of the defence or create a tiered form 
of defence when the level of protection is gradually increased further inland. 
Landward realignment can also be used to environmental gain as saltmarsh or mudflats can be 
created on what might have previously been low-lying farmland. Retreat can also be used to help 
provide a sediment source for further downdrift in order to provide more protection. 
D. 6.4. Rock beaches 
The principle role of a rock beach is to dissipate wave energy. In doing so the structure is expected 
to alter shape, but must not allow excessive overtopping of the beach crest, significant seepage 
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through the beach ridge or too great a loss of material. The main design problems are (CIRIA, 
1996): 
(1) Cross-shore movement, although this is can be beneficial as the crest can build upwards 
increasing overtopping resistance under all but the most severe storms. 
(2) Longshore movement, which can lead to degradation and loss of material from the updrift parts 
of the structure. 
(3) Material loss resulting from abrasion/attrition causing either a loss of material or a wider 
grading of material reducing the beaches resistance to wave action. 
Principal parameters that influence hydraulic performance and beach stability are (CIRIA, 1996 
and CIRIA and CUR, 1991): 
(1) Rock parameters 
a. Grading D85/D15 
b. Strength of rock and'resistance to attrition 
c. Median rock size: Di50 (M501p,. )113 (Mis the mass of individual rocks not exceeded by 50% 
of all rocks in a given grading) 
(2) Hydraulic parameters 
a. Relative wave height: Ns HS/dDnso 
b. Relative mean wave period: To Tm/(g/4Dnso)ln 
c. Wave angle to the shoreline: ß 
(3) Beach dimensions 
a. Thickness of permeable beach: tQ 
b. Initial slope: a 
c. Crest freeboard relative to design water level: Rý 
d. Permeability of beach to wave action (given by internal penetration length: A, which is the 
penetration of wave agitation across the internal water table, it is dependent on porosity, 
permeability, loading rate and wave period) 
Rock slope movement is predicted using BREAKWAT (Van Der Meer and Pilarczyk, 1986) or 
SHINGLE (Powell, 1990) software which both relate profile geometry to wave parameters. This 
can allow the designer to quantify the amount of rock required for a specific design life. 
Mud fiats and Saltmarshes .k-, .ir 
Aside from their environmental value mudflats and saltmarshes are a highly effective means of 
dissipating wave energy and 10m of saltmarsh allows the height of the flood defence to be halved 
(National Rivers Authority and Binnie and Partners, 1993). The main causes of erosion are a rising 
sea level, reduced sediment supply, natural cyclical pattern, pollution and increased wave activity. 
Cohesive elements tend to be lost in blocks, where as granular materials are eroded more slowly. 
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D. 6.5. Other methods 
Sills 
These are un-segmented, always or occasionally submerged shore parallel structures that are 
designed to reduce inshore wave climates by inducing waves to break. They have so far only been 
seen to be useful in low to moderate wave energy, micro tidal environments with low tidal drift 
(CIRIA, 1996). 
Beach drainage 
This involves the artificial lowering of the water table in the intertidal zone. This enhances the 
wave energy absorbing capacity of the beach. This can be achieved by pumps or drains, but has yet 
to be proven in a large tidal range and in storm dominated wave conditions. 
Supply restoration 
This involves the restoration of sediment supply or littoral drift so as to maintain balanced sediment 
cell budgets within a management unit. This can be required when a man-made structure has 
dramatically altered the sediment flow regime causing a sediment deficit in cells along the 
coastline. Supply can be restored by alteration to existing structures or standard nourishment at the 
appropriate place. 
Sediment bypassing 
This involves the movement of material of material from an accreting length of shoreline to an 
eroding length of shoreline. This can be done by mechanical bypassing when lorries transport the 
sand from one area to another. Hydraulic bypassing involves pumping the sand as a slurry. Seabed 
fluidisation increases the amount of material for bypassing; by pumping water at high pressures in 
the seabed, sand is released to be pumped away. There are other bypassing systems that are not 
well tested but the methodology used should be site specific. 
D. 7. RIVER BANKS AND LEVEES 
D. 7.1. Brief Summary, 
Not all river banks need artificial protection and often good river management is the optimum 
solution. Levees are river banks that have been raised to contain high water levels. 
D. 7.2. Processes effecting failure 
The failure of a river bank can be considered in terms of overall stability and also local stability. It 
should be noted that local in-stability can lead to mass bank failure. Failure modes of non-revetted 
slopes are predominantly governed by soil parameters such as shear strength and pore water 
pressures. The factors that determine stability in mass bank failure are: 
(1) Surface water and groundwater regime 
(a) Seepage 
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Excess pore pressure in the bank can trigger a rotational failure, as well as encourage erosion, 
toe scour and piping. 
(b) Infiltration 
Water infiltrating the soil can cause the unit weight to increase, combined with an increase in 
pore pressure the bank is more prone to failure. 
(2) Surcharge loading 
Loading on top of a bank increases its susceptibility to mass failure. 
(3) Tension cracks 
Formation of these in cohesive soils reduces stability particularly if filled with water. 
(4) Vegetation 
Soil properties can be improved in particular the shear strength, as well as possible provision of 
some tensile strength thereby increasing stability of the bank. 
(5) Toe scour and surface erosion 
Toe scour increases bank height and causes undercutting whilst a change in slope geometry 
caused by either scour or surface erosion can alter bank stability. 
D. 7.3. Failure modes 
Planar failure 
This is failure of a bank along a plane surface, this sort of failure is normally associated with non- 
cohesive soils or materials in which relatively deep tension cracks have developed. Safety against 
planar failure is analysed as follows: 
(1) Consider the stability of a single wedge or slab as shown Figure D. 6. 
(2) Assume a potential failure plane and calculate FoS. 
(3) Forces to consider: 
(a) Weight of slab and hence normal stresses on failure plane. 
a. Shear forces acting the plane to resist failure. 
FoS = 
2Cu sin a+ tanO 
pH sin(a - ß) sin 8 tan 8 
(D. 25) 
H 
Figure D. 6 Planar slope failure of an embankment -; }-". 
Modifications to the theory can be made to allow for tension cracking allowing the critical height 
of the bank to be assessed. A number of failure planes should be analysed to ensure the lowest FoS 
is obtained. 
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Shallow failure 
This type of failure occurs parallel to a shallow bank which consists of predominantly non-cohesive 
materials. Safety against shallow failure is analysed as follows: 
(1) Consider the bank as an infinite slope as in Figure D. 7. Where the failure surface is at a depth 
that is small compared with the length of the slope. 
(2) A slice can be taken and as all slices will be identical any interslice force will be equal and 
opposite and can therefore be ignored. 
(3) The water table is assumed to be parallel to the slope and steady seepage is taking place in a 
direction parallel to the slope. 
(4) rf= c' + (a- u) tan (q') and FoS = rjlr 
(5) where a= {(1- m)y+mysat}z cos2ß; r= {(1- m)y+ mys, r}z sin Qcosß; u(on plane) =mzy,, 
cos2ß 










Figure D. 7 Shallow slope failure of a slope 
Rotational failure 
This type of failure is most likely on a steep (and high) bank consisting of cohesive material (if the 
bank is homogenous then the failure plane will be rotational as in Figure D. 8, unhomogenous banks 
may have spiral or planar elements of their surface). Safety against rotational failure is designed 
for as follows. 
(1) As with planar analysis a number of potential failure surfaces should be analysed. 
(2) The easiest way to perform the analysis is to assume a circular plane of failure (as shown in 
Figure D. 8)and that the soil is purely cohesive and homogeneous. 
(3) By dividing the surface into sections and assuming the interslice forces cancel out the shear 
force along the bottom of the slice and the weight can be equated. 
FoS = 
c'La+tanO'FN' (D. 26) 
EWsina. 
where L. is the arc length and N is the normal force on the base (oO. 
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Figure D. 8 Rotational slope failure and division into slices used for failure analysis 
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(4) Equation D. 26 used to estimate the PoS is exact, approximations are introduced when 
estimating N. 
(5) Two methods can be used to solve this equation, the Fellenius solution assumes the resultant of 
the interslice forces is zero and therefore N'=Wcosa - ul. This method underestimates the FoS 
within 5-20%. 
(6) Bishop's method assumes that the resultant forces on the sides of the slices are horizontal 
meaning that: 
z=1 (c'l + Ntan 0') (D. 27) 
(7) Resolve in the vertical direction: 
N' = W. - 
- 





(8) Substituting this into Equation D. 26 it can be seen that the FoS appears on both sides and so the 
solution has to be converged upon therefore making this method more suitable for 
computational analysis. 
Composite failure 
Failure of composite banks will depend on the nature and thickness of the layers as well as their 
relative positions. If soil conditions are correct then the bank can fail as described previously and 
so the appropriate methods can be use. 
In low composite banks an undercutting can be formed creating an overhang which can then fail in 
shear, tension or as a beam. Shear failure is uncommon, but the final choice of failure mechanism 
is not based on soil properties but the cantilever geometry and soil irregularities. The three types of 
composite failure are: _ :.... 
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Figure D. 9 Tension failure of river embankment 
b) Shear failure 
This form of failure is rare with little available information (Hemphill and Bramley, 1989) 
c) Beam failure 
Layer 1 
Layer 2 ý---- 
, 
Figure D. 10 Beam failure of river embankment 
No source of information which performs a quantitative analysis of tension failure of river banks 
has been found. 
Flotation 
This is a rare failure mode, but is seen when unstable soil (such as peat) has been used in the bank 
construction 
Erosion 
This is gradual failure process (and often leads to other types of mass failure). It is influenced by 
many different loading processes which are described below. 
Current flow 
The boundary shear stress in a channel of finite width is given by: z=yRS (where R is the hydraulic 
radius, S is the bed slope and y is specific weight of water). A higher shear stress will give rise to 
more scour on the river bed. The Shield's formula (Equation D. 4) gives an estimation of the 
critical shear stress for a particle on a river bed. 
Irregularity in channel 
This can cause the creation of higher shear stresses and secondary currents which increase scour. 
Any local feature (such as a culvert, bridge pier or vegetation) can alter the local flow pattern 
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potentially causing downstream erosion. The variation in shear stress can be measured in the f ield 
or by using the assumption that the velocity profile is logarithmic and the Karman-Prandtl equation 
applies: 
Y2 v=5.75 zP logy + tonst. (D. 29) 
where u is the velocity at distance y from the bed and p is the density of water. Another 
relationship used is that comparing U to Ub: 
U 
Ub 
0.681og(y / ks) + 0.71 
(D. 30) 




(n'+1)(B / r) 
+1 (D. 31) do 1-(1-(Blr)) 
Where do is the mean depth, r the outer bank radius, B the channel width and n' is a coefficient 
(often equal to 2.5, but this is assigned from limited data) 
Wave action 
Wave length is calculated differently depending on the depth of water, for deep water 
gT2 LO 
2; r (D. 32) 
for water of an intermediate depth: 
i 
L=T tanh(2ird / L) 
(D. 33) 
and, for shallow water: 
L= =T gd (D. 34) 
where Lo, L and L, are the wave lengths in deep, intermediate and shallow water respectively, T is 
the wave period and d is the depth of the water. If d<1.28H approximately then the wave will 
break before hitting the bank, this is generally less damaging than if they break on the bank. The 
damage potential of a wave depends on whether the wave plunges, collapses or spills against the 
bank. This behaviour depends on the Iribarren number (I, ): 
tana 
(HS /Lo) 
where a is the banks slope. 
I 
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Wind generated 
For a river wind waves are normally fetch-limited and so the length of the wind gust is not 
considered. A recommended formula for estimating significant wave height is the Sverdrup-Munk- 
Bretschneider equation: 
Hs = 0.00354(U1o /g)o. s8F0.42 
Boat generated 
(D. 36) 
The waves generated depend on the size and geometry of the boat. If the boat speed, Vb, is: 
Vb 5 0.7 gd (D. 37) 
then the corresponding wave length is: 
Lb = 
41c (Vb Z 9 3 (D. 38) 
If this speed is exceeded, then the wave heights are primarily determined by the boat's speed, shape 
and size and the depth of the water. Boats with propellers can increase local flows, these effects 
are most pronounced when the boat is performing a complicated manoeuvre or starting. The scour 
depends on many factors including the type of engine, propeller sizes and duration of power burst. 
Mechanical erosion 
Freeze-thaw cycle. Internal friction is reduced by water freezing and reducing particle packing, the 
consequential thawing results in a weakened soil. 
Desiccation. Clay soils swell and shrink during wetting and drying cycles causing vertical fissures 
thereby weakening the soil.. 
Boat impact. Boats mooring and crashing, but also insertion of mooring pegs can weaken the soil 
or directly cause damage. 
Animal and man. Surface trampling reduces vegetation and therefore surface protection meaning 
the bank is more prone to erosion, burrowing can reduce the bulk strength of the soil. 
Seepage 
Seepage velocity depends on the local hydraulic gradient, seepage flow into the channel can 
increase the lift force on the surface material thereby increasing its susceptibility to removal. This 
can effect a semi-permeable soil considerably if there is a sudden draw down, or a natural (eg. 
tidal) cycle. 
Piping occurs when the net effective stresses are zero and is more likely to occur when beds of 
highly permeable soil are surrounded by beds of less permeable soil. 
Suffusion (removal of fine material from a network of coarse particles) can occur when the fabric is 
incompletely filled by fines. 
Review of flood defence failure 253 
High pore water pressure gradients are less likely to occur in highly permeable banks meaning that 
they are less likely to suffer from seepage erosion problems. On the other extreme highly 
impermeable clay banks will have extremely low seepage velocities and so not suffer from seepage 
problems. 
Surface run-off 
If the infiltration capacity of the bank is exceeded then surface runoff occurs, causing increase in 
damage to the soil surface. 
Particle entrainment 
The composition and cohesiveness of a river bank influence its rate of erosion. Cohesiveness 
depends on the degree of compaction and the organic content and is therefore highly variable. For 
non-cohesive beds, the critical shear stress for particle motion is calculated using the Shields 
(1936) formula (Equation D. 4). 
Lane (1955) developed a formula for critical shear stress for a river bank, r0: 
To sin2 aY 1- 
zý sine 
(D. 39) 
where r, is the critical shear stress of the bed, a is the bank slope and ý is the angle of repose of the 
soil material. Cohesive banks require higher stresses to have soil particles removed due to the 
effects of physical cohesion and electro-chemical bonding. 
The presence of vegetation can reduce local stress by affecting velocity gradients on the bank and 
increase erosion resistance of the surface material. However `rigid' vegetation (such as trees) can 
affect the local flow pattern in the channel particularly when its roots are exposed or when it falls 
into the river. This can lead to an increase in local scour and a disruption to the flow pattern 
downstream. 
D. 8. VERTICAL RETAINING STRUCTURES 
D. 8.1. Brief summary 
These structures are designed to provide vertical reinforcement for a river bank. Banks that are 
steeper than the soils angle of repose may be prone to failure. Vertical protection is designed to 
resist erosive forces as well as soil and groundwater pressure from the channel bank. The main 
types of retaining structure are: 
(1) Gravity walls 
(2) Gabion walls 
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(3) Cantilever walls 
(4) Sheet piles 
Specific design issues for these structures are considered later in this section. A few key points of 
geotechnical theory used in the design of vertical retaining structures are now described. Figure 
D. 18 shows a semi-infinite homogeneous and isotropic mass of soil with a vertical boundary 
formed by a smooth wall surface. 
O=45°+*º*2 
Figure D. 11 Active and passive Ranking states 
A soil element at depth z has stress az acting on it in the vertical direction and a in the horizontal 
direction. The active, p and passive pressures, pp, are given by: 
pý=KQ'Yz -NX. , pv Kpjz - %X, (D. 40) 
When the horizontal stress becomes equal to the active pressure the soil is in an active Rankine 
state, conversely when the horizontal stresses become equal to the passive pressure the soil is in a 
passive Rankine state. The active, PQ, and passive force, Pp, per unit length of wall is given by 
integrating the pressure distributions, p,, and p,,, over the depth, H, of the wall: 
HH 
Pa= f padz, Pp= f ppdz (D. 41) 
00 
K. and K. are the active and passive earth pressure coefficients respectively which are defined by: 
K 1-sins K_ 1+siný (D. 42) °_ 1+-Sin 60 'p 1-sind 
D. 8.2. Gravity walls 
These are large solid structures that support the bank by use of their self-weight and frictional 
forces generated along their base. They can fail in many ways: 
Active Rankine state Passive Rankine state 
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Bed Scour 
Scour in front of the wall causes loss of bed 
restraint and foundation support leading to 
sliding, bearing or overturning. Scour of 
foundation can be prevented by use of a cut-off 
Sliding 
Occurs when combined surcharge, active soil 
pressures and hydrostatic forces exceed 
restraining forces. Sliding resistance at base can 
be increased by shear key. 
Overturning 
Occurs when sum of overturning moments 
exceeds sum of restoring moments. Can be 
aided by drop in water level or loss of toe 
material. 
Piping 
Occurs when a hydraulic gradient leads to 
seepage causing piping under foundation that 




Figure D. 12 Gravity wall failure from scour 
: ey 
Figure D. 13 Gravity wall failure from sliding 
Figure D. 14 Gravity wall failure by overturning 
".... - 
Bearing pressure 
Occurs when bearing pressure at toes exceeds 
limiting pressure, resulting in collapse or 
unacceptable movement. 
Figure D. 15 Gravity wall allure from piping 
Figure D. 16 Gravity wall failure due to bearing 
pressure 
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Rotational slip 
Low shear strength (possibly caused by 
lowering of water level) or high surcharge can 
lead to rotational slip. 
Figure D. 17 Gravity wall failure by rotational slip 
The final failure mode of a gravity wall is due to tension cracking in the rear face of the wall 
following leaching of mortar and/or decomposition of material. Allowance for a degree of 
vandalism and abrasion should also be considered in design. 
Design 
These walls derive stability from self weight. Geotechnical factors are the most important in terms 
of failure analysis and are considered by resolving forces and moments. These should be analysed 
at normal and the most extreme conditions of seepage and water height variation. The structure 
should be shaped so that the resultant downward force acts within the middle third of the base 
length (so as to avoid any of the base being in tension). As with all vertical retaining structures, it 
is important to be very careful when making bed level assumptions, both the long and short term 
level can have a major impact on stability. 
D. 8.3. Cantilever walls 
These are designed with the same considerations as a gravity wall, but the soil above the toe 
(Figure D. 18 ) provides additional stability. 
Figure D. 18 A cantilever wall 
D. 8.4. Gabion walls 
These are covered in Section D. 5.3. 
D. 8.5. Sheet piles 
These walls are only used when the height of the retained structure is relatively small, often they 
are for temporary support only. Failure is by rotation near the base of the wall and occurs when the 
surcharge, active pressures and hydrostatic forces exceed the restraining forces. 





Figure D. 19 Failure of a non-anchored sheet pile and resulting earth pressures 
257 
The depth, d, is determined by equating moments about the point of rotation to zero. A factor of 
safety is usually applied. 
A sheet pile can receive additional support from a row of props or anchors behind the wall. These 
are normally steel cables or rods anchored in the soil some distance behind the wall. Plate anchors 
need to be far enough to ensure that the passive resistance mobilised by the anchor does not 
encroach on the active resistance of the wall. Ground anchors resist by creating skin friction 
between themselves and the soil. 
45°-ßa/2 L.. 
Figure D. 20 Anchored sheet pile: Horizontal tie with a plot of the corresponding bending 
moment in the sheet pile 
Anchored sheet piles can fail by: 
Figure D. 21 Anchored sheet pile: 
Rotation at tie 
Figure D. 23 Anchored sheet pile: 
Overstressing 
1 
Figure D. 22 Anchored sheet pile: 
Rupture of tie 
Figure D. 24Anchored sheet pile: 
Rotational slip 









(Kp - KQ) (D. 43) 
where s is the rod spacing, F the factor of safety, 1 the rod length, d, the depth from the surface to 
the bottom of the anchor. Proneness to failure by rotational slip is assessed using a standard slip 
circle analysis such as that described in Section D. 7.3. Design against overstressing of the sheet 
pile is done by calculating the maximum bending moment in the wall and selecting an appropriate 
moment capacity of the sheet pile from design guides (such as those published by Corus Group, 
2001). To design against rotation about the tie, the depth of embedment, d, is determined from the 
condition that the factored moments about the tie equate to zero. Another important consideration 
in sheet pile retaining structure design is the long and short term toe erosion. If toe erosion is 
underestimated, then the structure's stability could be compromised. 
As with gabion frames, metal walls have to be protected suitably. Although unprotected sheet piles 
will normally have a life of at least 60 years. A rate of corrosion of 0.05mm/side/year for fluvial 
defences is assumed as a rule of thumb (Hemphill and Bramley, 1989) and this should be 
accounted for in long term design. However, Corus Group (2001) state that the variable quality of 
freshwater means corrosion rates are variable. Corrosion in marine environments can be up to 
0.075mm/side/year and in certain cases 0.8mm/side/year has been observed. 
D. 8.6. Others 
Reinforced earth 
A composite structure of a concrete retaining face tied back into the body of the bank by long strips 
of webbing buried horizontally in the soil. The sole form of restraint is the resistive force between 
the webbing and the soil. Adequate drainage is imperative as high water pressures will reduce this 
resistance. 
Retaining geotextiles 
These can only be used at a limited height and not for high loadings or loose soil as the stability is 
dependent only on the stakes that support the material. The material must have long term stability 
under exposure to u-v light. In the long term, vegetation may grow through and around it to 
enhance appearance. 
Rubber tyres 
Two rows of rubber tyres with a filter layer behind them (and possibly an anchor) can be used. 
Although unattractive it is relatively inexpensive and provides a use for the large number of 
partially worn tyres that are discarded every year. 
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Crib walling 
This wall type employs concrete or wooden beams to build up a lattice of interlocking members 
which are then backfilled. The lattice prevents minor slips and provides reinforcement to the bank. 
In the long term vegetation is established to help prevent soil being washed away. 
D. 9. NATURAL RIVER BANK PROTECTION 
The design of natural defences is not really a quantitative process; experience and judgement are 
required in both the design and assessment of natural river protection. Another key issue is 
management; not only in the establishment of vegetation, but also in its long term state. Natural 
protection can be used to increase the resistance of a river bank to gradual erosion rather than mass 
failure. 
D. 9.1. River bank management 
Plant selection 
Key issues here are the local plant environment (would the addition of the wrong type of plant 
mean two plants competing), the suitability of the plant to the soil conditions and the role of the 
plant as a defence. 
(1) Reeds 
(a) Used in the `aquatic zone' of the bank to reduce wave and current energy 
(b) Their roots can be easily washed away and are therefore often protected by geotextiles and 
stone. 
(2) Shrubs and trees (predominantly willow and poplar) 
(a) Can provide substantial reinforcement to the bank above and below waterline. 
(b) Consideration must be provided for access to the waterway when planting. 
(c) Trees can help to stabilise the banks by reducing p. w. p. (although this effect is ended when 
the tree dies and the presence of the tree may then become detrimental to the stability of 
the bank) and their roots acting as reinforcement, but they can cause local scour if their 
roots become exposed (as discussed previously in this Appendix). 
(3) Grass 
(a) Generally used above the normal water level 
(b) Reinforced grass uses geotextiles or concrete reinforcement to increase erosion resistance 
of the top soil. 
(4) Timber 
(a) Cut timber can be driven in to the bank to reduce erosion 
(b) Thorn faggots are bundles of thorn branches that reduce erosion and increase drainage in 
the bank. 
(c) Toe boarding can be used to support banks and protect them from erosion. 
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Soil requirements 
The correct soil conditions are required to achieve the intended plant growth. 
Surface preparation 
The intention is to prepare the ground to achieve the intended plant growth 
(1) Production of a suitable seedbed 
(2) Provide suitable drainage 
(3) Relieve excessive subsoil compaction 
(4) Improve soil structure 
(5) Protection from immediate erosion whilst awaiting vegetation growth 
Vegetation establishment 
Method is chosen depending on plant type, location and soil type. 
Zones of protection 
As some plants respond well to wet soil and others prefer dry soil a policy of zoning can be 
instigated. Zoning allows permanently wet soil to benefit as much as possible from aquatic plants, 
and rarely flooded soil to benefit from other more suitable plantlife. 
Long-term management 
This is to ensure the vegetation is chosen and maintained to ensure long term objectives are met. 
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Appendix E 
Defence classification and fragility curves for 
use in a high level risk assessment 
The classification builds previous work by the Environment Agency (1996). It is explicitly 
hierarchical, illustrating how, as more information is acquired, it is possible to define defence 
performance more precisely (see Figure E. 3). Initially defences are classified into seven major 
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Figure E. I Major classification groups offlood defences 
The lower levels of the classification hierarchy for each of the defence types are shown in Figure 
E. 3, Figure E. 10, Figure E. 19, Figure E. 22, Figure E. 29, Figure E. 34 to the associated NFCDD 
codes are given in Table E. 1 to Table E. 6. The fragility curves for the different structure 
classifications are also displayed. These curves plot the mean value of the fragility. For the 
application fragility values of ±30% were used to reflect the uncertainty in the expert judgement 
used to define the curves. 
A defence is usually composed of several components. For example a sea defence may have a 
foreshore, a frontslope, a crest and a backslope. All of these will have an influence on the 
proneness to failure of the defence. Only information on these components is stored and monitored 
by the Environment Agency as there is no generic defence classification field in the database 
(Environment Agency, 2001), however, the primary criterion for classification should be the aspect 
with the most influence on proneness to failure (see Appendix D for a thorough review of defence 
failure mechanisms). A classification routine, which was established by the author, was used to 
classify the defences into generic types based only on the available information describing their 
components. 
11 ýý 
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The generic classification steps are as follows: 
(1) Identify whether defence is coastal (including estuarial defences) or fluvial by checking the 
assets tidal flag in the NFCDD. 
(2) Sub-divide into the seven major classes of defence as shown in Figure 5.5. 
(3) Identify whether defence is `wide' or `narrow'. As in previous classification methodologies 
(Environment Agency, 1996) a wide defence has a crest level width of 10m or greater. If no 
crest level measurement is available a `wide' defence is classified as not having a rear slope 
(NFCDD element code is FO). 
(4) Ascertain degree of protection of defence based on whether they are protected on the front 
face, crest and rear face. Protection is assumed if the revetment material of the asset element is 
not turf or trees. Examples of defences classified by width and by degree of protection are 
shown in Figure E. 2. 
Note: For the purposes of implementing the algorithm, it is necessary to know whether there is an 
outward slope to perform step 3, but the width classification is at a higher level than the degree of 
protection classification. 
(5) Sub-classify depending on material of front face protection (no classification based on crest or 
rear slope material). 
(6) Identify any structures (eg. outfalls) within defence as this will effect the defence's fragility. 
This step was not implemented, see Section E. 7 for more details. 
(7) Finally, further classification can be made based on whether the channel (in the case of fluvial 
defences) is lined or unlined or (in the case of sea defences) whether the defence is tidal or 
coastal. This step was not implemented; due to data limitations it was not possible to 
discriminate between tidal and coastal defences, and, experts were unable to differentiate 
between the strength of structures with lined and unlined channels. 
Initially, it may only be possible to construct fragility curves at relatively high levels of the 
classification. As more information becomes available, the fragility curves at lower levels can start 
to be populated. This increase in data will also allow the bounds on the fragility curves to be 
narrowed as demonstrated in Figure 5.7. Further refinement will be possible in more detailed 
analysis when the dimensions of the defence become available. 
The following sections link the classification methodology with the codes describing asset element 
types, sub-types, material and revetment used to populate the NFCDD. The NFCDD codes are 
defined in Section E. 8. The following notation is used in all the fragility curve graphs: 
" P(OT) is the fragility curve for the conditional probability of overtopping 
" P(B) is the fragility curve for the conditional probability of breaching 
" CGx is the condition grade of the defence (where x=1 corresponds to "very good" and 5 
corresponds to "very poor" condition. 
0 FP means the defence only has front protection 
Defence classification and fragility curves for use in a high level risk assessment 
" CP means the defence has front and crest protection, and, 




No protection Front protection 







Front protection Front protection 
Front and crest Front and crest 
Front and crest Front, crest and rear 
--40041""MN- Front, crest and rear 
Figure E. 2 Example of defence classification based on defence width and crest and rear slope 
protection (Environment Agency, 1996) 






Figure E. 3 Detailed classification of vertical fluvial defences showing how more sophisticated 
classification enables the bounds of the associated fragility curve to be narrowed 
0 
Note: Only front protection is classified further by material type. 
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Table E. 1 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for vertical fluvial defences 
Classification Relevant NFCDD codes 
Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
Vertical wall 
Concrete structures Channel: CB LN/R C/D/F/G/H/M/O/R/S - 
(reinforced or gravity) Defence: CS/FI/BE/FC/FO H/W CID/Q/R - 
Gabion walls Channel: CB L/N/R C/D/F/G/H/M/O/R/S - 
Defence: CS/FI/BE/FC/FO H/W G- 
Brick and masonry Channel: CB L/N/R CID/F/G/H/M/O/R/S - 
structures 
Defence: CS/FI/BE/FC/FO H/W M- 
Sheet pile walls Channel: CB LN/R C/D/F/G/H/M/O/R/S - 
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Figure E. 5 Fragility curves for vertical f uvial defence: narrow, front protected by concrete or 
bricks and masonry 
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Figure E. 9 Fragility curves for vertical fluvial defence: wide, front protected by sheet piles 
Note: Natural and regarded banks are assumed to be `wide' unless a crest width is specified 
Note: Rigid revetments include concrete slabs and flexible revetments include asphalt, concrete 
blockwork and pitched stone. 
Note: No further classification of Type 3 (High Ground) is necessary. 
Figure E. 10 Detailed classification of fluvial slopes or embankments 
E. 2. TYPE 2: SLOPES OR EMBANKMENTS 
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Table E. 2 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for sloping fluvial defences 
Classification Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
Slope or 
embankment 
Embankment Channel: CB/CS L/N/R/W C/D/F/G/fi/K/M/N/O/R/S/W - 
(K/N/W/Z) 






Regraded Channel: CB/CS LlNIR/W C/D/F/G/H/KIM/N/O/R/S/W - 
(K/N/W/Z) 






Natural Channel: CB/CS LN/R/W CID/F/G/ii/K/M/N/O/R/S/W - (K/N/W/Z) 
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Figure E. 11 Fragility curves for sloping fluvial defence: narrow, front protected is natural 
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Figure E. 14 Fragility curves for sloping fluvial defence: narrow, front protection is rip-rap 
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Figure E. 18 Fragility curves for sloping f uvial defence: wide, front protection is rip-rap 
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Table E. 3 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for high ground and culverts 
Classification Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
High Ground HG --- 
Culvert 
Box CU BC A/B/C/D/F/UM/O/P/Q/S/X - 
Pine CU PI A/B/C/D/F/IJM/0/P/O/S/X - 
Note: VE and GE (vegetation and geotextile) are bracketed to demonstrate that they can be 
associated with element types, but not important in the classification process. 
Note: CU (culvert) may have many associated elements (such as protection to the entrance and 
exit), but these are not relevant to the classification process. 
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Figure E. 21 Fragility curves for culverts 
I 
' 
274 Performance-based management of flood defence systems 
Figure E. 22 Detailed classification of vertical coastal defences 
Table E. 4 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for vertical coastal defences 
Classification Relevant NFCDD codes 
Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
Vertical sea wall 
Sheet piles and Seabed/ Foreshore: CB/FS UJ - 
other metals Defence: CS/FI/FC/FO/(DO) W P/L, /S - 
Concrete Seabed/ Foreshore: CB/FS I/J - 
structures Defence: CS/FI/FC/FO/(DO) W C/D/Q - 
Brick and Seabed/ Foreshore: CB/FS I/J - 
masonry Defence: CS/Fl/FC/FO/(DO) W M- 
E. 4. TYPE 5: VERTICAL SEAWALLS 
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Figure E. 28 Fragility curve for vertical coastal defence: wide, bricks and masonry front 
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E. 5. TYPE 6: SLOPING SEAWALLS OR DYKES 
Figure E. 29 Detailed classification of sloping coastal defences 
Table E. 5 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for sloping coastal defences 
Classification Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
Sloping seawall or Seabed/ Foreshore: I/J 
dyke CB/FS 
Defence: B A/B/CID/E/L Permeable: F/i L/J/K/T 
CS! FI/FC/FO/(DO) Impermeable: U/W/Y 
Either: A/B/O/Z 
Note: Permeable revetments include rock armour, impermeable revetments include asphalt. 
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Figure E. 32 Fragility curve for vertical coastal defence: wide, front protection permeable 
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Figure E. 34 Detailed classification of beaches 
C... II SN r, i. 
""ý bi. 
Table E. 6 Classification description and associated NFCDD codes for beaches 
Beach Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
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Figure E. 35 Fragility curve for dunes 
E. 7. CROSS-SECTION DEFENCES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON FRAGILITY 
River defences frequently have outfalls, flap valves, penstocks and sluice gates placed within them. 
These structures are often the point of failure for many such defences and as a result of this need to 
be taken into account when calculating defence fragility and therefore considered in the 
classification. 
This weakening of the structure can be accounted for by a change in the structure's fragility. 
Defences with cross-sectional structures can be identified by querying the NFCDD. The NFCDD 
codes associated with these types of structures are shown in Table E. 7. Whilst this was recognised 
as being important no reduction factor was included in the high level methodology and it was 
identified as an area for further research. 
Table E. 7 The NFCDD codes associated with outfalls, flap valves, penstocks and sluice gates 
Outfalls Type Sub-type Material Revetment 
Flap Valves OI/00/OM/OP F B/US - 
Penstocks 01/00/OM/OP P B/LS - 
Gates OU00/OM/OP 0/G B/LS - Screens OI/00/OM/OP K L/S '- 
E. 8. NFCDD CODES 
The following are the asset identification codes that are used to classify the defences into generic 
types as described above. Codes in grey are not flood defence structural elements. 
Name: ASSET ELEMENT TYPE CODE 
Definition: This code uniquely identifies the asset element type. 
Values: AP-Abstraction Point 
AR-Apron 
BA-Bastion 
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BE-Berm 

























01-Outfall Inward Face 
00-Outfall Outward Face 
OM-Outfall Mechanism 
OP-Outfall Protection 
PI-Pipe or Water Main 
PS-Pumping Station 
DS-Debris Screen 







Name: ASSET ELEMENT SUB TYPE CODE 







FD-Bridge (Flat Deck) 
FM-Crossing (Farm Bridge) 
FB-Crossing (Foot Bridge) 
RA-Crossing (Rail Bridge) 


































*Tetropod is used to represent all man made armour units 
Name: ' ASSET ELEMENT MATERIAL TYPE 




C-Concrete - Cast Insitu 
D-Concrete - Precast 
E-Earth 
F-Corrugated Steel 
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Name: ASSET ELEMENT REVETMENT CODE 














U-Unworked Stone or Rip-rap 
W-Worked Stone or Concrete Slab Cladding 
K-Trees 
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Appendix F 
High Level inundation modelling* 
Having estimated the probability of every scenario of defence failure, the consequences of flooding 
are established by first estimating floodplain depths and finally, the damages resulting from a flood 
of this depth. The key steps are discussed below. A summary of the equations is then provided in 
Table F. 1. An example of each parameter is then given in Table F. 2 and 
Table F. 3. 
Overflow flood volumes -fluvial flood plains 
In the case of overflow of a defence, the flow of water over or through the defence is similar to the 
flow over a rectangular, broad-crested weir and, therefore, the peak discharge Qp is given by 
(French, 1994): 
1.5 Qp lbhmax (F. 1) 
where b is flow width and h, ,.,, is the maximum head over the defence crest or breach, which is an 
empirical function of the form : 
hmax = Blxc' (F. 2) 
where B, and Ct are parameters based on type of failure (HR Wallingford et al., 2002). As 
previously, x is the ratio of the return period of the event under consideration over the SOP of the 
defence, and can take any value between 0 and 3. An upper limit to the ratio x has been defined to 
reflect the natural limit to hm. over any single defence. Above this limit overtopping of upstream 
defences is likely to limit the continued increase in hm,. with increasing load. The flood volume 
from failure of defence section i, Vi, is estimated as: 
Vl = 0.5QpT4x) (F. 3) 
where T, (x) is duration of flow across the defence, defined by the function: 
T, (x) = Ao. 2SB2XC2 (F. 4) 
where A is the catchment area and B2 and C2 are empirical parameters depending on floodplain type 
and return period of the event (HR Wallingford et al., 2002). 
0 The reader is reminded that the flood risk assessment methodologies were created in conjunction with 
external collaborators. The parametric inundation routine used in the high level methodology was provided 
by HR Wallingford Ltd. and is not the work of the author. It is included in this thesis for completeness. 
The reader is referred to HR Wallingford et al. (2002) for a more detailed study of the methodology. 
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As shown above both the duration of the flow across the defence (i. e. T, ) and depth of flow over 
defence (i. e. h) depend on the ratio, x. Therefore, both duration and water depth will increase as the 
ratio x increases. 
Overtopping flood volumes - coastal flood plains 
The coastal overtopping volume, V,, is a function of both waves and water levels and so the volume 
depends on the overtopping rate q per unit length of defence: 
Vi = gbT5(x) (F. 5) 
where b is the width of the defence overtopped, TS(x) is the effective duration of overtopping in 
seconds and the overtopping rate per unit length of defence is approximated from: 
C3 
q= B3x (F. 6) 
The rate q=0.05m3/m/s at x=1 is taken as the point at which significant overtopping occurs in an 
event equal to the SOP and the value of C3 is extracted by fitting to the results of typical 
overtopping analyses (CIRIA and CUR, 1991). The duration of coastal storms is strongly 
influenced by the rise. and fall of the tide and can be approximated (in hours) as: 
TS(x) x. T3 (F. 7) 
Where T, =3 hours, which is the typical effective duration of an overtopping event during a storm 
equal to the SOP. At the upper limit, . 3, the duration of the overtopping event will be 9 hours. In 
practice this depends on the relative magnitude of the tide and surge residual (Pugh, 1987), but in 
the absence of strong evidence to the contrary this has been found to be a good first approximation. 
Breach flood volumes -fluvial and coastal foodplains 
Overtopping is assumed to occur over the entire defence length Sd, whereas breach width, bB, is 
assumed to be a function of the load x: 
bB=x. Cb. Sd 
, 
bB <_ Sd (F. 8) 
where Cb is an empirical constant (HR Wallingford et al., 2002). There is little information on the 
breaching process. Therefore the estimation of the constant Cb has been supported by empirical 
evidence. For example, during the Autumn 2000 floods in England and Wales a river wall in 
Lewes with a SOP of 30-50 years breached along 33m during a 70-100 year return period flood 
event. The flood volume is then estimated from Equations (F. 3) or (F. 5), using T, (x) values from 
Equation (F. 4), and T5(x) values from (F. 7) for coastal defences. 
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Table F. 1 Summary of equations for calculating representative breach widths, maximum head and 
duration offlow across a defence (HR Wallingford et al., 2002) 
Failure mode Defence Type bh or qT 
Fluvial bor = Ldef h= x2B1 Tr = xo. 5Ao. 25 B2 
Overtopping 
Coastal bor=Laef q=x''5B3 Ts=xB. 
Fluvial bB =x BsLdef h= x°'5B. T= xo. sA0. zs B2 
Breaching 
Coastal bB =x B5Ldef h= x°'5B, T=x Bs 
where: 
Ldq = Defence length (m) 
x= Ratio between the return period of the event for which the defence is 
overtopped / breached and SOP of the defence (limited to a maximum value of 3) 
T(x) = Duration of flow across the defence(s) (hours) 
H= Maximum head on breach or defence crest (m) 
Q= Flow per unit length of defence ((m3/sec)/m) 
B. = Representative breach width or length of defence overtopped (m) 
A= Catchment area (km2). 
Bs = Base value of b, determined when the return period is equal to the SoP, assumed to 
be 0.05 for fluvial coastal defences 
B1 = Base value of h, determined when the return period is equal to the SoP, assumed to 
be 0.05m for overflow / overtopping scenario, and 0.5m for breach scenario 
B3 = Base value of q, determined when the Load is equal to the SoP, assumed to be 0.05 
(m3/sec)/m 
B2 = constant, which has the following values 
1.2 hours/km°'s for steep floodplains and Return Period of the event > 50 years 
0.6 hours/lan°'S for steep floodplains and Return Period of the event =< 50 years 
1.2 hours/km°'s for shallow floodplains and Return Period of the event > 50 years 
0.6 hours/km°'s for shallow floodplains and Return Period of the event =< 50 years 
0.8 hours/km°'S for average floodplains and Return Period of the event > 50 years 
0.4 hours/km°'s for average floodplains and Return Period of the event =< 50 years 
B4 3.0 hours for coastal floodplain 
Table F. 2 Estimation of b, h and T parameters for a defence that has been overtopped (HR 
Wallingford et al., 2002) 










(m) (m3/sec/m) (hrs) 
Fluvial 306 100 1000 3 306 0.15 3.78 
"Average slope" 500 3 306 0.15 3.78 
200 2 306 0.10 3.09 
100 1 306 0.05 2.18 
50 0.5 306 0.03 0.77 
Coastal 400 100 1000 10 400 1.58 30.00 
500 5 400 0.56 15.00 
200 2 400' 0.14 6.00 
100 1 400 0.05 3.00 
50 0.5 400 0.02 1.50 
High level inundation modelling 287 
Table F. 3 Estimation of b, h and T parameters for a defence that has been breached (HR 
Wallingford et al., 2002) 
Valley Type LQef SOP RP event Load x 





Fluvial 36 50 1000 3 5.4 0.9 3.78 
200 3 5.4 0.9 3.78 
"Average slope" 100 2 3.6 0.7 3.09 
50 1 1.8 0.5 1.09 
20 0.4 0.72 0.3 0.69 
10 0.2 0.36 0.2 0.49 
Coastal 200 100 1000 3 30 0.9 9 
200 2 20 0.7 6 
100 1 10 0.5 3 
50 0.5 5 0.4 1.5 
70 0.2 2 0.2- 0.6_ 
Flood extent 
The flood outline is obtained from the flood volume, average flood depth and outline shape. A 
uniform flood depth, d=0.2m is assumed. (Note that this depth is used only to establish the flood 
outline and is not further used to estimate the distribution of flood depths or flood damage). The 
floodplain is classified using a 1: 50,000 digital terrain model and the Indicative Floodplain Maps 
(IFMs) as U-shaped for flat floodplains, V-shaped for steeply sloping narrow floodplains, or W- 
shaped for compound floodplains in which depths flood depths increase from the river and then 
reduce (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 2000) as shown in Table F. 4. U-shaped and coastal 
floodplains are assumed to have a semi-circular flood outline centred at the point of failure, with 
equal up and downstream flooding (Figure F. 1 (a)). V-shaped floodplains are assigned a triangular 
flood outline, with greater downstream flooding (Figure F. 1(b)). For all floodplains, when the 
flood outline reaches the extent of the Indicative Floodplain it is elongated upstream and 
downstream rather than allowing it to cross the floodplain boundary (Figure F. 1 (c)). 
ý`"ý Flood outline 
Breach location Defence line 
(a) U-shaped and coastal floodplains 
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Flood outline 
Defence line Breach location ) 
Downstream 
(b) V-shaped floodplains 
IFM Boundary 
" ~', ----ý-- Flood outline 
. 11 
10 
Defence line Breach location 
Downstream 
(c) V-shaped floodplains where flood outline meets boundary of indicative floodplain map 
Figure F. 1 Assumed flood outlines for different valley types 
Table F. 4 Definition offloodplain types (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton, 2000) 
Geomorphology Floodplain width (m) 
Less than 250m 250-500m 500-1000m 
(narrow) (intermediate) (wide) 
Floodplain shape Floodplain characteristics 
U-Shaped Flat flood profile: Sloping to floodplain boundary 
V-Shaped Steeper flood profile: Largely restricted to narrow floodplains 
V 
W-Shaped Compound profile: Depths rising from river and then falling 
Coastal Flat flood profile 
Flood depth 
Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton (2000) reviewed 70 flood scenarios (real and simulated) and 
generated estimates of flood depth at points across the floodplain in floods of a range of severities 
(Table F. 5). These data were used to estimate flood depth at points between a failed defence and 
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the floodplain boundary, in events of a given severity. Due to the limited number of analyses, 
some extreme estimates of flood depth distributed the mean and so the median value of depth is 
taken instead. The depth is assumed to decrease linearly, by factor e, with distance upstream and 
downstream of the failure location, where e=1 at the failed defence and e=0 at the predicted limit 
of the flood outline (Figure F. 2). In the case of multiple defence failures resulting in the flood 
outlines overlapping, the factor e is aggregated to a maximum of 1. If a given point in the 
floodplain is predicted to be inundated in k different defence failure scenarios, each of which 
results in a flood depth yj, j =1,..., k, with corresponding probability Pj then the probability 
of the 





e=1 1e01 Lai, 
e =0 




Figure F. 2 How depth of f looding varies along river from the point of defence failure (e=1) 
References 
CIRIA and CUR (1991), CIRIA Special Publication 83/CUR Report 154, Manual on the use of 
rock in coastal and shoreline engineering, CIRIA, London. 
FRENCH, R. H. (1994), Open channel hydraulics. McGraw-Hill, London. 
HR WALLINGFORD, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, HALCROW and JOHN CHATTERTON 
ASSOCIATES (2002), Risk Assessment for Strategic Planning: High Level Methodology Report, 
HR Wallingford Report SR 603 / DEFRA / Environment Agency Report No W5b-030/TRl. 
PENNING-ROWSELL, E. C. and CHATTERTON, J. B. (2000) Flood depth model: Development 
and Specification, Middlesex University Flood Hazard Research Centre, unpublished report for 
Experion. 
PUGH, D. T. (1987), Tides, Surges and Mean Sea-Level, Wiley, Chichester. 
290 Performance-based management offlood defence systems 
!A ýQ 
Ä 
O = ~ " O 
C/1 v t0 
c e 
Cl, I0 
at c c VVi týJi Ný tV/l tt,, 
CA -3 z ýI ýy ý ý V 
Ö 
eft 
GA 'e, CL. m 
ö ö 
a+ 1-t ot oo öö äN 











O ý+ O N N p rl 
ý 










N O N O b I 






to O 1 
N0 
















































j Vi Vi I 
00 to N V A -4 Vi W J Vi -4 SO -4 J 
N 
W 






















to IV p ý1 NI 
.+ 
N pý :.. jJ w O Ö 
1 J 00 Qý 01 ýO r 00 %O W r y 
N 
O 






O º+ O ý"+ N 
r 
O N O N W 
N 





J 00 .r 4O 00 J W A Viii rý. + 'Q Vi 
1 
'o . ýO 00 
V1 

































r N N O 





























O N I rl J 
r N r N N 


















OI º+ OI º+ r r N O N 
Vi 
O O 
N N O N ý-+ N O N IN 
- LA 00 
W W 
i V Vii Viii rN.. ýO 
W N W oo 
  
O 





W -4 00 
V 









Ö W (ý, W pý 00 O Ö1 W ýC l/ý 
1 10 ýO Vi is W N In %0 
ýD O O O O O r- 
IC 
N 00 ý- O r - + r N O N 
1 1 I 
0 
l J { 0 V N .O r tA '. O 00 Nj { r ýO ýO is Vi ýO 




VNi ýO " 






Cý O, -+ 


























Q O Oý -+ 
N 




!+ O r+ 
0 
00 rI l N IOi N OO Ir N O N CI1 
OI 
r 
























































N I ( 00 ji "I ON 
ý W 
Wl rl A N A r 
r 6 61 6 jýI p r pl r. + r P ý iti 
o- 

























Cý 00 N ýo 
I r rý r, 
ý 
I 00 00 A W 
1 
ý 
01 01 0 0 0 W + r+1 01 - - p p p p -- O (OI N ja 
lr 





.. r .. o lO 
S 
O C 
O O O O O N r r O I r+ O O O O (O N r+ r O r r N r N N 00 vý J N E Äý ý ÄI W W W W 
IW 
O 
V i I ( 
ý 
O N ýN N !N r N ýOp ' 
ý rJ ýI N j 00 IA Iý 
0 V ý1 ýI1 
I 0 
I 
OIO0 OýOý N! ý+ rl0i -+ O Oý O O O 
fN 
º+Irlrir N r r- 
% 
ý ý Z 1 N b 0 N ý W 0 o1 47A l i0 0 0 ; cN 1 
OIOýO OIOI ý+1 O 
1 







N IVIN; N 
rfr 















National flood risk assessment 2002 
The National Flood Risk Assessment 2002 (NFRA) was a project designed to update the previous 
national assessment of flood risk (HR Wallingford et al., 2000, Halcrow et al., 2001) using the 
High Level Risk Assessment methodology described in Chapter 4 of this thesis. It should be noted 
that the author did not directly perform the national analysis, but as a key contributor towards the 
creation of the risk assessment methodology and the implementer of the case study for the river 
Parrett was a member of the advisory board for the project. Summary results of the NFRA 2002 
are provided as a matter of interest to the reader and a reminder of the relevance and applicability 
of the research described in this thesis. Results of the NFRA 2002 (reproduced from HR 
Wallingford et al., 2003) are summarised in Table G. 1 to Table G. 3 below. 
The previous national scale flood risk assessment estimated the national assessment of flood risk to 
be £626 million per year (Halcrow et al., 2001). Using the risk assessment methodology described 
in Chapter 4, this figure has now been calculated as being between £601 and £2,161 million per 
year with a best estimate of £1,060 million per year. 
Expected annual damage results from the NFRA have been categorised into three risk bands. 
Figure G. 1 shows the expected annual damage output from the NFRA for the Parrett catchment. 
Figure G. 2 shows the annual likelihood of inundation, again categorised into three bands, and the 
probability of defences being breached or overtopped. 
The two most likely causes of the difference between these estimates is the change in methodology 
and the difference between the depth-damage curves used. Although still limited by the 
availability of data on a national scale, the high level method provides a number of improvements 
over the previous national scale flood risk assessment by Halcrow et al. (2001) because: 
" defence failure is calculated as a function of load rather than as a point value, thereby providing 
a complete overview of defence performance. 
" the extent of flooding is estimated instead of assuming that a defence breach along a given 
reach floods all land behind this reach, thereby allowing defences to be associated with the 
parts of the floodplain they protect. 
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" multiple defence failures are considered, allowing the compound effects to be analysed, 
thereby considering all possible failure scenarios that can result in flooding of a given impact 
zone. 
" the depth of flooding is estimated instead of assuming inundation of a percentage of the 
floodplain behind a reach, thereby providing more accurate damage estimation. 
Table G. I Results for flood risk at regional and national level 
Number of Properties at Risk (k) Number of 
Region Agricultural People at Risk (k) 
Residential Commercial 
(k hectares) 
Anglian - -- 292 22.6 571 ---- -- ---- 701 
Midlands 193 16.5 173 464 
NorthEast 243 15.7 196 583 
NorthWest 144 10.5 90 345 
Southern 142 14.3 112 341 
SouthWest 71.3 8.3 111 171 
Thames 418 35.1 68 1000 
Wales 102 8.2 107 244 
National 1,610 131 1,430 3,850 
Table G.? Results for flood risk at regional and national level 
Value of Property at Risk Expected Annual Damage 
Region (£ Billion ) (£ million / year) 
Residential Agricultural Lower bound Upper bound Best estimate 
Anglian 40.1 3.04 106 370 184 
Midlands 21.5 0.78 37 143 68 
NorthEast 18.5 0.84 95 295 159 
NorthWest 12.6 0.39 71 226 119 
Southern 24.5 0.48 52 181 91 
SouthWest 9.9 0.41 27 118 52 
Thames 71.6 0.27 153 572 276 
Wales 10.0 0.31 60 256 111 
National 208.7 6.52 601 2161 1060 
.Sý 5' 
.. 
; lk hi 
4: '- 
! '. 
National flood risk assessment 2002 
Table G. 3 Distribution of Average Annual Damage at regional and national level 
% Area within Region for Given Expected Annual Damage (EAD)' 
Region 
EAD <lk/ ha ilk / ha < EAD <£5k ha 
Anglian 96% 2% 
Midlands 93% 3% 
NorthEast 92% 4% 
NorthWest 88% 7% 
Southern 92% 5% 
SouthWest 95% 2% 
Thames 79% 11% 
Wales 93% 4% 
National 93% 4% 
(Note: All agricultural land categorised as <£lk/ha) 
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Figure G. 1 GIS output from the National Flood Risk Assessment 2002 showing the expected annual 
damage for the Parrett catchment 
'A small percentage of the floodplain was disassociated from rivers and coastline and was therefore not 
evaluated. 
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The previous national assessment used the FLAIR dataset (Middlesex University, 1990), whereas 
the NFRA 2002 used data from the recently published Multi-Coloured Manual (Penning-Rowsell et 
al., 2003). The FLAIR dataset was also used in the case study in Chapter 4 to allow comparison 
with the previous study. On average the damage values used have increased two or threefold using 
the latest datasets. Using the old methodology - but with the new depth-damage curves, the flood 
risk would be calculated to be over 100% of its original estimate (HR Wallingford et a/., 2003). 
A 
This suggests that whilst the updated depth-damage dataset increases the overall estimate of flood 
risk, the improved high level risk assessment methodology acts to reduce the estimate. 
hors 
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Figure G. 2 GIS output showing from the National Flood Risk Assessment 2002 showing the annual 
likelihood of inundation and annual probability of breaching or overtopping of defences 
The autumn 2000 floods in England and Wales resulted in damages (to property and agricultural 
land) of the order of Million (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2002). This was caused by the wettest 
autumn on record and resulted in 10,000 properties being flooded at over 700 locations 
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(Environment Agency, 2001). It may therefore seem surprising that the national assessment of 
annual average damage is in the order of Million too. A lower figure might well be expected. A 
number of possible reasons for this being the case are now discussed. 
As previously identified, the depth-damage data used (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2003) was 
substantially higher than that used (Middlesex University, 1990) in the previous national 













-ý 2001 Assessment Data 
, -R-NFRA 2002 Data 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 
Damage £/m2 
Figure G. 3 Weighted mean depth-damage curves for NFRA 2002 national flood risk assessment 
and previous assessment performed in 2001 
It is important to remember that the latest depth-damage this data does contain the most up to date 
information on flood damages and includes analysis of the serious flood events of 1998 and 2000, 
therefore adding weight to the credibility of the updated values. These values were obtained from 
post flood event surveys and questionnaires given to other property owners asking them to provide 
information on their building, fittings, equipment and stock. The number of property categories 
has been significantly reduced in the new dataset. Whilst this simplifies aspects of handling the 
data, it results in wide bounds on the depth-damage curves reflecting the variability in properties 
that, for example, can be termed "Retail shops". Figure G. 4 shows the difference between the 
upper and lower bounds on damage for retail shops, that are for some flood depths greater than 
£ 1000/m2 apart. 
Inaccuracies in the SOP and condition grade data also affect the results of the risk asset 
management. These errors were also identified by Halcrow er al. (2001) in the previous national 
assessment of flood risk. On a national scale it is likely that many of these local errors will cancel 
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themselves out. The fragility curve is based on only limited analysis and consequently the reliance 
on expert judgements may be identified as a source of uncertainty. However, the use of fragility 
curves provides a significant improvement over previous risk assessment methods that define the 
probability of failure as being constant over all loadings. This is because the fragility curve acts to 
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Figure G. 4 Depth-damage curve for a "Retail shop" ; showing lower, upper and indicative damage 
bounds for fluvial flooding (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2002) 
The source of uncertainty most likely to have resulted in a flood risk assessment that is too high is 
related to the inundation modelling. The parametric modelling equations, whilst initially based on 
rules of thumb and expert judgement, have been calibrated to reduce the associated uncertainty. 
During the study it was recognised that the Indicative Floodplain Map (IFM) contained flaws. 
Areas of floodplain that are disassociated from watercourses and coastline were ignored in the 
analysis. Despite this, areas of high ground encapsulated within the IFM are not recognised. This 
error is particularly significant in some cities where enormous engineering channels, capable of 
conveying the 100 year flood without raised embankments are identified as having an associated 
100 year floodplain. Inaccuracies have also been recognised in other studies (Mylius, 2003). 
Errors in the IFM result from a number of reasons. The IFM was constructed from a number of 
different sources that include the surveys done as a result of Section 105 of the Water Resources 
Act, other modelling studies, previous maximum recorded flood outlines and expert judgement. 
Inaccuracies in each of the datasets are likely to be compounded when they are aggregated. Due to 
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insufficient data no hydrodynamic modelling could be undertaken to verify the outline or quantify 
the uncertainty associated with using it. 
The IFM is not the only source of uncertainty associated with the data used in the inundation 
modelling. The most likely source of inaccuracy is the use of statistical flood data (Penning- 
Rowsell and Chatterton, 2000) to estimate flood depths across the floodplain. This data was 
constructed from approximately 70 real and simulated flood events. However, with 
6 different 
types of valley classifications ('U', `U medium', `V', `V narrow', `W', `coastal'), the number of 
data points used to describe flood depths across each valley 
is frequently less than 10. Application 
of this dataset nationally is questionable due to the statistical insignificance of this sample size. 
Another issue with the data is the use of maximum depths from the original data. Only the 
maximum 5% of all the flood depths were used. The values used (shown 
in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4) 
in the NFRA were the median of this 5% (equivalent to the 97.5 percentile of the original data). 
This removes the very extreme values of the maximum depths, but still heavily biases the overall 
flood depths towards the maximum floods which is inappropriate for an assessment on a national 
scale. Data from the original analysis was unavailable meaning a more appropriate statistical 
measure, such as the mean depth, could not be calculated. Use of the mean depth, as opposed to 
the median of the maximum 5%, would result in a significant decease in the flood depth values 
used and therefore a significant decrease in the overall risk. The additional risk contribution that 
results from use of this dataset can not be evaluated. However, the increase in flood risk resulting 
from overestimates of flood depth will be compounded by the significant increase in the depth- 
damage relationships. 
Despite the fact that over 700 locations were flooded in 2000, only 20 locations contained more 
than 100 properties and in no single location were more than 230 properties flooded. No major city 
was seriously inundated. Therefore, whilst the floods were undoubtedly serious in some respects, 
their localisation meant that there is potential for significantly greater consequences given suitable 
conditions. This demonstrates the spatial complexity of the problem that flood risk managers face. 
Human intervention is not included in this risk assessment and this has potential to significantly 
reduce flood risk. Emergency repair, for example, may make a significant contribution to reducing 
the frequency of breaching. During the 1995 fluvial floods in the Netherlands a number of dykes 
were heavily reinforced and it is very likely that as a result of this there were no breaches and 
therefore considerably reduced damages (Langemheem, 2002). Successful flood warning 
dissemination that results in an appropriate response from floodplain residents can also 
significantly reduce the damages (eg. by moving valuables) associated with a flood event (Figure 
G. 5). 
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A number of points raised in the preceding sections have identified a number of possible sources of 
error in making a risk assessment on a national scale. The influence of some of these factors on the 
national flood risk assessment will remain unquantified. However, this does not render it useless. 
The national flood risk assessment provides a consistent and transparent tool with which to 
estimate the expected annual economic consequences of flooding. The methodology is a step 
towards a full probabilistic, process-based assessment of national flood risk. It can be used in 
national policy analysis by testing scenarios of changed flood frequency, investment in flood 
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Figure G. 5 Comparison between indicative depth-damage curves for a retail shop that receives a 
flood warning and a shop that does not receive a warning (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2003) 
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Appendix H' 
Uncertain inference using interval probability 
theory 
This appendix explains the evidence propagation calculation that is used by the PERIMETA 
software. The methodology used for evidence propagation was originally implemented by Hall et 
al. (1998). This was improved by Hall (1999) and recent developments have allowed the logical 
inference algorithm to be simplified. For simplicity, an example with two sub-systems propagating 
evidence to one super-system is used. The theory behind the calculation is first introduced and 
subsequently followed by an example. 
In the following sections, E, is a proposition that provides information about a hypothesis, H. The 
evidence of performance is used to judge the belief in the proposition, E. The hypothesis relates to 
the super-system of the process model and the propositions relates to the sub-systems of the 
process model. The interval probability is defined as P(E) C= [S(E), S, (E)] where S(E) represents 
the extent to which it is certainly believed that the proposition, E, is dependable and 1-S, (E) 
represents the extent to which the evidence is certainly not dependable and the value Sp(E)-SA(E) 
represents the uncertainty of belief in the dependability of E. 
H. I. COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS 
H. M. Classical probability theory 
Consider two propositions, El and E2 in which P(E1) =p and P(E2) = q. p and q are measures on 
the interval [0,1] and do not necessarily add to unity. Figure H. 1 shows how probability 
assignments, m;, are distributed over ElxE2. 
Ei EI 
E2 mº m2 l=q 
E2 m3 m4 
Ep 
Figure H. 1 Representation of a compound proposition using classical probability theory 
Uncertain inference using interval probability theory 
Therefore: 
" P=mI+m3=P(EI), 
" q=m2+m4=P(E2), and, 
41 Emj =1. 
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This problem has one degree of freedom and therefore one further piece of information 
is required 
about the relationship between E1 and E2 in order to establish values for m;. Knowledge of p and q 










Figure H. 2 Bounds on probabilities with one unconstrained degree of freedom 
H. 1.2. Interval probability theory 
Consider the two interval propositions El and E2, such that P(E) e [S(E), Sp (E)] with probability 
assignments, m;, to EjxE2 as shown in Figure H. 3. 




S. ( EI) 
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Figure H. 3 Representation of compound propositions using interval probability theory 
The dependency between the two propositions is defined as the interval [pi, p]. Referring back to 
Section 6.3.3: 
S, (E1 n E2) = pr. min(S(EI), S,, (E2)) (H. 1) 
Sp (El n E2) = pu. min(Sp(Ei), Sp(E2)) (H. 2) 
S. (El v E2) = S,. (E, ) + SS(E2) - pi. min(SS(E1), SS(E2)) 
S 
,p 
(El U E2) = SP(EI) + Sp(E2) - pu. min(Sp(E1), SP(E2)). 
(H. 3) 
(H. 4) 
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In terms of interval probabilities: 
P(El nE2)=(m11, m11 +m13 +m31 +m33) (H. 5) 
P(E1 nE2)=Lrn129 m12 +m13 +m32 +m331 (H. 6) 
P(Ei nE2)Lm21+ m21 +m23 +m31 +m33] (H. 7) 
P(E1 nE2)=Lm222 m22 +m23 +m32 +m33] (H. 8) 
And the bounds on P(E1) and P(E2) are: 
P(E1) = [m11 + M12 + m13 " mit + m12 + m13 + m31 + M32 + M331 (H. 9) 
P(E2) = Lm11 + m13 + m21 , ml l+ m13 + m21 + m23 + m31 + M331 
(H. 10) 
The values of my on the interval [0,1] are constrained such that: 
Sn(Ei)-mtt+mti+mt3 (11.11) 
1-Sp(E1)=me1+m22+m23 (11.12) 
Sn(E2)=m t t+m21+m31 (H. 13) 




Therefore, from Equations H. 1 and H. 5: 
m1i=p! x min(SS(Ei), SS(E2)) (H. 16) 
and from Equation H. 8: 
M22 =S (El nE2)=1-Sp(El JE2) (H. 17) 
so from Equation H. 4: 
m22=1 - Sp(E1) - Sp(E2) + p x min(Sp(Ei), Sp(E2)) (H. 18) 
P(E1 n E2) and P(-El n E2) are uniquely defined, however unique intervals under all values of 
P(Ei), P(E2) and p for P(E1 n E2) and P(E1 n E2) cannot be found with the restraints of 
Equations H. 11 to H. 18. To obtain these values would require knowledge of the dependency 
between El and E2 and between El and EZ, therefore a family of permissible values is calculated 
(Figure H. 6) where p=1 indicates that El c E2 (i. e. El and E2 are nested propositions) whilst 
p= max(P(E1), P(E2)) (H. 19) 
if they are independent. The minimum value of p is given by 
P(E1) + P(E2) -1 0) p= max 
min(P(Ei ), P(E2 )) 9 
(H. 20 
.9 
; where p=0 indicates that E1 and E2 are disjoint or mutually exclusive such that E1. E2=0. 
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This approach to obtaining the assignments can be extended to three or more propositions. For 
three propositions the compound proposition figure would take the form of a cube, for n 
propositions the figures will occupy n-dimensional space. A problem with n propositions will have 
3" degrees of freedom. Assigning an interval probability using this methodology provides 2n 
constraints, the dependency measures will provide an additional n! /(n-2)! constraints, with a final 




-1 (n - 2)t 
degrees of freedom (this compares to 2"-n-1 degrees for compound propositions using classical 
probability theory). This provides a cogent motive for implementing the methodology using 
software and describing only a small evidence propagation problem in detail. 
H. 2. LOGICAL INFERENCE 
Having established a method for combining probabilities, the relationship between the 
propositions, El, E2... E about the performance of sub-systems 1,2... n and some hypothesis, H, 
about the performance of their super-system needs to be addressed. To establish the support, P(H), 
on the basis of the propositions, P(E) and the relationship between E and H need to be established. 
This relationship is defined by the conditional measures P(AE) and P(H E) which can be 
obtained using the theorem of total probability (see Section 3.2.4). Referring back to Section 6.3.6, 
for a single proposition Dubois and Prade (1990) adapted the total probability theorem for interval 
probability to show the bounds on H, S. and Sp can be calculated using: 
S(H)=S(HI E)S(E)+S(HI E)(1-S. (E)) ; S. (HI E)ZS(HI E), 
S. (H) = S (H I E)S p (E) + S. (H (E)(1- SP (E)) ; otherwise (H. 21) 
and 
Sp(H)=Sp(HI E)Sp(E)+Sp(HI E)(1-S, (E)) ; Sp(HI E)zSp(HI E), 
Sp (H) = Sp (H I E)Sn (E) + Sp (H I E)(1- S (E)) ; otherwise (H. 22) 
In the case where there are two propositions, El and E2, the total probability theorem dictates that: 
P(H) = P(H I El rn E2). P(El n E2) + P(H I El n E2). P(El n E2) + 
(H. 23) P(H I EI n E2). P(El n E2) + P(H I El n E2). P(El r) 
where P(H I E, rs E2) , P(H I E, n E2) , P(H I E, n E2) and P(H EI r E2) define the 
relationship between H and El and E2. This is illustrated by the Venn diagram shown in Figure 
H. 4. 
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Figure H. 4 Relationship between H and two propositions El and E2 
So, for example, if El and E2 are both necessary conditions for H then 
P(H I E, n EZ) = P(H I El n E2) = P(H I El n E2) =0, meaning that 
P(H) = P(H I El n E2). P(El n E2) . If both propositions are necessary and sufficient for H, then 
P(1AE1nE2)=1, so P(H)=P(E1r E2). It is not usually the case that hypotheses are entirely sufficient 
or necessary. However, Equation H. 23 can be re-written as: 
P(H) - 
JP(H I E2), '(E2) + )(H I Ei)"P(Ei) -_ 
-_-_ (H. 24) P(H I EI n E2). P(El n E2) + P(H I El n E2). P(El n E2), 
The conditional probabilities can be defined by the modeller (Section H. 3). Table H. 1 shows the 
assignments that potentially contribute to the probabilities of three of the four subsets in Equation 
H. 24. The subset P(E, nE2) does not need to be included in Table H. 1. The following 
methodology ensures that the assignments ml,, m3Iv M132 m33 which would contribute to this 
probability are not double counted, thereby negating the need to subtract them. 
Table H. 1 Assignments that contribute to the upper bound of the probabilities 
M11 m12 ml; M21 M22 m23 m31 m32 m3; 
Corresponding Conditional 
probability (C; ) 
P(E1) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 P(I1E1) 
P(E2) 1 0 1 1 0 1" 1 0 1 P(HIE2) 
S (H EI n E2) , P(El n E2) 0 0 ,0 
0 1 1 0 1 1 
Sp(HIE1nE2)] 
Upper and lower bounds on S,, and Sp can now be established. The minimum of S(H) will occur 
when the largest combination of mass assignments are applied to the smallest conditional 
probability. This procedure is formalised as follows: 
(1) Use S (H Ir E2) as the conditional probability related to P(Ej r E2) . 
(2) Order the conditional probabilities such that C1<C2<C3. 
(3) For C1, sum all the corresponding values of m; 1 from Table H. 1 to obtain M,. 
(4) For C2, sum all values of mj from Table H. 1 that have not been summed previously (M2). 
- 
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(5) For C3, sum the remaining values of my from Table H. 1 (M3). 
(6) Subject to restraints defined in Figure H. 6: 
S. (H) = min [CIMI + C2M2 + C3M3 
] (H. 25) 
M12-m=1 
To calculate SP(H): 
(1) Use SP (H I El n E2) as the conditional probability related to P(-Et n E2) . 
(2) Order the conditional probabilities such that Cl<C2<C3. 
(3) For C3, sum all the corresponding values of m;; from Table H.! to obtain M3. 
(4) For C2, sum all values of m;, that have not been summed previously (M2). 
(5) For C1, sum the remaining values of my (MI). 
(6) Subject to restraints defined in Figure H. 6: 
S (H) = max [C1M1 + C2M2 + C3M3] (H. 26) Sp 
m12-m21 
H3. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPOSITIONS AND THE HYPOTHESIS 
In terms of software implementation, for ease of use, the model developer is asked to enter three 
parameters; dependency, sufficiency and necessity. These define the relationship between a 
proposition, E, and the hypothesis, H. The relationship between interval probability theory and 
these parameters is described below. 
H3.1. Dependency between propositions 
Dependency is first defined by the dependency parameter on a scale of ["1,1]. A linear 
transformation converts this to the actual dependency, p, on a scale [0,11 defined by three points in 
Table H. 2 with points in between linearly extrapolated. This is a convenient means of exploring 
different dependence relationships when the exact nature is uncertain 
Table H. 2 The relationship between the dependency parameter and p 
Mutually exclusive Independent Dependent 
p0 max(P(Ei), P(E2)) 1 
Dependency parameter -1 01 
H. 3.2. Necessity and sufficiency 
As defined in Chapter 6, the sufficiency, S, is a measure of the influence that a given sub-system 
has on the performance of its parent or super-system, and, the necessity, N, is a measure of the 
extent to which failure (non-performance) of a sub-system will cause failure (non-performance) of 
its parent super-system. A necessity and sufficiency value is defined for each sub-process. The 
sufficiency value is directly mapped to the conditional probability: 
P(H1E; ) = suf(E; ) (H. 27) 
ýýý 
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The necessity value is used to approximate the conditional probabilities of the negation of all the 
propositions P(H I El n E2 t -I 
S(H I El r E2 _ ... En)= 2I 0+imin 
[1-nec(Ei)]) (H. 28) 
-1 n 
Sp (H I E, n E2 n... En 
)= 2 (1 
+ max [1- nec(E; )1) (H. 29) 
These heuristic rules were 
defined 
by averaging two intervals. The first interval is totally uncertain 
[0,1] and reflects the fact that the exact relationship between the necessities of the propositions and 
the conditional probabilities is unknown. The second interval is the negation of minimum and 
maximum necessities of the propositions, [min(1-nec(E1)), max(1-nec(E2))], and uses the user- 
defined information on necessity to constrain the conditional probability of negation. This 
relationship between necessity and conditional probability was validated through model testing. 
H. 4. EXAMPLE 
The example model is shown in Figure H. 5 and the variables that can be defined by the modeller 
have been assigned the values shown in Table H. 3. It can be seen from Figure H. 5 that the bounds 
for the super-system are calculated as P(H) e [0.36,0.73). 
Figure H. 5 Figure of merits for two sub-systems and their super-system 
Table H. 3 The input values for the example problem shown in Figure H. S 
Sub-system 1 Sub-system 2 
S(E1) 0.3 S(E2) 0.5 
S E, 0.6 SD(E2) 0.8 
Necessity (]Vl) 0.4 Necessity (N2) 0.2 
Sufficiency (SI) 0.6 Sufficiency (S2) 0.4 
Dependency 0.5 Dependency 
10.5 
The value of p assuming independence between the sub-systems is calculated as [0.5,0.8]. The 
actual value of p (calculated using the user-defined dependency value of 0.5) is therefore [0.75, 
0.9]. This enables the assignments of the compound proposition to be established as shown in 
Figure H. 6. 








E2 E2 E2u 
0.5 0.2 0.3 
0.23 m12 0.07-m12 
m21 0.14 0.26 -m21 
0.27-m21 0.06-m12 m 10.03 0.03 
subject OS<m12<0.06 
to: 0<-M2,: 50.26 
0.035 m21+m i2 
Figure H. 6 Compound proposition P(E, ) e [0.3,0.6], P(E2) E [0.5,0.8], pc 
[0.75,0.9] defined by 
dependency parameter of 0.5 
Following the steps outlined previously for this example: 
(1) P(H I Ej n E2) is calculated as [0.3,0.9], take S,, (H I El r1 E2) =0.3 
(2) The conditional probabilities are ordered: C1=0.3 (P(H I El n E2)) < C2=0.4 
(P(F11E2)) < 
C3=0.6 (P(IIEI)) 
(3) Mi = m22+m23+m32+m33 = 0.43 
(4) M2 = mll+m13+m21+m31= 0.57-mt2 
(5) M3=m12 
(6) SA(H)=min[O. 3X0.43+0.4x(0.57-m12)+0.6xmi2]=0.36 as calculated by the software, this 
occurs when m12=0 and 0.03 : 5m21 <_0.26 
Following the methodology for Sp(IH), it is verified as being 0.73: 
(1) P(H I El n E2) is calculated as [0.3,0.9], take Sp (H IT, n Ez) =0.9 
(2) The conditional probabilities are ordered: C, =0.4 (P(HIE2)) < C2=0.6 (P(HjE1)) < C3=0.9 
(P(H I EI n E2) ) 
(3) M3 = m22+m23+m32+m33 = 0.43 
(4) M2 = mll+m12+m13+m31= 0.57-m21 
(5) Mi = met 
(6) S(H)=max[0.4xm21+0.6X(0.57-m21)+0.9XO. 43]=0.73, at m21 0 and 0.03 Sm12 : -50.06 
References 
DUBOIS, D. and PRADE, H. (1990), A discussion of uncertainty handling in support logic 
programming, in Int. J. Intelligent Systems, vol 5, pp 15-42. 
HALL, J. W. (1999), Uncertainty management for coastal defence systems, PhD Thesis, Bristol 
University. 
HALL, J. W., BLOCKLEY, D. I. and DAVIS, J. P. (1998), Uncertain inference using interval 




PERIMETA: Software guidance 
This Appendix is the help documentation for the PERIMETA software that has been developed by 
the research group, including the author, that was engaged in the EPSRC Condition Monitoring and 
Asset Management for complex infrastructure systems (CMAM) project. The author was involved 
in designing the specification of the software and was solely responsible for the case study 
described in Chapter 6, whilst the software implementation was conducted by co-researchers. 
This documentation is included to provide a more thorough overview of the workings of the 
software. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
PERIMETA (Performance Through Intelligent Measurement) is a software supported methodology 
to manage the performance of complex infrastructure systems. 
This appendix explains the features of the software, how the tool is used to create and analyse 
system performance and an explanation of the key terminology. The appendix is organised into the 
following sections: 
" An overview of the software tool and the main GUI elements. 
" Creating processes and links in the model. 
" Adding performance indicators. 
" Viewing different aspects of performance. 
" Calculating evidence propogation. 
"A glossary of terms. 
I. 2. OVERVIEW 
After launching the PERIMETA application a PERIMETA model needs to be created. Either a new 
empty model is created or a previously saved model may be opened from a PERIMETA document. 
See File menu options for more details. The PERIMETA model encapsulates the process model 
and links, the performance indicators and the aspects of performance. Currently only one 
PERIMETA document at a time may be opened. The user interface is split into three main areas, 
indicated in Figure I. 1. 
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t 
The main pane displays either the graphical network view of the processes or the performance 
indicator search results. To switch between these use menu options-View I Process Graph or View ý 
Performance Indicators, or the related toolbar buttons. 
The properties pane displays details about the currently selected object in the main pane. Selecting 
the background in the graphical view will display summary details for the model. Selecting more 
than one object will display nothing. 
The directory pane displays the graphical network of processes as a hierarchical tree view. 
Selecting processes in the directory pane will display the processes in the main pane. 
1.2.1. Menu 
The main window shows seven drop-down menu options: 
File Edit View Model Calculation Window Hj 
ý' ; 
Figure 1.1 The main pane, properties pane and directory pane of the PERIMETA software 
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File Menu 
New Create a new empty PERIMETA model with no processes or performance 
indicators. The model is given a default name. 
Open Open an existing PERIMETA model from a PERIMETA document. These are 
stored as XML files and have an xml extension. The document must match the 
PERIMETA XML schema, cmam-model. xsd, or it can not be openned. 
Close Close the currently displayed PERIMETA model without ending the 
application. 
Save Save the PERIMETA model to a PERIMETA document. If previously saved 
then will be saved to the same file, otherwise a save dialog will prompt for a file 
name. 
Save As Save the PERIMETA model to a PERIMETA document and specify the save 
file name. 
Save As JPEG Save the process graph image as a JPEG file. 
Exit Exit the application. 
Edit Menu 
Undo Undo last edit. 
Copy Copy selection to the clipboard. Use to copy processes and links in the process 
graph view or performance indicators in the performance indicator view. Note 
that copied processes also include copies of associated performance indicators, 
however copied performance indicators do not include copies of associated 
processes. 
Paste Paste the selection from the clipboard. 
Delete Delete the current selection(s) in the graph or performance indicator views. 
Select All Select all processes and links in the process graph view. 
View Menu 
Zoom In Zoom into the process graph view. 
Zoom Normal Reset to the normal scale in the process graph view. 
Zoom Out Zoom out from the process graph view. 
Zoom To Fit Zoom to a scale such that the entire process graph fits into the current main 
pane. 
Process Graph Switch to the process graph view. 
Performance Switch to the performance indicator view. 
Indicators 
Split Process Split (or reform) the process graph into two views of the same model. The top 
Graph view is read only, the bottom allows changes. 
Show/Hide Grid Controls whether the grid in the graph view is visible. 
Show/Hide Link Display the necessity/sufficiency as a label over the link in the graph view. 
Labels 
Model Menu 
Add Process Create a new process with default attributes. 
Add Create a new performance indicator with default attributes. 
Performance 
Indicator 
Import Performance indicators created in another application may be imported from an 
Performance XML file. The document must match the PERIMETA performance indicator 
Indicators schema, cmam-perfind. xsd. 
Maintain Add, delete or update performance aspects. 
Performance 
Aspect 
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Calculation Menu 
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Suspend Disable/Enable changes in local evidence from being propagated up through the 
Evidence network. 
Propagation 
Recalculate Recalculate propagated evidence for all process nodes in the network for all 
Evidence aspects of performance. 
Propagation 
Calculation Allow the learning rate and necessity power to be set for this PERIMETA 
Preferences model. These variables are used to approximate the 2^N judgements to 2N 
sufficiency and necessity judgements for N processes. Also enables the direct 
input of conditional probabilities (see calculation preferences for more 
information). 
Window Menu 
Directory Pane Show/Hide the directory pane. 




Field-Level Go straight to the relevant help section appropriate to the GUI control in the 
Help application. Only some controls are set-up for this, if not the top level help is 
displayed. 
About Information about PERIMETA 
PERIMETA 
1.2.2. Toolbar 
The controls in the toolbar are listed below. Follow the link to the menu options for a fuller 
description of the action. 
Icon Menu equivalent Description 
Q, p File I New Create a new empty PERIMETA model. 
File Open Open an existing PERIMETA document. 
File Save Save the PERIMETA model to a PERIMETA document. 
View I Performance Switch to the performance indicator view. 
Indicators 
jZ View I Process Graph Switch to the process graph view. 
Window I Properties Pane Show or hide the properties pane. % View Split Process Graph Split or reform the process graph view. ß View Zoom Normal Show process graph view at normal size. View Zoom In Zoom in to process graph. 
View I Zoom Out Zoom out of process graph. % View Zoom To Fit Zoom to show entire process graph in main pane. ® Model I Add Process Add a new process to the graph. k? Help I Field-Level Help Enter field level help mode. 
Calculation I Suspend Prevent evidence from being automatically propagated. Evidence Pronaeation 
Overview, ý+ I Choose the current aspect ofperformance view. 
ý. rý. tq 
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1.3. CREATING A NEW PROCESS MODEL 
I3.1. Introduction 
A PERIMETA model graph defines the parent and child processes which form the engineering 
system under consideration. The graph is formally a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). 
Directed: It has direction from top to bottom as super processes are broken down into sub- 
processes. 
Acyclic: Cycles of child to parent back to child are not allowed (an error message is displayed in 
the status bar if such a link is attempted). 
Graph: A child process may feed into more than one parent. 
Evidence is applied to the PERIMETA model by assigning performance indicators to a process or 
by entering local evidence (Figure of Merit) directly. This evidence is propagated through the 
model using interval probability theory. Although the direction of the graph is top down for process 
decomposition, the propagation of evidence is bottom up. 
A tree view of the graph is presented in the directory pane. This allows larger graphs to be 
inspected and navigated in a more compact form. Note that converting a DAG to a tree 
representation requires that child processes with multiple parents appear more than once. 
1.3.2. Presenting the evidence 
The evidence for and against a proposition represented by a process is displayed with an'Italian 
Flag' symbol where green is evidence for, red is evidence against and white is the uncertainty. 
Sn Sp 
Gr 
4-Sn-- <- 1-Sp -> 
Figure I. 2 The Italian Flag showing evidence for and against a proposition 
The evidence for is Sn and the evidence against is 1-Sp. The interval pair numeric value is 
displayed as [Sn, Sp]. 
1.3.3. Creating the model 
Use menu option Model I Add Process or the ® toolbar button to add a new process. 
Press mouse down and drag to change the process position. 
Place the mouse over the top or bottom of the process to highlight the link end points (blue oval). 
Drag to create a link between processes, the link will snap to the nearest valid end point. 
Highlighting a process or a link by clicking on it will load the property pane with the process 
attributes or link attributes. Use the property pane to edit details about the process or link. 
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I3.4. Process Attributes 
The process attributes are split between three tabs. All user entered values are saved to the 
PERIMETA model in memory by pressing enter or by tabbing off the control. A process has a 
number of attributes that can be associated with it. These are listed in the following sections. 
Description and evidence 
' ý 
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Figure 1.3 Pane showing process properties 
ID Is a unique identifier for the process within the model and is assigned 
automatically. 
Name Is a user supplied name. 
Desc Is an optional description of the process. 
Local Figure of Is either read only and calculated from assigned performance indicators or 
Merit may be assigned by ticking 'Direct Evidence' and dragging from either end of 
the bar. If there is no local FOM this is displayed as the interval [0,1]. 
Propagated Is read only and displays evidence contributed from children of this process. If 
Figure of Merit there is no local FOM this is displayed as the interval [0,1]. 
Combined Is read only and is a weighted sum of local and propagated FOM. If there is no 
Figure of Merit local FOM the weights are ignored and the propagated FOM is used (and vice 
versa). 
Local Weighting Weights the contribution of local FOM. 
Propagated Weights the contribution of propagated FOM. 
Weighting 
Direct Evidence Allows local FOM to be set directly for this process by clicking and dragging 
on the local FOM italian flag. 
ýý 
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Associate performance indicators 
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Figure I. 4 Pane showing performance indicators associated with a process 
Associate Displays a dialog of all performance indicators not already assigned to this 
process and sorted alphabetically by name. One or more may be selected and 
pressing OK associates them with this process. 
Remove Is enabled if a performance indicator entry is selected, it then removes the 
association with the process. 
Amend Value Allows an aspect specific value function to be assigned to this 
Function process/performance indicator combination. 
Weight Is used to combine performance indicators. A value between 0 and 1 may be 
entered and this is normalised when applied to calculate the local FOM from 
the non dimensional performance indicator values. 
Commentary 
tasted out with direct evidence have now moved 
Ito performance indicator based. 
Figure I. 5 Process specific commentary box 
Commentary Allows supporting information to be recorded. 
1.3.5. Value Functions 
The value functions are predefined within the PERIMETA software and consist of one linguistic 
and five numeric value functions. 
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Figure 1.6 Linguistic Performance Indicator 
The linguistic value function comprises a set of curves, one for each of the five performance values 
(very poor, poor, medium,. good, very good). The curve above is for good performance. The x-axis 
scale takes five discrete values representing confidence in the performance value. 
Numeric 
Each numeric value function requires an upper and lower bound to be set. By reversing these, i. e. 
making the upper bound less than the lower bound, the sign of the curve is reversed. The bounds 
are used to limit the acceptable measured values. 
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Figure 1.11 S-shaped value function. 
1.3.6. Performance Indicators 
Introduction 
Performance indicators represent evidence about the performance of a process. This evidence is 
assembled from all available sources, including monitoring measurements, inspection records, 
design calculations and expert judgements. The measured value of performance may be input as a 
numeric value or a linguistic statement. 
Measured performance will typically be against a collection of different dimensions and so to 
estimate the system performance a dimensional measure must be passed through a value function 
to: 
" map onto a common non-dimensional scale 
" compare with an organisational target that represents good performance 
If a process has more than one performance indicator these may be weighted according to relative 
importance (see process attributes). 
Performance indicators are created and exist separately from the PERIMETA model graph of 
processes. They are not dependent on the aspect of performance, although when assigned to 
processes will have aspect specificproperties set. They may be assigned to more than one process 
including processes in the same path, for example a parent and child process. 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
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Adding/Deleting 
Performance indicators are stored as a list within the PERIMETA model. They are not displayed 
by 
default, to show some or all of the list use the search button. The results are displayed 
in a table: 
w_ ., > ý; ý: a: ? Näme 
"=r :"' `" Value °; ; Dimension. Väiüe Function°.. Processes £Z : 
3161.02.10. L0ß-Overturning 1.25+10.1 S-shaped 
31161.02.110.1-09-Overturning 1.25+1-0.0 
3161.02.10.1.09 - Sliding 1.25+1-0.0 
3161.02.10. L10 - Rotn Riverw... 1.25+/-0.0 
Cost of flood waming 650.0+150.0 
Cost of Inspection strategy 2000.0+1-50.0 
Cost of maintenance strategy 2000.0+1-50.0 
Environmental Impacts medium low 
Flood Waming Lead Time 180.0+1-30.0 
S-shaped 
S-shaped 
Linear Flood warning 
Linear Sub-Reach 01 
Linear Sub-Reach 01 
Linguistic Reach 3161.02 
S-shaped Flood warning 
Figure 1.12 Performance indicator search result pane 
The table is a read only list of the important attributes sorted alphabetically by name. The total 
number of performance indicators displayed and the total number available in the model are 
displayed at the bottom of the dialog. The processes column lists only the first process associated 
with the performance indicator. If more than one is present the process is followed by dots. 
To add a new performance indicator with default attributes press the New button. To delete an 
existing performance indicator select the table entry and press the Delete button. 
Highlighting a performance indicator in the results table by clicking on it will load the property 
pane with the performance indicator attributes. Use the property pane to edit the details. 
A performance indicator may be associated with a process by dragging and dropping from the 
results table to the process in the directory view. 
Performance indicators may be imported into a PERIMETA model from an external source by 
creating an xml document which meets the cmam-perfind. xsd xml schema. Run Model I Import 
Performance Indicators to load the file. Any performance indicators supplied without an ID are 
added as new, those with an ID are used to update an existing indicator. Any errors are reported to 
the screen after running the import., 
1.3.7. Performance Indicator Attributes 
The performance indicator attributes are split between three tabs (the two greyed out tabs have not 
been implemented). Most user entered values are saved to the PERIMETA model in memory by 
I "'. 
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pressing enter or by tabbing off the control, however because of the relationship between attributes 
some must be explicitly saved using the Wicon. 
Name and Value 
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Figure 113 Pane showing attributes of a `Performance Indicator' 
Name Is a user supplied name. 
ID Is a unique identifier for the performance indicator within the model and is 
assigned automatically. 
Desc Is an optional description of the performance indicator. 
URL Is an optional identifier for the source of the information. 
Numeric Value Is the measured value. 
Uncertainty Is an optional numeric uncertainty on the measured value. 
Bounds 
Linguistic Is a linguistic judgement of system performance on a5 point scale of 'very 
Performance poor' to 'very good'. 
Linguistic Is a linguistic judgement of confidence in the measure on a5 point scale of 
Confidence 'very low' to 'very high'. 
Combined Is a feature not yet implemented to indicate that the performance indicator is a 
combination of other performance indicators. 
Dimension Is an optional description of the measurement dimension. 
Date Is an optional measurement date which allows a time series plot (not yet 
implemented) to be produced. 
When the value attributes are saved by pressing the red tick icon a check is made that the value 
type (numeric or linguistic) matches the default value function. A warning is issued and the value 
function is changed to the numeric default (linear) or to the linguistic value function. 
Default Value Function 
The default value function is used when a performance indicator is assigned to a process unless an 
aspect specific value function is set. 
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Figure 1.14 The default value function pane 
Value Function Allows one of the pre-defined value functions to be selected. Each value 
function has one or more properties to be set from the following list. 
Max Performance Sets the measured value at which performance is 1. A value outside this 
Bound bound will be set to a performance of 1. 
Min Performance Sets the measured value at which performance is 0. A value outside this 
Bound bound will be set to a performance of 0. 
Curvature Sets the amount of curvature on convex, concave and s-shaped curves. 
Step Sets the step position on stepped and s-shaped curves. 
Uncertainty From Is an optional uncertainty for the value function and must be less than or 
equal to zero. 
Uncertainty To Is an optional uncertainty for the value function and must be greater than or 
equal to zero. 
Plot Shows the value function graph plotted as measured value (x-axis) against 
non dimensional performance (y-axis). 
Processes 
Figure L15 Process commentary pane 
Processes Displays a read only list of process nodes associated with this performance indicator. 
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1.4. ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE 
I. 4.1. Introduction 
Figure of merit gives a summary of system performance against a range of objectives. This is the 
overview aspect of performance that all PERIMETA models must have. Performance may also be 
measured against different objectives such as cost, safety or environment and these give rise to 
alternative aspects of performance. 
This is achieved by altering certain system attributes for different aspects of performance. The 
weighting of performance indicators is one such attribute and can be used to increase or decrease 
the weight of a measure according to the aspect of performance. A list of attributes dependent on 
aspect are detailed below. 
The PERIMETA software allows an aspect of performance to be selected with a drop down list 
found on the toolbar, so that performance for that aspect can be displayed. Visual clues are 
provided, using an aspect colour, to remind the user of the current aspect. The process graph view 
in the main pane uses the aspect colour as a background colour and an aspect icon W is displayed 
where ever aspect related data is displayed. 
1.4.2. Maintaining aspects 
Aspects of performance are added, updated or deleted with the menu option Model I Maintain 
Performance Aspect. 
Figure 1.16 Maintaining aspects of performance pane 
New creates a new aspect of performance. Click on the name to edit the aspect name and click on 
the colour to launch a colour chooser dialog and set the aspect colour. Highlight an aspect and click 
on Delete to delete an aspect. This will raise a warning as all the attributes relating to the aspect 
within the model will be deleted. The overview aspect cannot be deleted. 
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When a new aspect is created the system attributes from the overview are copied to the new aspect. 
If any aspect related attributes are changed for either the new aspect or the overview the two 
aspects will no longer be the same. 
1.4.3. Aspect related attributes 
The attributes of each process and link within a PERIMETA model which are dependent upon 
aspect of performance are shown below . Note that processes, the process graph and performance 
indicators are independent of aspect of performance. So for example adding a process or 
performance indicator will add it to all aspects of performance. 
Local 
Figure of Merit Propagated 
Combined 
Local 
Process Weighting Propagated 
Direct Evidence Flag 
i Value Function cator Performance Ind Value Function Weight 
Necessity 
Sufficiency 
Link All Children Dependency 
Pair-wise Dependency 
Conditional Probabilities 
1.4.4. Aspect specific value function 
When a performance indicator is assigned to a process there is the option of overriding the default 
value function supplied by the performance indicator. This is specific to the current aspect of 
performance displayed and so allows a different interpretation of performance measures according 
to aspect. For example a measure of increasing overtime on operational maintenance may show as 
better performance for an operational view, but as worse performance for a financial view. 
t '\ 
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Use Performance Sets this process - performance indicator to use the default value 
Indicator Default function. 
Set for Process and Create a value function for this process - performance indicator and 
Aspect aspect. 
Value function As for the default value function. 
attributes 
1.5. CALCULATING EVIDENCE PROPAGATION 
1.5.1. Introduction 
Evidence is calculated locally for a process to give the local figure of merit but it is also dependent 
on the performance of sub-systems. Evidence is propagated from the child processes to give a 
propagated figure of merit. Local and propagated are combined to give a weighted sum known. as 
the combined figure of merit. 
Propagation of evidence is achieved using the uncertain inference mechanism of Interval 
Probability Theory. 
Changes to system attributes which affect local figure of merit, for example changes to 
performance indicators or value functions, are applied immediately. Propagation of evidence 
through the model graph from the point of change to the top level process also happens 
immediately. However if the model is large and/or many changes are required (for example 
updating all performance indicators) the delay during propagation may be inconvenient. The menu 
option Calculation Suspend Evidence Propagation and the toolbar control 
j] Suspend Pröpagätiön w' stop evidence propagation from running. 
Figure 117 Pane for amending a value function 
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After enabling propagation with the same menu option, propagation can be recalculated for all 
processes and all aspects of performance with menu option Calculation ( Recalculate Evidence 
Propagation. 
Figure I. 18 Calculation preferences pane: Setting the 'Learning Rate' and 'Necessity Power' 
323 
The propagation calculation requires 2^N conditional probabilities to be entered for N child 
processes. However to simplify maintenance of the model only 2N are elicited from the user in the 
form of necessity and sufficiency for each link. The full number are approximated with an 
algorithm which requires a learning rate for sufficiency and a necessity power. 
Where there are between 2 and 4 child processes the conditional probabilities may be entered 
directly. The 'Enable direct entry of conditional probability' check box makes the control on the 
link attributes tab visible. 
Only the learning rate and necessity power are stored and saved with the model, the conditional 
probability checkbox is not saved. Default values for all fields are set for a new model. 
I. 5.3. Link Attributes 
The link attributes are split between three tabs. The first tab is always available whilst the other two 
are only enabled dependent on settings for the links. The second tab, representing pairwise 
dependency, is only enabled if the pairwise option button is set. The third tab, representing direct 
entry of conditional probabilities, is only enabled if the'set conditional probability directly' 
checkbox is ticked. This checkbox is only visible if enabled in calculation preferences. 
All user entered values are saved to the PERIMETA model in memory by pressing enter or by 
tabbing off the control. 
Necessity and sufficiency are displayed for the selected link. However the dependency and 
conditional probabilities by definition relate to the parent process of the link and so are common for 
all links emanating from the parent. 
ýs> 
I 
1.5.2. Calculation Preferences 
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Necessity, Sufficiency and Shared Dependency 
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Figure 1.19 Setting 'Necessity, 'Suf ciency' and 'Dependency' pane 
Necessity May be set in the interval [0,1] by typing the value or by dragging the 
coloured bar from the left. See Section 1.5.4. 
Sufficiency May be set in the interval [0,1] by typing the value or by dragging the 
coloured bar from the left. See Section 1.5.4. 
dependency May be set in the interval [-1,1] by typing the value or by dragging the 
coloured bar from the left. See Section 1.5.5. 
All Children Indicates that all combinations of child pairs will be given the same 
dependency value. 
Pair-wise Indicates that each combination of child pairs may be given a different pair- 
wise dependency value. These values are entered on the Pair-wise Dependency 
tab. 
Set conditional This check box is only visible if direct entry of conditional probability has 
probability been enabled in the calculation preferences. Indicates that conditional 
directly probability will be entered directly and so the necessity and sufficiency 
controls are disabled. Conditional probability may only be entered directly for 
between 2 and 4 child processes. 
Painvise Dependency 
Figure L20 Setting the 'Pairwise Dependency' pane 
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Dependency May be set in the interval [-1,1] by typing the value in any of the enabled table 
cells. Dependency of a process with itself is displayed as 1.0 but is not 
relevant for the propagation calculations. 
E1'n'E2n, E3A>«! E4n: u. 11 1D U., sra 
z E1; n; E2ä E3: it, E4. ': ' 0.9277 0.9277 ; A; ä 
E1'ii:: +E2 hýE3 Ki 'lE4 a*. =} '- 0.375 0.375 
E1; n -E2 iZýEliCE4 ä -' «w 0.8594 0.8594 
Figure 1.21 Viewing conditional probabilities pane 
Sn Judgement May be set in the interval [0,1] and used to calculate the parent Sn value 
during evidence propagation. 
Sp Judgement May be set in the interval [0,1] and used to calculate the parent Sp value 
during evidence propagation. 
This tab displays a fixed length list of all combinations of child evidence, where evidence for is 
displayed as El, E2 etc. and evidence against is displayed as -, El, 'E2 etc. There are 2^N 
combinations for N children. The conditional probability for the Sn and Sp cases may be entered 
separately. 
When the tab is enabled the conditional probability values are set to a default using the 
approximation method which converts necessity and sufficiency to conditional probabilities in the 
propagation calculations. 
The conditional probabilities are lost in the following circumstances: 
" If the first tab 'set conditional probability directly' checkbox is unticked 
" If the calculation preferences 'enable conditional probabilities' is unticked 
" If a link is added or removed from the parent 
" If the model is closed 
When the tab is enabled the conditional probability values are set to a default using the 
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1.5.4. Necessity and Sufficiency 
Sufficiency is a measure of the amount of influence a given child process has on the performance 
of its parent. Therefore sufficiency is related to the positive contribution of the child process to the 
parent. 
Necessity is a measure of the extent to which failure of a child process will cause failure of its 
parent. Therefore necessity is related to failure or poor performance. 
These definitions are demonstrated by the following examples (Figure 1.22) for the case where a 
process has a single sub-process which has no uncertainty and defined by the interval [0.5,0.5]. 
:: New Process. 1 s. New; Process 3 _. New. Process. 5: " 'New Process 7. 
[0150.5) 0.75,1.0] (00.025] [0.3025] 
N: 0.0 N: 4.0 N: j. 0 N: '1.0 
S: 0.0 S: 1.0 S: 0.0 S: 1.0 
New Process'. 2 New Process 4: New'Process 6= New Process 8 
[0.5.0.5] [0.5.0.5] [0.5,0.5] [0.5.0.5] 
Figure I. 22 The influence of `Necessity' and 'Sufficiency' 
(1) In the first case (process 1) necessity and sufficiency are both zero. The interval of the 
super-system has uncertainty introduced because the relationship between necessity and 
the interval probability defining the super system is not known precisely (Section H. 3). 
(2) In the second case (process 3) sufficiency is set to one and the sub-process defines the 
parent. Evidence for performance is determined by the sub-process and evidence against 
may vary from 0 to 0.25. 
(3) In the third case (process 5) sufficiency is zero and necessity is one. Failure of the parent 
(evidence against) is determined by the sub-process and evidence in favour of the process 
may vary from 0 to 0.25. 
(4) In the fourth case (process 7) necessity and sufficiency are set to one. 
1.5.5. Dependency 
Dependency can be interpreted as being due to evidence originating from a common source or 
being influenced by common processes. The dependency parameter allows uncertain dependency 
to be added to the PERIMETA model. 
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(1) In the first case dependency is set to 1 which represents dependence. 
(2) In the second case dependency is set to 0 which represents independence. 
(3) In the third case dependency is set to -1 which represents mutual exclusion. 
327 
1.6. GLOSSARY OF PERIMETA TERMINOLOGY 
Aspect of performance A view onto system performance which weights specific performance 
indicators. A default aspect called overview must exist. Further 
aspects such as safety, cost, operations or environment are optional. 
Combined Figure of A linear weighted sum of local and propagated Figure of Merit for a 
Merit process. 
Conditional probability User elicited weightings for each combination of child process 
evidence for and against the proposition. In PERIMETA this is either 
derived from user entered necessity and sufficiency or may be entered 
directly for a limited number of child processes. 
Dependency A point value on [-1,1] that defines the relation between 2 sub- 
processes which share a parent process. -1 represents mutual 
exclusion, 0 independence, 1 dependence. 
Figure of Merit An interval on [0,1] to indicate evidence for the process proposition 
(green area), evidence against the proposition (red area) and 
uncertainty (white area). 
Locally measured Figure The combined evidence gathered for a specified process, either 
of Merit' entered directly or a linear weighted sum of performance indicator 
evidence. 
Necessity A point value on [0,1 ] that indicates the extent to which failure of the 
sub-process will cause failure of the parent system. '1' means that the 
parent will certainly fail if this sub-process fails, '0' means that it 
do. esn't matter, something else will take its place. 
Node A node in the PERIMETA graph represents a process or sub-process 
in the engineering system. 
Non-dimensional An interval on [0,1] indicating evidence for and against performance 
Performance Value and optional uncertainty. Either input directly or derived from a 
performance indicator. 
Performance Indicator Externally supplied. measure of performance, numerical or linguistic 
with optional uncertainty. 
Propagated Figure of The evidence provided by sub-processes for a parent process. 
Merit Evidence is propagated using the Interval Probability Theorem. 
Sufficiency A point value on [0,1] that indicates the influence a sub-process has 
on the performance of the parent process. '1' means no other process is 
needed, the sub-process is sufficient to define the parent, '0' means the 
sub-process is irrelevant. 
Value Function Represents organisational objectives and regulatory standards Used . to project a dimerisi al performance indicator to a non-dimensional 
value. ý Roy 
